The State

A Criminal Organization

Tome 3 : Facts & Features

Edited by
Gian Piero de Bellis

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Tome 3: Facts & Features

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Introduction

More than two centuries of State dominance have made clear to all those who have a critical view of history what are the facts that have been produced by the State rulers and the features that characterize their actions.

Here the attention is focused on the most unpalatable of them, as Imperialism, Militarism and Corruption. Clearly there are other aspects that could be seen with a benevolent eye, especially in peace time periods. But, on the balance, they cannot cancel or diminish the horrible events that have seen the State apparatus as protagonist.

Moreover, beneficial actions and aspects that have taken place during the age of Statism are attributable more to individuals and groups acting in society than to the power of the State. For this reason, in future, those social forces should be left to operate freely. And their dynamics might open a more acceptable and fruitful chapter of human history.

Territorialism - Sovereignism

The most specific feature of the State is the exclusive dominion over a specific territory. This monopolistic power is called territorial sovereignty or simply territorialism.

In the course of history, the end results of territorialism have always been:

- Violence for keeping a territory under control or for annexing new territories.

- Exploitation of people and resources present in the controlled territory.

With the rise and consolidation of the so-called nation States violence and exploitation have become large-scale phenomena. What in the past were even ferocious fights or just simple squabbles, involving only occasionally the civil population, under the Territorial States have become wars involving million of people and enormous amounts of resources. The entire territory of the States is a battle-field, where no one and nothing is safe.

It is only by exiting territorialism that this situation can be transformed radically. Phenomena of violence and exploitation can still happen but certainly not on the scale that we have witnessed in the recent past and that we are witnessing even nowadays.

Henry Sumner Maine

On the Origin of State Territorial Sovereignty

(1861)

In this short text Maine puts forward a very interesting hypothesis concerning the birth of State territorial sovereignty. During the Middle Ages the kings were affirming their sovereignty towards their own people and not with respect to a portion of the earth. They were claiming, for instance, to be Kings of the Franks and not Kings of France. The reality of territorial sovereignty was at that time asserted only by the local ruler (the feudal master) or by the universal ruler (the Emperor), with the Pope demanding universal ascendency on everybody, the Emperor included.

In a later age, with, on one side the gradual decadence of the small fiefdoms, eroded by the rising of the stronger feudal master (e.g. the feudal master of the territory surrounding Paris) and on the other the loss of prestige and strength of the universal masters (Empire and Papacy) embroiled in a series of struggles (the so called Religious Wars, Reformation and Counter-Reformation), the time came for the birth and consolidation of the territorial States. And so the King of the Franks became the King of France and now he is the President of France. Territorial statism (or State territorialism) can be then seen as

the continuation and amalgamation of territorial feudalism with the hubris of imperial centralism.

And this is where we are still at the present, until we get rid of the strictures and absurdities of territorialism once for all.

Source: Henry Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law*, Chapter IV, 1861.

It is a consideration well worthy to be kept in view that during a large part of what we usually term modern history no such conception was entertained as that of *territorial sovereignty*. Sovereignty was not associated with dominion over a portion or subdivision of the earth. The world had lain for so many centuries under the shadow of Imperial Rome as to have forgotten that distribution of the vast spaces comprised in the empire which had once parcelled them out into a number of independent commonwealths, claiming immunity from extrinsic interference, and pretending to equality of national rights.

After the subsidence of the barbarian irruptions, the notion of sovereignty that prevailed seems to have been twofold. On the one hand it assumed the form of what may be called "*tribe*-sovereignty." The Franks, the Burgundians, the Vandals, the Lombards, and Visigoths were masters, of course, of the territories which they occupied, and to which some of them have given a geographical appellation; but they based no claim of right upon the fact of territorial possession, and indeed attached no importance to it whatever. They appear to have retained the traditions which they brought with them from the forest and the steppe, and to have still been in their own view a patriarchal society, a nomad horde, merely encamped for the time upon the soil which afforded them sustenance. Part of Transalpine Gaul, with part of Germany, had now become the country *de facto* occupied by the Franks — it was France; but the Merovingian line of chieftains, the

descendants of Clovis, were not Kings of France, they were Kings of the Franks.

The alternative to this peculiar notion of sovereignty appears to have been — and this is the important point — the idea of universal dominion. The moment a monarch departed from the special relation of chief to clansmen, and became solicitous, for purposes of his own, to invest himself with a novel form of sovereignty, the only precedent which suggested itself for his adoption was the domination of the Emperors of Rome. To parody a common quotation, he became *aut Caesar aut nullusi* [meaning: All or Nothing]. Either he pretended to the full prerogative of the Byzantine Emperor, or he had no political status whatever. In our own age, when a new dynasty is desirous of obliterating the prescriptive title of a deposed line of sovereigns, it takes its designation from the *people*, instead of the *territory*. Thus we have Emperors and Kings of the French, and a King of the Belgians.

At the period of which we have been speaking, under similar circumstances a different alternative presented itself. The Chieftain who would no longer call himself King of the tribe must claim to be Emperor of the world. Thus, when the hereditary Mayors of the Palace had ceased to compromise with the monarchs they had long since virtually dethroned, they soon became unwilling to call themselves Kings of the Franks, a title which belonged to the displaced Merovings; but they could not style themselves Kings of France, for such a designation, though apparently not unknown, was not a title of dignity. Accordingly they came forward as aspirants to universal empire. Their motive has been greatly misapprehended. It has been taken for granted by recent French writers that Charlemagne was far before his age, quite as much in the character of his designs as in the energy with which he prosecuted them. Whether it be true or not that anybody is at any time before his age, it is certainly true that Charlemagne, in aiming at an unlimited dominion, was emphatically taking the only course which the characteristic ideas of his age

permitted him to follow. Of his intellectual eminence there cannot be a question, but it is proved by his acts and not by his theory.

These singularities of view were not altered on the partition of the inheritance of Charlemagne among his three grandsons. Charles the Bald, Lewis, and Lothair were still theoretically — if it be proper to use the word — Emperors of Rome. Just as the Caesars of the Eastern and Western Empires had each been *de jure* emperor of the whole world, with *de facto* control over half of it, so the three Carlovingians appear to have considered their power as limited, but their title as unqualified. The same speculative universality of sovereignty continued to be associated with the Imperial throne after the second division on the death of Charles the Fat, and, indeed, was never thoroughly dissociated from it so long as the empire of Germany lasted. Territorial sovereignty — the view which connects sovereignty with the possession of a limited portion of the earth's surface — was distinctly an offshoot, though a tardy one, of *feudalism*. This might have been expected *a priori*, for it was feudalism which for the first time linked personal duties, and by consequence personal rights, to the ownership of land. Whatever be the proper view of its origin and legal nature, the best mode of vividly picturing to ourselves the feudal organisation is to begin with the basis, to consider the relation of the tenant to the patch of soil which created and limited his services — and then to mount up, through narrowing circles of super-feudation, till we approximate to the apex of the system. Where that summit exactly was during the later portion of the dark ages it is not easy to decide. Probably, wherever the conception of tribe sovereignty had really decayed, the topmost point was always assigned to the supposed successor of the Caesars of the West. But before long, when the actual sphere of Imperial authority had immensely contracted, and when the emperors had concentrated the scanty remains of their power upon Germany and North Italy, the highest feudal superiors in all the outlying portions of the former Carlovingian empire found them-

selves practically without a supreme head. Gradually they habituated themselves to the new situation, and the fact of immunity put at last out of sight the theory of dependence; but there are many symptoms that this change was not quite easily accomplished; and, indeed, to the impression that in the nature of things there must necessarily be a culminating domination somewhere, we may, no doubt, refer the increasing tendency to attribute secular superiority to the See of Rome.

The completion of the first stage in the revolution of opinion is marked, of course, by the accession of the Capetian dynasty in France. When the feudal prince of a limited territory surrounding Paris began, from the accident of his uniting an unusual number of suzerainties in his own person, to call himself *King of France*, he became king in quite a new sense, a sovereign standing in the same relation to the soil of France as the baron to his estate, the tenant to his freehold. The precedent, however, was as influential as it was novel, and the form of the monarchy in France had visible effects in hastening changes which were elsewhere proceeding in the same direction. The kingship of our Anglo-Saxon regal houses was midway between the chieftainship of a tribe and a territorial supremacy; but the superiority of the Norman monarchs, imitated from that of the King of France, was distinctly a territorial sovereignty. Every subsequent dominion which was established or consolidated was formed on the later model. Spain, Naples, and the principalities founded on the ruins of municipal freedom in Italy, were all under rulers whose sovereignty was territorial. Few things, I may add, are more curious than the gradual lapse of the *Venetians* from one view to the other. At the commencement of its foreign conquests, the republic regarded itself as an antitype of the Roman commonwealth, governing a number of subject provinces. Move a century onwards, and you find that it wishes to be looked upon as a corporate sovereign, claiming the rights of a feudal suzerain over its possessions in Italy and the Aegean.

During the period through which the popular ideas on the subject of sovereignty were undergoing this remarkable change, the system which stood in the place of what we now call International Law, was heterogeneous in form and inconsistent in the principles to which it appealed. Over so much of Europe as was comprised in the Romano-German empire, the connection of the confederate states was regulated by the complex and as yet incomplete mechanism of the Imperial constitution; and, surprising as it may seem to us, it was a favourite notion of German lawyers that the relations of commonwealths, whether inside or outside the empire, ought to be regulated not by the *Jus Gentium*, but by the pure Roman jurisprudence, of which Caesar was still the centre. This doctrine was less confidently repudiated in the outlying countries than we might have supposed antecedently; but, substantially, through the rest of Europe feudal subordinations furnished a substitute for a public law; and when those were undetermined or ambiguous, there lay behind, in theory at least, a supreme regulating force in the authority of the head of the Church.

It is certain, however, that both feudal and ecclesiastical influences were rapidly decaying during the fifteenth, and even the fourteenth century; and if we closely examine the current pretexts of wars, and the avowed motives of alliances, it will be seen that, step by step with the displacement of the old principles, the views afterwards harmonised and consolidated by Ayala and Grotius were making considerable progress, though it was silent and but slow. Whether the fusion of all the sources of authority would ultimately have evolved a system of international relations, and whether that system would have exhibited material differences from the fabric of Grotius, is not now possible to decide, for as a matter of fact the Reformation annihilated all its potential elements except one. Beginning in Germany, it divided the princes of the empire by a gulf too broad to be bridged over by the Imperial supremacy, even if the Imperial superior had stood neutral. He, however, was forced to take colour

with the church against the reformer; the Pope was, as a matter of course, in the same predicament; and thus the two authorities to whom belonged the office of mediation between combatants became themselves the chiefs of one great faction in the schism of the nations. Feudalism, already enfeebled and discredited as a principle of public relations, furnished no bond whatever which was stable enough to countervail the alliances of religion. In a condition, therefore, of public law which was little less than chaotic, those views of a State System to which the Roman jurisconsults were supposed to have given their sanction alone remained standing. The shape, the symmetry and the prominence which they assumed in the hands of Grotius are known to every educated man; but the great marvel of the Treatise *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, was its rapid, complete, and universal success. The horrors of the Thirty Years' War, the boundless terror and pity which the unbridled license of the soldiery was exciting, must, no doubt, be taken to explain that success in some measure, but they do not wholly account for it. Very little penetration into the ideas of that age is required to convince one that if the ground plan of the international edifice which was sketched in the great book of Grotius had not appeared to be theoretically perfect, it would have been discarded by jurists and neglected by statesmen and soldiers.

It is obvious that the speculative perfection of the Grotian system is intimately connected with that conception of territorial sovereignty which we have been discussing. The theory of International Law assumes that commonwealths are, relatively to each other, in a state of nature; but the component atoms of a natural society must, by the fundamental assumption, be insulated and independent of each other. If there be a higher power connecting them, however slightly and occasionally by the claim of common supremacy, the very conception of a common superior introduces the notion of positive law, and excludes the idea of a law natural. It follows, therefore, that if the universal suzerainty of an Imperial head had been admitted

even in bare theory, the labours of Grotius would have been idle. Nor is this the only point of junction between modern public law and those views of sovereignty of which I have endeavoured to describe the development. I have said that there are entire departments of international jurisprudence which consist of the Roman Law of Property. What then is the inference? It is, that if there had been no such change as I have described in the estimate of sovereignty — if sovereignty had not been associated with the proprietorship of a limited portion of the earth, had not, in other words, become territorial — three parts of the Grotian theory would have been incapable of application.

Frederick Jackson Turner

American Territorialism (1910)

In this extract, the author presents the American territorial expansion towards West resulting in the gain of vast new territories, with the displacement of Indigenous Americans. By disposing of new land resources, the old and new immigrants from Europe could massively increase agricultural and industrial production. The territorial internal expansion considered a *Manifest Destiny*, led subsequently, when the Federal State was quite strong, to external expansion, that is to Imperialism, with the annexation of Texas (1845) and that of Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico and American Samoa (in the 1890s).

Source: Frederick Jackson Turner, *Social Forces in American History*. Annual address of the president of the American Historical Association, delivered at Indianapolis, December 28, 1910.

The transformations through which the United States is passing in our own day are so profound, so far-reaching, that it is hardly an

exaggeration to say that we are witnessing the birth of a new nation in America. The revolution in the social and economic structure of this country during the past two decades is comparable to what occurred when independence was declared and the Constitution was formed, or to the changes wrought by the era which began half a century ago, the era of Civil War and Reconstruction.

These changes have been long in preparation and are, in part, the result of world-wide forces of reorganization incident to the age of steam production and large-scale industry, and, in part, the result of the closing of the period of the colonization of the West. They have been prophesied, and the course of the movement partly described, by students of American development; but after all, it is with a shock that the people of the United States are coming to realize that the fundamental forces which have shaped their society up to the present are disappearing. Twenty years ago, as I have before had occasion to point out, the Superintendent of the Census declared that the frontier line, which its maps had depicted for decade after decade of the westward march of the nation, could no longer be described. To-day we must add that the age of free competition of individuals for the unpossessed resources of the nation is nearing its end. It is taking less than a generation to write the chapter which began with the disappearance of the line of the frontier — the last chapter in the history of the colonization of the United States, the conclusion to the annals of its pioneer democracy.

It is a wonderful chapter, this final rush of American energy upon the remaining wilderness. Even the bare statistics become eloquent of a new era. They no longer derive their significance from the exhibit of vast portions of the public domain transferred to agriculture, of wildernesses equal to European nations changed decade after decade into the farm area of the United States. It is true there was added to the farms of the nation between 1870 and 1880 a territory equal to that of France, and between 1880 and 1900 a territory

equal to the European area of France, Germany, England, and Wales combined. The records for 1910 are not yet available, but whatever they reveal they will not be so full of meaning as the figures which tell of upleaping wealth and organization and concentration of industrial power in the East in the last decade. As the final provinces of the Western empire have been subdued to the purposes of civilization and have yielded their spoils, as the spheres of operation of the great industrial corporations have extended, with the extension of American settlement, production and wealth have increased beyond all precedent.

The total deposits in all national banks have more than trebled in the present decade; the money in circulation has doubled since 1890. The flood of gold makes it difficult to gauge the full meaning of the incredible increase in values, for in the decade ending with 1909 over 41,600,000 ounces of gold were mined in the United States alone. Over four million ounces have been produced every year since 1905, whereas between 1880 and 1894 no year showed a production of two million ounces. As a result of this swelling stream of gold, aided by a variety of other causes, prices have risen until their height has become one of the most marked features and influential factors in American life, producing social readjustments and contributing effectively to party revolutions.

But if we avoid those statistics which require analysis because of the changing standard of value, we still find that the decade occupies an exceptional place in American history. More coal was mined in the United States in the ten years after 1897 than in all the life of the nation before that time. Fifty years ago we mined less than fifteen million long tons of coal. In 1907 we mined nearly 429,000,000. At the present rate it is estimated that the supply of coal would be exhausted at a date no farther in the future than the formation of the Constitution is in the past. Iron and coal are the measures of industrial power. The nation has produced three times as much iron ore in

the past two decades as in all its previous history; the production of the past ten years was more than double that of the prior decade. Pig-iron production is admitted to be an excellent barometer of manufacture and of transportation. Never until 1898 had this reached an annual total of ten million long tons. But in the five years beginning with 1904 it averaged over twice that. By 1907 the United States had surpassed Great Britain, Germany, and France combined in the production of pig-iron and steel together, and in the same decade a single great corporation has established its domination over the iron mines and steel manufacture of the United States. It is more than a mere accident that the United States Steel Corporation with its stocks and bonds aggregating $1,400,000,000 was organized at the beginning of the present decade. The former wilderness about Lake Superior has, principally in the past two decades, established its position as overwhelmingly the preponderant source of iron ore, present and prospective, in the United States — a treasury from which Pittsburgh has drawn wealth and extended its unparalleled industrial empire in these years. The tremendous energies thus liberated at this centre of industrial power in the United States revolutionized methods of manufacture in general, and in many indirect ways profoundly influenced the life of the nation.

Railroad statistics tell the same story of unprecedented development, the formation of a new industrial society. The number of passengers carried one mile more than doubled between 1890 and 1908; freight carried one mile has nearly trebled in the same period and has doubled in the past decade. Agricultural products tell a different story. The corn crop has only risen from about two billion bushels in 1891 to two and seven-tenths billions in 1909; wheat from six hundred and eleven million bushels in 1891 to only seven hundred and thirty-seven million in 1909, and cotton from about nine million bales in 1891 to ten and three-tenths million bales in 1909. Population has increased in the United States proper from about sixty-two

and one-half millions in 1890 to seventy-five and one-half millions in 1900 and to about ninety millions in 1910.

It is clear from these statistics that the ratio of the nation's increased production of immediate wealth by the enormously increased exploitation of its remaining natural resources vastly exceeds the ratio of increase of population and still more strikingly exceeds the ratio of increase of agricultural products. Already population is pressing upon the food supply while capital consolidates in billion-dollar organizations. The "Triumphant Democracy" whose achievements the iron-master celebrated has reached a stature even more imposing than he could have foreseen ; but still less did he perceive the changes in democracy itself and the conditions of its life which have accompanied this material growth.

Having colonized the Far West, having mastered its internal resources, the nation turned at the conclusion of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century to deal with the Far East, to engage in the world-politics of the Pacific Ocean. Having brought to its logical conclusion its long continued expansion into the lands of the old Spanish empire by the successful outcome of the recent war, the United States became the mistress of the Philippines at the same time that it came into possession of the Hawaiian Islands, and the controlling influence in the Gulf of Mexico. It provided early in the present decade for connecting its Atlantic and Pacific coasts by the Isthmian Canal, and became an imperial republic with dependencies and protectorates — admittedly a new world-power, with a voice potential in the problems of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

This extension of power and undertaking of grave responsibilities in new fields, this entry into the sisterhood of World-States, was no unrelated event. It was, indeed, in some respects the logical outcome of the nation's march to the Pacific, the sequence to the era in which it was engaged in occupying the free lands and exploiting the

resources of the West. When it had achieved this position among the nations of the earth, the United States found itself confronted, also, with the need of constitutional readjustment, arising from the relations of federal government and territorial acquisitions. It was obliged to reconsider questions of the rights of man and traditional American ideals of liberty and democracy, in view of the task of government of other races politically inexperienced and undeveloped.

If we turn to consider the effect upon American society and domestic policy in these two decades of transition we are met with palpable evidences of the invasion of the old pioneer democratic order. Obvious among them is the effect of unprecedented immigration to supply the mobile army of cheap labor for the centres of industrial life. In the past ten years, beginning with 1900, over eight million immigrants have arrived. The newcomers of the eight years since 1900 would, according to a writer in 1908, "repopulate all the five older New England States as they stand to-day; or, if properly disseminated over the newer parts of the country they would serve to populate no less than nineteen States of the Union as they stand." In 1907 "there were one and one-quarter million arrivals. This number would entirely populate both New Hampshire and Maine, two of our oldest States." "The arrivals of this one year would found a State with more inhabitants than any one of twenty-one of our other existing commonwealths which could be named." Not only has the addition to the population from Europe been thus extraordinary, it has come in increasing measure from southern and eastern Europe. For the year 1907, Professor Ripley, whom I am quoting, has redistributed the incomers on the basis of physical type and finds that one-quarter of them were of the Mediterranean race, one-quarter of the Slavic race, one-eighth Jewish, and only one-sixth of the Alpine, and one-sixth of the Teutonic. In 1882 Germans had come to the amount of 250,000; in 1907 they were replaced by 330,000 South Italians. Thus it is evident that the ethnic elements of the United

States have undergone startling changes; and instead of spreading over the nation these immigrants have concentrated especially in the cities and great industrial centres in the past decade. The composition of the labor class and its relation to wages and to the native American employer have been deeply influenced thereby; the sympathy of the employers with labor has been unfavorably affected by the pressure of great numbers of immigrants of alien nationality and of lower standards of life.

The familiar facts of the massing of population in the cities and contemporaneous increase of urban power, and of the massing of capital and production in fewer and vastly greater economic units, especially attest the revolution. "It is a proposition too plain to require elucidation," wrote Richard Rush, Secretary of the Treasury, in his report of 1827, "that the creation of capital is retarded rather than accelerated by the diffusion of a thin population over a great surface of soil." Thirty years before Rush wrote these words, Albert Gallatin declared in Congress that "if the cause of the happiness of this country were examined into, it would be found to arise as much from the great plenty of land in proportion to the inhabitants which their citizens enjoyed as from the wisdom of their political institutions." Possibly both of these Pennsylvania financiers were right under the conditions of the time; but it is at least significant that capital and labor entered upon a new era as the end of the free lands approached. A contemporary of Gallatin in Congress had replied to the argument that cheap lands would depopulate the Atlantic coast by saying that if a law were framed to prevent ready access to western lands it would be tantamount to saying that there is some class which must remain "and by law be obliged to serve the others for such wages as they pleased to give." The passage of the arable public domain into private possession has raised this question in a new form and has brought forth new answers. This is peculiarly the era when competitive individualism in the midst of vast unappropriated opportunities changed into the monopoly of the fundamental

industrial processes by huge aggregations of capital, as the free lands disappeared. All the tendencies of the large-scale production of the twentieth century, all of the energies of the age of steam, found in America exceptional freedom of action and were offered regions of activity equal to the States of all Western Europe. Here they reached their highest development.

