Jacques Ellul

Politicisation

Thinking everything in terms of politics, covering everything with this word (with intellectuals taking inspiration from Plato and a few others), putting everything in the hands of the State, appealing to it in all circumstances, deferring the problems of the individual to the mass, believing that politics is for everyone, that everyone is capable of it: this is the politicisation of modern man. This politicisation has therefore a mainly mythological aspect. It is expressed in beliefs and, as a result, easily elicits a passionate fervour.

We cannot conceive of society except as being directed by a centralised, omnipresent and all-powerful State. What was once the realm of utopia, with an organicist view of society in which the State plays the role of the brain, has now not only been accepted ideologically but has been deeply integrated into the depths of our consciousness. To think and act in a contrary way risk of bringing us into radical disagreement with the entire movement of our society, a painful condition that we cannot accept. We can no longer even conceive of a society in which the political function (that of governmental authority) would be limited by an external obstacle: we have arrived at the monist idea of power that stops power. We can no longer conceive of a society with autonomous intermediate groups or divergent activities. This pre-eminence of politics is one of the sociological presuppositions common to everyone today, and which is gradually spreading to all countries.

It seems obvious to us, without reservation, that everything should be subject to the power of the State; it would seem extraordinary to us if any activity should escape it. The de facto situation of the expansion of the State's areas of intervention corresponds exactly to the conviction, deep within us, that this is how it should be. The claim of a company, a university or a charity to remain independent seems anachronistic to us. The State directly embodies the common good. It is the great ordainer, the great organiser, the one towards which all the voices of the people converge, and from which emanate all reasonable, balanced solutions, independent of private interests and therefore just. Whenever by chance we find that this is not the case, we are deeply scandalised, so much does this image of the perfection of the State inhabit us. In our eyes, there can be no other decision-making centre in a social body. Once again, it is not just the fact of the State being at the centre of our lives that counts, but our spontaneous adherence, our internal justification of the fact: for the world to be in order, the State must have assumed all powers. 

Conversely, we can observe a very curious attitude on the part of certain sociologists or social psychologists, for whom any phenomenon of authority, at whatever level it is found, in whatever group or in whatever way it is expressed, is nothing else than an accident whose paradigm is the State. Whether a leader emerges in a group, a father exercises authority in the family, or a technician imposes himself in a corporation, the phenomenon of authority is immediately removed from its context and reduced to that of the State, to the form it can adopt in politics. We need so much this pyramidal vision that we consider each micro authority as only a reduced form of the Macro Authority.

And the place we give in our hearts to the State and to political life leads us to a whole interpretation of History which we regard, first and foremost, as political history.

For a long time, only the events concerning kingdoms and nations, only wars and conquests, only political revolutions were taken into account. This conception of history is undoubtedly outdated; however it has been replaced by the importance attributed to political and administrative structures. A society has no reality for us except through its political institutions, and those institutions take precedence over any other view (despite the importance assumed by economic and social history). And above all, we cannot escape this strange view of a History that is ultimately a function of the State. Only where there is a State, there is a History worthy of the name. The Merovingian period is only so dark because the State was so derisory. The ‘Middle Ages’ are an intermediate age, a nameless period, only because it lies between two periods of greatness of the State: the Roman, the Monarchical. Between the two there was this regrettable interlude, where one is obliged to consider society shapeless because it was not directed from the top, because it was not animated by a single will, because it was not concretely organised. Fortunately, the kings restored the State with an iron fist. France once again became a safe place, and the superiority of this movement was compared to the disorderly dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire. Of course, as democrats, we were against the monarchical authoritarianism of Louis XIV. But he has retained our secret affection because he was The State.

Politics everywhere

Participating in non-political activities, that are nevertheless definitively related to our society, is considered worthless. The poet who confines himself to being a poet without signing petitions and manifestos will immediately be accused of locking himself away in his ivory tower. We prefer the political plays of Aristophanes to any of Aeschylus. And as a renowned, highly politicised French actress, once said: ‘We want to bring a message to the world’ (Simone Signoret).

And now, in this general trend, values too are politicised. All values have, in our eyes, as Maurice Barrès [1] said, a connotation, and even more, a political content. Freedom? We leap with both feet from the most hazy metaphysical dispute into the conception of political regimes, into the political definition of freedom, which, if it is not enshrined in a regime, if it is not the fruit of a constitution, if it is not the participation of the citizen in power, is ultimately negligible in our eyes. To say that freedom consists quite simply in the fact that the  individual can escape the power of the State and decide for himself about the meaning of his life and his actions, seems nowadays simplistic, ridiculous and the reaction by an adolescent! Similarly, justice no longer exists as a personal virtue, nor as the result, more or less well attained, of the law. But if we want to give it some seriousness, this unfortunate value of justice must include some adjective, and particularly the adjective ‘social’, which means that, in the end, it is regarded as political. It is the State that must ensure that justice is done; there is only collective justice, and the difficult approaches of legal philosophers of past centuries no longer make sense, nor does the Christian assertion that justice is the miraculous transformation of the individual made just by the Grace of God. In our days, values that cannot be given a political content or be used for political purposes are ultimately no longer taken seriously.

