Adam Knott

Libertarianism and government.
Government is a universal aspect of contemporary social life. A collective of individuals gives its assent to specific members of that collective—the ‘government’—to use violence, or the threat of violence, as a means of attaining the goals of the collective. The term government refers primarily to this collectively organized violence. Liberty and libertarianism concern the relationship between this collectively organized violence and those to whom that violence, or the threat of that violence, is directed. Libertarianism is essentially a theory of the relationship between individuals and governments; a theory of the relationship between individuals and collectively organized violence.

Nonlibertarian society as an evolutionary process.
Modern society is fundamentally nonlibertarian. We can describe nonlibertarian society as a society in which, as social objects or social situations are deemed ‘important,’ they are shifted from the private sector to the public sector (i.e., from individual control to government control). In nonlibertarian society, as money, banking, insurance, health care, education, science, etc., become identified as ‘important’ social goods, they are eventually deemed too important to leave in the hands of private individuals and are transferred to government control. This process continues indefinitely, as social objects that were not deemed important enough to remove from private control yesterday, become too important to leave in private control today. Thus, nonlibertarian society can be seen as an evolutionary process whereby social objects become important, thereby become inconsistent with private control, and are transferred to government control.

The list of social objects or activities that are deemed important is not absolute but rather ‘marginal.’ This means that once a social object or activity has been transferred to government control, then the next most important object or activity still in private control is transferred to government control, and after that the next, etc. It is an evolutionary process with no end. The asymptotic goal of this process is maximum government control and minimal individual autonomy.

Revised understanding of liberty.
In our current understanding of liberty, our ‘liberties’ consist in those things we are permitted to do without incurring government violence or the threat of government violence. Implicit in this understanding of liberty is the notion that nonlibertarian society has assented to the liberties we currently enjoy. That is, we often interpret the fact that the government does not stop us from doing something to mean that nonlibertarian society assents to our doing that thing. This is the assumption of shared values. We believe that because we are allowed to engage in various activities, this means everyone in larger society—or most people—want to allow these activities. However, this presumption of shared values obscures an important aspect of social life.

If I don’t try to stop someone from doing something, this doesn’t necessarily mean I want them to continue doing it. Instead, it could be that I don’t try to stop them because of some other consideration. For example, if I try to stop them, they may become angry with me. Or perhaps trying to stop them will take too much effort and cause me too much stress. Or perhaps I believe that if I try to stop them, they will still continue doing the same thing despite my efforts. There are practical considerations that may keep me from trying to stop someone even though I do not want them to continue doing something.

Thus, in our revised notion of liberty, we will not assume that the liberties we currently enjoy necessarily imply the assent of nonlibertarian society. Instead, we will assume that nonlibertarian society does not assent to many of our present liberties. We will assume that in many instances nonlibertarian society would like to curtail or eliminate the liberties we currently enjoy, but practical considerations (e.g., present political realities) prevent them from doing so.

Our liberties exist because of the practical difficulties in eliminating them.
In present-day society, individuals are allowed to make a vast number of choices regarding their own education. They choose the field they wish to study, the amount of time and effort they apply to their education, and many other aspects. These liberties of choice in education result in large discrepancies in knowledge levels in society, and in turn, the large discrepancies in knowledge lead to large discrepancies in wealth and power in society. We can refer to large discrepancies in wealth and power simply as ‘material discrepancies’ or ‘discrepancies in material circumstances.’

Material discrepancies in society could be significantly reduced if education levels could be equalized (imagine a society in which no person had any more or any less knowledge than any other person). In practical terms, the equalization of education levels would require the elimination of the individual’s liberty to make their own education choices, i.e., the criminalization of private education, including self-education. If individual choice in education remains, large discrepancies in knowledge will remain, and large discrepancies in material circumstances will persist.

Historically, one of the important goals of nonlibertarian society is the elimination of material discrepancies between individuals. As discussed, the elimination of these discrepancies would require, among other things, the elimination of individual choice in the area of education. Thus, an important question is, why haven’t those who seek to eliminate material discrepancies in society eliminated individual choice in education? Why are these choices we currently enjoy still allowed? The obvious answer is that these choices are still allowed because preventing or eliminating them is not politically feasible at this time. In recalling instances of past nonlibertarian societies that were highly evolved in the transfer of social goods from individual to government control, we can see that, in general, individual education choices are eliminated as nonlibertarian society evolves.

Thus, the liberties we enjoy today, in choosing our own paths of education, and in choosing the time, energy, and resources we devote to our own education, are not primarily due to values that are shared between libertarian and nonlibertarian society. The liberties we enjoy with respect to our own education exist because it is currently impractical for nonlibertarian society to eliminate them.

If our liberties exist not because they have been assented to by nonlibertarian society, but because it is impractical for nonlibertarian society to eliminate them, this suggests that in our quest for liberty, we should not seek the assent of nonlibertarian society, but rather seek those liberties that it will be impractical for nonlibertarian society to prevent.