Max Weber

The State as a Monopolistic Territorial Political Association (1922)

For Max Weber controlling a territory and ruling over all its inhabitants is the defining feature of the Modern State. The willingness to use violence against those who do not fully recognise the power of the State over them is strictly linked to territorial rule. Otherwise, a State within the State would emerge and this is not at all acceptable to territorial State rulers for whom monopolistic territorial sovereignty is an essential requisite for their exercise of power. The delegation of some powers to an international entity does not alter substantially, even nowadays, this reality.

Source: Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1922.

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§17. A political organization shall be deemed a sovereign association if and to the extent that its existence and the validity of its rules are continuously guaranteed within a definable geographical area by the use and threat of physical coercion on the part of the administrative staff. A State shall be deemed a political institution if and to the

extent that its administrative staff successfully exercises the *monopoly* of *legitimate* physical coercion for the enforcement of its rules. — 'Politically oriented' shall mean social action, in particular the action of an association, if and to the extent that it aims to influence the leadership of a political association, in particular the appropriation or expropriation or redistribution or allocation of governmental powers.

[...]

1. For political associations, violence is obviously neither the only nor even the normal means of administration. Rather, their leaders have used all possible means to achieve their ends. However, the threat and, if necessary, the use of violence is their specific means and, everywhere, the last resort when other means fail. Not only political organizations have used and continue to use violence as a legitimate means, but also clans, households, social associations and, in the Middle Ages, under certain circumstances, all those entitled to bear arms. In addition to the fact that violence is employed (at least also) to guarantee 'order,' political associations are characterised by the fact that they claim and violently guarantee the rule of their administrative staff and their orders within a territorial area. Wherever this characteristic applies to associations that use violence — be they village communities or even individual households or associations of guilds or workers' associations ('councils') — they must be called, to that extent, political associations.

[...]

3. It is advisable to define the concept of the State, since it is thoroughly modern in its fully developed form, in accordance with its modern type — but again, abstracting from its changeable substantive purposes, as we are currently experiencing. The formal characteristics of the modern State are: an administrative and legal order that

can be changed by statutes, which guides the actions of the administrative staff (also regulated by statutes) and which claims validity not only for the members of the association (who essentially join by birth), but also to a large extent for all actions taking place in the controlled territory (i.e. territorially). Furthermore, however, that 'legitimate' violence today only exists to the extent that the State order permits or prescribes it (e.g. by leaving the 'right of chastisement' to the head of the household, a remnant of the former self-legitimate violence of the master of the house, which extended to the power of life and death over his children or slaves). This monopolistic character of State despotism is just as essential a feature of its present state as its rational 'institutional' and continuous 'operational' character.

(Part One, Chapter 1)

Political communities

§ 1. Nature and 'legitimacy' of territorial political associations.

By political community, we mean a community whose collective action is directed towards: 'a territory' (not necessarily an absolutely constant and fixed territory, but one that can be defined in some way) and the actions of the people who are permanently or temporarily located there through a willingness to use physical force, normally including armed force, to reserve orderly control for the participants (and possibly to acquire further territories for them).

The existence of a political community in this sense is not something that has always existed everywhere. As a separate community, it is absent from all those situations in which the violent defence against enemies is a matter that, when necessary, is taken over by the individual household community or neighbourhood association or some other association that is essentially oriented towards economic interests. But it does not even exist everywhere and always in the sense

that the conceptual minimum of 'violent assertion of orderly rule over a territory and the people in it' is conceived as a necessary function of one and the same community. Often these functions are distributed among several communities with partly complementary, partly intersecting community actions.

Violence and protection 'towards the outside world' often lie in the hands of blood relatives (the clan), neighbourhood associations, or *ad hoc* warrior communities, while the orderly control of the 'territory' and the order of human relationships 'within the community' is often also distributed among various powers, including religious ones. And, insofar as violence is used, this has not necessarily been monopolised by any one community.

Under certain circumstances, external violence may even be rejected on principle — as was temporarily the case in the Pennsylvania Quaker community — or at least there may be no organised provisions for it. However, as a rule, the willingness to use violence is linked to territorial rule. As a special construct, however, a 'political' community exists only if and to the extent that the community is not merely an 'economic community,' i.e., it has orders that regulate matters other than the direct economic disposal of material goods and services.

What kind of content the collective action is aimed at, apart from the violent domination of territory and people — and this varies infinitely from the 'robber state' to the 'welfare state,' the 'constitutional state' and the 'cultural state' — should be conceptually irrelevant to us. By virtue of the drastic nature of its means of action, the political association is particularly capable of confiscating for itself all possible content of an association's actions, and there is indeed probably nothing in the world that has not, at some point and in some place, been subject to collective action on the part of some political association.

On the other hand, however, a political association can limit itself to social action whose sole purpose is to continue to secure its *de facto* dominion over a territory. In fact, it has done so frequently enough.

Even in the exercise of this function, the action of a political association is, in many cases, intermittent, no matter what its general level of development may be in other respects. Such action flares up in the event of a threat or a sudden tendency towards violence arising for whatever reason, while in 'normal' peaceful times there is practically a kind of 'anarchy' i.e.: the coexistence and communal action of the people populating an area takes the form of a purely factual mutual respect for the familiar economic sphere, without any coercion being exercised 'outwardly' or 'inwardly.'

In our conception, in order to constitute a separate 'political' association these features are needed: (1) a 'territory' (2) the readiness to use physical force to control it (3) collective action that is not limited to the satisfaction of common needs, but regulates the relationships between the people within the territory.

The opponents against whom the potentially violent collective action is directed may be outside or inside the territory concerned. And since political power has become the monopoly of the political organization, today 'institutionalised' as association, those exposed to the violence of collective action are also, and even primarily, those who are compelled to be part of the organization [the State subjects].

For the political community, even more than other institutionally formed communities, is so constituted that it imposes obligations on the individual participants which, in any case, large sections of them fulfil only because they know that physical coercion is backing up those obligations.

The political community is also one of those communities whose collective action, at least under normal circumstances, involves coercion

through the threat of danger and destruction of life and freedom of movement, both for outsiders and for the members themselves. It is the seriousness of death, which the individual may be expected to face for the sake of the community's interests, that gives the political community its specific *pathos*. It also provides the basis for its enduring emotional foundations.

Shared political destinies, i.e. primarily shared political struggles for life and death, forge joint memories that often have a stronger effect than bonds of culture, language or ancestry. It is these "communities of memories" that, as we shall see, give "national consciousness" its final decisive character.

However, the political community was and is by no means the only community in which standing up for one's life is an essential part of community duties. The blood feud obligation of the clan, the martyrdom obligation of religious communities, class-based communities with a 'code of honour,' many sports communities, communities such as the Camorra and, above all, any community created for the purpose of violently appropriating economic goods of others, all entail the same extreme consequences.

From a sociological perspective, political communities initially differ from such communities only in their particularly enduring and manifest existence as a consolidated power over a considerable area of land or sea. Therefore, the further back in history we go, the less this special position is apparent. The more comprehensive political community action develops from mere occasional action that flares up in the event of direct threat into continuous institutionalised socialisation. And the more the severity and effectiveness of its coercive measures coincide with the possibility of a rational, casuistic order for their application, the more the mere quantitative special position of the political order is transformed into a qualitative one in the minds of those involved.

The modern position of political associations is based on the prestige conferred on them by the specific belief, widespread among those

involved, in a special consecration: the 'legitimacy' of the collective action they organise, even and especially insofar as it involves physical coercion, including the power of life and death. This belief in the specific 'legitimacy' of political association can — as is indeed the case in modern conditions — increase to such an extent that only certain political communities (under the name of 'States') are recognised as having the power to exercise 'legitimate' physical coercion over other communities by virtue of their mandate or authorisation.

For the exercise and threat of this coercion, there exists in the fully developed political community a system of casuistic rules, to which that specific 'legitimacy' is usually attributed: the 'legal order,' whose sole normal creator is today regarded as the political community, because it has in fact normally usurped the monopoly of enforcing that order by physical coercion.

This prominence of the 'legal order' guaranteed by political power has emerged in a very slow process of development. This happened because other communities, which once had exercised their own coercive powers, lost their grip over the individual under the pressure of economic and organisational shifts. They either disintegrated or, subjugated by political community action, had their coercive power limited and controlled by the new political organization. At the same time, new interests emerged which needed a protection which could not be provided within the earlier autonomous communities. And thus, a constantly expanding circle of interests, especially economic interests, found sufficient security only through the rationally ordered guaranties created by the political community. The manner in which this process of 'nationalisation' of all 'legal norms' has taken place and is still taking place is discussed elsewhere.

(Part Three, Chapter 2)

Adolf Hitler

Lebensraum
(1926)

In this extract Adolf Hitler presents the objectives of his future policies, to be implemented once gained the State Power. He wants to imitate the imperialistic States of his time (England, France) and those who rule over enormous areas of land (United States, China, Russia) because only by controlling vast territories and huge masses of people Germany could become a World Power. The continuous growth of State controlled territory (State territorialism) is then the essential condition for the greatness of the Reich.

Source: Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Volume Two, Chapter 14: Eastern orientation or Ostpolitik, 1926.

I would like to start by making the following general remark:

If we understand foreign policy to mean the regulation of a people's relations with the rest of the world, then the nature of this regulation will be determined by very specific facts. As National Socialists, we

can further lay down the following axiom regarding the nature of the foreign policy of a People's State:

The foreign policy of a People's State must ensure the existence of the race which is incorporated in the State. And this must be done by establishing a healthy, viable, natural relationship between the number and growth of the population on the one hand and the size and quality of the territory on the other.

Only a situation that ensures the nutrition of a people on its own soil can be regarded as a healthy relationship. Any other situation, even if it lasts for centuries or even millennia, is nonetheless unhealthy and will sooner or later lead to the damage, if not the destruction, of the people concerned.

Only a sufficiently large area on this earth can guarantee a people's freedom of existence.

The necessary size of the settlement area cannot be assessed solely on the basis of present requirements, or even on the basis of the size of the land yield in relation to the number of inhabitants. For, as I already explained in the first volume under the heading 'German alliance policy before the war,' the territorial area of a State has another significance besides its importance as a direct source of sustenance for a people, namely as a military-political asset. Even if a people has secured its food supply through the size of its land, it is still necessary to consider the security of the territory itself. National security depends on the general power of the State, which in turn is determined to a large extent by military-geographical considerations.

Only in this way will the German people be able to assure their future as a World Power. For almost two thousand years, the defence of our people's interests, as we should describe our more or less successful foreign policy activities, was a matter of world history. We ourselves have been witnesses to this: for the gigantic struggle of nations from 1914 to 1918 was nothing more than the struggle of the

German people for its existence on this earth, but the event itself is known as a World War.

The German people entered this struggle as a supposed World Power. I say supposed, because in reality it was not one. If in 1914 the German people had had a different ratio of land area to population, Germany would have been a true World Power, and if we leave all other factors aside, the war could have ended in our favour.

It is not my task or even my intention here to discuss what would have happened if certain conditions had been fulfilled. However, I do feel it is absolutely necessary to present the existing situation unvarnished and soberly, to point out its frightening weaknesses, in order to deepen understanding of what is necessary, at least within the ranks of the National Socialist movement.

Germany is not a World Power today. Even if our current military impotence were overcome, we would still have no claim to this title. What importance does have today on the world stage an entity with such a pitiful ratio of population to territorial area, as is the case for the present German Reich? In an age in which the earth is gradually being divided up among States, some of which span almost entire continents, one cannot speak of World Power in relation to an entity whose political mother country is limited to a ridiculous area of barely five hundred thousand square kilometres.

From a purely territorial point of view, the area of the German Empire pales into insignificance compared to that of the so-called World Powers. England should not be cited as counter-evidence, for the English mother country is really only the large capital of the British Empire, which covers almost a quarter of the earth's surface. Furthermore, we must regard the American Union, followed by Russia and China, as giant States. These are all territorial entities, some of which are more than ten times larger than the current German Empire. And even France must be counted among these States.

France, not only is supplementing its army to an ever greater extent by recruiting coloured troops from the population of its vast empire, but it is also making such rapid progress in its racial negrification that one can actually speak of the emergence of an African State on European soil. The colonial policy of today's France cannot be compared with that of Germany in the past. If France were to continue developing along the same lines for another three hundred years, the last remnants of Frankish blood would disappear in the emerging European-African Mulatto State. A vast, closed settlement area stretching from the Rhine to the Congo, populated by a low race, is slowly emerging from continuous interbreeding. This process distinguishes French colonial policy from the old German policy.

The former German colonial policy was carried out by half-measures, like everything else they did at that time. It neither enlarged the settlement area of the German race nor did it attempt to strengthen the power of the empire by introducing black blood, which would have been a criminal undertaking. The Askaris in German East Africa were a small, hesitant step in that direction. In fact, they served only to defend the colony itself. The idea of bringing black troops to a European theatre of war, quite apart from its actual impossibility in a World War, was never even considered as an intention to be realised under more favourable circumstances; whereas, on the contrary, it had always been regarded and felt by the French as another reason for their colonial activities.

Today, we see a number of powerful States on Earth that not only far exceed the strength of our German people in terms of population, but also derive the greatest support for their political power from their territorial size. Never before, in terms of territory and population, has the relationship between the German Empire and other emerging World Powers been as unfavourable as it was at the beginning of our history two thousand years ago and again today. At that time, we emerged as a young people into a world of disintegrating large States, whose last giant, Rome, we ourselves helped to bring

down. Today, we find ourselves in a world of emerging great powers, in which our own Empire is sinking ever deeper into insignificance.

It is necessary that we face this bitter truth with cool and sober minds. It is necessary that we trace and compare the German Reich in terms of population and territory in relation to other States throughout the centuries. I know that everyone will then come to the same dismayed conclusion that I expressed at the beginning of this reflection: Germany is no longer a World Power, regardless of whether it is militarily strong or weak.

We have lost all sense of proportion in relation to the other great States of the world, and this is solely due to the fact that our foreign policy never had a definite aim to attain, and also to the loss of any healthy instinct or drive for self-preservation

If the National Socialist movement truly wants to be entrusted with a great mission for our people before history, it must, imbued with the knowledge and filled with the pain of its real situation on this earth, boldly and purposefully take up the fight against the aimlessness and incompetence that have guided our German people in its foreign policy to date. The National Socialist movement must then, without regard for 'traditions' and without any preconceived notions, find the courage to gather our people and to organize their strength to advance along the path that leads out of the present confinement of this people's living space to new soil. Thus the movement will save the German people from the danger of perishing on this earth or of being slaves in the service of other people.

The National Socialist movement must try to eliminate the imbalance between our population and our land area – which is regarded as both a source of sustenance and a political power base – between our historical past and the hopelessly powerless situation in which we are in the present. In doing so, we must remain conscious that, as the guardians of the highest humanity on this earth, we are also bound by the highest obligation. The National Socialist movement

will be able to fulfil this obligation only if the German people come to their senses in racial matters, so that they will occupy themselves not merely with the breeding of good dogs and horses and cats but also care for the purity of their own blood.

[...]

We National Socialists must never, ever join in the usual hurrah patriotism of our present-day bourgeois world. In particular, it is deadly dangerous to regard the last developments before the war as even remotely binding on our own path. The entire historical period of the nineteenth century does not contain a single undertaking that we would be justified in pursuing today. In contrast to the behaviour of the representatives of that time, we must once again commit ourselves to the highest principle of all foreign policy, namely, the necessity of bringing our territorial area into just proportion with the number of our population. Indeed, we can only learn from the past that we must pursue our political goals in two directions: (1) the acquisition of territory as the objective of our foreign policy, and (2) a new, ideologically sound, unified foundation as the goal of our domestic political action.

I would like to briefly deal with the question of how far our territorial aims are justified according to ethical and moral principles. This is necessary because, unfortunately, even in so-called nationalist circles, all kinds of unctuous windbags are trying to convince the German people that the goal of their foreign policy should be to make amends for the wrongs of 1918, while at the same time assuring the whole world of the spirit of brotherhood and sympathy towards all other nations.

In regard to this point I would like to make the following statement: The demand for the restoration of the borders of 1914 is political nonsense of such magnitude and with such consequences that it appears to be a crime. Quite apart from the fact that the borders of

the Empire in 1914 were anything but logical. In reality, they were neither complete in terms of bringing together people of German nationality nor reasonable in view of the geographical exigencies of military defence. They were not the result of deliberate political action, but rather the consequence of a political struggle that is by no means over, and in some cases the chance result of circumstances. One could just as easily, and in many cases with more justification, pick any other year in German history to declare that the objective of our foreign policy should be the restoration of the conditions existing at that time.

However, the above demand is entirely in keeping with our bourgeois world, which does not have a single viable political idea for the future, but rather lives only in the past, and indeed in the very recent past; for even its backward glance does not extend beyond its own time. The law of inertia binds them to a given situation, causing them to resist any change, without ever raising their act of resistance above the level of mere perseverance. It is therefore self-evident that the political horizon of these people does not extend beyond the boundary of 1914. But by proclaiming the restoration of those borders as the political goal of their actions, they are constantly renewing the crumbling alliance of our enemies. This is the only explanation for the fact that, eight years after a World War in which States with sometimes highly heterogeneous desires and goals took part, the coalition of the former victors is still able to maintain itself in a more or less united form.

[...]

The frontiers of 1914 mean nothing for the future of the German nation. They did not serve to protect us in the past, nor do they offer any guarantee for our defence in the future. They will not preserve the internal unity of the German people, nor will they secure its livelihood. From a military point of view, these borders do not appear

to be expedient or even satisfactory, nor can they ultimately improve our current relationship with the other World Powers, or rather, the real World Powers. By keeping them we shall not lessen the discrepancy between our territory and that of Great Britain, nor shall we reach the magnitude of the United States of America. Not only that, but we could not substantially lessen the importance of France in international politics.

Only one thing would be certain: even if successful, such an attempt to restore the borders of 1914 would lead to further bleeding of our national body to such an extent that there would be no possibilities left to secure the life and future of the Nation. On the contrary, under the intoxication of such a shallow success, one would be all the more inclined to abandon any further objectives, since 'national honour' would have been restored and the gates to commercial development would have been opened again, at least for the time being.

In contrast, we National Socialists must remain steadfast in our foreign policy goal, namely to secure for the German people the territorial area on this earth that is rightfully theirs. And this action is the only one that, before God and our German posterity, justifies the shedding of blood: before God, insofar as we have been placed in this world with the destiny of eternal struggle for our daily bread, as beings to whom nothing is given and who owe their position as masters of the earth only to the genius and courage with which they know how to fight for it and preserve it. And this justification must be given also before our German posterity, on the grounds that for each one who has shed his blood the life of a thousand others will be guaranteed to posterity.

The territory on which one day our German peasants will be able to bring forth and nourish their sturdy sons will justify the blood of the sons of the peasants that has to be shed to-day. And the statesmen who will have decreed this sacrifice might be persecuted by their

contemporaries, but posterity will absolve them from all guilt for having demanded this sacrifice from their people.

I must strongly oppose those nationalist writers who claim to see such land acquisition as a 'violation of sacred human rights' and who use their writings to oppose it. One never knows what are the hidden forces behind such persons. The only thing that is certain is that the confusion they are capable of causing is desirable and convenient for the enemies of our people. By adopting such an attitude, they are criminally helping to weaken and eliminate our people's will to find the only correct way to promote their vital interests. For no people on this earth possesses even a square metre of land by decree of a higher Will and in virtue of a higher Right. Just as Germany's frontiers are borders of chance and are only temporary borders during the current political struggles, so too are the frontiers which demarcate the living spaces of other peoples.

And just as the shape of the Earth's surface may appear to the thoughtless fool to be unchangeable, when in reality it represents only an apparent resting point in an ongoing process of development, a constant evolution by the powerful forces of nature, only to be destroyed or transformed tomorrow by forces even greater, so too are the boundaries of human habitats (*Lebensräume*) in the life of nations.

National borders are created by people and changed by people.

The fact that a people has succeeded in acquiring excessive amounts of land does not impose a higher obligation on others to recognise this acquisition in perpetuity. At most, it proves the strength of the conquerors and the weakness of those who tolerate them. And it is in this strength alone that the right lies. If the German people today, crammed together on an impossible small territory, are facing a miserable future, this is no more a dictate of fate than rebelling against it is a snub to fate.

For just as no Higher Power has granted to another people more land than to the German people, so it cannot be blamed by the fact of this unjust distribution of land. Just as our ancestors did not receive the land on which we live today as a gift from heaven, but had to fight for it with their lives, so too will the land and thus the life of our people in the future not be assigned to us by divine grace, but only by the force of a victorious sword.

As much as we all recognise the necessity of confronting France today, such a confrontation would remain largely ineffective if it were to exhaust our foreign policy objectives. It can and will only make sense if it provides backing for an expansion of our people's living space in Europe. For we do not see the solution to this question in colonial acquisition, but exclusively in the gain of a settlement area that increases the land area of the mother country itself and thereby not only keeps the new settlers in close community with the mother country, but also secures for the entire area the advantages that lie in its united size.

The Nationalist Movement must not be the advocate of other peoples, but the champion of its own people. Otherwise, it is superfluous and, above all, has no right to complain about the past. For then it would be acting just like those it condemns. Just as old German politics was wrongly determined by dynastic considerations, so future politics must not be guided by nationalistic sentimentality. In particular, however, we are not the protective police of the well-known 'poor, little peoples,' but soldiers of our own.

