Note
The author of this text tackles the arduous task of envisioning some possible scenarios for resolving inevitable disputes that will arise between non-territorial communities when the idea of panarchy begins to make its way theoretically and practically. This is a daunting but necessary task, which, in due course, will be supplemented by experimentation and acceptance of variety, two aspects that constitute the basic core of panarchy.
Further contributions in this regard will, I imagine, be welcomed by the author because they would indicate that the debate about the idea and the desire to experiment with it have become a living reality.
Contents
1. Introduction
2. The main aspects of panarchy and universal principles
3. Relations between governments
4. The interaction of citizens of different governments
5. World and continental associations
6. World confederation (and why not federation)
7. Fragmentable and non-fragmentable elements
8. Problem areas
9. Conclusion
This article is a continuation of thoughts on a new vision for the future of cosmopolitan world order within the paradigm of panarchy, rather than traditional territorial states. It addresses topics that panarchy theorists generally do not discuss specifically (or if they do, they do so very superficially). Since panarchy primarily involves a multiplicity of governments/extraterritorial communities, this is the focus of the discussion. However, many critics of panarchy or individuals who have just learned about this theory have numerous questions regarding the interaction of governments, jurisdictional conflicts, and so on. In absence of adequate answers to their questions, potential supporters of panarchy begin to view it as a utopia, politically unviable dreams. Therefore, it is crucial to develop an effective theory of panarchy that encompasses the themes of inter- and supra-jurisdictional levels.
The main aspects of panarchy and universal principles
The main aspects of panarchy include plurality, diversity, and experimentation. Plurality (or extraterritoriality) means that multiple jurisdictions, economic systems, and denominations can function simultaneously within a single territory (i.e., a person is free to join a system based on personal choice, rather than by virtue of being born in a specific territory). Diversity is the coexistence of the most diverse systems (from socialist economies to Buddhist religious groups). Experimentation means that we are constantly trying different forms of social organization in a free environment. One can even conduct scientific experiments, recruiting volunteers to, for example, prove a social theory. At the same time, no one is harmed, and the experiment can always be terminated. Perhaps, with this arrangement, it will be possible in the future to identify the most rational social systems.
Panarchy also has universal principles that cannot be violated regardless of the chosen jurisdiction or social system. There are at least two: the non-aggression principle and the ecological principle. The non-aggression principle (NAP) is a concept in which "aggression", defined as the initiation or threat of any forceful interference with a person's life, property, or agreements (contracts), is immoral and cannot be condoned anywhere. The ecological principle states that no individual may pollute nature or destroy it in any way.
Alexey Shustov, in his book "AFTER THE STATE 2.030", proposes international relations as a model for the interaction of today's governments, with the aim of applying such practices to extraterritorial governments and communities. This means that the means of establishing relationships between governments should be treaties, which are supposed to resolve jurisdictional conflicts in various areas of life (from crimes against clients of another government to enrolling a child in a school belonging to a different state).
However, let’s imagine the following scenario. Suppose there are 50 extraterritorial governments in the world (this is the minimum number; theoretically, there could be up to a million). Each government needs to enter into 49 agreements with other states (or communities) for just one legal case. This results in 1,225 treaties for one case. But in reality, there could be thousands of such cases. Let’s take the minimum number — 1,000. In total, that results in 1,225,000 agreements and 49,000 for each government. I reiterate that these are only minimal numbers. In practice, there could be many more treaties. It is clear that this situation is absurd. But that's not all.
One might assume that all these treaties will be drafted as needed, not all at once. But I quote Shustov: "In fact, no new government has the right to start signing treaties with citizens until it has a package of agreements with already existing governments that guarantees its 'clients' the provision of the 'services' it promises". This means that every newly established government needs to create at least 49,000 treaties before they can start accepting their first citizens. I do not believe that a new government would have enough resources (money, time) to draft such a number of treaties, especially considering they do not yet have any taxpayers. In this case, only a millionaire or a large corporation with initial capital could establish some form of government.
The absurdity of such a proposition can also be understood through examples where such practices are useless and not used in life (and yet everything functions perfectly fine). A club with its own code of conduct doesn't necessarily need to enter into agreements with all the clubs in the world. Concluding a contract with a telephone company doesn't mean that the telephone company has entered into agreements with all the other telephone companies to avoid any problems with service or the provision of services.