Geography.
The contemporary conception of government is geographic. This means that the application of the laws is based on geography; the laws apply to people who reside or travel within a given geographic area. Generally, the political values of various individuals living within a given geographic area are irreconcilable. For example, some individuals may want a society in which education is privatized, while some individuals may want a society in which education is government controlled. Some individuals may want a society in which the private sale and purchase of drugs is legalized, while some individuals may want a society in which the private sale and purchase of drugs is illegal. Under the geographic conception of government, there is a singular law for a given geographic region. Private education is either legal, or illegal, for the entire geographic region. The purchase and sale of drugs is either legal, or illegal, for the entire geographic region. Thus, the institution of the political values of one group in the geographic region negates the political values of another group in that geographic region. For each political issue, there is the ruling group (the group that succeeded in having its political values implemented in the geographic region) and the ruled group (the group that failed to have its political values implemented in the geographic region). In the geographic conception of government, the choice is to rule or be ruled.
The geographic form of government is not the only possible form of government. For example, a foreign diplomat may be exempt from specific U.S. laws while visiting the U.S. In this case, what that person is allowed to do is based on their identity. A person can provide documentation to the legal authorities demonstrating that they are exempt from the law in question. Thus, while everyone else in the geographic region is subject to the law in question, a person providing such documentation is not subject to that law.

Reinforcement of the employed political principle.
In our current political system, we observe the following persistent pattern. A group of people share a set of political values. This group (group 1) attempts to gain control over the political system and to implement its political values. As the political system is organized on a geographical basis, the implementation of the political values of group 1 negates the implementation of the political values of other groups. These other groups, in turn, observing how group 1 succeeded in gaining control over the political system and in implementing its political values, therefore employ the same political principle; they try to gain control over the political system in order to implement their political values and negate the political values of other groups. To the extent that any particular group succeeds in gaining control of the political system and in having their political values implemented, this serves as further confirmation and encouragement to all other groups that they must intensify their efforts to regain control. It is a perpetual cycle of “control or be controlled.” As there is no alternative principle of political action, intensification of the attempt to gain control of the existing political system—and thus of other people—is the only option. Each side fights harder and harder for control. As the cycle repeats, the stakes rise. Politics becomes war by nonlethal means.

As this is occurring, the people involved fail to realize that they themselves are reinforcing the principle of political control that their adversaries are using against them. When we seek to attain political control over others, through our actions, we affirm this goal as a legitimate and worthy goal. We put a principle into action that is observed, learned, and replicated by others. In the absence of other, competing principles, the one principle we do employ, through repetition, and through replication by others, comes to pervade the entire political realm. And that is where we find ourselves today. We know only one political principle, and thus we know only one political choice: control or be controlled.

Political convictions: Morality versus evolution.
In a widely-held conception of the political processes, we begin by envisioning a future political situation different from that which currently exists. We then attempt, by various means (argumentation, political action, etc.), to attain this envisioned political future. In so doing, we meet resistance from our political adversaries and are prevented, to a significant degree, from enacting our political reforms. In debating our differences with our political adversaries, we often come to believe that our political differences are due, in small or in large part, to the immorality of our political adversaries. We believe either that they are callous with regard to important human values (freedom, prosperity, the disadvantaged, the environment, etc.), or we believe that they are dishonest in their arguments or dishonest about their motives and goals. In short, we believe that a large part of the difference in political outlooks between ourselves and our political adversaries consists in the moral shortcomings of our political adversaries. We conclude that the moral shortcomings of our political adversaries prevent us from attaining the political future we desire. We will not be able to attain our desired political future until our adversaries improve morally.
This view of things implies that there exists a singular set of moral and political truths and that every individual comprehends it, or at least has the capacity to comprehend it. Those who refuse to acknowledge these moral and political truths, then, are morally defective; they are evil, or bad, or at least ignorant. They could, if they tried, change their morality from the incorrect one to the correct one, but they refuse to. As such, they are deserving of condemnation and perhaps punishment.

As opposed to the ‘morality’ approach to the political views of our contemporaries, we can take the view that the moral and political convictions of our political adversaries are, for practical purposes, fixed. We may take this view, not because a person’s morality and political convictions are absolutely unchangeable, but rather because, as a practical matter, most people’s moral and political convictions do not change to a degree, and within a timespan, that would allow us to proceed with our desired political future. This assumption, that everyone’s political convictions are, for practical purposes, fixed—a ‘given’ to be accepted—mirrors our empirical experience. We observe that, in general, we are not able to change the moral and political convictions of our contemporaries by argumentation or by appeals to important human values (freedom, prosperity, the disadvantaged, the environment, etc.) or by accusing them of immorality.
If we assume that, for practical purposes, the moral and political convictions of our political adversaries are fixed, this has an important implication for our political theory. If we assume that our political adversaries’ views won’t change, then changing the views of our political adversaries will not be part of our political strategy. And this frees us to search for other political strategies—strategies that do not depend on a change in the views of our political adversaries.