However, we National Socialists must go even further: the right to territory can become a duty if, without land expansion, a large nation appears doomed to extinction. This is especially true when it is not just any old tribe of Negroes, but the Germanic mother of all life, which has given the modern world its cultural image. Germany will either become a World Power or cease to exist. But to become a World Power, it needs that territorial magnitude that gives it the

necessary significance in the modern age and assures the existence of its citizens.

In doing so, we National Socialists are deliberately scratching out the foreign policy practices of our pre-war period. We are starting where we left off six centuries ago. We are stopping the eternal Germanic march towards the South and West of Europe and turning our gaze to the land in the East. We are finally putting an end to the colonial and trade policies of the pre-war period and moving on to the land policy of the future.

When we talk about new territories in Europe today, we can think primarily only of Russia and the peripheral States subject to it.

Fate itself seems to be trying to give us a hint here. By handing Russia over to Bolshevism, it robbed the Russian people of the intelligence that had previously brought about and guaranteed their statehood. For the organisation of a Russian State was not the result of the political abilities of the Slavs in Russia, but rather a wonderful example of the State-forming effectiveness of the Germanic element present in an inferior race.

This is how numerous powerful Empires on earth were created. Inferior peoples with Germanic organisers and rulers at their helm often swelled into mighty States and remained intact as long as the racial core of the State-forming race was preserved. For centuries, Russia owed the source of its livelihood as a State to the Germanic nucleus of its upper ruling classes.

Today, that nucleus can be considered almost completely eradicated and wiped out. The Jew has taken its place. Just as it is impossible for the Russian to shake off the yoke of the Jews by his own strength, it is equally impossible for the Jew to maintain this powerful Empire in existence in the long run. He himself is not an element capable of organization, but a ferment of decomposition. The giant Empire in the East is ripe for collapse. And the end of Jewish rule in Russia will

also be the end of Russia as a State. We are destined by fate to witness a catastrophe that will be the most powerful confirmation of the correctness of the racial theory of the peoples.

Our task, the mission of the National Socialist movement, is to bring our own people to the political realisation that their future goal is not to be found in the intoxicating impression of a new Alexander campaign, but rather in the diligent work of the German plough, for which the German sword will provide the soil.

Robert Ardrey

Territorialism and War (1966)

In this text we can find confirmation that territorialism (State monopolistic sovereignty) and war (State violent behaviour) are strictly interlinked. But, while showing the existence of this link, the author wants also to make people believe that the existence of territorialism and war are inevitable components of the human experience and of human nature. However, even a superficial observation of historical reality tells us that this is not the case otherwise all non territorially attached individuals (e.g. migrants) should be considered non-human, the existence of deserters and state court-martial for deserters should be inconceivable, and the manifestation of traumatic disorders for war combatants should be considered an invention of psychologists. All these, and many others, are factual realities that do not fit into Robert Ardrey's discourse. And that is why not only territorialism and war are not inevitable but the sooner we get over territorialism the better the prospects for eliminating war.

Source: Robert Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative,* Chapter 9, 1966.

I suggest that there are three beginnings — three faces of Janus — psychologically motivating the behavior of all higher animals including man. They are these same needs for identity, for stimulation, and for security. How low and how ancient they may be evidenced in the evolutionary scale we have no means as yet to guess. For all we know, they may be the primordial psychological necessities of life itself. Let us restrain ourselves now to the suggestion that they are the inward and frequently conflicting impulses lending both unity to the behavior of higher beings and continuity to the higher evolutionary processes. They provide the final refutation of human uniqueness.

I am grateful to the American psychologist Abraham Maslow for the concept which he first presented to describe needs universal to a species. He used the phrase "instinctoid needs." I find difficulty with the word "instinctoid," which for some reason or other presents me with the immediate need for either a surgeon or a bottle of Worcestershire sauce. It is an entirely personal affliction, and both Dr Maslow and the reader must forgive me if I use the term no further. Maslow's thesis stemmed from his radical approach to psychology, the analysis of healthy people. To find out what was wrong with us, his was the heretical impulse to find out what was right with us. He assumed that just as the lack of a needed vitamin will spread disorder through the body, so the starvation of a basic psychological need will spread disorder through mind and emotion. Only through the study of healthy personalities, who through a variety of means have found satisfaction for basic needs, can one discover what the needs consist of.

As a psychologist, Maslow confined his observations to the human being and so came up with answers different from mine. He regarded love, for example, as an instinct-like human need. I should regard it not as a human need but a human answer, satisfying demands of an older and wider order. As specific patterns originating in the evolutionary past characterize the behavior of four-dimen-

sional man, so the more general psychological needs, which they serve have seen their beginnings in the time before man was born.

Identity, stimulation, security: if again you will think of them in terms of their opposites their images will be sharpened. Identity is the opposite of anonymity. Stimulation is the opposite of boredom. Security is the opposite of anxiety. We shun anonymity, dread boredom, seek to dispel anxiety. We grasp at identification, yearn for stimulation, conserve or gain security. And brood though I may over Janus' three faces, I have yet to discover a fourth.

The extent of a given need, of course, will vary from species to species, population to population, group to group, individual to individual. The need for security must be greater in prey animals than in predators, in the female than in the male, in the ill than in the well, in the unpropertied than in the propertied, in the omega fish than in the alpha, in the unstable society than in the stable. It is characteristic of an innate need, however, that it is never absent, and never more than temporarily satisfied. Like a vitamin, there must be a daily dose.

Also, there is a definite hierarchy of value among the three needs. Some needs are more pressing than others, and these too must vary from species to species, individual to individual. But curiously enough there is not the variation that one might expect. There are few exceptions to the rule that the need for identity is the most powerful and the most pervasive among all species. The need for stimulation is not far behind. And security, normally, will be sacrificed for either of the other two.

A behavior pattern or a cultural tradition is successful if it satisfies a maximum of innate need. Human war, for example, has been the most successful of all our cultural traditions because it satisfies all three basic needs. Our struggle for identity is the endless quest to achieve recognition of oneself as an individual in one's own eyes and the eyes of one's kind. War provides glory for some, the ultimate identity in the eyes of a maximum number. But the dread of

anonymity does not imply a necessary tussle for fame; it is a tussle for recognition, even self-recognition, for knowing who one is. Rank satisfies identity. In a subtle fashion, war provides identity for all, from commanding general to private, through squads and companies, regiments and divisions, functional association with air or infantry or naval disposal, artillery, communications, supply, a thousand satisfying pigeonholes. All are identifications which the anonymity of civilian life can less successfully provide.

The stimulation of warfare is the most powerful produced ever in the history of species. The flight from boredom has never been presented with such maximum satisfactions for maximum numbers. No philosopher, viewing the horrors of war through the astigmatic lenses of the pain-pleasure principle, can grasp the attraction which war presents to civilized men. It is the ultimate release from the boredom of normal existence. This was what William James so well understood when he wrote that a permanent peace economy can never be based on a pleasure economy. Pain may be far more stimulating than pleasure; death and disaster may present hypodermic charges more potent than life at its fullest, success at its most resounding. In all the rich catalogue of human hypocrisy it is difficult to find anything to compare with that dainty of dainties, that sugared delicacy, the belief that people do not like war.

Finally, there is the need for security. The rewards are equivalent. The predator fights for a net gain in security, whether in loot, land, slaves, or the confusion of enemies. The defender, on the other hand, fights to conserve security, and to destroy those forces that threaten it. A certain local anxiety may be generated, the anxiety of mothers and wives. But it is a small force as compared to the anxiety of losing the war itself.

War has suffered few sacrifices of appeal in this century. As it has gained in size and techniques of terror, it has gained in stimulation. As it has gained in participating numbers, it has gained in identifica-

tion. The only real loss has been to the security of the predator through the rise of the organized territorial nation, and to the suicidal consequences of nuclear argument. While general warfare has in our time become something too fissionably hot to handle, the result has been not so much to reduce war's basic appeal as to introduce frustration into our lives; we are denied what we want. Under a *pax atomica*, a program for peace which does not include substitute satisfactions for those basic, innate needs satisfied in past times by our most popular diversion is a program of controversial validity.

As we may understand the popularity of human war, we may understand the popularity of territory. There are few institutions, animal or human, that satisfy all three needs at once. Besides the security and the stimulation of border quarrels which it provides with equivalent largesse among species, it provides identity. "This place is mine; I am of this place," says the albatross, the patas monkey, the green sunfish, the Spaniard, the great horned owl, the wolf, the Venetian, the prairie dog, the three-spined stickleback, the Scotsman, the skua, the man from La Crosse, Wisconsin, the Alsatian, the little-ringed plover, the Argentine, the lungfish, the lion, the Chinook salmon, the Parisian. I am of this place which is different from and superior to all other places on earth and I partake of its identity so that I too am both different and superior, and it is something that you cannot take away from me despite all afflictions which I may suffer or where I may go or where I may die. I shall remain always and uniquely of this place.

I can discover no argument of objective worth which can effectively counter the claim that the psychological relationship of a lungfish to a piece of muddy water differs in any degree from the psychological relationship of the San Franciscan to the hills and the bay that he loves so well. Several hundred million years of biological evolution have altered not at all the psychological tie between proprietor and property. Neither have those unimaginable epochs of evolutionary time altered the psychological stimulation which enhances the physi-

ological energies of the challenged proprietor. Nor have we reason to believe that the sense of security spreading ease through a troop of black lemurs in their heartland has changed a least whit throughout all of primate history in its effect on the sailor, home from the sea, or the businessman, home from the office.

War may be the most permanent, the most changeless, the most prevalent, and thus the most successful of our cultural innovations, but the reasons differ not at all from the prevalent success of territory. Both satisfy all three basic needs. And we have few other institutions to rival them.

Erich Fromm

On Territorialism and Dominance (1973)

In this short extract Erich Fromm disposes of the idea that there exists an instinct of territorialism that leads humans and animals to defend and dominate vast areas of territory they inhabit. Instead, there is a tendency, supported by the ideology of the war makers, to invade and appropriate new territories. However this has nothing to do with innate human instincts but with man-made aggressive ideologies and institutions.

Source: Erich Fromm, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, Part 2, Chapter 6, 1973.

The popular picture of animal aggressiveness has been largely influenced by the concept of *territorialism*. Robert Ardrey's *Territorial Imperative* (1966) has left the general public with the implication that man is dominated by an instinct for defense of his territory, inherited from his animal ancestors.

This instinct is supposed to be one of the main sources of animal and human aggressiveness. Analogies are easily drawn, and the facile idea appeals to many that war is caused by the power of this same instinct.

The idea, however, is quite erroneous for a number of reasons.

In the first place there are many animal species for whom the concept of territoriality does not apply. «Territoriality occurs only in higher animals such as the vertebrates and arthropods and even there in a very spotty fashion.» (J. P. Scott, That Old-Time Aggression, in *Man and Aggression*, M. F. A. Montagu, ed., Oxford University Press, 1968). Other students of behavior, like Zing Yang Kuo, are «rather inclined to think that the so-called 'territorial defense' is after all, merely a fancy name for the reaction patterns to strangers, flavored with anthropomorphism and nineteenth century Darwinism. Further and more systematic experimental explorations are necessary to decide this issue.» (Zing Yang Kuo, Studies on the Basic factors in Animal Fighting, *Journal General Psychology*, 97, 1960).

Nikolaas Tinbergen distinguishes between the territorialism of the species and that of the individual: «It seems certain that territories are selected mainly on the basis of properties to which the animals react innately. This makes all animals of the same species, or at least of the same population, select the same general type of habitat. However, the personal binding of a male to its own territory — a particular representative of the species' breeding habitat — is the result of a learning process.» (N. Tinbergen, *Social Behavior in Animals*, Wiley, 1953).

In the description of primates we have seen how often there is an overlap of territory. If the observation of apes teaches us anything, it is that various groups of primates are quite tolerant and flexible with regard to their territory and simply do not offer a picture that would permit the analogy to a society, jealously guarding its frontiers and forcibly preventing the entry of any "foreigner."

The assumption that territorialism is the basis for human aggressiveness is erroneous for still another reason. Defense of territory has the function of avoiding the serious fighting that would become necessary if the territory were invaded to such an extent as to generate crowding. Actually the threat behavior in which territorial aggression manifests itself is the instinctively patterned way of upholding spatial equilibrium and peace. The instinctive equipment of the animal has the function that legal arrangements have in man. Hence the instinct becomes obsolete when other symbolic ways are available to mark a territory and to warn: no trespassing. It is also worth keeping in mind that, as we shall see later, most wars start for the purposes of gaining advantages of various kinds and not in defense against a threat to one's territory — except in the ideology of the war makers.

Equally wrong impressions exist popularly about the concept of dominance. In many species, but by no means in all, one finds that the group is organized hierarchically. The strongest male takes precedence in food, sex, and grooming over other males on lower orders of the hierarchy [*****]. But dominance, like territorialism, by no means exists in all animals and, again, not regularly in the vertebrates and mammals.

With regard to dominance among the nonhuman primates we find a great difference between some of the monkey species like the baboons and macaques, in whom one finds rather well-developed and strict hierarchical systems, and the apes with whom dominance patterns are much less strong. Of the mountain gorillas, Schaller reports:

> Definite dominance inter-actions were observed 110 times. Dominance was most frequently asserted along narrow trails, when one animal claimed the right of way, or in the choice of sitting place, when the dominant animal supplanted the subordinate one. Gorillas showed their dominance with a minimum of actions.

> Usually an animal low in the rank order simply moved out of the way at the mere approach or brief stare of a high ranking one. The most frequently noted gesture involving bodily contact was a light tap with the back of the hand of a dominant individual against the body of a subordinate one. (G. B. Schaller, *The Mountain Gorilla*, University of Chicago Press, 1965).

In their report on the chimpanzees of the Bodongo Forest, V. and F. Reynolds state:

> Although there was some evidence of differences in status between individuals, dominance interactions formed a minute fraction of the observed chimpanzee behavior. There was no evidence of a linear hierarchy of dominance among males or females; and there were no permanent leaders of groups. (V. and F. Reynolds, The Chimpanzees of the Bodongo Forest, in *Primate Behavior: Field Studies of Primates and Apes*, I. DeVore, ed., Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965).

T. E. Rowell, in his study of baboons, argues against the whole concept of dominance and states that

> circumstantial evidence suggests that hierarchical behavior is associated with environmental stress of various kinds and under stress it is the lower-ranking animal which first shows physiological symptoms (lower disease resistance, for example). If it is subordinate behavior that determines rank (rather than dominant behavior as usually assumed), the stress factor can be seen as directly affecting all animals to different degrees dependent on their construction, producing physiological and behavioral (submitting behavior) changes at the same time, the latter in turn giving rise to a hierarchical social organization. (T. E. Rowell, *Hierarchies in the Organization of the Captive Baboon Group*, Animal Behavior, 14, 1966).

He comes to the conclusion «that the hierarchy appears to be maintained chiefly by subordinates' behavior patterns, and by the low- rather than the high-ranking animals.» (T. E. Rowell, 1966).

W. A. Mason also expresses strong reservations based on his studies of chimpanzees:

> The view taken here is that "dominance" and "subordination" are simply conventional designations for the fact that chimpanzees often stand in the relationship to each other of intimidator and intimidated. Naturally, we would expect the larger, stronger, more boisterous, and more aggressive animals in any group (being intimidating to almost everyone else) to display a kind of generalized dominance status. Presumably this accounts for the fact that in the wild, mature males are generally dominant over adult females, and they, in turn, are dominant over adolescents and juveniles. Apart from this observation, however, there is no indication that chimpanzee groups as a whole are organized hierarchically; nor is there any convincing evidence of an autonomous drive for social supremacy. Chimpanzees are wilful, impulsive, and greedy, certainly a sufficient basis for the development of dominance and subordination, without the participation of specialized social motives and needs.
>
> Dominance and subordination can thus be regarded as the natural by-product of social intercourse, and but one facet of the relationship between two individuals. (W. A. Mason, Chimpanzee Social Behavior, in *The Chimpanzee*, G. H. Bourne, ed., 1970).

For dominance, as far as it exists, the same comment applies which I have made with regard to territorialism. It functions to give peace and coherence to the group and to prevent friction that could lead to serious fighting. Man substitutes agreements, etiquette, and laws for the missing instinct.

Animal dominance has been widely interpreted as a fierce "bossiness" of the leader who enjoys having power over the rest of the group. It is true that among monkeys, for instance, the authority of the leader is often based on the fear he engenders in the others. But among the apes, as for instance the chimpanzee, it is often not fear of the retaliatory power of the strongest animal, but his competence in leading the group which establishes his authority. As an example of this, mentioned earlier, Kortlandt (Chimpanzee in the Wild, *Scientific American*, 206, 1962) reports about an old chimpanzee who retained his leadership because of his experience and wisdom, in spite of the fact that he was physically weak.

Whatever the role of dominance in animals is, it seems to be pretty clear that the dominant animal must constantly merit his role — that is to say, show his greater physical strength, wisdom, energy, or whatever it is that makes him accepted as a leader. A very ingenious experiment with monkeys, reported by J. M. R. Delgado (Aggression and Defense under Cerebral Radio Control, in *Aggression and Defense*, C. D. Clemente and D. B. Lindsley, eds., University of California Press, 1967), suggests that if the dominant animal loses his distinguishing qualities even momentarily, his commanding role ends. In human history, when dominance becomes institutionalized and no longer a function of personal competence as is still the case in many primitive societies, it is not necessary for the leader to be in constant possession of his outstanding qualities, in fact it is not even necessary that he has them. The social system conditions people to see in the title, the uniform, or whatever else it may be, the proof that the leader is competent, and as long as these symbols, supported by the whole system, are present, the average man does not even dare to ask himself whether the emperor wears clothes.

Note by the author

[*] One has more rarely drawn a parallel from this hierarchy to the «instinctive» roots for dictatorship than one has from territorialism to patriotism, although the logic would be the same. The reason for this different treatment lies probably in that it is less popular to construct an instinctive basis for dictatorship than for «patriotism.»

Carl Watner

The Territorial Assumption: Rationale for Conquest

(2007)

The States are based on territorial monopolistic sovereignty coercively imposed. This is a quite recent and shaky foundation that will not withstand the passing of time, especially following the rise of a new consciousness and of personal potentialities related to the development and diffusion of culture and technology.

Source: *The Voluntaryist*, Issue 133, 2007.

> *Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies?* (St. Augustine, *The City of God*, Book IV, Chapter IV)

The classic definition of the State involves two elements: a coercive monopolization of defense services over a given geographic area, and the imposition of coercive revenue collection from all of the area's inhabitants. As Murray Rothbard has pointed out, even if taxes were voluntary, the libertarian must still oppose State control over protective services. [1] By what right does the State prohibit competition in

the production of security? By what right does the State force the pacifist or libertarian to subscribe to its service? The competition among States to provide protection services is certainly anarchic (and chaotic), by anyone's standard. To be consistent, shouldn't statists be opposed to world anarchy, just as they oppose domestic anarchy? How far should State boundaries extend and what should determine the extent of a State's jurisdiction? How do statists answer these questions? (A consistent libertarian, of course, would reply that there should be no State, and therefore the question of State boundaries and State jurisdiction would not arise.)

There are some statists, who in the name of consistency, argue for a one-world government, but do we have any special name for the person who advocates both no world government and no national State?

The libertarian argument against the State exists whether there is a multitude of competing national States or a single world government. Just as the libertarian challenges the right of a national government to exert its monopoly jurisdiction over a given geographic area, so we must question the right of a world government to exert control over the entire face of the globe. The consistent libertarian must challenge the jurisdiction and legitimacy of the State — whatever its boundaries — no matter how big or how small.

The observation that the State is an invasive institution —regardless of its size or form — rests on the fact that the primary purpose of the State is conquest and control over the person and property of its citizens. [2] It is clear from their behavior that all rulers "regard the people as resources to be deployed for the State's purposes." [3] The fundamental purpose of all governments and bureaucrats "is to steal as much property as possible, using the least amount of violence." [4] The people, their real estate, and their moveable property all exist to satisfy their government's insatiable appetite for power and wealth. The entire basis for conscription, eminent domain, and taxes (of

whatever nature) is the State's assertion of jurisdiction over its subjects and their wealth, wherever located. This insight helps explain why the United States government collects taxes from American citizens, whether they live here or abroad, and why the Internal Revenue insists on collecting taxes for ten years from ex-Americans who have renounced their citizenship for tax reasons.