In reality, it is no longer values that serve as our criterion of judgement for estimating good and evil; it is politics that today becomes the supreme value in relation to which others are ordered. It is politics, with its epigones (nationalism, for example), that have become the cornerstone of what is good and represent progress. Politics is thought to be, by its very nature, excellent. Human progress in today's society consists of participating in politics. How many articles and statements have we read on this subject: women are finally becoming human beings because they are being granted ‘political rights’. To say that women, as mothers, who provide their children with a deep sense of values, are the true creators in the long term, the true initiators of all political actions, is considered reactionary talk. If you don't have the (magical, indeed) right to put a paper in the ballot box, you are nothing, not even a person. Progress means receiving this extreme power, this mythical part of a theoretical sovereignty that consists of dispossessing yourself of your decisions in favour of someone who will make them for you. Progress means reading the newspaper. One scientist (Rivet) could seriously write: “A man who cannot (this was about Africa) read a newspaper to be informed is not a man.” What a strange conception of manhood! The political Trinity: ‘Information-Participation-Execution,’ is in today's world the supreme watchword for progress.

[…]

In any case, it is this participation in politics that becomes the aspiration of those who do not have it, the criterion of dignity, personality and freedom. Colonised peoples finally become civilised because they join the United Nations. Africans finally have dignity because they participate in political power. And some thinkers solemnly declare to us: “They enter history.” For those thinkers there is no history where there is no politics. Who would not be struck by such a depth of politicisation? So, the complex social organization of the Bantu or the transformation of a continent by the Manchu, are not part of history? This is a bad joke. Yet, it is the most profound conviction of our time that these peoples are making history only because they are beginning to adopt Western-style State structures and political life. However, what really counts is the reference to politics. Now, at last, they are going to “make their voices heard.”

This positive judgement about politics, only mildly exaggerated, has its counterpart: the severe condemnation of ‘apolitical people’. In our society, the person who keeps to himself, does not vote, considers political debates and constitutional changes to be superficial and without any real impact on the real problems of mankind, the person who knows full well that the Algerian war affects him and his children, but does not believe that declarations, motions and votes will change anything, will be judged very severely by everyone. He is the true heretic of our times. And society excommunicates him as the medieval Church excommunicated the sorcerer. He is regarded as a pessimist, a fool (for he fails to see the very deep and secret relationships of the political game), a defeatist who bows to fate, a bad citizen: surely if everything is going wrong, it's because of him, because if he showed some civic spirit, voting would make a difference (it's not enough for 80% of voters to vote, no, it needs to be 100%!) and democracy would be effective! He is the subject of endless judgements, both in terms of his efficiency and his morality, and even his psychic health is questioned (because an apolitical person is necessarily a little paranoid or schizophrenic). Finally, the ultimate condemnation in our time: he can only be a reactionary.

We sense that the human being, in his entirety, is today judged in terms of politics, which is invested with ultimate value. In our judgement, everything has become political and, in addition, politics is the ultimate guidepost. To politics a global content is given, and beyond that, there is nothing. Politics can only be judged by politics. One can certainly say that politics should be at the service of the human being or of the economy, but the fact remains that the greatness of the State, its power to organise, and man's participation in the collectivity through politics are the ultimate symbols of our time, replacing religious symbols.

Politics as a presumed universal solution

Another aspect of the political illusion lies in the conviction, deeply rooted in the heart of modern Western man, that ultimately all problems are political, and that they can be solved through politics which, moreover, offers the only practicable way. Without repeating what we have already said about this conviction of modern man, or about the influence of Leninist thought, let us note, for example, that for all of us, when a man is ‘bad’, it is ‘society's fault’. All the studies on criminals or other antisocial elements are intended to demonstrate that it is not their fault... The culprit, the one responsible, is the environment, society, the parents, the housing, the cinema, the circumstances. All of us. We are all murderers. On the other hand, we are convinced that if society were what it should be, there would be no criminals or thugs. And who, according to the average modern man, should reorganise this society so that it is what it should be? The State, always the State. So the whole problem of morality is thrown back, even by non-Marxists, on the State. It is a political matter. A political matter too is that of Values, Justice, Liberty, and even Truth (through science and information) must be achieved by way of politics. But what is the attitude of the average human being in this respect? In his mind there is no doubt that the State can and must accomplish all this. It is the State that must ensure social justice, it is the State that must guarantee truth in information, it is the State that must protect freedom (which leads to Tito's admirable shortcut: the more powerful the State, the more freedom there is). The State as creator and protector of values: that is the business of politics.