The focus of libertarian social theory.
The notion of voluntary, uncoerced, exchange is central to libertarian social theory. Libertarianism’s focus on voluntary social interaction derives from the centrality of individual happiness to libertarian social theory. Whether it is implicit or explicit, the happiness of the individual person (the individual’s satisfaction, contentment, well-being, etc.) is the foundation or anchor of libertarian social theorizing. Because social actions such as coercion, force, assault, fraud, dishonesty, and similar social actions are, by their nature, instances of unhappiness for the recipient of such actions, libertarian social theory has been guided by the principle of reducing such social actions as much as possible. Thus, libertarian social theory emphasizes the reduction of harmful social actions as opposed to the application of harmful social actions. In general, and allowing for exceptions, libertarian social theory in the ideal can be thought of as a theory of social interaction in which each individual exchange is a voluntary, noncoerced, exchange—i.e., a theory in which each individual exchange results in happiness for both participants.

Due to its focus on mutually beneficial exchange and on the reduction of harmful social actions, libertarian social theory neglects, or deemphasizes, a corresponding theory of the application, or expansion, of harmful social actions. In its emphasis on exchanges which result in the happiness of both parties, libertarian social theory deemphasizes an analysis of exchanges that result in unhappiness for both participants, or exchanges which result in happiness for one participant and unhappiness for the other participant.
Speaking in broad terms, libertarian social theory has treated the phenomenon of harmful social actions in one of two ways. It tried to envision a future society in which all or most social interaction is voluntary and uncoerced, i.e., a society without intentional harmful actions. Or, it sought to construct a moral code or system, analogous to a traditional religious text, instructing on which actions are to be labeled as harmful (immoral, unethical, etc.) as the basis for a future libertarian legal code and government. Both of these paths turned out to be dead ends. The libertarian theories of harmful actions, insofar as they exist, pale in comparison to the libertarian theories of voluntary actions as exemplified by the important libertarian economic texts and treatises. In this sense, one can reasonably argue that historically, libertarian social theory has been unbalanced or unrealistic. Its theoretical treatment of harmful social actions such as coercion, force, assault, dishonesty, fraud, deception, etc., has been inadequate when contrasted to its economic analysis of voluntary exchange.

Government coercion in libertarian social theory.
As mentioned, one shortcoming of libertarian social theory is its one-sided focus on voluntary, uncoerced, exchange. Libertarian economic theory, such as that developed by Ludwig von Mises, can be interpreted as an elaborated theory of voluntary exchange. In voluntary exchange, each party to the exchange is conceived to benefit from the exchange and, in this sense, is said to be “happy” with the exchange (i.e., each party is satisfied, content, etc., with the exchange). Libertarian social theory has no corresponding elaborated theory of involuntary exchange; a theory in which exchanges are coerced—not voluntary—and in which one or both parties to the exchange are unhappy with the exchange (dissatisfied, discontent, etc.). In this sense, libertarian social theory can be criticized as being utopian or unrealistic in not providing a comprehensive theoretical treatment of coercion and, more specifically, of government-initiated coercion. Libertarian social theory explains the acquisition of goods and services through voluntary exchange, while, in larger society, many goods and services are obtained through government-initiated coercion. In short, while libertarian social theory provides an admirable analysis of voluntary exchange, it fails to provide an adequate theory of government.

Libertarian social theory does not provide a theory of the use of coercion in the acquisition of goods and services that is comparable to its economic analysis of voluntary exchange. However, a proxy exists for such a theory, because nonlibertarian society is itself the embodiment of such a theory. The tax and regulatory system of nonlibertarian society is not voluntary. In nonlibertarian society, the government appropriates the labor and assets of its citizens by threats of fines, imprisonment, physical compulsion, and deadly force (i.e., through nonvoluntary, coerced, exchange). In this sense, from the libertarian point of view, the workings of contemporary, nonlibertarian society, can be understood as a concrete implementation of a social theory of nonvoluntary exchange. The day-to-day functioning of nonlibertarian society, and specifically the method by which goods and services are obtained by government coercion, can be comprehensively explained. This comprehensive explanation constitutes a “theory” of the way in which goods and services are acquired through government coercion, analogous to the libertarian’s theory of the way in which goods and services are acquired through voluntary exchange.
Since libertarian social theory is a theory of voluntary exchange, and since concrete nonlibertarian society, when explained theoretically, constitutes a theory of nonvoluntary exchange, these facts indicate or imply a more general social theory incorporating the notion of “complementarity.” In this more general theory, the coercive, nonvoluntary element is provided by nonlibertarian society and nonlibertarian social theory, while the voluntary element is provided by libertarian society and libertarian social theory.

The ranking of social actions inducing social reactions.
In any social setting in which multiple actors are involved, there are many things that actor B could do that actor A does not want actor B to do. For example, B could physically strike A, or B could rob A. If B does these unwanted things, it is likely to induce A to take overt action toward B. Perhaps A will try to retaliate against B or try to restrain B. On the other hand, there are things B might do that, though A does not want B to do them, will not, or may not, induce an overt action by A towards B in response. For example, B may be speaking too loudly, or B may be criticizing someone that A admires. A may not want B to do these things, and yet A may take no action to prevent B from doing them.
Thus, in a social setting, there are things that people don’t want us to do, and they will take overt action toward us if we do them. On the other hand, there are things that people don’t want us to do, but if we do them, they won’t take overt action toward us. In this empirical fact of social reality lies an important principle of political action.