In order for States to exist they must legitimize themselves in the eyes of those they conquer. The exercise of brute force is too expensive and too demonstrative of the true nature of the State. One of the primary aims of the State propaganda apparatus (from schools to the media) is to inculcate the idea that territoriality is the essence of the State. "My country: Love it or leave it!" The modern territorial State so pervades our lives that we can hardly think of existing without it. It appears to most of us as "the only imaginable spatial framework for political life." [5] The intentional "fusing of polity, economy, nation and society has produced the most powerful of all institutions in our times, so powerful in fact that for much of modern discourse it masquerades as a natural phenomenon rather than the historical creation that it is." [6] Just as it might be said that the last thing a fish would discover is water, so it appears that 21st Century men and women accept the State "as a fixed element of [their] circumstances." [7] The purpose of this article is to challenge this territorial assumption and the illogical reasoning from which it stems. [8]

An assumption, of course, is the taking of something for granted or for truth, even though it may not be true. Thus, the territorial assumption embraces two ideas: first that States are necessary to the existence of society; and second, that defense services must be provided on a contiguous geographic basis. Neither assumption is objectively true. There is nothing immutable or unchangeable about the size and shape of political governments; nor is there anything to the fact that we must have them. [9] Why must the production of security be based on a coerced geographic monopoly? Even the St. Augustine quote at the beginning of this article assumes that some

element of justice resides in the State as a matter of course. But how can justice be present in an institution which, by necessity, violates the rights of at least some of those over whom it rules? So long as at least one libertarian exists on the face of the earth the idea that the State and justice can co-exist in the same political container must be a false proposition. And even after the State has killed off the last libertarian can it be said to be a just institution if all those who accept it do so because they fear for their lives and the confiscation of their property? What kind of justice is it that says "Your money or your life," and whichever way you answer, your antagonist wins the game? Even though territory is derived from the Latin *terra*, is there not some etymological basis for the claim that territory and terrorist have the same root derivation— *terreor*, meaning to frighten? [10]

All human activity takes place in particular locations. [11] Even the virtual reality of the computer screen requires a spot for the monitor and its operator. People require the use of the earth, for standing (and sitting) room, as well as to provide the means for food, shelter and clothing. Governments take advantage of this fact by asserting their authority and control over specific pieces of contiguous land. The land may be said to be "owned" by some private party but the ultimate arbiter for its use and control is the sovereign, national State. According to the international legal system, "the State is the grand owner of its territory and the people living there." [12] "People generally accept the assumption that the land surface of the earth should be divided up into discrete territorial units, each with a government that exercises substantial authority within its own territory." [13] Within its sphere, each Nation-State is the supreme decision-maker as to what may or may not be done. Thus, each State is sovereign over its own territory and within its own jurisdiction.

States and the Question of Boundaries

There are two types of boundaries that concern us here: political boundaries that demarcate portions of the earth into different political jurisdictions, "that is areas within which a particular political authority holds sway"; and property boundaries that serve to define the "area within which an owner is entitled to make use of physical objects" and the real estate itself, and to exclude others from that use. [14] As we shall see there are questions that arise from the implicit acceptance of both political boundaries and property boundaries. From the first arises questions that must be answered, like: if the just powers of government are derived from the people (for example, as outlined in the *American Declaration of Independence*), then who are the relevant people and how are they bounded? [15] There is no "natural" boundary between the United States and Canada, so why didn't the people of Canada become Americans in 1776? As David Miller has written, "[N]o justificatory account of political authority can avoid paying attention to the boundary question, that is, of how to determine the limits of the political community within and over which political authority is to be exercised." [16] From the second arises questions about the justification of private property: What justifies the holding of property by individuals? If property ownership precedes the formation of the State, then by what right do States exert jurisdiction over property owners who do not want to be included? And, "when should rights to private property give way to the interests of the wider community?" [17]

Geographers and political scientists enumerate five different methods by which boundaries may be established: 1) conquest; 2) settlement; 3) inheritance; 4) sale/purchase; and 5) secession. [18] However, by far the vast number of political boundaries over the course of history have been established or altered by wars. As David Hume noted in 1748:

> The face of the earth is continually changing, by the increase of small kingdoms into great empires, by the dissolution of great empires into smaller kingdoms, by the planting of colonies, by the migration of tribes. Is there anything discoverable in all these events but force and violence? [19]

The boundaries that exist at any moment are clearly arbitrary and the product of historical accidents, such as the outcome of wars, compensations, monarchical marriage agreements, population transfers, suppression of regional ethnic groups, and just plain "naked power politics." [20] Diplomats, political leaders, generals, and their "mapmakers are likely to have been ignorant, drunken, or corrupt" or just plain power-freaks. [21]

There is absolutely no reason why one State's borders stop at a particular line and why another State's territory begins on the other side of that line—except that one State's military violence had the ability to expand that far. Can any one think of a State committing "suicide" or of "withdrawing to its natural boundaries?" [22] Without doubt, "more than any other form of human association, the State is devoted to" expanding its population, its territory, and its physical and ideological power. [23] When the Mexican government, before the U.S. War with Mexico in 1848, decided to make a boundary around the Hopi country, the Hopi thought the boundary lines to be so ridiculous that they laughed about it. [24] Similarly, "the dividing line between Mexico and the United States is" simply an imaginary line created by politicians, and on the northern border of the United States there is "only an artificial concept that divides the vast stretch of nature that native tribes freely traversed before the emergence of Canada and of the United States." [25]

Do Nations Have Moral Rights to their Territory?

Murray Rothbard once wrote to the effect that it was absurd to consider the territory of every nation-State sacrosanct.

> "The crucial flaw is the implicit assumption ... that every nation-state 'owns' its entire geographic area in the same just and proper way that every individual property owner owns his person and the property that he has inherited, worked for, or gained in voluntary exchange." [26]

In answering the question, "Can nations have moral rights to territory?," Jeffrey Reiman paints the following picture:

> Imagine a gigantic crowd of people, millions of them, standing on a gigantic piece of land, say the size of Europe. When a whistle blows, they are to form themselves into groups of any size and then, in the fashion of musical chairs, to grab any amount of land they can successfully hold onto against other groups. They may use as much violence as they wish to seize and hold what they grab. When the dust settles, groups of varying size from tiny to huge hold patches of land of varying size from tiny to huge. Could it possibly be that such groups — so unequal in size, so arbitrarily assembled, so unlimited in their use of violence — could have moral rights to the territory they happen to end up with? I don't see how. And I don't think that the actual history of the way nations end up with their territory differs in any morally relevant way from this imaginary story. [27]

The very existence of State boundaries poses some very curious questions and situations. Consider the border between two very large countries. "Citizens living near the border are obviously closer to people on the other side than they are to citizens [of their own country] living in the interior." [28] If passports are necessary to move across borders, from one country to another, what about move-

ment between cities in the same country? How do you draw the line between passports for external use and internal use? [29] And what is the justification for distinguishing the rights of citizens inside the borders from those of aliens outside the borders? Do people have any more or any fewer rights because they live on one side of an imaginary line as opposed to the other? [30] "How can those who argue for principles of justice of universal scope, or for human rights, endorse structures that entail that the rights people actually have depend on where they live?" [31] Another curious, but somewhat unrelated point, is that in a mixed world of anarchist territories and nation-States, the anarchist societies only have borders in a negative sense. In an area where no formal government exists, like Somalia today, the political borders of the surrounding nation-States define the geographical extent of the anarchist society.

It should be clear that the assertion that political borders are arbitrary calls into question the legitimacy of the State. If the State is not properly and justly sovereign over its "own" territory, if its claims to sovereignty are fraudulent, then one must be inexorably led "toward both anarchism and extreme cosmopolitanism." [32] This being the case, governments would not have any legal jurisdiction over the land masses they now control. Such a situation would allow private land owners several different options: they could protect themselves; or sign up with Protection Agency A, B, or C, or any other protection agency of their choice; or decline all protection whatsoever. If many, but not all, private landowners signed up with Protection Agency A to defend them, then at most we might rename the general area in which this occurred, Region A, after the defense agency that had the most clients in the area. David Miller challenges this picture by pointing out that "[i]t relies on giving an account of property rights prior to an account of territorial jurisdiction, and it collapses as soon as we observe that there is no 'natural' system of property, but instead property entitlements depend upon the positive laws of the State." [33]

Miller also applies the same analysis to the idea that consent might serve as the basis for legitimizing the jurisdiction of the State.

To say that a State has authority over a piece of land because its owner, A, has consented to the State's jurisdiction is to go in circles because A's claim to ownership is dependent upon the positive laws of the state. "So unless it can be shown that [A] has a pre-political, natural right to [his property]," the State's jurisdiction over A and his property cannot be established by referring back to A's consent. Secondly, what happens if various individuals in the same geographic area prefer to contract with different political agencies? "Either we say that jurisdiction should be personal, rather than territorial, and abandon the idea of political authority residing in a State" which claims and exercises a monopoly of the legitimate use of force in a given territorial area, "or else we have to abandon the idea of individual consent, and say, for example that majority consent in any given territory is sufficient to establish legitimate authority." This creates new problems as in logically determining what area the State should encompass (how are its boundaries determined); and is inconsistent with the belief "that political authority should be constituted on the model of free association, with everyone having a choice about who he is engaged with politically." [34]

Miller, thus, finds himself in a quandary, one which is avoided by the Rothbardian libertarian. For Rothbard, the very essence of his natural rights libertarianism is a theory of property titles which is totally independent of the State. [35] For Rothbard the twin axioms of self-ownership and homesteading provide a way to defend individual consent as the basis for any protection contract. One of the reasons the State is illegitimate is because there is an independent system of establishing property titles. Individuals and the societies they formed existed prior to the State. The State could not exist without individuals (either to man it or support it). Property is not dependent on the State for its formation. Rather, the State's parasitic nature depends upon the wealth produced by individuals in society.

Hence, property pre-exists the State. Legitimate property ownership does not depend upon the State for definition nor enforcement.

The King's Patents and Justice in Property Titles

Rothbard points out the importance of a theory of justice in property titles by offering up the following example. Suppose, he said, the government of New York State is about to be dissolved. Prior to the deadline the State legislature turns over all the real estate in the entire State to the Rockefellers. How would the owners and occupiers of such land react? Should the existing owners of the land refuse to recognize its reassignment or should they meekly obey because the State of New York can define property titles any way it wishes? [36] The same situation occurred during the English colonization of the Eastern seaboard of the United States during the 17th century. The King's patents were used to justify control over all the inhabitants (the aborigines, as well as English settlers) of a given colony. [37] When, during the 1630s, Roger Williams engaged John Cotton in a debate over the validity of the King's patent in Massachusetts, Williams was actually challenging English sovereignty and jurisdiction to the New World. [38] "Williams insisted that the settlers could have no title to their lands by royal grants since the country 'belonged to the native Indians'." [39] In the Carolinas, all title to the land there was strictly controlled by the governors. An individual settler who claimed vacant land, and then cultivated it through his own labor, was actually denied title by the colonial government. Individual settlers were also prohibited from buying lands from the Indians. As the colonial governor put it, "Individuals are not to claim property through their labour alone but [only] as surveyed and granted by the laws written by the Lord Proprietor." [40] When John Ellis, an Indian trader in the Carolinas, informed the Catawbas that neither his Majesty in England, nor the colonists settling the area "had [... any] right to those Lands," he was promptly

threatened with arrest by the colonial governor if he continued his diatribe. [41]

It is clear that the English governments of the colonies understood the importance of controlling land distribution. [42] When certain land titles were adjudicated before the United States Supreme Court in the early 1830s, Chief Justice John Marshall recognized that it was not peaceful labor or purchase from the Indians which gave European governments rightful title to aboriginal lands. Rather, he wrote, it was nothing but sheer force and violence. "[T]he real basis of the European's right was 'conquest'," and moreover, "once conquered [-] not only the land, but the people, bec[a]me subject to the victorious government." [43] This points out the importance of establishing whether aboriginal title was extinguished by conquest and leads right back to considering the justness of political boundaries. Any comprehensive moral theory of political boundaries must answer the question: who can make the legal rules that define property rights? Does the extent of political jurisdiction and territory depend upon the consent of land owners, who willingly place their land and property under the protection of a given State? Or does the State conquer the inhabitants of a given area and then promulgate (and/or confirm) the needed conventions that establish property titles within the area under the government's control? [44]

Although the Rothbardian position has not often been embraced by natural law theorists, there is a strain of thinking within the natural law tradition which argues that "all mankind is one," and that in fairness all human beings should be treated the same, regardless of where they live or whether they are pagan, Christian, atheist or barbarian. "By natural law one's rights arise from being a human being" and not from being a citizen of any particular country or a member of any particular culture. [45] The ancient Confucian view that there is no reason why one's moral duties to others must stop at the borders of one's own political community would seem to coincide with the Stoic vision of a single humanity embracing a

universal moral community. [46] In other words, "States are morally irrelevant" because "human rights transcend national boundaries." [47]

The force of this argument leads to two possibilities. If States are irrelevant, then one can simply dismiss the State and enter the arena of libertarianism; or one could argue for a one-world State where there would be no political borders except at the bounds of the known world. The consistent statist wants to extend the idea of the domestic State to "comprehend the whole world." One commentator has called such people "statists whose country is the United States of Earth." The difference between them and the Rothbardian is that the natural rights libertarian sees the State as totally antithetical to the ends of human justice, whereas the consistent statist, while dismissing the national State, argues that justice can only be found in a world State.

Conclusion

Whether or not statists would agree, the successful justification of any political authority would need to address the following question:

1. The Question of Protection: "Why, in general, is a system of political authority to be preferred to an anarchic state of nature in which personal protection and other essential services are left to individual persons, or voluntary associations of persons?"

And, if one surmounts this hurdle, then the following questions must still be confronted:

2. The Question of Form: If political authority should exist, what form should it take?

3. The Question of Boundaries: If political authority should exist, then how "are we to demarcate people and territories so that each system" or country is delineated?

4. The Question of Limits of Jurisdiction: If political authority should exist, over "what matters may political authority not be rightfully exercised"? In "what areas of life must individuals be left free to act as they choose — alone or in association with others?"[48]

5. The Question of Taxation: If political authority should exist, how should it support itself? If it is granted the power to tax, how is it possible to control the purse strings?

To posit these questions is to demonstrate the need to challenge the territorial assumption. The fact is, that for most of human history "there have been very few societies which revolved primarily around relatively fixed and clearly defined territorial units." [49] Until the advent of the modern State, group membership depended less upon one's physical location than on one's position within the social/kinship system. [50] Under such arrangements, jurisdiction and authority were mainly over people, not the territory where they lived. Even today, there are tribal peoples in Africa that do not accept the view that there must be a well-defined system of territorial boundaries bringing all people within the jurisdiction of some political system. [51] In the long, historical view, territoriality "only achieves prominence" with the emergence of the nation-State. [52]

And what, might we ask, is most responsible for laying the foundation of the modern nation-State? At least one possible (and powerful) answer is offered by Joseph Strayer:

> The power ... of the modern State [... is] based on its ability to tax — on the fact that in the last analysis it can raise more money than any competing social group. And the acceptance of the principle that all subjects must pay taxes for the defense of the realm ... [regardless of their other loyalties and obligations] was a long step toward nationalism. It meant that the primary loyalty of all the inhabitants of a kingdom must be to that kingdom and that supranational or subnational organizations were of lesser importance. [53]

As we know, most people in the world today have been acculturated to take the State for granted, and they, at most, seek to limit the State within the confines of national boundaries. Most people have never thought about the fact that taxation is theft, nor have they ever questioned the legitimacy of State boundaries. Most of our contemporaries simply assume that the State must exist, "and accept grudgingly or willingly, the enormous impact it has on [their] lives." [54] Nevertheless, there are still those few siren voices that call the nation-State into question and claim that we can live without it. Some of those people are libertarians, and it is they who identify the territorial assumption as a rationale for conquest.

Notes

[1] Murray Rothbard, "Will Rothbard's Free-Market Justice Suffice?" reprinted in Carl Watner (ed.), *I Must Speak Out* (San Francisco: Fox & Wilkes, 1999), pp. 47–48.

[2] For an "institutional analysis" of the State see George Smith, "The Ethics of Voting: Part I," in ibid., especially pp. 29–30.

[3] Frederick G. Whelan, "Citizenship and the Right to Leave," 75 American Political Science Review (1981): 636–53 at p. 640.

[4] Marc Stevens, *Marc Stevens' Adventures in Legal Land* (Mesa, Az.: by the author, 2005 (3rd printing), p. 24.

[5] Alexander B. Murphy, "The Sovereign State System As Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations," in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 81–120 at p. 91.

[6] Peter J. Taylor, "The State As Container: Territoriality in the Modern World- System," 18 Progress in Human Geography (1994): 151–62 at p. 157.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Murphy, op. cit., p. 106. The title for this article was suggested here, but also see Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), p. 5, which refers to "the rationalization for conquest."

[9] Colin Williams and Anthony D. Smith, "The National Construction of Social Space," 7 Progress in Human Geography (1983): 502–18 at p. 505.

[10] Thomas Baldwin, "The Territorial State," in Hyman Gross and Ross Harrison (eds.), *Jurisprudence: Cambridge Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 207–30 at pp. 209–10.

[11] Edward W. Soja, *The Political Organization of Space* (Washington, D.C.: Association of American Geographers, 1971), p. 3.

[12] Daniel Philpott, "The Ethics of Boundaries: A Question of Partial Commitments," in David Miller and Sohail H. Hashmi (eds.), *Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspectives* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), pp. 335–60 at pp. 341–42.

[13] Murphy, op. cit., p. 81.

[14] Miller and Hashmi (eds.), op. cit., p. 4, in their "Introduction."

[15] Jeremy Rabkin, "In Defense of Reasonable Lines: Natural Law from a Natural Rights Perspective," in ibid., pp. 317–34 at p. 325.

[16] David Miller, "The Justification of Political Authority," in David Schmidtz (ed.), Robert Nozick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 10–33 at p. 28.

[17] Miller and Hashmi (eds.), op. cit., p. 6, from their "Introduction."

[18] Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore (eds.), *States, Nations,*

and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 13, from their "Introduction."

[19] David Hume, "Of the Original Contract," in his *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary* (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987 [first published 1748]), p. 471.

[20] Raimondo Strassoldo, "Boundaries in Sociological Theory: A Reassessment," in Raimondo Strassoldo and Giovanni Delli Zotti (eds.), *Cooperation and Conflict in Border Areas* (Milano: Franco Angeli Editore, 1982), pp. 245–72 at p. 259. Also see Lea Brilmayer, *Justifying International Acts* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 73.

[21] Michael Walzer, The Rights of Political Communities," in Charles R. Beitz, Marshall Cohen, Thomas Scanlon, and A. John Simmons (eds.), *International Ethics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 65–194, at p. 171.

[22] Soja, op. cit., p. 52, citing Luther Gulick, *The Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1962), p. 36: "[A]mong governmental institutions, the suicide complex is notably absent ... ." Also see J. R. V. Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 110: "There is no recorded case of a state wishing to withdraw to its 'natural boundaries'."

[23] Soja, op. cit., p. 15 citing Morton H. Fried, *The Evolution of Political Society* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 240.

[24] Peter Spotswood Dillard, "The Unconquered Remnant: The Hopis and Voluntaryism," Whole Number 129 The Voluntaryist (2006): citing George Yamada, *The Great Resistance, A Hopi Anthology* (New York: G. Yamada, 1957), p. 20.

[25] Ali Khan, "The Extinction of Nation-States," 7 American University Journal of International Law and Policy (1991–1992): 197–234 at p. 231.

[26] Murray N. Rothbard, "Nations by Consent: Decomposing the Nation-State," 11 Journal of Libertarian Studies (1994): 1–10 at p. 3.

[27] Jeffrey Reiman, "Can Nations Have Moral Rights to Territory?" in John R. Jacobson (ed.), *The Territorial Rights of Nations and Peoples* (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd., 1989), pp. 163-185, at p. 163.

[28] Michael Walzer, "Response to Chaney and Lichtenberg," in Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue (eds.), *Boundaries: National, Autonomy and its Limits* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), pp. 101–06 at p. 104.

[29] David MacGregor, "The Passport Fraud: Nation States As Prison Camps," November 24, 2003, www.sovereignlife.com/essays/24-11-03.html.

[30] Will Kymlicka, "Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective," in Miller and Hashmi (eds.), op. cit., pp. 249-275 at p. 249.

[31] Onora O'Neill, *Bounds of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 170.

[32] Brilmayer, op. cit., p. 137

[33] David Miller, "Liberalism and Boundaries: A Response to Allen Buchanan," in Buchanan and Moore (eds.), op. cit., pp. 262–72 at p. 264.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Murray N. Rothbard, *For a New Liberty* (New York: Collier Books, 1978), pp. 30–31.

[36] Ibid., p. 30.

[37] Ruth Barnes Moynihan, "The Patent and the Indians: The Problem of Jurisdiction in Seventeenth-Century New England," 2

American Indian Culture and Research Journal (1977): 8–18 at p. 12.

[38] Ibid., p. 8.

[39] Richard Tuck, "The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries from the Natural Law Perspective," in Buchanan and Moore (eds.), op. cit., pp. 143–70 at p. 156.

[40] Barbara Arneil, *John Locke and America* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 129.

[41] Ibid., p. 76.

[42] Ibid., p. 83.

[43] Ibid., p. 197.

[44] Allen Buchanan, "The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries: What Liberalism Has to Say," in Buchanan and Moore (eds.), op. cit., pp. 231–61 at pp. 233–234.

[45] Brian Barry and Robert Goodin (eds.), *Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), p. 205.

[46] Joseph Chan, "Boundaries of the Body and the Body Politic in Early Confucian Thought," in Miller and Hashmi (eds.), op. cit., pp. 89–111 at p. 101. Also see Neal Wood, *Cicero's Social and Political Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p 140, and Anthony Pagden, "The Christian Tradition," in Buchanan and Moore (eds.), op. cit., pp. 103–26 at p. 104.

[47] Brilmayer, op. cit., pp. 30–31.

[48] Miller (2002), op. cit., pp. 28-29. These questions are partially quoted and paraphrased from Miller's text.

[49] Soja, op. cit., p. 33.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid. Also see Michael van Notten, *The Law of the Somalis* (Trenton, N.J.: The Red Sea Press, 2005), for a description of the customary law of the Somali people.

[52] Soja, op. cit., p. 30.

[53] Joseph Strayer, *Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 339–40.

[54] Miller (2002), op. cit., p. 11.

Gian Piero de Bellis

Territory, Territoriality, Territorialism (2013)

A brief overview of the concepts of territory, territoriality and territorialism aimed at highlighting the crimes committed by State rulers who wield immense power derived from the general acceptance of the (illusory) idea and the (disastrous) practice of State territorial sovereignty presented as the indispensable means of guaranteeing the security and well-being of the State subjects.