Therefore, I propose a different system. It is not 100% likely or the best; this is a realm of debates. A newly formed government will not be obliged to conclude thousands of contracts at the start. In case of any jurisdictional conflicts, this can be considered a new legal precedent. This precedent will be considered in inter-jurisdictional courts (in the case of crimes) or at a meeting of representatives of governments whose jurisdictions have collided (in all other cases). And only when a decision is made, an intergovernmental agreement is drawn up. Perhaps in some everyday or infrequent situations, it might be unnecessary to sign any contracts.
The interaction of citizens of different governments
Citizens, associations, companies, etc., located in different jurisdictions can freely enter into contracts with each other. There may be cases where the terms of the contract are violated by one of the parties. Then the second party has two options on how to proceed: either appeal to an inter-jurisdictional court, or to a neutral arbitration court.
An inter-jurisdictional court can essentially be considered an extraterritorial analogue of territorial state courts. I.e., it is an official structure of the world confederation.
A neutral arbitration court is analogous to an arbitration or private court in today's states. The principle is the same as that of the inter-jurisdictional court, but a neutral arbitration court is created by some international legal organization that has such permission (it can be obtained after passing accreditation for the corresponding activity). Judges in both types of courts must be admitted to work only if they have completed training and preparation.
A linking element between different jurisdictions can be "meta-law". This is a set of common laws, rules, and principles that would be above all jurisdictions and ensure the compatibility of different systems (both for making decisions in inter-jurisdictional or neutral arbitration courts, and for legally justifying opposition to individuals, governments, communities that would violate common universal principles). The laws, rules, and principles of such "meta-law" must be exclusively either universal or neutral in their rational and objective understanding, and not in some misinterpreted way.
World and continental associations
In another of my articles, "A Libertarian view of the cosmopolitan order" (2024), I introduced the term "world association". In this section, I will attempt to elaborate more on the essence of both world and continental associations.
The definition I provided for this term in that article is not entirely accurate. Therefore, I will present a modified version. A world association is a unified structure, an alliance that includes all extraterritorial governments/communities from different parts of the world, connected by a similar style of governance, established practices, etc., with the aim of addressing more global issues that go beyond the level of individual communities but pertain specifically to their activities.
The term "continental association", as one might guess, has almost the same definition. The only difference is that this type of association includes communities from across an entire continent.
To better understand the concept of world and continental associations, it is helpful to provide some examples. Let’s imagine that there are 15 extraterritorial social-democratic governments in North America. When creating a North American Association of Social-Democratic States, referendums are held in the potential member states regarding joining the association among their citizens. If the citizens approve this decision, the government applies for membership. If the government is accepted into the association, it elects its delegate(s) to the parliament. In the parliament, delegates from the governments vote on specific decisions that have a continental level of significance. The same applies to world associations, with the only difference being that the issues discussed are of a global scale. Essentially, these are similar political, economic, and military alliances of states that exist today.
In my article "Cosmopolitan panarchy" (2024), I proposed a world parliament to address global issues that concern all people, regardless of their citizenship. Initially, it was suggested to elect delegates from each extraterritorial government to this parliament. However, it became clear that there could be an unlimited number of such governments, and naturally, there would be no way to gather many delegates together. Therefore, it is preferable to nominate delegates to the world parliament from world associations to keep their number manageable.
World confederation (and why not federation)
Panarchy is generally very good for organizing a more efficient social structure at the local level. Social fragmentation is good as a way to avoid conflict, revolution, and violence. But at the global level, fragmentation can lead to dire consequences. Therefore, if there is a need to unite extraterritorial governments and communities in the face of global problems (such as epidemics, hunger, natural disasters, etc.), then that very unifying structure is needed.
A world confederation, uniting all extraterritorial governments and communities that are willing to cooperate together, can serve as an excellent way to prevent the fragmentation of society. Do not rush to conclusions if you are skeptical about the very concept of a "world confederation", comparing it to a world government ready to establish a global dictatorship. The confederation itself will rather resemble a decentralized union of cantons (as in Switzerland before 1848), and not a bureaucratic European Union. The powers of the people providing the activities of the world confederation will be limited in order to avoid the statization of structures. In addition, the world confederation does not imply the presence of a president, simply because there is no need for one (all decisions will be made directly by the people or delegates).