The absence of a tangible libertarian society.
Though libertarianism has succeeded as a scholarship movement, it has failed as a political movement. One approach to grasping this is to consider the cumulative growth of libertarian scholarship since 1950 in relation to the cumulative growth of government since 1950. The volume of libertarian scholarship and size of government have both grown enormously since 1950. Unfortunately, if one considers the growth of government as a rough proxy for a corresponding decline in liberty, one might question the effect of libertarian scholarship since 1950. In fact, one could plausibly argue that libertarian scholarship has been a contributing factor to the decline in individual liberty. For example, one could argue that, in advocating a geographic conception of government, libertarians have inadvertently argued for a nonlibertarian form of government, thus reinforcing, rather than alleviating, the impulse toward government control.
If the libertarian political movement were succeeding, one should be able to observe either a contraction in the size/scope of government, or an expansion in individual liberty in relation to the size/scope of government. Neither of those things is occurring (here, we do not account for liberty that exists by virtue of the U.S. constitution and the standard ebbs and flows of the two-party political process, and we do not account for liberty that exists by virtue of technological progress alone). Though libertarian scholarship has flourished since 1950, this seems to have had little effect, and has possibly had a negative effect, on the growth of individual liberty since 1950.

One paramount fact explains why libertarianism has failed as a political movement: No libertarian society has been established that people could join and support. During the Cold War, there were two tangible alternatives to choose from. One could choose to live in a communist society or a Western capitalist society (notwithstanding the difficulty in leaving a communist society). In present times, one can choose to store one’s savings in nonlibertarian financial instruments (stocks, bonds, bank accounts, etc.) or one can choose to store one’s savings in decentralized cryptographic financial instruments such as Bitcoin. In both cases, an alternative choice existed or exists. However, in the case of libertarianism, there is nonlibertarian society, but there is no libertarian society that one can join or support. Thus, a conspicuous asymmetry exists. On the one hand, there is the enormous body of nonlibertarian scholarship and nonlibertarian society as the embodiment of that scholarship. On the other hand, there is a large body of libertarian scholarship but no libertarian society as the embodiment of that scholarship. In short, libertarian scholarship theorizes about a society that does not exist.

Individual identification and individual legal status.
In our habitual way of seeing things, in a democratic society such as ours, the laws apply equally to every citizen, or at least that is the agreed-upon goal or ideal. Laws about murder and theft, laws about drunk driving, and laws about pollution, and many other laws, apply equally to the average citizen, to the wealthy citizen, and to the politician. While this may be true as a generality, there is a sense in which the laws do not apply equally to every citizen, and this unequal application of the laws is an intentional aspect of the system, agreed upon by almost everyone.
For example, if someone is breaking the law, a policeman may hold that person at gunpoint, then handcuff that person, and then lock that person in his/her patrol car. However, if that same person is breaking the law, I am not allowed to hold that person at gunpoint, handcuff that person, and lock that person in my own car. Similarly, if someone is of Native-American descent, that person may own a gambling casino in many areas of the United States. However, I, as a person of European descent, am not allowed to own a gambling casino in the same areas of the United States. Similarly, a park ranger may have a key to the gate of a public park, unlock the gate, and drive his/her truck into that public park. However, I, as an average citizen, am not allowed to have a key to the gate of that same public park, or unlock the gate to that park, or drive my truck into that public park.

The purpose in bringing these examples to light is to highlight an important aspect of the existing legal system: some people, based upon their identity, are allowed to engage in activities that other people, based on their identity, are prevented from engaging in. If I try to arrest someone in the manner indicated, or if I try to operate a gambling casino in the areas indicated, or if I try to drive my automobile in a public park in the manner indicated, I will face legal repercussions. When I face the legal system for adjudication, I will be told, essentially, that I am not allowed to engage in the activities in question because I do not possess the appropriate identification to engage in those activities. However, other people, with the appropriate identification, will be allowed to engage in those activities.

This aspect of the existing legal system represents a largely unrecognized opportunity for a libertarian society. Because there are libertarians who would prefer to enjoy greater liberties even if those liberties were not wanted by, or not granted to, other members of larger society (analogous to how engaging in some activities is granted to some, but not all, members of society, in the examples above). The fact that, based on their identity, some citizens are allowed to engage in activities that others are barred from engaging in, demonstrates that, 1) It is feasible to obtain legal status to engage in activities that other members of society are banned from engaging in, and, 2) Nonlibertarian society is currently administering such a system.

Thus, with respect to libertarians and their desire to engage in specific activities that they are currently barred from engaging in, the realization of their desire is definitely feasible and practical. It is not the case that a society in which libertarians could engage in activities denied to other citizens is unrealistic or impractical. It is rather that most citizens in larger society do not want libertarians to have these kinds of legal entitlements and would likely not vote for them. In other words, the nonlibertarian legal framework is consistent with and can accommodate a libertarian society. Those who control nonlibertarian society simply do not want a libertarian society to exist or emerge.

Options for political change and evolution.
Those who desire a libertarian society, in whatever form, necessarily envision some process by which nonlibertarian society can evolve into libertarian society. As we discussed above, libertarianism can be seen as a theory of voluntary, noncoerced, exchange. As a corollary, generally absent from libertarianism is a positive theory of hostile or violent exchange. In practice, this means that libertarians, in general, and as a group, prefer nonviolent methods of social change and social evolution. The fact that we do not observe many instances of violent libertarian political action is empirical evidence that libertarians prefer nonviolent political action to violent political action. Thus, in discussing the libertarian’s envisioned process of social change, we will consider violent or coercive methods as off the table. Violence is ruled out beforehand as being generally contradictory to libertarian ethical principles and sensibilities.