Source: Extract from Gian Piero de Bellis, *From closed territorialism to open spatialism*, 2013, polyarchy.org

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Introduction

The analysis of the physical world by scientists in the natural sciences (physics, chemistry, biology, geology, etc.) has progressed tremendously in the last few centuries, moving from unsubstantiated concepts (e.g. the phlogiston) to testable hypotheses, and leading to an incredible array of technological devices and breakthroughs in knowledge.

However, the same cannot be said with reference to physical space as analyzed, represented and planned by social scientists. Up to now, the way the space (the habitat) is viewed and organized has practically nothing to do with a scientific approach but is almost entirely concerned with the cultivation of cherished myths (democracy as power of the people, the State as the indispensable provider of security and welfare, etc.) and the preservation of existing power mechanisms (political, economic, cultural).

It is therefore appropriate and helpful to present a different view that tries to disentangle the current cultural conception concerning the environment in which we live (especially land or territory) from unnecessary physical restrictions and plain mental distortions.

The analysis will focus essentially on the following aspects:

- Territory
- Territoriality
- Territorialism

Particularly, what is territory, territoriality territorialism? What have they become? And what should be made of them once they are no longer attached to or subjugated by any form of monopolistic and exploitative power.

Territory

The term *territory* comes from the Latin *terra* that refers either to the earth or to a specific part of it, a region, or to the material of which the land is composed, the soil.

A territory is, first of all, a natural-physical reality, namely a piece of land inhabited/occupied by some animate or inanimate entity. When people settle on a specific territory, that piece of land becomes also a social reality.

This means that a territory is either an existing natural environment, a human-built environment or a variable mixture of both.

To call a specific tract of land a territory relates to the fact that, usually, it contains some homogenous natural or man-made features that differentiate it from other pieces of land. In this respect a town, a forest, the estuary of a river can be called territories and examined on the basis of their distinctive characteristics.

All territories seen as homogenous spaces are not only delimited and distinguished by specific features, but also linked or linkable to other territories, in many cases through the effort and ingenuity of individuals that have overcome physical barriers such as mountains, rivers and seas. The search for and discovery of new territories beyond the Pillars of Hercules (the Strait of Gibraltar) or in the American Far West or in the South Pacific seas has been one of the distinctive traits of past human beings.

Moreover, a territory is something transformable by humans within very large limits, for instance from desert to cultivated land and from forest to arid soil.

Human Being's reliance on a specific piece of land as a place to live and a means of sustenance (stationary cultivation instead of recurrent migrations) has produced the social trait called *territoriality*.

Territoriality

It seems that prehistoric human beings moved from place to place in search of food (plants, animals). It was only at a later stage that the cultivation of plants and the raising of animals were introduced and practised by a growing number of people.

These new techniques of food production transformed, in many cases, what were non-territorial migratory hunters or groups of hunters into settled territorial farmers or communities of farmers.

The development of territoriality was the logical and rational outcome of the continual reliance on the same specific territory for all or most of the necessities of life, both material and psychological.

The Merriam-Webster dictionary gives, among others, these two definitions of territoriality:

"2a: persistent attachment to a specific territory

2b: the pattern of behavior associated with the defense of a territory."

Territoriality can then be seen as an historical outcome of the protracted use and care of a specific territory that generates a sense of belongingness and a will to defend it from intruders.

The fact that territoriality was alien to the prehistoric human being means that:

- Territoriality is not part of the genetic endowment of the individual but is a quite sensible attitude that emerges once specific agricultural practices are put in place.

- Territoriality is an attitude learned and displayed only in the presence of those practices (farming, breeding) that are based on the continuous use of a certain territory.

That territoriality is not a universal human instinct but a learned attitude in response to specific situations is very apparent if we take into account the historical reality of millions of people that migrated from one place to another, or the existence of nomadic populations and individuals with no fixed abode (see the exemplary case of the mathematician Paul Erdős who spent most of his adult life moving from place to place).

For stationary people, territoriality is a quite appropriate way of dealing with problems of ownership and management of territories. Unfortunately, by exercising irrational passions and developing absurd pretensions, some power-hungry individuals have developed a pathological

urge to tamper with the concept of territoriality. This has resulted in the development of what is known as *territorialism*, a conviction accepted nowadays by most people without giving it much thought.

Territorialism

Throughout history the control of large expanses of territory has been synonymous with power, since control of a given territory equates to control of that territory's exploitable resources, including people (labour) and raw materials (cultivable soil, minerals, timber, etc.).

Using the same formulation of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, we could say that the first brute who, having enclosed a piece of land, declared it to be his own, without basing his assertion on having worked and improved the land, and nevertheless found people afraid to challenge him and gullible enough to believe and accept his claim, he is the real originator of territorialism.

Over the course of centuries, all who have shown an addiction to power (ambitious kings in the past and arrogant politicians in the present) have developed an urge to territorialism.

Territorialism is the claim to monopolistic sovereignty over a very large territory or territories and all of its inhabitants and resources.

This claim, put forward by certain power-hungry individuals, often in exchange for the promise (real or illusory) of protection against aggression from external forces, has been reiterated with such constancy that, to many timid and credulous minds, it has become, in the course of time, a fully legitimate and seemingly quite proper demand. The claim to territorialism remains, nevertheless, even now, an invented (made up) and imposed (forced upon) pretension, never accepted by the totality of people living in a certain territory. It has

therefore resulted in violent struggles, forced displacements and personal tragedies.

Three main aspects characterize territorialism:

- Monopoly of power: there is only one superior power — thus an exclusive power — for each delimited territory.

- Submission of people: everybody living within that territory is subject to the laws of the territorial superior power and cannot enter or exit the territory without his authorization in the form of a passport or visa.

- Exaction of resources: personal resources are appropriated by the superior power through taxation and monetary policy; all natural resources of significant economic value (e.g. gas, minerals, etc.) are appropriated by the superior power, and legal rights to their commercial exploitation are granted to people in return for a fee.

Territorialism has assumed in history two main forms: micro-territorialism and macro-territorialism. Setting aside the micro-territorialism of the Greek city state and the macro-territorialism of the Roman Empire, we focus briefly on two realities closer to us in time: the micro-territorialism of the Middle Ages and the macro-territorialism of the modern world.

Micro-territorialism (feudalism)

The importance of territory as the most substantial and direct source of power appears very clearly in Europe during the Middle Ages when, usually, the one who controlled the largest extent of territories was the king and he recompensed obedience and services of other men by assigning to them large pieces of land. In the course of time those large pieces of territory were transformed into hereditary fiefdoms.

The local feudal master became then, eventually, the unique owner of a territory and of its inhabitants, who were in turn reduced to the condition of serfs. The only way for them to be free was to abandon that territory and run away. If not, they would be subject to a series of work and payment obligations and other rules characterizing their position as servile appendages to the land.

The expression: *Nulle terre sans seigneur* (No land without a lord) that was meant to indicate that all concession of land was in relation to services provided to the king, might be also interpreted as the desire, by those in power, that all tracts of land be under a master. The fulfilment of this desire would have represented the universalisation of territorialism in the medieval age.

Fortunately, there were tracts of land where the rising class of merchants and artisans congregated, that were outside the sphere of control of the feudal masters. These spaces became the nuclei of the free towns that attracted all those who wanted to lead a life away from the shackles of territorialism (i.e. the subjection to a territorial ruler). In order to free themselves, many serfs abandoned the feudal dominions and started again from scratch in a new urban environment.

It happened then that, in the course of time, the flourishing cities became the new centres of territorial power, first stretching out their control to the surrounding rural areas, and then, as capital cities, extending their territorial pretensions to lands further and further away. Eventually, the rulers living in some capital cities (Madrid, Amsterdam, Lisbon, London, Paris, Berlin) started to entertain the idea that the entire earth was up for grabs.

Within this new scenario, any expressions of micro-territorialism — be it the ancient feudal master transformed into a countryside aristocrat or the local ruler of small principalities — would become impotent remnants of the past, superseded by the new reality of national macro-territorialism under the rule of the central State.

Macro-territorialism (statism)

The emergence of the modern territorial State can be seen as the fulfilment of the ambition of the strongest feudal lord who succeeded in conquering, annexing or associating vast new territories and their inhabitants.

Territorial statism has been viewed as a direct continuation and extension of territorial feudalism. Henry Sumner Maine remarked:

> "Territorial sovereignty — the view which connects sovereignty with the possession of a limited portion of the earth's surface — was distinctly an offshoot, though a tardy one, of *feudalism*. This might have been expected *a priori*, for it was feudalism which for the first time linked personal duties, and by consequence personal rights, to the ownership of land." (*Ancient Law*, Chapter IV)

In other words, statism is feudalism writ large.

In the transition from feudalism to statism, some feudal vassals at the service of the king became high-ranking State bureaucrats, while all the feudal servants became State subjects. In addition, there were also a number of other significant changes that strengthened territorialism and that we are going to examine briefly.

The Peace of Westphalia (1648) that ended the Thirty Years' War and the ensuing treaties are credited with having set up the conditions suitable for the rise of the system of territorial States, each one sovereign in a specific territory and over all of its inhabitants.

This is a significant departure from the Middle Ages conception when the king, albeit controlling vast tracts of land, was essentially the ruler of his people. As pointed out by Henry Sumner Maine, even while occupying the land that is now known as France "the Merovingian line of chieftains, the descendants of Clovis, were not Kings of France, they were Kings of the Francs." (*Ancient Law*,

Chapter IV). Confirming this notion is the fact that the power and jurisdiction of the medieval kings did not apply to foreigners; for instance, to the travelling merchants who had their own *lex mercatoria*.

Under the type of territorialism imposed by the modern State, national and democratic, there are no more bounded-men (the country people) and free-men (the merchants, the artisans and the city dwellers) but all are or become State subjects (i.e. subservient to the territorial State rulers), even the foreigners living in that specific territory.

The major impulse towards State territorialism was provided, later on, when the concept of Nation came to be associated with the reality of Territory. Until the formation of the idea of Nation and the ideology of Nationalism, the pretension of monopolistic territorial sovereignty by a king over a vast extent of land rested always on very shaky foundations and could be very well dismissed by a powerful rival or questioned by the authority of the Church. It was when the masses, as Nations, came to the scene that modern territorialism was born. Nationalism and Territorialism are then the two sides of the same coin, and nationalism is a truly territorial ideology.

After the middle of the 19th century, with the unification of Italy (1861) and of Germany (1871), the idea that every nation (national group) had a right to own a specific territory (homeland) became, at least in the Western world, an entrenched creed, unquestioned and unquestionable.

The First World War and its aftermath sanctioned State territorialism in the most compelling ways as the absolute and exclusive right of the State rulers to dominate a specific territory and whatever it included, without any external interference or the presence, internally, of any other autonomous entity. In other words, full and unlimited sovereignty within the borders fixed by the State and recognised by other States.

The distinctive characteristics of State macro-territorialism are then:

- The monopoly of territorial sovereignty: the territorial State is, first of all, a monopolist. For the territorial State rulers and their followers, a State within a State is an inconceivable idea. This is because they see the State as a territory at their exclusive disposal and not as a social organization at the service of voluntary members and free customers. Only some extraterritorial rights are given to foreign State representatives through the reciprocal fiction that locates each diplomatic mission on a piece of land granted to the other State.

- The fixing of territorial boundaries: the territorial State is based on restricted access and exit. Boundaries are essential elements for the existence of the territorial State. Even nowadays, the suppression of border posts between two European states means only that a certain freedom of movement has been allowed over a larger area. It does not mean that State boundaries have been abolished.

- The imposition of territorial identities: the territorial State can survive only by perpetuating the fiction of a homogeneous culture, officially imposed on everybody by the dominant national group. For this reason, the territorial State is fully determined on dictating/cultivating a mono-culture (the same cultural identity for all those living on a territory) and rejecting any substantial cultural variety.

These three interrelated aspects of territorialism have generated a series of appalling deeds that are the criminal traits of territorial statism and that we will now briefly analyze.

The wrongs/faults of territorialism (monopolizing territories)

Territorialism, that is, one huge territory and one almighty master, has been the exclusive form of social ruling in modern times because, in its apparent simplicity and straightforwardness, it could plausibly

be presented and accepted as the one most suitable to grant (i.e. impose) order.

However, if we take even a superficial glance at the events of the last century, when State territorialism was fully dominant, we cannot fail to notice levels of disorder (for instance, repeated massacres of human beings made under the order of the territorial state rulers) on a scale rarely witnessed in history. This cannot be simplistically ascribed to the introduction of more efficient means of extermination. Knives and clubs, as shown for example in 1994 in Rwanda, have also been effective tools to perform genocide in an attempt to affirm exclusive territorial dominance.

Given that, the current appeal and acceptance of territorialism can be explained only by the existence of a massive propaganda machine orchestrated by the rulers and their intellectual servants that have succeeded in making people believe that territorialism has scientific unquestionable underpinnings. The cultural bases of territorialism are, on the contrary, total fabrications in the form of:

- Inexistent instinct. The territorial instinct, put forward for example by Robert Ardrey in *The Territorial Imperative,* is no instinct at all being absent in many humans and even in many animals; otherwise we could not make sense, for example, of confirmed travellers, wanderers, hobos and migrant workers, or individuals that do not own or are not particularly attached to any specific piece of land (like those living all their lives in rented accommodation or mobile homes). The territorial instinct is perhaps confused with the rational expectations of somebody who does not want intruders disturbing the peace of his home (owned or rented) or a farmer who cultivates an area of peacefully acquired land and declares that specific piece of land and the fruits of his work to be his own. But this has to do with basic rationality, basic decency and not with any basic instinct.

- Invented myth. The widely diffused idea that each nation has a territory of its own is a powerful but nevertheless invented myth based

on the association of two made up realities, that of a national group and that of a mother country. In reality, we are first of all distinctive individuals and not creatures of a national herd; furthermore, almost every person on earth is the result of mass migrations and extensive genetic crosses. Out of this comes the true reality of cultural affinities that are a product of human development. It leads individuals to the formation of and choice amongst a multiplicity of social groups (like personal clubs) that have less and less to do with territorial rooting and certainly nothing to do with the fanciful tales of *Volksgeist* and *Fatherland*. The myth is now breaking down because, with current communication technology, one can be in constant touch and associate with many individuals without the necessity of territorial physical proximity. This fact opens up a new world of virtual intentional communities and affinity groups, beyond the territorial State.

- Inaccurate story. The feudal idea that every piece of land must have a master has been reaffirmed in quite recent times through a fable called *The Tragedy of the Commons* in which the author, Garrett Hardin, advocates universal territorialism (one territory - one master) for fear that otherwise the land will be overexploited by everybody. However, Hardin's tale is a very inaccurate way, to say the least, of presenting the historical reality of the commons that were not at all pieces of land subject to egoistic overexploitation. Moreover, it leads to a totally illusory/deceitful proposal to solve problems of territorial management by way of state territorial sovereignty.

Because these fabrications have found fertile ground with people having vested interests or those with gullible minds, we are all stuck with a system of territorial organization (State territorialism) that has produced, as previously said, an abominable series of disasters on all fronts (moral, social, cultural, ecological, economic, etc.).

The wrongs/faults of statism are the inevitable by-product of its distinctive characteristics arising out of territorialism:

- The monopoly of territorial sovereignty: wars and imperialisms. In a world characterized by territorial monopolistic powers, the scrambling for territories to annex and dominate has been the recurrent preoccupation of every state ruler, compatible with his military strength. Hitler's *Lebensraum* (a living space) or Mussolini's *un posto al sole* (a place in the sun) have been only the crassest expressions of the way of thinking and acting of every territorial power. Wars and imperialisms are then intrinsic urges of territorial State rulers, manifested either by occupying territories (as in Africa, Asia and the Americas) or by vying for spheres of political influence (as during the period of the Cold War and afterwards). For those who abide by the reality and conception of territorial monopolistic sovereignty, there is a kind of *horror vacui* (fear of empty spaces) so that, within a system of territorial States, the rulers feel obliged, by right, to occupy a place before others arrive and do the same. This policy is nowadays applied mainly within each territorial State, given the practical disappearance of stateless territories, with the looting of local resources by the national robber rulers via taxes and the spoils system. In the most appalling instances this predatory behaviour leads to more or less violent "civil wars" that are quite often the ghastly identity card of the territorial State (see the cases of Palestine, the ex-Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Sierra Leone, Somalia, East Timor, Darfur, Sudan, and so many others).

- The fixing of territorial boundaries: partitions and segregations. The territorial States are obsessed with the tracing of boundaries that, in many cases (as in Africa) were and are invented lines of demarcation drawn for the convenience of the occupying power. The fixing of boundaries generated by State territorialism has led to tragedies of appalling horror, like for instance the mass migration and massacres following the partition of India. The existence of territorial states has been directly responsible for the extermination of six million Jews that had nowhere to go because the borders of all territorial States

were closed to them (except for limited cases of individuals and small groups). Internally, the fixing of territorial boundaries resulted also in Native Americans being confined in the reserves, some sections of the black population (for instance in South Africa) being shunted into the shantytowns and the Jews, or other "undesirable" people like the immigrants, into ghettoes. One of the most appalling signs of territorialism have been, in the past, the Berlin Wall and the Barbed Wire running along the border of Hungary and dividing Europe into two blocks, Eastern and Western. Nowadays, some of the same Europeans that vehemently opposed the illiberal practices of State communism have built Fortress Europe whose military forces, patrolling land and sea, are re-enacting the same policies with the same immoral insouciance and idiotic arrogance.

- The imposition of territorial identities: ethnocentrism and homogenization. State territorialism can survive only through the manipulation of minds and the imposition of idiotic territorial identities, that is the perpetuation of phoney ideas of artificial differentiations instilled in the minds of individuals from infancy. This means the manufacturing of serial mass-morons (identical national marionettes) on a scale never attained in the past. One of the most heinous moral crimes committed by State territorial masters is the destruction of local cultures (the real variety) and the invention of national cultures (the fake diversity), all this leading to the end of cosmopolitanism. The gentle a-territorial Jews exterminated in the concentration camps are here again an indication of what we have lost because of territorialism. In their place we have now in Israel the ultra-territorialist Zionist State rulers and their followers, prepared to bomb, torture and confine in ghettoes men, women and children in the process of granting to themselves the exclusive control and use of a large territory.

It is then not an exaggeration to say that the ideology and practice of territorialism has created monsters (the criminal bosses of the territorial States) that have committed monstrous acts that they are continu-

ously replicating. They feel legitimized to do this, as long as territorialism will remain the commonly accepted creed and mode of political and social governance.

For all these reasons, we must recognize that territorialism is indeed a nefarious manner for social groups to regulate, organize and manage themselves and is totally inadequate for dealing with territorial problems. Clearly, the existence of a territorial reality requires theoretical and practical tools to deal with that reality but not in the simplistic and abominable way put forward and implemented by the advocates and actors of State territorialism.

Nationalism - Patriotism

Nationalism, as clearly indicated by Elie Kedourie, is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. As every invented doctrine, it had its makers and promoters, namely the builders of the Nation States who were quite popular at that time

The end results of nationalism have been minimally positive, as movements for the independence of subject populations, but generally highly negative as the spread of particularism and militarism.

As a matter of fact, since that invention, the nationalization of the masses has been the main aim of the States in view of having docile people to exploit internally (e.g. to extract resources) and to employ externally for all sort of violent ventures (e.g. territorial expansion).

In the current 21st century, the rulers of the State are trying to stop and revert their decline by re-proposing this nefarious doctrine even in the presence of cultural and technological conditions that make the success of this attempt highly improbable in the long run. Unless most people opt for a collective suicide and the end of civilized humanity.

Juan Bautista Alberdi

Patriotism as State slavery (1880)

This extract, from a speech delivered at the graduation ceremony of the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires, on 24 May 1880, clarifies very well the nefarious nature of patriotism, an attitude that Samuel Johnson had already defined as "the last refuge of the scoundrel" (1775).

Source: Juan Bautista Alberdi, *La Omnipotencia del Estado es la Negación de la Libertad Individual*, 1880.

One of the deepest roots of our modern tyrannies in South America is the Greco-Roman notion of patriotism and homeland, which we owe to the half-classical education that our universities have copied from France.

Homeland, as the Greeks and Romans understood it, was essentially and radically opposed to what we understand it to be in our modern times and societies. It was an institution of religious and holy origin and character, equivalent to what the Church is today, not to say

holier than it, for it was the association of souls, of persons and of the interests of its members.

Its power was omnipotent and without limits with respect to the individuals of which it was composed.

The Fatherland, thus understood, was and had to be the negation of individual liberty, in which all modern societies that are really free base their freedom. The individual man owed everything to the Fatherland; he owed it his soul, his person, his will, his fortune, his life, his family, his honour.

To withhold any of these things from the Fatherland was to betray it; it was an act of impiety.

According to these ideas, patriotism was not only reconcilable, but identical and the same as the most absolute and omnipotent despotism in the social order.

The great revolution brought about by Christianity in the notions of man, of God, of the family, of society as a whole, radically and diametrically changed the foundations of the Greco-Roman social system.

However, the rebirth of ancient civilisation from the ruins of the Roman Empire and the formation of Modern States, preserved or revived the foundations of the past and dead civilisation, no longer in the interest of the still formless States themselves, but in the majesty of their rulers, in whom the majesty, omnipotence and authority of the Fatherland were personified.

Hence, we have the despotism of the Absolute Kings who emerged from the feudalism of Europe regenerated by Christianity.

The State, or the Fatherland, continued to be omnipotent in respect of the person of each of its members; but the Fatherland personified in its monarchs or sovereigns, not in its peoples.

The omnipotence of Kings took the place of the omnipotence of the State or Fatherland.

Those who did not say: "I am the State," thought and believed as the one who said it [i.e. We are the State].

When the people rose up against the kings, they replaced them in the exercise of the power of the nation, a power which was ultimately more legitimate in terms of its origin. The sovereignty of the people took the place of the sovereignty of the monarchs, albeit theoretically.