The difference between a confederation and a federation is that a confederation is a union of independent states (in the case of panarchy, extraterritorial states or voluntary communities), while a federation is a polycentric state. According to this definition, extraterritorial states or communities cannot form a federation, as they are not just limited centers, but full-fledged independent structures. Moreover, even if we form a "federation of extraterritorial states and communities" (while we allow such an oxymoronic term), it will, over time, begin to usurp more power (as the example of the United States shows), which will be catastrophic on a global scale.
In practice, the creation of a world confederation could look as follows. Extraterritorial states and communities, when there are enough of them to establish a solid union, recognize the existence of certain global problems that governments cannot tackle alone. Some government may initiate the creation of a world confederation by reaching out to other governments. The number of participants in the union could increase over time. States and communities wishing to join the confederation must meet certain requirements. If they do, they sign an agreement to join.
Fragmentable and non-fragmentable elements
Panarchy is a theory that pertains only to fragmentable elements. Fragmentable elements refer to everything that can be divided and allowed to "live its own life" without negative consequences, which may not be universal (for example, jurisdictions, economic relations, religions, etc.). This is the limitation of panarchy; it addresses only the fragmentable while ignoring the non-fragmentable.
Non-fragmentable elements most often have a territorial basis. I'll give an example of a situation that panarchists might ignore. Let's say there is some territory of land in a city that is entirely politically un-monopolized, i.e. all the people living there are clients of extraterritorial governments. And then, a company decided to place benches in a park where there were none before. Clients of one government agreed with this, and those of another did not. So what to do in this case? Obviously, vote. However panarchy seems to be opposed to democratic voting, because inevitably some part of the people will remain ignored. This problem will be discussed in the next section.
Other examples of non-fragmentable territorial elements include ownership of natural resources (minerals), rivers, lakes, oceans, seas, and forests. All of these can be owned by a local or global supra-jurisdictional organization. Additionally, rules with territorial ties are necessary (for example, whether traffic is right-handed or left-handed, whether smoking is allowed or prohibited in public places, noise restrictions after a certain hour, dress codes, avoid leaving trash in the forest or on the streets, etc.). These can be resolved through voting in supra-jurisdictional structures at the local level.
The question of land ownership is very complex. Different governments will approve various forms of land ownership for their citizens, and they may formally treat the same piece of land differently. For instance, anarcho-capitalists adhere to the homestead principle, which states that a person can acquire property rights to land if it is unowned (provided they have performed an initial act of appropriation, such as starting to cultivate or build on it). On the other hand, Georgists and Gesellians (followers of Henry George/Silvio Gesell) believe that land cannot be appropriated by anyone in the form of private property. So what should be done? The only proposal I found regarding this issue is William Schnack's "geo-mutualist panarchism". To put it briefly, he seems to suggest applying Georgist and mutualist principles exclusively to the economic domain while leaving panarchy in the social sphere. This means that only Georgist and mutualist principles would apply to land. However, this does not solve the problem at all. Firstly, it is a utopia (no matter how much I dislike that word) because the author projects his economic views onto this theory and expects everyone to follow these practices, which no one except Georgists and mutualists would agree to. Secondly, it constitutes a monopoly. Non-fragmentable elements can be managed not just through monopolization but also through partial restrictions on the freedom of clients. Regarding land, I propose the following. Politically non-monopolized territories may be owned by a local supra-jurisdictional organization or a land trust that will sell/lease land to clients of different governments and communities. Depending on the request of the buyer/tenant, various forms of ownership would be provided. For example, a client from a socialist government might lease a certain piece of land for collective use, while a client from a liberal government might purchase a plot of land for private ownership. However, practices and principles that go beyond these frameworks (such as the homestead principle or the belief that all land on the planet cannot be privately owned) cannot be implemented.