The large body of libertarian scholarship creates the impression that libertarians believe, or believed, that the primary means for a peaceful evolution to libertarian society would be through education. Through its large body of scholarship, libertarians would educate society, and this would lead to a libertarian society, possibly in one of two ways. Either the electorate, educated in libertarian philosophy, would vote for a more libertarian society. Or, society, educated in libertarian philosophy, would be equipped to build a society on libertarian principles after the existing society fails or collapses. We will briefly consider both ideas.
As an empirical matter, it is a fact that, though there is a robust body of libertarian scholarship that has built up since the 1950s, this scholarship and the attempt to educate the public about libertarianism have not resulted in the electorate voting for more and more liberty over time. There is a fundamental reason why education of the public has failed to convince the public to vote for a libertarian society. The libertarian’s primary ethical imperative is that a person’s labor and assets belong exclusively to that person, and that the government should not coercively appropriate them for its own purposes or those of society. By contrast, the view held by the vast majority of the public is precisely the opposite. In their view, government should, whenever deemed necessary, whether for its own purposes or those of society, coercively appropriate the labor and assets of its citizens. By and large, all libertarians hold the former political conviction, while all nonlibertarians hold the latter political conviction.

As we discussed previously, we can, if we wish, choose to understand society’s rejection of libertarian political philosophy in moral terms. For example, in a democracy, a politician may make the promise that, if elected, he/she will take the assets of one person or group, and give them to another person or group. Or, a politician may make the promise that, if elected, he/she will prosecute or imprison people who advocate a different political perspective. Or, a politician may make the assertion that, in a government-run, socialist, or communist society, all people will be enriched, while, in a free, commercial society, all people will be impoverished. From the point of view of libertarianism, these actions and claims, and others like them, are considered immoral or deceitful. And thus, it is possible to argue that society rejects libertarianism due to the immorality of nonlibertarians. However, there is another approach to understanding why libertarianism is rejected by nonlibertarians.

Libertarians, in general, hold a conviction that free exchange, and the economic and social evolution that results, are the best means to secure the important social needs of any given individual. Nonlibertarians hold the opposite conviction. They believe that, without social control (i.e., without a government that commandeers the labor and assets of its citizens), any given individual may, therefore, not be able to secure important social needs. Nonlibertarians are correct in a sense. Libertarians cannot make the absolute promise that a free and wealthy society will necessarily, and without fail, provide a given desired social product or social service, in the future, to a given individual. The libertarian conviction about the provision of goods and services in a libertarian society is statistical in nature. The libertarian’s argument is that, in a society in which vastly more goods and services are available, any given individual is more likely to have such goods and services available to them from the point of view of availability and affordability. But a libertarian cannot promise that a given good or service (e.g., an expensive surgery, an inexpensive health insurance policy, an affordable home in a desirable area, etc.) will be obtainable by a given individual in the future. The libertarian’s argument about how libertarian society would impact individual well-being is a statistical argument. It does not predict how its policies will necessarily impact any given individual (here, we’re referring to libertarianism primarily as an economic theory, and we’re not referring to the psychological impacts of libertarian society versus nonlibertarian society).

However, the nonlibertarian may not be too interested in the argument that goods and services will be available in greater general abundance and with more affordability, in the future, leading to a greater probability that any given individual will be able to obtain them. The nonlibertarian may instead be concerned specifically with his or her individual case, and whether important social products and services can be secured, for him or herself, with a high level of assuredness (certainty). The nonlibertarian may reason that he/she may be able to secure those important social goods and services that are being produced now (food, housing, health care, etc.) and that are likely to be produced in the foreseeable future, through government action (i.e., coercive expropriation). From the point of view of nonlibertarians, this method of obtaining important social goods and services affords them a higher degree of certainty that each individual nonlibertarian will actually receive these goods and services. This method is, in an important sense, less probabilistic, and more certain, than the libertarian’s proposed method. From the point of the nonlibertarian, the government can expropriate from the existing pool of goods and services, and transfer them to the nonlibertarian, in the very near future (as soon as the government is elected and takes power) and with a relatively high level of certainty. By contrast, the libertarian’s proposed method of obtaining these same goods entails a relatively lengthy period of economic evolution—to develop the abundance of goods that result from free exchange—at the end of which, there is still no guarantee that any particular individual will be allocated any particular good or service from this abundant pool of goods and services.
Analogous to the proverb “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush,” the nonlibertarian reasons, “A certain allotment of goods to me now outweighs an uncertain allotment of twice the goods to me in the future.”