The Fatherland was everything and it was considered as the only legitimate power. It retained the original nature of its absolute and omnipotent power over the person of each of its members. The omnipotence of the Fatherland itself remained the negation of the liberty of the individual in the republic, as it had been in the monarchy. And modern Christian society, in which the human being and his rights are theoretically the most important thing, continued in reality to be governed by the rules of ancient and pagan societies, in which the Fatherland was the most absolute negation of liberty.

Divorced from freedom, patriotism was united with glory, understood as the Greeks and Romans understood it.

This is the present condition of societies of Greco-Roman origin in both worlds.

Its individuals, rather than free, are the servants of the Fatherland.

The Fatherland is free, inasmuch as it does not depend on the foreigner; but the individual lacks freedom, inasmuch as he depends on the State in an omnipotent and absolute manner. The Fatherland is free, inasmuch as it absorbs and monopolises the liberties of all its individuals; but its individuals are not free because the Government owns all their liberties.

Such is the social regime which the French Revolution has produced, and such is the political society which the Latin America of Greco-Latin race has begotten, following the example, till the present day, of the French Revolution.

Rousseau's *Social Contract*, turned into the catechism of our revolution by his illustrious coryphaeus Dr. Moreno [1], has governed our society, in which the citizen has remained a belonging of the State or of the Fatherland, incarnated and personified in its Governments, as natural representatives of the majesty of the omnipotent State.

The omnipotence of the State, exercised according to the rules of the ancient societies of Greece and Rome, has been the *raison d'être* of its representatives, the governments, called free only because they ceased to emanate from abroad.

[...]

The ancients knew neither freedom of private life, nor freedom of education, nor freedom of religion. The human person was counted for very little before that holy and almost divine authority which was called the Fatherland or the State.

It was not surprising, according to these historical precedents, that, distorted in their meaning, they induced the French revolutionaries of the last century, unconscious imitators of the ancient society of Greece and Rome, to copy enthusiastically these dead models .

The disastrous revolutionary maxim that the health of the State is the supreme law of society was formulated in Greek and Roman antiquity.

It was then thought that law, justice, morality, everything had to yield to the interests of the Fatherland.

There was, then, no greater error than to believe that in the ancient cities the human being enjoyed freedom. They did not even have the

idea of it. They did not believe that any right could exist in opposition to the city and its gods.

It is true that later revolutions changed this form of Government; but the nature of the State remained almost the same. The Government was called successively monarchy, aristocracy, democracy; but none of these revolutions gave men true liberty, which is personal liberty.

To have political rights, to vote, to appoint or elect magistrates, to be able to be one of them, is all that was called liberty; but the human being remained no less subjugated to the State than he was before.

[...]

It follows from the observations contained in this study that what we usually understand by Homeland and patriotism are very dangerous bases and starting points for the organisation of a free country, because far from leading to freedom, they can lead us to the opposite pole, that is to say, to despotism, even if that path is not fully followed.

It is a very simple path by which extreme love of the country can lead away from the freedom of the individual and lead to the patriotic despotism of the State. He who loves the Fatherland above all things is not far from giving it all powers and making it omnipotent. But the omnipotence of the Fatherland or of the State is the exclusion and negation of individual liberty, that is to say, of man's liberty, which is, in itself, only a power moderating the power of the State.

Personal liberty is the sacred limit at which the power of the Fatherland ends.

The omnipotence of the Fatherland or of the State is the whole cause and *raison d'être* of the omnipotence of the government of the Fatherland, which serves as its personification or representation in the action of its sovereign power.

All public crimes against the liberty of man have been committed, not only with impunity, but legally, in the name of the Omnipotent Fatherland, invoked by its Omnipotent Government.

The liberty of man may not only be incompatible with the liberty of the Fatherland, but the former may be disregarded and devoured by the latter. They are two different freedoms which are often at odds with each other and are separate. The freedom of the Fatherland is independence from every foreign country. The freedom of the human being is the independence of the individual from the government of his own country.

The freedom of the Fatherland is compatible with the greatest tyranny, and both can coexist in the same country. The freedom of the individual ceases to exist by the very fact that the Fatherland assumes an omnipotent power in ruling the country.

Individual liberty literally means the absence of all omnipotent power concentrated in the State and in the government of the State.

[...]

The omnipotence of the Fatherland excludes not only all liberty, but all public progress, because the main agent of this progress is the individual who knows how to use his natural energy and efforts to preserve and improve his person, his fortune and his condition as a civilised human being.

Now, as the mass or aggregate of these particular individuals is what is commonly referred as the people, it follows that it is the people, and not the Government, to whom the gradual work of progress and civilisation is entrusted taking into account the conditions of South American society. And the people's favourite means of achieving this is civil or social liberty, distributed equally among its native and foreign individuals, who form the association or people of South America.

If this natural and inevitable law of individual self-aggrandisement is called *selfishness*, it must be admitted that *selfishness* is bound to precede *patriotism* in the hierarchy of the agents and servants of national progress.

The progress of the country must necessarily be in direct proportion to the number of its intelligent, industrious and energetic individuals, and to the facilities and guarantees which their fertile and civilising selfishness finds for exercising and developing itself.

South American society would be saved and assured of a future of freedom and progress if it were intelligent selfishness and not selfish patriotism that was called upon to build and construct the edifice of the Republics of South America.

And as it is not natural for healthy selfishness to neglect the work of its own individual development, on pain of damaging its cardinal interest, it may be said with perfect truth that the future progress of South America is guaranteed and assured by the fact that it remains under the watchful protectorate of the individual selfishness which never sleeps.

The Omnipotence of the Fatherland, fatally converted into the Omnipotence of the Government, is not only the negation of liberty, but also the negation of social progress, because it suppresses personal initiative in the work of that progress. The State absorbs all the activity of individuals, when it has absorbed all their means and work of improvement. In order to carry out this absorption, the State enlists in the ranks of its employees those individuals who would be more capable if they were left to themselves.

The State intervenes in everything, and everything is done on its initiative in the management of its public interests. The State becomes a manufacturer, builder, entrepreneur, banker, merchant, publisher, and thus distracts itself from its essential and unique mandate, which is to protect the individuals against all internal and

external aggression. In all functions which are not essential to government, it acts as an ignorant and harmful competitor of the individuals, worsening the service to the country, far away from serving it better.

Public administration becomes an industry and a way of life for half of the individuals of which society is composed. The exercise of this administrative and political industry, which is merely a way of life, takes the name of patriotism, since the service that each individual performs for the country in order to live takes on the appearance of service to the Fatherland. Naturally, then, the love for the hand that provides the bread on which one lives takes the appearance of love for the country — a great and essentially disinterested sentiment. How can one not love one's country as one loves one's life, when it is the country that gives one the means of life?

Thus, patriotism is not religion as in the old Greek and Roman times, nor is it even superstition or fanaticism. It is often mere hypocrisy in its pretensions to virtue, and in reality, a simple industry of living.

[...]

If more than one young man, instead of competing for the honour of receiving a salary as an employee or agent or salaried servant of the State, would prefer the honour of being master of himself in the management of his farm or rural property, the country would henceforth be placed on the road to its greatness, its freedom and its true progress.

Note

[1] Mariano Moreno (1778-1811) was an Argentine lawyer, journalist, and politician. He translated into Spanish *The Social Contract* of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Lev Nikolajevic' Tolstoy

Patriotism as Slavery (1894)

A superb text on the alienation and the debasement produced by what the State regards as the noble sentiment of patriotism.

Source: Lev Tolstoy, *On Patriotism*, March 29, 1894.

Patriotism today is the cruel tradition of an outlived period, which exists not merely by its inertia, but because the governments and ruling classes, aware that not their power only, but their very existence, depends upon it, persistently excite and maintain it among the people, both by cunning and violent methods.

Patriotism today is like a scaffolding which was needful once for raising the walls of the building, but which, though it presents the only obstacle to the house being inhabited, is none the less retained, because its existence is of profit to certain persons.

For a long while there has not been and cannot be any reason for dissension between Christian nations. It is even impossible to imag-

ine, how and for what, Russian and German workmen, peacefully and conjointly working on the frontiers or in the capitals, should quarrel. And much less easily can one imagine animosity between some Kazan peasant who supplies Germans with wheat, and a German who supplies him with scythes and machines.

It is the same between French, German, and Italian workmen. And it would be even ridiculous to speak of the possibility of a quarrel between men of science, art, and letters of different nationalities, who have the same objects of common interest independent of nationalities or of governments.

But the various governments cannot leave the nations in peace, because the main, if not the sole, justification for the existence of governments is the pretense to pacificate nations and settling their hostile relationships. Hence governments evoke such hostile relationships under the aspect of patriotism, in order to exhibit their powers of pacification. Somewhat like a gipsy who, having put some pepper under a horse's tail, and beaten it in its stall, brings it out, and hanging on to the reins, pretends that he can hardly control the excited animal.

We are told that governments are very careful to maintain peace between nations. But how do they maintain it? People live on the Rhine in peaceful communication with one another. Suddenly, owing to certain quarrels and intrigues between kings and emperors, a war commences; and we learn that the French government has considered it necessary to regard this peaceful people as Frenchmen. Centuries pass, the population has become accustomed to their position, when animosity again begins amongst the governments of the great nations, and a war is started upon the most empty pretext, because the German government considers it necessary to regard this population as Germans: and between all Frenchmen and Germans is kindled a mutual feeling of ill-will.

Or else Germans and Russians live in a friendly fashion on their frontiers, pacifically exchanging the results of their labour; when all of a sudden those same institutions, which only exist to maintain the peace of nations, begin to quarrel, are guilty of one stupidity after another, and finally are unable to invent anything better than a most childish method of self-punishment in order to have their own way, and do a bad turn to their opponent — which in this case is especially easy, as those who arrange a war of tariffs are not the sufferers from it; it is others who suffer — and so arrange such a war of tariffs as took place not long ago between Russia and Germany. And so between Russians and Germans a feeling of animosity is fostered, which is still more inflamed by the Franco-Russian agreement, and may lead at one moment or another to a bloody war.

I have mentioned these last two examples of the influence of a government over the people for exciting their animosity against another people, because they have occurred in our times. But in all history there is no war which was not hatched by the governments, the governments alone, independent of the interests of the people, to whom war is always pernicious even when successful.

The government assures the people that they are in danger from the invasion of another nation, or from foes in their midst, and that the only way to escape this danger is by the slavish obedience of the people to their government. This fact is seen most prominently during revolutions and dictatorships, but it exists always and everywhere the power of the government is in place. Every government explains its existence, and justifies its deeds of violence, by the argument that if it did not exist the condition of things would be very much worse. After assuring the people of the current danger, the government subordinates it to control, and once engendered this situation, compels it to attack some other nation. And thus the manufactured danger of attack from other nations is corroborated in the eyes of the people.

Divide et impera.

Patriotism in its simplest, clearest, and most indubitable signification is nothing else but a means of obtaining for the rulers their ambitions and covetous desires, and for the ruled the abdication of human dignity, reason, and conscience, and a slavish enthralment to those in power.

Patriotism is slavery.

Those who preach peace by arbitration argue thus: Two animals cannot divide their prey otherwise than by fighting; as also is the case with children, savages, and savage nations. But reasonable people settle their differences by argument, persuasion, and by referring the decision of the question to other impartial and reasonable persons. So the nations should act today. This argument seems quite correct. The nations of our time have reached the period of reasonableness, have no animosity toward one another, and might decide their differences in a peaceful fashion. But this argument applies only so far as it has reference to the people, and only to the people who are not under the control of a government. But the people that subordinate themselves to a government cannot be reasonable, because the subordination is in itself a sign of lack of reason.

How can we speak of the reasonableness of individuals who promise in advance to accomplish everything, including murder, that the government — that is, certain men who have attained a certain position — may command? Individuals who can accept such obligations, and resignedly subordinate themselves to anything that may be prescribed by persons unknown to them in Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, Paris, cannot be considered reasonable; and the government, that is, those who are in possession of such power, can still less be considered reasonable, and cannot but misuse it, and become dazed by such insane and dreadful power.

This is why peace between nations cannot be attained by reasonable means, by conversations, by arbitration, as long as the subordination of the people to the government continues, a condition always unreasonable and always pernicious. But the subordination of people to governments will exist as long as patriotism exists, because all governmental authority is founded upon patriotism, that is, upon the readiness of people to subordinate themselves to authority in order to defend their nation, country, or state from dangers which are supposed to threaten. The power of the French kings over their people before the Revolution was founded on patriotism; upon it too was based the power of the Committee of Public Welfare after the Revolution; upon it was erected the power of Napoleon, both as consul and as emperor; upon it, after the downfall of Napoleon, was based the power of the Bourbons, then that of the Republic, Louis Philippe, and again of the Republic; then of Napoleon III, and again of the Republic, and upon it finally rested the power of M. Boulanger.

It is dreadful to say so, but there is not, nor has there been, any conjoint violence of one people against another which was not accomplished in the name of patriotism. In its name the Russians fought the French, and the French the Russians; in its name Russians and French are preparing to fight the Germans, and the Germans to wage war on two frontiers. And such is the case not only with wars. In the name of patriotism the Russians stifle the Poles, the Germans persecute the Slavonians, the men of the Commune killed those of Versailles, and those of Versailles the men of the Commune.

Emma Goldman

Patriotism: a menace to liberty (1908)

A powerful and well documented plea against the insanity and rottenness of patriotism.

Source: Emma Goldman, *Anarchism and other essays*, 1917.

What is patriotism? Is it love of one's birthplace, the place of childhood's recollections and hopes, dreams and aspirations? Is it the place where, in childlike naivety, we would watch the fleeting clouds, and wonder why we, too, could not run so swiftly? The place where we would count the milliard glittering stars, terror-stricken lest each one "an eye should be," piercing the very depths of our little souls? Is it the place where we would listen to the music of the birds, and long to have wings to fly, even as they, to distant lands? Or the place where we would sit at mother's knee, enraptured by wonderful tales of great deeds and conquests? In short, is it love for the spot, every inch representing dear and precious recollections of a happy, joyous, and playful childhood?

If that were patriotism, few American men of today could be called upon to be patriotic, since the place of play has been turned into factory, mill, and mine, while deafening sounds of machinery have replaced the music of the birds. Nor can we longer hear the tales of great deeds, for the stories our mothers tell today are but those of sorrow, tears, and grief.

What, then, is patriotism? "Patriotism, sir, is the last resort of scoundrels," said Dr. Johnson. Leo Tolstoy, the greatest anti-patriot of our times, defines patriotism as the principle that will justify the training of wholesale murderers; a trade that requires better equipment for the exercise of man-killing than the making of such necessities of life as shoes, clothing, and houses; a trade that guarantees better returns and greater glory than that of the average workingman.

Gustave Hervé [**1**], another great anti-patriot, justly calls patriotism a superstition — one far more injurious, brutal, and inhumane than religion. The superstition of religion originated in man's inability to explain natural phenomena. That is, when primitive man heard thunder or saw the lightning, he could not account for either, and therefore concluded that back of them must be a force greater than himself. Similarly he saw a supernatural force in the rain, and in the various other changes in nature. Patriotism, on the other hand, is a superstition artificially created and maintained through a network of lies and falsehoods; a superstition that robs man of his self-respect and dignity, and increases his arrogance and conceit.

Indeed, conceit, arrogance, and egotism are the essentials of patriotism. Let me illustrate. Patriotism assumes that our globe is divided into little spots, each one surrounded by an iron gate. Those who have had the fortune of being born on some particular spot, consider themselves better, nobler, grander, more intelligent than the living beings inhabiting any other spot. It is, therefore, the duty of everyone living on that chosen spot to fight, kill, and die in the attempt to impose his superiority upon all the others.

The inhabitants of the other spots reason in like manner, of course, with the result that, from early infancy, the mind of the child is poisoned with bloodcurdling stories about the Germans, the French, the Italians, Russians, etc. When the child has reached manhood, he is thoroughly saturated with the belief that he is chosen by the Lord himself to defend *his* country against the attack or invasion of any foreigner. It is for that purpose that we are clamoring for a greater army and navy, more battleships and ammunition. It is for that purpose that America has within a short time spent four hundred million dollars. Just think of it — four hundred million dollars taken from the produce of *the people*. For surely it is not the rich who contribute to patriotism. They are cosmopolitans, perfectly at home in every land. We in America know well the truth of this. Are not our rich Americans Frenchmen in France, Germans in Germany, or Englishmen in England? And do they not squander with cosmopolitan grace fortunes coined by American factory children and cotton slaves? Yes, theirs is the patriotism that will make it possible to send messages of condolence to a despot like the Russian Tsar, when any mishap befalls him, as President Roosevelt [**2**] did in the name of *his* people, when Sergius [**3**] was punished by the Russian revolutionists.

It is a patriotism that will assist the arch-murderer, Diaz [**4**], in destroying thousands of lives in Mexico, or that will even aid in arresting Mexican revolutionists on American soil and keep them incarcerated in American prisons, without the slightest cause or reason.

But, then, patriotism is not for those who represent wealth and power. It is good enough for the people. It reminds one of the historic wisdom of Frederick the Great, the bosom friend of Voltaire, who said: "Religion is a fraud, but it must be maintained for the masses."

That patriotism is rather a costly institution, no one will doubt after considering the following statistics. The progressive increase of the

expenditures for the leading armies and navies of the world during the last quarter of a century is a fact of such gravity as to startle every thoughtful student of economic problems. It may be briefly indicated by dividing the time from 1881 to 1905 into five-year periods, and noting the disbursements of several great nations for army and navy purposes during the first and last of those periods. From the first to the last of the periods noted the expenditures of Great Britain increased from $2,101,848,936 to $4,143,226,885, those of France from $3,324,500,000 to $3,455,109,900, those of Germany from $725,000,200 to $2,700,375,600, those of the United States from $1,275,500,750 to $2,650,900,450, those of Russia from $1,900,975,500 to $5,250,445,100, those of Italy from $1,600,975,750 to $1,755,500,100, and those of Japan from $182,900,500 to $700,925,475.

The military expenditures of each of the nations mentioned increased in each of the five-year periods under review.

[...]

The awful waste that patriotism necessitates ought to be sufficient to cure the man of even average intelligence from this disease. Yet patriotism demands still more. The people are urged to be patriotic and for that luxury they pay, not only by supporting their "defenders," but even by sacrificing their own children. Patriotism requires allegiance to the flag, which means obedience and readiness to kill father, mother, brother, sister.

The usual contention is that we need a standing army to protect the country from foreign invasion. Every intelligent man and woman knows, however, that this is a myth maintained to frighten and coerce the foolish. The governments of the world, knowing each other's interests, do not invade each other. They have learned that they can gain much more by international arbitration of disputes than by war and conquest. Indeed, as Carlyle said,

> "War is a quarrel between two thieves too cowardly to fight their own battle; therefore they take boys from one village and another village, stick them into uniforms, equip them with guns, and let them loose like wild beasts against each other."

[...]

The contention that a standing army and navy is the best security of peace is about as logical as the claim that the most peaceful citizen is he who goes about heavily armed. The experience of every-day life fully proves that the armed individual is invariably anxious to try his strength. The same is historically true of governments. Really peaceful countries do not waste life and energy in war preparations, with the result that peace is maintained.

However, the clamor for an increased army and navy is not due to any foreign danger. It is owing to the dread of the growing discontent of the masses and of the international spirit among the workers. It is to meet the internal enemy that the Powers of various countries are preparing themselves; an enemy, who, once awakened to consciousness, will prove more dangerous than any foreign invader.

The powers that have for centuries been engaged in enslaving the masses have made a thorough study of their psychology. They know that the people at large are like children whose despair, sorrow, and tears can be turned into joy with a little toy. And the more gorgeously the toy is dressed, the louder the colors, the more it will appeal to the million-headed child.

An army and navy represents the people's toys. To make them more attractive and acceptable, hundreds and thousands of dollars are being spent for the display of these toys. That was the purpose of the American government in equipping a fleet and sending it along the Pacific coast, that every American citizen should be made to feel the pride and glory of the United States. The city of San Francisco spent

one hundred thousand dollars for the entertainment of the fleet; Los Angeles, sixty thousand; Seattle and Tacoma, about one hundred thousand. To entertain the fleet, did I say? To dine and wine a few superior officers, while the "brave boys" had to mutiny to get sufficient food. Yes, two hundred and sixty thousand dollars were spent on fireworks, theatre parties, and revelries, at a time when men, women, and children through the breadth and length of the country were starving in the streets; when thousands of unemployed were ready to sell their labor at any price.

Two hundred and sixty thousand dollars! What could not have been accomplished with such an enormous sum? But instead of bread and shelter, the children of those cities were taken to see the fleet, that it may remain, as one of the newspapers said, "a lasting memory for the child."

A wonderful thing to remember, is it not? The implements of civilized slaughter. If the mind of the child is to be poisoned with such memories, what hope is there for a true realization of human brotherhood?

We Americans claim to be a peace-loving people. We hate bloodshed; we are opposed to violence. Yet we go into spasms of joy over the possibility of projecting dynamite bombs from flying machines upon helpless citizens. We are ready to hang, electrocute, or lynch anyone, who, from economic necessity, will risk his own life in the attempt upon that of some industrial magnate. Yet our hearts swell with pride at the thought that America is becoming the most powerful nation on earth, and that it will eventually plant her iron foot on the necks of all other nations.

Such is the logic of patriotism.

Considering the evil results that patriotism is fraught with for the average man, it is as nothing compared with the insult and injury that patriotism heaps upon the soldier himself, — that poor, deluded

victim of superstition and ignorance. He, the savior of his country, the protector of his nation, — what has patriotism in store for him? A life of slavish submission, vice, and perversion, during peace; a life of danger, exposure, and death, during war.

[...]