There are also non-fragmentable elements that are not tied to territory: newborn children whose parents are clients of different governments, and intellectual property. The complex issue of intellectual property will be addressed in the next section. The question of the jurisdiction of a newborn child has not been raised before. It is quite clear when the parents of a newborn child are clients of the same government; automatically, their child will adopt the same jurisdiction. However, complications arise when the parents have chosen different jurisdictions. It is evident that a newborn child is incapacitated and cannot independently choose a jurisdiction. Therefore, I propose the following system: before or immediately after birth, the parents must jointly select whether their child will adopt the jurisdiction of the mother or the father (or possibly a completely different one). This choice cannot be made unilaterally by just one parent. Both parents must sign a contract with a jurisdictional agency. However, I believe there will also be cases where the parents cannot agree on a single jurisdiction and do not sign a contract (or simply ignore this). In such cases, the supra-jurisdictional structure responsible for this will choose one parent's jurisdiction for the child (possibly based on criteria such as greater responsibility or some other factor). Until the age of 14, the child will be under the legal framework of the jurisdiction chosen at birth. From ages 14 to 18, they will be able to change it with the consent of their parents or guardians. After turning 18, they will be able to make this decision entirely on their own.
It is important to note that there can be any number of similar rare and extreme problems. And all these reflections may be significantly revised over time (when they actually encounter this in practice) in the context of the entire situation and condition.
First and foremost, I would like to discuss the issue of intellectual property. At first glance, one might assume that it is a fragmentable element. After all, clients of socialist governments would oppose intellectual property, while those of liberal or other types of governments would support it. However, if we were to fragment intellectual property, numerous jurisdictional conflicts would arise. For example, a client of a liberal government publishes a book that is protected by copyright. Meanwhile, a client of a mutualist government (or rather a community) takes that book and begins to reproduce copies to sell them later. The question arises: what is the point of copyright if the client of the liberal government can switch to the mutualist one and legally sell someone else's books? Or vice versa: a client of a socialist government invents something new, while a client of a liberal government patents that invention in their name. This leads to absurd situations. That is why intellectual property is not a fragmentable element.
I do not see any solutions to such inter-jurisdictional conflicts. Perhaps solutions will emerge when the theory of panarchy begins to be developed more broadly.
Regarding the form of joint decision-making. The least flawed forms we have are consensus, compromise, and democracy. However, each of these has significant drawbacks. Consensus is almost never achievable when more than 20-30 people are involved in the discussion. More advanced forms of consensus (like the Quaker model) may be more effective, but not in cases of large assemblies with a thousand or several thousand participants. Compromise is much better than consensus because it does not require an excessive amount of time to reach a decision. However, compromise is also a contentious tool. Some stubborn or "principled" individuals and groups dislike compromise altogether. This can complicate the decision-making process. Additionally, the way compromise is expressed can sometimes be unclear and vague, meaning not all compromise solutions may be accepted. In democracy (or voting), the main downside is the neglect of minority interests. Moreover, voters can be manipulated, altering voting outcomes to serve the interests of one person or a small group.
In any case, some sacrifices or concessions must be made; this is inevitable. However, I believe that the most rational strategy would be to choose the decision-making method based on the situation rather than having a rigid regulation. I.e., it all depends on the number of people making the decision. For example, for up to 20-30 people — consensus; for up to ~300 — compromise; beyond that — voting. Mary Parker Follett, an American sociologist and management consultant, had a similar suggestion. In her book "The Giving of Orders", she wrote that orders should be given in the context of the situation at hand.
You shouldn't take my suggestions as dogma or something 100% certain. These are some options that could theoretically exist. But perhaps in some moments my judgments could have been subjective, although I tried to avoid this. In any case, this does not negate the importance of the topic raised in the article. In order to most objectively theorize cosmopolitan panarchy, it is necessary to organize brainstorms and discussions. This is how truth, something practically applicable, will be born.
Sources
1. Gian Piero de Bellis, Comunità volontarie e realtà territoriali (come risolvere problemi territoriali tra comunità aterritoriali) (2011)
2. Gian Piero de Bellis, PANARCHY - POLYARCHY - PERSONARCHY (2005)
3. Mary Parker Follett, The Law of the Situation (extract from The Giving of Orders) (1925)
4. McCunnLaw: What Does Private Judge Mean? (2023)
5. Wikipedia: Arbitration
6. Wikipedia: Georgism
7. Wikipedia: Homestead principle
8. Wikipedia: Mary Parker Follett
9. Wikipedia: Non-aggression principle
10. William Schnack, Geo-Mutualist Panarchism: A Synopsis (2014)
11. Алексей Шустов, ПОСЛЕ ГОСУДАРСТВА 2.030 (2023)
12. Анна Юрасова, Конфедерация: исторический опыт и современность (2017)