The libertarian may object to this reasoning on moral or ethical grounds, but moral grounds are not absolute; they depend on the context. If a criminal breaks into my house demanding to know the location of my daughter, I will lie to him because the well-being of my daughter outweighs my commitment to the ethical principle of honesty. For the nonlibertarian, securing their own material well-being outweighs the ethical or moral aversion to availing themselves of government action. This is especially true if government action is ubiquitous, noncontroversial, and lacking a negative ethical or moral connotation in their society.
It is this simple reason that prevents people from desiring a libertarian society. Essentially, people fear that absent government control, their acquisition of important goods and services will be left up to chance. They view the acquisition of these goods and services as far more important than the libertarian ethical principle of voluntary exchange. They conclude that the certainty with which they can obtain a limited amount of goods now, through government action, far outweighs the uncertainty of obtaining a larger amount of goods, later, through voluntary exchange. Thus, they do not “vote for freedom.”

This brings us to the second way that libertarian scholarship might result in a libertarian society. Some libertarians, seeing that the public refuses to vote for a libertarian society, hold out the hope that the existing political order will collapse under its own weight, after which a libertarian society will rise from the ruins. The value of libertarian scholarship, then, is in the education of those who will build the future libertarian society once contemporary society collapses.
Unfortunately, this view of things is patently unrealistic. If the nonlibertarian political order collapses in an orderly manner, with continuity, stability, and little change in uncertainty, then the basic impediment to libertarian society still remains. The public will continue to reject libertarianism due to their fear of the uncertainty of the acquisition of goods and services under conditions of free exchange. On the other hand, if the existing political order collapses in a disorderly manner, with a high degree of volatility, instability, and uncertainty, the nonlibertarian’s fear with regard to securing desired social goods and services will increase. In these conditions, the nonlibertarian’s propensity to demand government—or even violent—action can only be expected to increase, not decrease. A small number of libertarians may be ready to build a libertarian society on the ruins of nonlibertarian society, but, if a sudden collapse occurs, society at large will shorten its time horizon and try to secure whatever goods are available, immediately, by any means at their disposal. They will not suddenly begin to engage in the long-term economic thinking that is the defining trait of libertarianism.

Thus, at least three paths toward a libertarian society seem highly unlikely. Libertarians will not establish a libertarian society through violent action since that is counter to core libertarian ethics. Society will not vote for libertarianism since doing so is to relinquish ‘control’ over the allotment of important social goods and services. Libertarian society will not rise from the collapse of nonlibertarian society because, if nonlibertarian society collapses, the public impulse to commandeer goods and services by nonvoluntary means will increase, not decrease.

Initial conditions.
In the discussion so far, we have sketched the existing political conditions libertarians will face if they seek to establish an incipient libertarian society. These conditions are:

A. Nonlibertarian society as an evolutionary process. Nonlibertarian society is an evolutionary process in which social objects and activities are deemed important, and then transferred from private control to government control. The asymptotic goal of nonlibertarian society is maximum government control and minimal individual autonomy.
B. The assumption of shared political values. In thinking about the political values of our contemporaries, we shouldn’t assume that, because specific activities are currently permitted, our contemporaries therefore necessarily assent to our engaging in these activities. That we are permitted to engage in specific activities may be due to the fact that our contemporaries judge it impractical to prohibit such activities in the current political atmosphere. This implies that, in our quest for liberty, we should not seek the assent of nonlibertarian society, but instead should seek to attain liberties that nonlibertarian society finds it impractical to prohibit.
C. Geographic conception of government. In the geographic conception of government, the attainment of the political values of one person or group necessitates the negation of the political values of another person or group. If the group who abandons their political values does not do so voluntarily, the negation of the political values of this group is inconsistent with the libertarian ethic of voluntary, noncoercive, exchange. Thus, libertarian social theory is inconsistent with the geographical conception of government, and this implies that libertarian society cannot be built on a geographical or territorial model.
D. Reinforcement and replication of the employed political principle. Any attempt by libertarians to establish a libertarian society will entail a political principle put into action. As discussed, any principle employed will be observed, learned, and potentially replicated by others. The political principle of nonlibertarian society—the principle of control—is a principle that most people are willing to initiate but unwilling to receive. They are content to ‘give’ control but outraged in ‘receiving’ control. They put into motion a political practice that they are happy to see applied to others but which they bitterly oppose having applied to themselves.
 E. The assumption of fixed political values. If we assume that our political contemporaries’ views won’t change, then changing the views of our contemporaries will not be part of our political strategy. And this frees us to search for other political strategies—strategies that do not depend on our having to change the views of our contemporaries.
F. Libertarianism as voluntary exchange. In general, libertarian social theory is a theory of social interaction in which each individual exchange is a voluntary, noncoerced, exchange.
G. Libertarianism: no positive theory of coerced exchange. Due to its focus on voluntary, noncoerced, exchange, libertarian social theory has been disinclined to elaborate a positive theory of nonvoluntary, coerced, exchange. This suggests the possibility of a general social theory incorporating ‘complementarity,’ in which the voluntary element is provided from the libertarian side while the nonvoluntary element is provided from the nonlibertarian side.
H. The principle of tolerated activities. In a political setting, there are actions or activities our contemporaries don’t want us to do, and if we do them, they will initiate overt government action toward us. On the other hand, there are actions or activities that our contemporaries don’t want us to do, but if we do them, they won’t initiate overt government action toward us. In this political social reality lies an important principle of political action.
I. No libertarian society has yet been established. There is one fundamental reason that libertarianism has failed as a political movement: No libertarian society has been established that people can join and support.
J. A libertarian society is practical and feasible. The existing nonlibertarian legal framework can accommodate a libertarian society. Many people and groups in nonlibertarian society are allowed to engage in activities that others are prohibited from engaging in. A libertarian society is therefore practical and feasible. Nonlibertarians simply do not want a libertarian society to exist or emerge.
K. A libertarian society will not be established by violence or by education. A libertarian society will not come into being through violent action since this negates the libertarian ethic of voluntary exchange. A libertarian society will not come into being through education or through the collapse of contemporary society, because these two pathways do not address the essential problem that nonlibertarians solve through nonlibertarian society: how to secure important goods and services with the relative certainty that government appropriation provides, as contrasted to the probabilistic uncertainty that libertarian society necessarily implies.