However, we claim that in all these areas we are faced with the most tragic illusion of our time. That politics can be used to solve some administrative problems, problems of the material management of the city, problems of economic organisation: that can be accepted, and would be already something not bad. But politics absolutely cannot deal with the personal problems of the human being, such as good and evil, truth and justice, the meaning of his life, and personal responsibility in the face of freedom. Of course, we also know that none of this is considered important by some people. So be it. But, if that is the case, then let's not talk about it, let's stop bothering us with these stories of torture, seizures of newspapers, democracy, because all this is only worthwhile if good and evil, truth and justice, the meaning of life and responsibility have a personal meaning. Otherwise, the torturer and the tortured are impersonal beings, and there is no the slightest sense in protesting, condemning, or glorifying anything. Those who discuss torture presuppose that it all has a personal and not a collective meaning. But it is not through politics, political action and the transformation of the State that we will find an answer and a solution. In fact, if we avoid mythological explanations in the post-Marxist or unconscious Marxist style, the enthusiasm with which everyone has seized on this convenient explanation, whether they are intellectuals trained in existentialism, reactionary shopkeepers or radical petty bourgeois, betrays a common preoccupation: that of escaping personal responsibility in such matter. The conviction that the inner conflicts of the individual and the external realisation of values are collective, social matters, and will find their solution in political organisation, is only the mystifying face of the personal surrender of each individual with respect to his own life. It is because I am incapable of achieving good in my life that I project it onto the State, which must achieve it by proxy in my place. It is because I am incapable of discerning the truth that I demand that the administration discern it for me, relieve me of this painful quest, and hand it over to me fully formed. It is because I cannot dispense justice myself that I expect a just organisation to exist, in which justice would be granted and in which I would only have the task of fitting in.

Feuerbach's [2] perfectly convincing demonstration with regard to God must today be transposed exactly to the subject of what has taken the place of God in the consciousness of modern man, namely the State. The same motives, the same process, the same mystification that led man into religion and to expect from God the fulfilment of what he did not know how to do, are today leading him into politics and to expect these same things from the State. ‘But’ — one might say — ‘in politics, man is prompted to act for himself, he commits himself, he sacrifices himself, he takes charge of his own destiny...’ We tend to forget that in religion too, man was by no means passive; he acted a lot, sacrificed himself even more, and committed himself fully. And if we consider current politics, we have already seen how little man really attains influence over his own destiny through it. In reality, it is not from him that fulfilment is expected, nor from any man, but from a mysterious and superior Power, invested with indefinable qualities such as Sovereignty, a Power which, by a kind of magic, transforms the citizen's poor efforts into something Efficient, Good and Absolute.

Just as the prayer will unleashes transcendent forces, the ballot box will move the sovereign Will. But the latter assumption is no more reasonable than the former. For we all agree that the sovereign Will is not a simple sum of individual Wills... This is truly a religious phenomenon. Political commitment is then comparable to religion. Moreover, both terms have the same tone of ‘binding the individual’ (in wadium = legal contract in Medieval Latin; re-ligare = to link in Ancient Latin). And it is then a real escape from oneself, from one's own destiny, from one's own responsibilities. On the one hand, we assume political, collective and social responsibilities, but they are never more than vicarious and secondary, they are never more than external, even if the individual completely submerges himself in them. They are never more than a diversion that can be taken absolutely seriously only by those concerned with behaviourism, but not otherwise. On the other hand, when it comes to confronting oneself, we reject, hide and flee our immediate responsibility towards our neighbour. We are faced with a mystification that is identical but opposite in meaning to the one that Marxism rightly criticised when it said that personal virtue made it possible to forget one's collective responsibility, or that charity made it possible to avoid justice. This condemnation was justified in the 19th century. Today, it is no longer a problem: the same operation is taking place before our eyes, but in reverse. Blaming the organisation of society for the solution of all personal problems, the realisation of values, is to carry out a very convenient operation of human absenteeism.