Thinking men and women the world over are beginning to realize that patriotism is too narrow and limited a conception to meet the necessities of our time. The centralisation of power has brought into being an international feeling of solidarity among the oppressed nations of the world; a solidarity which represents a greater harmony of interests between the workingman of America and his brothers abroad than between the American miner and his exploiting compatriot; a solidarity which fears not foreign invasion, because it is bringing all the workers to the point when they will say to their masters, "Go and do your own killing. We have done it long enough for you."

This solidarity is awakening the consciousness of even the soldiers, they, too, being flesh of the flesh of the great human family. A solidarity that has proven infallible more than once during past struggles, and which has been the impetus inducing the Parisian soldiers, during the Commune of 1871, to refuse to obey when ordered to shoot their brothers. It has given courage to the men who mutinied on Russian warships during recent years. It will eventually bring about the uprising of all the oppressed and downtrodden against their international exploiters.

The proletariat of Europe has realized the great force of that solidarity and has, as a result, inaugurated a war against patriotism and its bloody spectre, militarism. Thousands of men fill the prisons of France, Germany, Russia, and the Scandinavian countries, because they dared to defy the ancient superstition. Nor is the movement limited to the working class; it has embraced representatives in all

stations of life, its chief exponents being men and women prominent in art, science, and letters.

America will have to follow suit. The spirit of militarism has already permeated all walks of life. Indeed, I am convinced that militarism is growing a greater danger here than anywhere else, because of the many bribes capitalism holds out to those whom it wishes to destroy.

The beginning has already been made in the schools. Evidently the government holds to the Jesuitical conception, "Give me the child mind, and I will mould the man." Children are trained in military tactics, the glory of military achievements extolled in the curriculum, and the youthful minds perverted to suit the government. Further, the youth of the country is appealed to in glaring posters to join the army and navy. "A fine chance to see the world!" cries the governmental huckster. Thus innocent boys are morally shanghaied into patriotism, and the military Moloch strides conquering through the Nation.

The American workingman has suffered so much at the hands of the soldier, State and Federal, that he is quite justified in his disgust with, and his opposition to, the uniformed parasite. However, mere denunciation will not solve this great problem. What we need is a propaganda of education for the soldier: antipatriotic literature that will enlighten him as to the real horrors of his trade, and that will awaken his consciousness to his true relation to the man to whose labor he owes his very existence.

It is precisely this that the authorities fear most. It is already high treason for a soldier to attend a radical meeting. No doubt they will also stamp it high treason for a soldier to read a radical pamphlet. But, then, has not authority from time immemorial stamped every step of progress as treasonable? Those, however, who earnestly strive for social reconstruction can well afford to face all that; for it is probably even more important to carry the truth into the barracks than into the factory. When we have undermined the patriotic lie, we

shall have cleared the path for that great structure wherein all nationalities shall be united into a universal brotherhood, — a truly FREE SOCIETY.

Notes

[1] Gustave Hervé (Brest 1871 - Paris 1944) gained notoriety in 1901 by writing an article which included the image of the tricolour planted in a pile of manure. He was a strong antimilitarist voice until 1912 as director of the paper *La Guerre Sociale* (The Social War). Then, frustrated by the ineffectiveness of all his efforts he abandoned his antimilitarism and became nationalist and patriotic, founding with others, in 1919, a national socialist party.

[2] Theodore Roosevelt (October 27, 1858 - January 6, 1919) 26th President of the U.S.A. He expanded the power of the Federal State over social and economic life.

[3] The Grand Duke Sergius, commander of the Moscow garrison and uncle of the Tsar Nicholas II was assassinated by the social revolutionary Kaliaiev.

[4] Porfirio Diaz (15 September 1830 - 2 July 1915) President of Mexico for over 30 years (1877-18881 and 1884-1911), he controlled the political and administrative life through a system generally referred to as centralized tyranny.

Albert Schweitzer

Psychopathology of Nationalism (1915-1917)

A very powerful statement against the virus of nationalism that has caused so much harm, and continues to do so, throughout the world.

Source: Albert Schweitzer, *Psychopatologie du Nationalisme*, 1915-1917.

The origins of the nation state and nationalism

The idea of the nation state essentially took hold in all developed countries during the 19th century. The advent of the nationalist nation state seemed to fulfil the deepest desire of civilisation. As a result, national sentiment became an end in itself, freed from the constraints of civilisation, reason and morality.

In reality, the nation state, which is built on this principle, is proving incapable of serving the universal state and embodying it. On the contrary, it denies it and does everything in its power to prevent its development. And all the solemn declarations to the contrary,

claiming that it is working towards this goal, that it is fighting for its advent and that it has no other purpose, change nothing.

A national sentiment as unbridled and pushed to the point of absurdity as that which has arisen in Europe in the 19th century has no equivalent in the past, among any people. It is truly something new in the history of humanity, which has required a new word, 'nationalism.'

The question of the right of a particular people to national existence with its own language and culture, and the question of the borders of the territory to which it is entitled, were addressed and settled during the 19th century in the process of nation-state formation. Only a few specific cases remain unresolved, but these should not pose insurmountable difficulties provided that the parties concerned show themselves to be reasonable.

Two types of difficulties can be distinguished. The first concerns patriotic sentiment as such; the second involves divergent economic or geostrategic interests. It must first be acknowledged that the process of forming nation states could not be completed everywhere in a way that was satisfactory to all, because, by their very nature, it is inevitable that here and there small sections of a people, constituting minorities, and their territories, constituting enclaves, will find themselves incorporated into a state other than that corresponding to their nature or culture.

This often stems from the fact that two or more peoples coexist in a border country; it also happens that part of a people has lived for so long within a nation that it feels deeply attached to it, more so than to its neighbour nation with which it shares the same language and ethnic origin.

It may therefore be impossible to divide territories on either side of a border fairly according to a strict national principle, for a wide variety of reasons. Thus, historical considerations, topographical

features (the course of a river, the crest of a mountain) and economic interests ultimately determine the division of territories, which does not respect a very ancient linguistic border. Many peoples have never been autonomous, while others have lost their autonomy over the course of history because they lacked the necessary virtues to preserve it. They have therefore remained minorities, enjoying varying degrees of freedom within larger entities to which the fate of history has subordinated them and where their existence has multiplied the number of enclaves.

It is mainly for overseas countries, which are not yet under the control of the major powers, that the question of dividing up territories according to the economic and geopolitical interests of the moment now arises. The best lands have already been distributed to the colonisers. What remains to be conquered is of no major strategic interest, even in the long term, for the development of any of the powers. National interest cannot therefore be invoked.

Nationalism is not a natural consequence of these situations; rather, it arises from an exaggerated sense of belonging to the nation, and is a psychological phenomenon. Once the nation has been largely formed, the movement of the soul that inspired it does not stop, but enters a condition of growing excitement and generates ideas of grandeur and persecution that then alter its content.

It is according to these ideas that policy will now be decided and that events will take on, as we have seen in recent decades, an excessive dramatic charge. If an economic or territorial advantage is called into question, the sacrosanct rights of the nation are immediately invoked. If a concession is considered, the homeland is immediately believed to be in danger.

Pathologies of nationalism

By its very nature, nationalism consists of a pathological interpretation and transformation of political realities, against a backdrop of megalomaniacal and paranoid ideas, the product of a delusional imagination. And by operating in this way, in mindsets, discourses and actions, nationalism only serves to permanently exacerbate reality.

One people's ideas of greatness become a reality for other peoples, something they have to reckon with and which reinforces their own fears of persecution. They then act in the same way towards their neighbours. This is how an initially imaginary threat becomes a real one. A sick imagination and a certain way to perceive reality form a circle in which increasingly absurd representations and increasingly absurd situations reinforce each other, fatally tilting politics towards absurd actions and coups.

The root cause of this whole process lies in the decline of a civilisation after it has elevated the national idea to the status of a supreme cultural value.

When general ethical principles and values are no longer powerful enough to regulate a sentiment such as love of country, when it is no longer informed by moral reason, it begins to grow and proliferate. As other ideals collapse, the national ideal, the sole survivor, becomes the ideal of ideals; as we allow the assets of civilisation to be lost, nationalism appears to embody all that remains and thus to make up for their absence.

This explains the mentality of our time; all the enthusiasm of which the people are capable is focused on the national idea, with the illusion that it is now the repository of all spiritual values and morality, so that this idea, experienced in a primitive love of country, becomes perverted, exclusive and morbid. The result is that it is impossible to

hold a rational discussion with our contemporaries on the question of nationality.

Even those who otherwise display logical thinking and ethical sensibilities willingly or instinctively stop thinking and judging rationally when their patriotic feelings are touched. For the modern masses, national ideas have become a taboo that no calm reflection is allowed to shake. It is taken for granted that reason and morality have no place here, and strict respect is demanded for these feelings, which are considered the most sacred of all. Nationalism, in fact, now presents itself as a popular religion.

If in the past the decline of culture did not have such dire consequences as it does today, it was because the national idea had never been elevated to the status of a civilisational value. It remained within the bounds of a simple feeling of attachment to one's country and was not associated with considerations about the meaning of civilisation. The idea that this meaning passed through it and found its fulfilment there was foreign at the time. It was therefore inconceivable, in this frame of mind, that the national idea could replace the ideal of civilisation itself. The state of barbarism that could have taken hold was not then activated and aggravated, as we now see, by the rise of nationalist representations and conceptions of history.

If we understand the pathological nature of nationalism itself, we will pay little attention to a discussion that attempts to determine which people are most responsible for its unstoppable spread.

In fact, the historical task of objectively reconstructing its origins and spread throughout civilisation is impossible at present. It has not always been most powerful where it has been most vocal; it has often been observed that it has progressed most rapidly in a latent stage. On the whole, the disturbances it has caused have been of the same nature everywhere, except that, depending on the circumstances, it has manifested itself more strongly in some peoples than in others.

(The same bacillus appears in different cultures.)

Unity of humanity

Progress in the realisation of the ideas of reason will be correlated with the shaking of the authority of national cultures and the decline of their credit.

Thought guided by reason can only lead to the conception of a single, universal civilisation. The spiritual norms it establishes are addressed to people as citizens of humanity, not as national citizens. However, as members of national communities, they understand that their role is to contribute to the formation of a global civilisation. In this process, the particular talents of these communities will manifest themselves, without harming the unity of civilisation, but rather enhancing it.

The richer the spiritual life of a people, the better it will fit into the melting pot of general civilisation with all its distinctive features. The brighter the colours of the spectrum, the more intense the brightness of the white light that unites them all.

The theory that races and peoples have specific cultures that they must protect does not stand up to either ethnology or historical science.

The first teaches us that racial differences, as they are presented today, simply do not exist. Both historical knowledge and skull measurements show that European peoples, who are bearers of different cultures, are the result of the most astonishing population mixing. None of them reveal any absolutely unique or pure characteristics. Even the common distinction between Latin and Germanic races is unfounded. What we take to be a difference in racial disposition is in fact the product of historically recent events and situations (political regimes, religious affiliations).

The European peoples, heirs to the Greco-Roman world, entered the Middle Ages together and successively experienced, at a rapid pace, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and modern philosophy. Together with their colonial extensions in other parts of the world, they constitute an indivisible unity of civilisation. If cultural differences between them have become increasingly marked and apparent in recent times, this is primarily due to a weakening of civilisation. When the tide goes out, the unevenness and crevices that the flow covered and hid appear on the beach.

Proof that the peoples of world historical civilisation are spiritually related is that they are undergoing the same process of decline.

In the name of the ideas of reason, which lay down the conditions for civilisation and its renewal, national cultures engaged in a process of regeneration and seeking to export their culture will be subjected to uncompromising criticism. For the ideas of reason can only be revived if we are first convinced that our existing concepts and organisations are simply untenable.

The leading thinkers of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment must have felt something similar; it was under pressure from necessity that they found within themselves the courage to think and the will to change the world by infusing it with new ideas. If we do not experience a similar dilemma ourselves, either to change or to decline, we will be unable to take up and continue the intellectual work begun by the men of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment.

But instead, we are repulsed by seeing things as they are and cling with all our might to an optimistic vision of our civilisation.

The murky mixture of optimism and pessimism that pervades the spirit of our age, with the former dominating the latter, is not the result of acquired knowledge about the phenomena of the universe, and in particular the human phenomenon, which would be obvious to any clear-minded person, but rather stems from a deficiency in

thinking. It will be overcome to the extent that a will, underlying the ideals of reason, manifests itself among us.

Then the way will be open for an optimistic world view, and we will be able to resume and advance the work of civilisation.

But those who know that the formation of such a will is the great task before us cannot but give themselves the right to destroy the semi-ideals contained in masked pessimism.

Their mission is to demolish, without any kind of pity, the old temples, to prepare for the construction of new realities.

Any form of understanding and indulgence must give way to the need to realise the absolute impossibility of preserving the current spiritual and political arrangements.

This realisation is a prerequisite for emerging from decadence and for the necessary regeneration.

Carlton J. H. Hayes

Nationalism as a Religion (1926)

This essay on nationalism is a masterpiece of social and cultural analysis. It deals with religion and with the replacement of spiritual religion by the secular state religion of nationalism. The valuable aspect of this essay consists in the wealth of informative data provided by the author to underpin his thesis, so that it is very difficult to dismiss or ignore what is here presented.

Source: Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1928.

I

The present generation has a curious hobby of at least pretending to like a thing not because it has intrinsic excellence but solely because it is new. In some quarters this hobby is interpreted as "progress." Indeed the proverbial Man from Mars, initiated into the temper of our age and informed of the current vogue of nationalism on Earth,

might reasonably conjecture that nationalism is extolled by us because it is modern. He would be right, as I have sought to show, in guessing that it is modern; he might truthfully say that it is very modern; but he would be wrong in concluding that its modernity is the sole or chief cause of its popularity.

Contemporary nationalism has been attributed to historical events of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. It has been explained that the contact of political democracy, the Industrial Revolution, and philosophical romanticism with a long germinating popular consciousness of nationality produced a nationalist process and a nationalist doctrine — the body and the soul, as it were, of nationalism. It has also been explained that the doctrine was preached and the process made palatable to the masses of mankind by means of educational and propagandist agencies which the French Revolution deemed desirable and the Industrial Revolution rendered practical — national schooling, national militarism, and national journalism. These explanations, however, are not entirely satisfactory. They may be valid so far as they go, but they do not make perfectly clear why apostles of nationalism are characterised by a missionary zeal that is fiery and why its multitudinous disciples are possessed of a love that is consuming. Why are millions ready and willing to lay down their lives for nationalism?

There have been many historical processes and philosophical preachments which called forth no such popular response in the past as in the present age nationalism evokes. Ancient stoicism, mediaeval nominalism or realism, modern hedonism, alike have led to interesting speculation by "intellectuals," have been accepted by influential members of the upper classes, and have had at least some indirect effect upon the masses, but great aggregates of men have never fought and died for any of those philosophies. There must be something more than a philosophy, something more than a doctrine and an historical process, about modern nationalism.

This something is obviously an emotion, an emotional loyalty to the idea or the fact of the national state, a loyalty so intensely emotional that it motivates all sorts of people and causes them to subordinate all other human loyalties to national loyalty. In modern national states, of course, individual citizens still retain many if not most of the emotional loyalties to particular persons, specific places, and peculiar ideas that have marked the human race since the dawn of its history. The loyalty of the American to a political leader, a secret lodge, a church, a trade-union, a college, a New England town, a Southern plantation, or a Western ranch, is different in degree but not in kind from loyalties of ancient Roman, Jew, and Egyptian. Now as ever, too, it may transpire that an individual must choose between two loyalties: he may throw over a political leader to do the bidding of a secret lodge; he may leave the lodge at the behest of his priests; he may turn against the priests in order to follow the fortunes of a political leader. But nowadays, and herein lies the fundamental difference between us and our ancient and mediaeval and early modern forebears, the individual is commonly disposed, in case of conflict, to sacrifice one loyalty after another, loyalty to persons, places and ideas, loyalty even to family, to the paramount call of nationality and the national state. This is nationalism, and surely it must have a richly emotional content to predominate over all other emotional loyalties of the present generation.

Now, as one looks back over the multifarious pages of man's history, one is struck by the frequency and force of human movements which have had their mainspring in religious emotion. Herein is a valuable clue for us. May it not be that we shall here find the most convincing explanation of the strength of modern nationalism, the zeal of its apostles, and the devotion of its disciples? Is it not a demonstrable fact that nationalism has become to a vast number of persons a veritable religion, capable of arousing that deep and compelling emotion which is essentially religious? To this aspect of the subject let us address ourselves.

2

From the dawn of his history man has been distinguished by what may be called a "religious sense," that is, a mysterious faith in some power outside of himself, a faith always accompanied by feelings of reverence and usually attended by external acts and ceremonial. Everywhere, under the most diverse forms, you find its expression, in the caves of primitive men, in the pyramids of Egypt, in the laws of Moses and the rites of Aaron, in the words of the Delphic oracle, in the tended fire of the Vestal virgins, in the temples of Inca and Aztec, in the tabus of Eskimo and Hottentot. You find it enshrined in great religious systems, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism, which through the centuries have counted their devotees by billions. As always, so today, man feels its spell. Apparently the "religious sense" is so ingrained in man that normally he must give expression to it in one way or another. He may lose faith in a particular religion, but if so he usually dedicates himself consciously or unconsciously to another object of worship. It may be worship of Christ or Buddha; it may be worship of totem or fetish; it may likewise be worship of science or humanity — provided these concepts are written in his mind with capital letters. In any case it involves an experience, a reverential emotion, which is primordially religious.

Even in ages when doubt and scepticism about a popular religion have been most rampant, the very sceptics and doubters have been disposed to seek some object outside of themselves to which they might pay reverence. For example, in the early centuries of the Christian era, when Graeco-Roman Paganism was losing its hold upon the intellectual classes of the Roman Empire, there was a notable tendency to find an outlet for the religious sense, on the one hand, in Stoicism and other philosophies that proclaimed a truer and higher divinity in Duty or in Reasoned Pleasure, and, on the other hand, in

mystical communion with strange and somewhat bizarre gods, with Isis and Osiris, with Mithra, or with the "spirits" of Neo-Platonism. The resultant unsettling and diversification of religion was in that instance only transitional and not at all irreligious; it inspired quaint attempts to mingle and reconcile heterogeneous objects of worship; it presently produced a kind of religious syncretism; and thereby it prepared the way for the eventual widespread diffusion and acceptance of Christianity. Christianity was, in fundamental respects, novel and revolutionary, but it did not represent a clean break with the past; it preserved much of the antique doctrine and practice of Judaism, and simultaneously it borrowed for its cult and theology many elements from pagan and Gentile religions. Christianity was a syncretic religion, as had been, Graeco-Roman Paganism before it. Both Paganism and Christianity, and also the transitional steps from the one to the other, appealed to man's religious sense.

Again, in the later middle ages, doubts arose and multiplied in western and central Europe about the teaching of the Catholic Church concerning the nature and proper worship of the Christian God. Followed the rise of Protestantism. But as one studies historic Protestantism one is impressed less by the novelties which the Reformers introduced into the content of Christianity than by the conservatism with which they clung to certain central dogmas and rites of the older Christian Church [1]. They borrowed plentifully from Catholicism, whilst at the same time they appropriated much from the intellectual movements of their day and put themselves especially under new obligations to ancient Judaism. Conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism in the sixteenth century doubtless betokened a lessening faith in a particular religion, but the historical student knows that the sixteenth century was not irreligious. In Protestantism, as in Catholicism, or in Judaism, and likewise in the transition from one to another, man gave expression to his religious sense.

In like manner it may be argued that the subsequent rapid disintegration of Protestantism into innumerable denominations and sects has been simply a modern parallel to the ancient deliquescence of Graeco-Roman Paganism and further that the syncretism latterly proceeding in the Protestant world may correspondingly usher in a new form of religion, which, however Christian and Protestant in name, will depart very considerably from historic Protestantism and historic Christianity. Yet such a neo-Protestantism, if and when it appears, will be, quite as much as historic Protestantism, and as historic Catholicism before that, an embodiment of man's religious sense [2].

Of all periods of religious scepticism and theological doubt, the most crucial in human history, at any rate for our present purpose, is the eighteenth century. It was the eighteenth century which witnessed in western Europe, especially in France, the mocking attacks of Voltaire and other "enlightened" litterateurs upon "supernatural" religion and ecclesiastical institutions. Christian tradition and the Christian Bible were alike impugned. Ecclesiastical authority was assailed. Miracles were ridiculed, and mysteries such as the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Redemption, were rejected. Christianity was denounced as superstition and its clergy as humbugs. Nor were these opinions and judgments confined to a few philosophers. They were shared by wide circles, so that the eighteenth century clearly witnessed a pronounced loosening of the hold of traditional Christianity, whether Catholic or Protestant, upon the intellectual classes of Europe. For the first time since the Arian Controversy, a large number of influential adherents to Christianity had come openly to doubt the truth and worth of its most fundamental tenets; for the first time, Christian intellectuals would abandon Christianity or subvert it wholly. Many of the eighteenth-century intellectuals perceived in the Trinity, in the God-made-Man, and in the Christian sacraments, only the vain imaginings of dupes or hypocrites. They perceived nothing in the Christian Revelation or, for that matter, in any "super-

naturalism," to which man could justifiably attach any devotion or reverence. They were logical — in their fashion. They might not and they would not express their religious sense in Christian worship. They would not be Christians.

But those same intellectuals of the eighteenth century did possess a religious sense. And they showed it in many curious ways. Most of them got excited about a God of Nature who started things which he could not stop and who was so intent upon watching numberless worlds go round in their appointed orbits and so transfixed by the operation of all the eternal immutable Laws which he had invented that he had no time or ear for the little entreaties of puny men upon a pygmy Earth. This God of Nature was obviously not much of a person and not much of a power; he was only a fraction of the God of the Christians. But he was outside of man, and eighteenth-century intellectuals managed somehow to develop quite a mysterious feeling about him. They praised him with a voice so loud that he would have heard them if he could have heard anyone, and with a voice so awed that it betrayed the religious fervour which moved them.