An Example of a Nascent Libertarian Society.
For our example of a nascent libertarian society, we will assume a nonlibertarian society in which many activities are prohibited. Among the prohibited activities is discussing or speaking about Darwin’s Theory of Evolution and associated ideas. Against this political backdrop, two or more people declare, publicly, that amongst themselves, speaking about Darwin’s Theory of Evolution and associated ideas will not be prohibited.
Upon this declaration, a concrete, nascent, libertarian society has been established, and in the sense previously described. Namely, these two or more people are now allowed—as per their declaration—to engage in an activity that others are prohibited from engaging in (in the same way that some people are allowed to operate a casino, and some people are allowed to arrest other people, and some people are allowed to drive their truck in a public park). On the one hand, by virtue of their agreement, these people are now allowed to engage in the specified activity. On the other hand, by virtue of the laws of nonlibertarian society, other people, who have not chosen to enter this agreement, are prohibited from engaging in the specified activity.

The process through which this nascent libertarian society is created includes the following attributes:

A. This society is entered into voluntarily, and thus satisfies the libertarian ethical code that eschews coercion.
B. This society is not established on a geographical basis.
C. This society does not require the assent of nonlibertarian society and does not require a change in nonlibertarians’ political convictions, viewpoints, or morality.
D. This society is not established by violence or by education or by voting.

Discussion.
As discussed previously, in a political setting, there are activities that our contemporaries do not want us to engage in. Conversely, there are activities that we do not want our contemporaries to engage in. However, the most important question from a political point of view is whether the activities engaged in rise to such a level that the offended party initiates government action toward the offending party. This ‘level’ of offense is not absolute; it depends on a judgment or calculation consisting of two inputs: 1) The magnitude of the gain anticipated from preventing the specific activity, and 2) The magnitude of the cost anticipated to prevent the specific activity. If the magnitude of the expected gain is too small in comparison to an expected cost that is too large, then government action will not be initiated. The determination will be made that, while one does not want the specific activity to continue, for practical purposes, the cost of preventing the activity is too great in relation to the small gain to be achieved through preventing the activity. The attempt to prevent an activity is deemed impractical when the cost to prevent it is too high and the gain to be expected is too low.

In the nascent libertarian society, an agreement is made to engage in a specific activity only amongst those who agree to do so. The agreement deliberately omits any suggestion that this same activity be engaged in 1) between members of nonlibertarian society, or 2) between members of libertarian society and members of nonlibertarian society. That the agreement is clearly circumscribed and limited in its applicability is an important feature of the agreement. The limited applicability of the agreement—between those who agree only—significantly decreases the ‘gain to be expected’ from preventing the activity in question. For example, we assume a nonlibertarian society comprised of ten thousand citizens, among which only three hundred are libertarians. A libertarian could, potentially, propose a society-wide law, stating that every citizen residing in nonlibertarian society is permitted to talk about Darwin’s Theory of Evolution. In this case, the gain to be expected from preventing this activity would be the prevention of this activity from occurring among ten thousand people. However, if the activity in question will only occur among three hundred people, the gain to be expected from preventing the activity is lowered by 97% (in purely numerical terms).
The gain to be expected from preventing the activity in question may be lowered in other ways as well. For example, one could potentially propose an agreement, intended to apply only amongst libertarians, that libertarians are no longer required to pay for the construction of public roads or to pay for public education. One can imagine that, from a nonlibertarian perspective, preventing the activity “withdrawal of funding for a public service” would be a higher priority than preventing the activity “speaking about the Theory of Evolution.” From a nonlibertarian perspective, the expected gain from preventing the former is likely much higher than the expected gain from preventing the latter. Thus, in choosing to implement the latter agreement over the former agreement, the libertarians would lower the nonlibertarians’ expected gain in preventing the activity in question.

By choosing some types of agreements and eschewing other types of agreements, libertarians can thereby also increase the cost of preventing the activity specified in those agreements. For example, a libertarian could potentially propose an agreement in which libertarians would be exempted from purchasing auto insurance or would no longer be required to register their automobile. Presumably, the cost for nonlibertarians to prevent these activities would be relatively low, as a policing system for these activities is already in place and the activities themselves are relatively easy to identify. By contrast, conversations are ubiquitous, and the attempt to identify and prevent all conversations of a specific type would, presumably, be very high. Thus, in choosing specific activities as the basis of their agreements, libertarians can bring about a situation in which the gain to be expected from preventing their activity is low while the expected cost to prevent their activity is high. Doing so would increase the likelihood that their contemporaries in nonlibertarian society, while not wanting libertarians to engage in those activities, may nonetheless decide that preventing those activities is impractical.