This operation has two aspects: first of all, it means that no one is ultimately responsible for the matter, no one is in charge of justice, truth or freedom which are the affair of the organisation, a collective matter. It is the problem of “somebody one.” If these values are not realised, if things go wrong, it means that the organisation is bad, or that there is a saboteur, a devil who prevents me from being just, in accord with society’s objective justice. This Enemy will therefore be accused, and of course Power too, since it is Power that must ensure the just organisation and elimination of the corrupting Enemy. This strenuous escape from personal responsibility for having to accomplish oneself what is good and just is often accompanied among intellectuals and Christians by a corollary vice, that of universal responsibility. Persuading oneself that I am responsible for the torture in Algeria while I am giving a course in Bordeaux, that I am responsible for world hunger, or for racist outbursts in various parts of the world, is exactly the same thing as rejecting all responsibility. Because, what characterises this attitude is the fact of impotence: I can't really do anything about it, except sign manifestos and make declarations, or pretend to act through political channels and establish a just order with the aid of some abstraction. To say that we are all murderers means, translated into plain language, that no one is individually a murderer, therefore I am not a murderer. To admit that I am responsible for all the evil that happens in the world is to use a fictitious guilty conscience to assuage my own by not doing what is within my power. Recognising that I am a bastard because I live in the Western world that exploits the Third World means avoiding the slightest effort to personally stop being a bastard. And I do so at the lowest possible price, joining a political party, shouting in the street. I am also assured of being on the right side of those who work to ensure that ‘the French’ stop being bastards. The demands of religion were obviously more severe! And these proclamations of scruples, bad conscience and shared responsibility are quickly resolved by accusing the villain on the other side, the communist or the fascist. And these are the same people who, without seeing the contradiction, proclaim both things. This contradiction reveals the mystification.

The second mystification of the politicisation of problems and values is the ease with which we allow ourselves to put off taking the whole affair seriously until tomorrow or the day after. Because justice is a political matter, because it will finally be achieved in a new organisation, so wait until tomorrow. People would say: “Wait for this organisation. We are currently at the preparation stage, at the resource stage, we are following tortuous paths, but rest assured that we are heading in the right direction. We are accumulating injustices, but it is with a view to greater justice. We are destroying liberties, but we are preparing for the supreme Liberty. We ask you, today, right now, you militant, to lie, to kill, to imprison... but you are absolved of your guilt by the grandiose realisation that you will not see, because we need one, or two, or three generations sacrificed, but rest assured, your sacrifice will not have been in vain, your injustice is covered by the great Justice to come.” We are here in the presence of the individual, moral and psychological aspect of the ethical and general problem of ends and means. And we can see how easy it is for everyone to avoid the personal question of their own behaviour by politicising it. Since the solution is yet to come, everything is permissible today.

Mr. Bertrand de Jouvenel (De la politique pure, 1963) rightly reminds us that the ‘myth of the solution obscures our understanding of Politics; on the contrary, things can be facilitated by the recognition that in these matters one can only arrive at precarious settlements’. A problem involves specific, concordant and known data, and can therefore be solved: there is bound to be a solution to an arithmetical problem. But a political situation is not of this order: what makes it political is ‘precisely that the terms in which it is posed do not allow any solution in the strict sense of the word’. ‘A real political problem arises when the data is contradictory, that is to say when it is insoluble’. A political problem permit only an accommodation, but not a solution. There can then be compromise, decay, evolution, conciliation, authoritarian methods, etc. These are not solutions. But more and more, modern man demands solutions. Increasingly, technicians claim to be able to formulate society's problems as exact problems and in terms that allow for a solution. The growing myth of the solution gradually removes from our consciousness the sense of relativity, that is to say the humility of true politics.

Finally, let us consider one last aspect: the politicisation of a real, existing problem makes it possible to escape from its reality, its depth, its human aspect. The process of politicising an issue involves generalisation and abstraction. At the political level, what is said and done can be right while completely disregarding the human aspect and values. But wanting to consider this human aspect and these values destroys the possibility of thinking about the political problem. There was no doubt in the Third Reich that the Jewish problem had to be ‘solved’. In the eyes of the Nazi leaders, this was a political problem. Therefore they could give the abstract order to massacre. But all historians of the Third Reich report that Himmler fainted when he saw a few dozen Jews shot in front of him. The question had suddenly become brutally human. But the ordinary course of the political process consists in hiding this human question. Celebrating the Don canal helped to hide the fact that it cost one hundred thousand human lives to dig it. Thus the politicisation of an issue goes much further than the question of ends and means, or the attempt at justification. In reality, the political viewpoint today allows us to escape from values, to obliterate the human reality of situations (which, moreover, being always particular, are uninteresting). We hide the real and the true under the political, we close the closet and we talk at ease about plans and revolutions. Political consideration then makes it possible to think that we have the ‘general solution’ because it makes it possible at one stroke to do away with human Reality and the search for Truth.

Notes

[1] Maurice Barrès (1862-1923) was a French novelist, journalist, philosopher, and politician. He was a strong advocate of French nationalism and militarism.

[2] Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) was a German philosopher. In his book, The Essence of Christianity (1841) he portrays God as the outward projection of man's inward nature.