Finally, there is an added benefit to limiting the applicability of the libertarians’ proposed agreements. It is relatively easy to implement an agreement amongst those who are desirous of the agreement. In contrast, it is relatively difficult to force an agreement amongst people who are opposed to the agreement. In abandoning the attempt to force libertarian agreements on nonlibertarians, libertarians make their task much easier. They vastly lower the cost of founding a libertarian society.

Activities of importance.
As discussed previously, nonlibertarian society can be seen as an evolutionary process in which activities are deemed important and then transferred from private control to government control. As an example of an important social activity, we will consider the activity of dumping a toxic substance into a river, and we will assume a nonlibertarian society in which 1) this activity is controlled by government, 2) discussing Darwin’s Theory of Evolution and associated ideas has been prohibited, and 3) two or more people—libertarians—declare, publicly, that amongst themselves, speaking about Darwin’s Theory of Evolution and associated ideas will not be prohibited.

Under these circumstances, if one observes a person polluting a river, one may alert the government to this activity as a means of preventing the continuance of this activity. However, it is not only the nonlibertarian citizen who may alert the government as a means of preventing the pollution, but also the above-mentioned libertarians who may alert the government as a means of preventing the pollution (in the same way that the people who arrest other people, and the people who operate casinos, and the people who drive their trucks in a public park, may alert the government as a means of preventing the pollution). The fact that specific people in nonlibertarian society have secured the ability to engage in activities that others are prohibited from engaging in, does not, in itself, nullify one’s citizenship in nonlibertarian society. In fact, that some people engage in activities which others are prohibited from engaging in is a distinct feature of nonlibertarian society.

Thus, for any libertarian living in nonlibertarian society, the government remains in place as a means for preventing those activities that he or she may deem too important to leave up to voluntary, uncoerced, agreement. In other words, at any point in time, if an activity is deemed important, and it is impractical to address this activity through voluntary agreement, the libertarian can, if desired, avail himself or herself of the means of government control. In this sense, there is no need for a distinctly libertarian theory of government. And there is no need for libertarian social theory to elaborate a theory of coercive, nonvoluntary, actions to complement its positive theory of voluntary exchange. The legacy political system, in which government coercion is used to obtain specific social outcomes, already exists.

Theoretical Structure.
In the structure of social theory as it exists today, libertarian scholarship and nonlibertarian scholarship each present their own self-sufficient theory, each theory comprised of two universal elements—government control and individual autonomy. Each theoretical framework, libertarian and nonlibertarian, proposes its own balance between these opposed forces. Libertarian social theory proposes a relatively large scope of individual autonomy, while nonlibertarian social theory proposes a relatively large scope of government control. In place of this structure, we suggest the possibility of a “complementary” two-element social theory, in which nonlibertarian scholarship provides the element of government control and libertarian scholarship provides the element of individual autonomy. This conception reflects our empirical observation to a large degree, since nonlibertarian social theory is largely concerned with government action, while libertarian social theory is largely concerned with individual action. This new conception reflects an explicit acknowledgment that the asymptotic goal of nonlibertarian social theory is maximum government control, while the asymptotic goal of libertarian social theory is maximum individual autonomy.

Libertarianism as an evolutionary process.
Since libertarian and nonlibertarian social theory aim at opposite outcomes, and since nonlibertarian society can be seen as an evolutionary process in which individual autonomy is continually forfeited in favor of government control, this suggests that libertarian society can be seen as an evolutionary process in which government control is continually forfeited in favor of individual autonomy.

The introduction of a new political principle.
The social theory presented here is a proposal for a new political principle. A group of people share a set of political values. These people form an agreement amongst themselves and do not attempt to gain control over the nonlibertarian political system. They do not attempt to institute their political values on a society-wide basis. As the libertarian society is not organized on a geographical basis, the institution of the political values of libertarians amongst themselves does not negate the political values of nonlibertarians. Other groups, observing how libertarians succeeded in forming agreements amongst themselves—instituting their political values and gaining greater individual autonomy—employ the same political principle. They try to form new agreements amongst themselves to institute their own political values and gain greater individual autonomy. To the extent that any particular group succeeds in this endeavor, this serves as further confirmation and encouragement to still other groups that they could gain greater liberty by similar means. As an alternative principle of political action has been introduced, the attempt to gain control of the existing political system, and of other people, is no longer the only option. The perpetual cycle of “control-or-be-controlled” has been broken. Politics can once again embody the quest for freedom rather than the desire for control.

As we engage in politics, we often fail to realize that, in so doing, we are strengthening and reinforcing the political principles of our contemporaries. Through our political actions and strategies, we put principles into action that are observed, learned, and replicated by others. We fail to appreciate how the political principles we employ, through continual replication by others, and over time, come to pervade the entire political realm. The political principles that we put into motion today are a precursor to the political atmosphere we will experience in the future. And, regarding the political principles we put into motion today, we have only two choices: liberty or control.