The God of Nature was not, of course, the only object of religious devotion on the part of eighteenth-century intellectuals. Some discovered and paid obeisance to a mysterious force outside of themselves which they termed Science — though this Science, when duly capitalised, proved to be but a theological handmaid to the God of Nature. Others found a hydra-headed monstrosity which they proceeded to worship under the title of Humanity, and these were especially devout, perhaps because the deification of all Humanity is fraught with infinitely greater mystery than the conception of a single God-Man or even a Triune God. And between the sect of the Naturalists and that of the Humanitarians many another speedily arose. These were the Rationalists, who isolated a little bit of man's being and ascribed to it a most mysterious infallibility; the Progressives who venerated Progress as if it were a sailing vessel and who, by aid of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, were eager to

go wherever the wind might blow them; and the Perfectabilists, who with eyes of faith and the gift of tongues saw and proclaimed the millennium — Eden and Paradise — on this earth just around the corner.

As might be expected of any era of doubt and scepticism about popular religion, there was a good deal of syncretism among the cults of the eighteenth century. Some Humanitarians were devoted to Nature; some Naturalists adored Reason; some Rationalists worshipped at a side-altar to Perfectability or Progress or Humanity; even some Christians who exchanged their traditional God for Nature went on styling themselves Christian and participating in Christian worship. In any event, the eighteenth century, which beheld a waning faith in Christianity, beheld a waxing faith in Deism, Nature, Law, Science, Reason, Progress, Perfectability, and Humanity. It beheld also the rise of various organisations, such as Freemasonry and Illuminism, which enshrined one or all of the cults of the day and began to spread internationally. In the whole of the new syncretism, as well as in its component elements, the intellectual of the eighteenth century was giving expression to his inherent sense of religion.

3

All the doubting and sceptical periods of which mention has here been made have been characterised by another sort of worship — the worship of the Political State. It is an interesting fact that during the second and third centuries, when pagan scepticism was prevalent among Greek and Roman intellectuals and when philosophers and mystics were toying with new cults, the deification of the Roman Emperor was completed and his worship was widely and popularly indulged. It is another interesting fact that in the sixteenth century, when doubt about Catholicism was rife, not only Protestantism appeared on the scene, but also that popular exaltation of the lay

State which a host of the intellectuals of the time — Machiavelli and Erastus (to name but two) — proclaimed and idealised. It is, moreover, an arresting fact that the eighteenth century, which witnessed among the classes the growth of scepticism about Christianity and simultaneously the rise of a novel faith in Deism, witnessed also, for the masses, the enthronement of the national state — *la Patrie* — as the central object of worship. Perhaps these instances are mere coincidence; more likely they may represent causal connections.

Doubt about a particular popular religion begins with intellectuals, and intellectuals as a class are notoriously timid. They have frequently been fearful of the unsettling effects of their own doubts upon the masses, and even willing on occasion that the masses, for the sake of social peace and general security, should go on indulging in belief and worship which to these intellectuals must seem superstitious. At the same time their very scepticism denies them any leadership in the preservation of the older popular religion, and their substituted faiths are usually so diverse and so abstract as to militate against the immediate and vulgar acceptance of any of them as a new popular religion. What is more natural, under these trying circumstances, than that the masses should be encouraged to transfer a large part of their inherent awe and reverence from a "supernatural" religion which the classes deem superstitious if not degrading, to a political religion which has the twofold advantage of being obviously real and of having physical power sufficient to club the multitudes into some semblance of social harmony? Let the masses and the classes unite to rear and dedicate a high altar to the state; the masses may then be suffered to bring a few flowers to the little side-shrines of their ancestral gods, whilst the classes in assured peace can utilise the crypt for their novel rites and gradually impregnate the whole temple with the strange sweet odors of their esoteric incense.

The French Revolution – that landmark in the history of nationalism – was a landmark in the development of nationalism as a religion. At first many a French intellectual entertained the idea of syncretising

eighteenth-century philosophy with Catholic Christianity in a State Church which should be organised democratically and conducted in the national interests. "The state, it seems to me," said the Abbe Raynal, "is not made for religion, but religion is made for the state. ... The state has supremacy in everything ... When the state has pronounced, the church has nothing more to say." [3] The Civil Constitution of the Clergy, voted by the National Assembly in July, 1790, was the formal legal attempt to realise the Abbe's programme; it aimed to create a national clergy, under the control of the civil power, with the same standing as other state-officials. But the pope and the large majority of the French clergy were not ready for any such religious syncretism; the Civil Constitution was condemned at Rome in April, 1791; and thenceforth issue was squarely joined in France between the religions of Catholicism and Nationalism. Christianity was not formally proscribed, but only the clergy who swore allegiance to the Civil Constitution were allowed to perform Christian services, and the Catholic churches in most parts of France were transformed into civic temples. Against the refractory clergy, measures of increasing severity were taken; but severity did not suffice, and by the summer of 1793 a real persecution of Catholicism had begun. For in the minds of the Revolutionaries the Catholic clergy as a whole had committed the greatest infamy of all – they had defied the national state.

For nationalism truly became a religion with the French Revolutionaries. In the "new order" they perceived a miraculous regeneration for France not only, but for the entire human race. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was hailed as "the national catechism," [4] and solemn profession of belief in it was prescribed by the Constitution of 1791. Those who refused to swear to it were cut off from the community by civil excommunication, and foreigners who proclaimed their loyalty to it were admitted to the ranks of the faithful and enrolled as in a communion of saints. The written Constitution, embodying the Declaration, became holy writ.

At the first session of the Legislative Assembly, in the autumn of 1791, "twelve old men went in procession to seek the Book of the Constitution. They came back, having at their head the archivist Camus, who, holding up the Book with his two hands and resting it on his breast, carried with slow and measured tread the new Blessed Sacrament of the French. All the deputies stood up and bared their heads. Camus, with meditative mien, kept his eyes lowered." [5]

The tricolor *cocarde*, the "trees of liberty," the Phrygian cap, the tablets of the declaration of rights and of the Constitution, the altars to *la Patrie* — all these were symbols of the new faith. The Legislative Assembly decreed in June, 1792, that "in all the communes an altar to the Fatherland shall be raised, on which shall be engraved the Declaration of Rights with the inscription, 'the citizen is born, lives, and dies for *la Patrie*'." [6] Two years earlier, at Strasbourg was introduced the rite of "civic baptism." "Civic marriages" and "civic funerals" came later. And the new religion soon had its hymns and its prayers, its fasts and its festivals.

Whilst the masses were drawn increasingly to the faith and worship of the national state, the revolutionary intellectuals redoubled their attacks upon historic Catholicism and attempted to substitute for it various specialised cults of nationalism. In the National Convention, on November 5, 1793, Marie-Joseph Chenier proposed the formal establishment of an exclusively lay religion, that of *la Patrie*. "Wrest," said he, on that occasion, "the sons of the Republic from the yoke of theocracy which still weighs upon them. . . . Devoid of prejudices and worthy to represent the French nation, you will know how to found, on the debris of the dethroned superstitions, the single universal religion, which has neither sects nor mysteries, of which the only dogma is equality, of which our law-makers are the preachers, of which the magistrates are the pontiffs, and in which the human family burns its incense only at the altar of *la Patrie*, common mother and divinity." [7] Two days later the Constitutional bishop of Paris announced to the Convention his abdication, and declared that

"there should no longer be any public worship other than that of liberty and holy equality." [8] Three days more, and the worship of Reason was solemnly inaugurated in the cathedral of Notre Dame.

Reason, however, did not obtain universal or permanent adoration. It was speedily succeeded, under the influence of Robespierre, by the worship of the Supreme Being (Deism), and this in turn, after the downfall of Robespierre, by the civic cult of the Decadi and the ethical cult of Theophilanthropy. But what vitality there was in any or all of these varieties and vagaries of religious experience is attributable to their intermixture with the religion of nationalism. This religion had already lodged deep in popular consciousness, and eventually it was to emerge, in more or less curious syncretisms with older philosophies and world-religions, as the dominant religion of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Under the mask of laicisation the new religion of nationalism soon claimed the allegiance of a multitude of determined zealots throughout the world.

4

Nationalism, viewed as a religion, has much in common with other great religious systems of the past. It has, for example, a god, who is either the patron or the personification of one's *patrie*, one's fatherland, one's national state. This god resembles the Jewish Yahweh, in that he is the god of a chosen people, a jealous god, and preeminently a god of battles, but he must not be identified with Yahweh, for French and German and British and all non-Jewish nationalists have a contempt for Yahweh as deep-seated and expressive as the priests of Yahweh entertained in biblical times for Baal and his priests. Devotees of a particular national god are prone to mock and sneer at any failure of another national god to bring down fire from heaven.

On his own national god the modern religious nationalist is conscious of dependence. Of His powerful help he feels the need. In Him he recognises the source of his own perfection and happiness.

To Him, in a strictly religious sense, he subjects himself. Moreover, the religious nationalist not only is disposed subjectively to acknowledge his dependence on the national god, but also he is ready to acknowledge such dependence objectively through acts of homage and adoration. Nationalism, like any religion, calls into play not simply the will, but the intellect, the imagination, and the emotions. The intellect constructs a speculative theology or mythology of nationalism. The imagination builds an unseen world around the eternal past and the everlasting future of one's nationality. The emotions feed the theological virtues of faith, hope, and filial love; they arouse a joy and ecstasy in the contemplation of the national god, who is all-good and all-protecting, a longing for His favours, a thankfulness for His benefits, a fear of offending Him, and feelings of awe and reverence at the immensity of His power and wisdom; they express themselves naturally in worship, both internal and external, both private and public. For nationalism, again like any other religion, is to a large extent a social function, and its chief rites are public rites, performed in the name and for the salvation of the whole community.

Nationalism as a religion first appeared among peoples that were traditionally Christian, and it is not extraordinary, therefore, that it should have borrowed and adapted to its own purposes many customs and usages of historic Christianity. In fact the current notion of the national state is so similar to the mediaeval notion of the Christian Church that the close study of the doctrine and practices of contemporary nationalism is recommended to the modern man who would comprehend the seemingly incomprehensible middle ages.

To the modern national state, as to the mediaeval church, is attributable an *ideal*, a *mission*. It is the mission of salvation and the ideal of immortality. The nation is conceived of as eternal, and the deaths of her loyal sons do but add to her undying fame and glory. She protects her children and saves them from foreign devils; she assures them life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; she fosters for

them the arts and the sciences; and she gives them nourishment. Nor may the role of the modern national state, any more than that of the mediaeval church, be thought of as economic or mercenary; it is primarily spiritual, even otherworldly, and its driving force is its collective faith, a faith in its mission and destiny, a faith in things unseen, a faith that would move mountains. Nationalism is sentimental, emotional, and inspirational.

There are very definite and illuminating parallels between contemporary nationalism and mediaeval Christianity. Nowadays the individual is born into the national state as formerly he was born into the church, and the secular registration of birth is the national rite of baptism. Thenceforth, with tender solicitude, the state follows the individual through life, teaching him in patriotic schools the national catechism, showing him by pious precept and solemn sacrament the beauties of national holiness, fitting him for a life of service (no matter how glorious or how menial) to the state, the Alpha and Omega of his being, the author and finisher of his blessings, and commemorating his vital crises by formal registration (with a fee) not only of his birth but likewise of his marriage, of the birth of his children, and of his death. If he is a crusader in behalf of nationalism, his place of entombment is marked forever with the ensign of his service. And the funerals of national potentates and heroes are celebrated with patriotic pomp and circumstance that make the obsequies of mediaeval bishops seem drab.

Membership in some modern national state is compulsory.

The individual may withdraw from the earthly State Militant only by death or emigration, and in the latter case he finds it well nigh impossible to discover any land which does not possess some established form of the religion of nationalism. He may change his sect, so to speak, but not his religion. The fabled "man without a country" has become an up-to-date version of the "flying Dutchman." And the individual, however sceptical he may be about his national faith,

knows that compulsory membership in any national state involves compulsory financial support of its maintenance and missionary enterprise, for such a state is as insistent upon the collection of taxes as ever was the mediaeval church upon the levying of tithes.

Interior devotion to nationalism is expected of all persons, though here a little allowance can appropriately be made for human frailty. So long as public rites and ceremonies are decently observed, the hearts of the individual worshippers need not be too closely searched. Human beings doubtless differ from one another in the intensity of their religious feelings, and some, perhaps, are so abnormal as not to experience any religious emotion whatever. Besides, it has long been recognised that he who prays the loudest and beats his breast with greatest ostentation may be most lacking in true interior devotion. The ways of sceptics and doubters have been notoriously subtle, and it may be questioned whether Pharisees and whited sepulchres do not exist among the hordes of sincerely devout nationalists.

There can be no question, however, of the popular and compelling character of external nationalist worship. Blasphemy and sacrilege have always been treated by man as heinous crimes, and the modern man who allows a flitting mental doubt to find expression in jest or sneer at the expense of the national cult is eligible for mad-house or penitentiary.

The ritual of modern nationalism is simpler than that of certain other great historic religions, probably because sufficient time has not yet elapsed for its elaboration, but, considering its youthfulness, it is already fairly well developed. Nationalism's chief symbol of faith and central object of worship is the flag, and curious liturgical forms have been devised for "saluting" the flag, for "dipping" the flag, for "lowering" the flag, and for "hoisting" the flag. Men bare their heads when the flag passes by; and in praise of the flag poets write odes and children sing hymns. In America young people are ranged in serried

rows and required to recite daily, with hierophantic voice and ritualistic gesture, the mystical formula: "I pledge allegiance to our flag and to the country for which it stands, one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Everywhere, in all solemn feasts and fasts of nationalism the flag is in evidence, and with it that other sacred thing, the national anthem. An acute literary critic in his purely secular capacity might be tempted to find fault with certain phrases in "Rule Britannia," in "Deutschland über Alles," or even in the "Marseillaise"; he might conceivably object, on literary grounds, to such a lame beginning as "Oh say, can you see?" But a national anthem is not a profane object and does not admit of textual criticism. It is holy. It is the *Te Deum* of the new dispensation; the worshippers stand when it is intoned, the military at "attention" and the male civilians with uncovered heads, all with external signs of veneration and respect.

Nationalism has its parades, processions, and pilgrimages. It has, moreover, its distinctive holy days, and just as the Christian Church took over some festivals from Paganism, so the national state has borrowed freely from Christianity. In the United States, for example, the Fourth of July is a nationalist Christmas, Flag Day is substituted for Corpus Christi, and Decoration Day for the commemoration of All Souls of the faithful departed, whilst in place of the saints' days of the Christian calendar appear the birthdays of national saints and heroes, such as Washington and Lincoln. Nationalism also has its temples, and he who would find the places and the buildings that are held most dear and most sacred by the vast majority of Americans, should seek not Christian cathedrals but Independence Hall in Philadelphia, Faneuil Hall in Boston, the shrine to General Lee in Lexington, and that to General Grant in New York, and the city of Washington with its stately Capitol, its White House, its great monuments to Lincoln and Washington, and its adjacent Arlington and Mount Vernon.

Moderns, especially Americans, are inclined to regard the mediaeval veneration of images, icons, and relics as savouring of "superstition," but let them replace a statue of St. George by a graven image of General George Washington, an icon of the Blessed Virgin Mary by a lithograph of the brave Molly Pitcher, and a relic of the Holy Cross by a tattered battle-flag, and they display a reverence which they deem beautiful and ennobling. If one calls to mind the images of national heroes with which every town is plentifully supplied and the icons of national fathers which adorn both the sumptuous clubs of the rich and the simple cottages of the poor, one can appreciate the basic religious appeal of modern nationalism. In 1915, when the old cracked Liberty Bell was transported from Philadelphia to the San Francisco Exposition, throngs of refined and lovely ladies met it at many a station on the long way and piously bestowed upon it their sweet kisses. By veneration of a national relic these ladies were expressing their religious sense and practicing the nationalist cult.

5

Every national state has a "theology," a more or less systematised body of official doctrines which have been deduced from the precepts of the "Fathers" and from the admonitions of the national scriptures and which reflect the "genius of the people" and constitute a guide to national behaviour. In America, the canon of national holy scripture certainly includes the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, Washington's Farewell Address, the Monroe Doctrine, and Lincoln's addresses, but here, as elsewhere, the canon is not yet definitive. There is even now an intense rivalry between two theological schools, that which supports the authenticity of the gospel according to Theodore Roosevelt and that which attributes inspiration to the epistles of Woodrow Wilson. Such rivalries, of course, can be but transient; and it is as probable as it is desirable that in the long run our doctors of sacred theology will arrive at a compromise and will then

exercise their infallible authority by incorporating into the American canon both the Woodrownine epistles and the gospel of Theodore. Nationalism can easily survive, as other religions have survived, and even profit from, some little discrepancies and minor contradictions in holy writ. An opportunity for interpretation and higher criticism is a wonderfully golden opportunity for professed theologians.

From the theologians of nationalism proceed more or less learned works, say about the Constitution or the Monroe Doctrine or the Wisdom of Abraham Lincoln, which are commented upon and simplified by publicists and textbook compilers, and the writings of these gentlemen (and ladies) in turn are piously vulgarised by sentimental journalists and emotional orators. The upshot of the whole process is that a nationalist theology of the intellectuals becomes a nationalist mythology for the masses.

Nationalist mythology is not in every detail strictly accurate and literally true — no mythology ever is — but after all its main purpose is didactic, "for example of life and instruction of manners," [9] and didacticism need not depend slavishly upon historical or scientific fact. It claims and deserves the wider range of imagination and emotion. Take for instance almost any Fourth-of-July oration delivered in any year or in any part of the United States, or almost any patriotic speech read into the Congressional Record and distributed gratis among the Representative's constituents, and you will find that objective truth and scientific detachment have been sacrificed to a more emotional appeal and a higher truth. It is not that patriotic orators and national Congressmen set out to prevaricate or lie; as a rule they are upright and honourable men. What actually happens is that they are so convinced of the sacred truth of the nationalist teachings and myths which have been handed down to them and so inflamed with the desire to confirm the faith of the multitude that they unquestioningly repeat any statement favourable to the cause and may go so far as to invent and spread a quite erroneous picture of the nation's past. In this way they contribute to the elaboration of a

popular mythology and to its confusion with official nationalist theology.

I have before me now a speech which my own Congressman delivered in the House of Representatives on August 15, 1916, and which with kindly thoughtfulness he had the Government, at its expense, send to me, along with numerous packages of agricultural seeds, for my national nourishment and edification. The speech closes with an uplifting nationalist paean:

> The military annals of mankind reveal no finer discipline, no more splendid heroism, than were displayed on every battlefield of the Revolution and the War between the States. The soldiers of Washington were no craven spirits, no mercenary hirelings, imported from the shambles of Europe to do battle for filthy lucre at the bidding of tyrant kings. They were freemen, champions of human liberty, as brave and gallant warriors as ever breasted the flood of death. No ignorant, vulgar rebels they! The Revolutionary ranks were filled with accomplished scholars, with men who read the tragedies of Aeschylus in Greek as easily as the tragedies of Shakespeare in English. Government, philosophy, and religion were themes of daily and familiar converse around colonial camp fires. The soldiers of the Revolution knew the richness of their blood. They traced their lineage along a noble line to Crécy, Poitiers, Malplaquet, and Ramillies. They read the military achievements of their race in the recovery of the holy sepulchre, in the battle at Hohenlinden, in the capture of Quebec. They felt no inability to multiply these brilliant deeds; and when the battle call was sounded by the bugle's stirring blast and the thrilling tones of the trumpet and the drum, it was then that the heroes of Saratoga and Yorktown, of Brandywine and Valley Forge, moved to the impetuous charge with the victors' exultant shout. It was then they stepped "like bridegrooms to a marriage feast," into the jaws of death, and their soldier spirits joined in eternity that band of

> warrior souls that, in every age from the mountain pass of Thermopylae to the battle plains of Cuba and Mukden, have died for the liberties of their fellow men. Such was the character and such the conduct of the soldiers of Washington.
>
> More than fifty years ago civil war broke upon the country. The most momentous struggle in history called to the field of battle the finest armies of the world. Men from the North and men from the South rushed to the dividing line in serried ranks, with martial step, and with hearts that beat like kettledrums; and whether dressed in blue or clad in gray, at Gettysburg and Antietam, at Cold Harbour and the Wilderness, they sent to generations yet unborn a message of perfect discipline and deathless valour. . . . Mr. Speaker, I have an abiding and an unbounded faith in the great destiny and in the undying glory of my country. I believe that the time is not far distant when we shall have complete military and naval, economic and industrial, intellectual and spiritual preparedness; when American genius and American influence will dominate the nations and overshadow the earth; when our Constitution and our Declaration of Independence will be the mould and model of free institutions among all the tribes of men; when the torch of freedom which was lit at the flame of the American Revolution will be a beacon light to the oppressed of all mankind; when our soldiers and our sailors will be feared and respected on every land and on every sea; when the drum beat of our country will be heard around the world; when freedom's flag will illumine all the skies; and, whether proceeding from the mouth of an ambassador or from the hot throats of Federal guns, the mandate of the great Republic will be heard and obeyed throughout the earth. [Applause.]

Such a peroration is nobly dithyrambic, but it does propagate some myths. The trained historian knows that there were battles in the Revolutionary War and in the War between the States (for instance, the First Battle of Bull Run) in which no sort of discipline or heroism

was displayed. He also knows that the Revolutionary ranks were not exactly filled with men who read the tragedies of Shakespeare (or anything else) in English, to say nothing of men who read Aeschylus in the original Greek. Nor is it easy for a severe logician to perceive just how freedom's flag will illumine all the skies at the very time when American soldiers and sailors are feared on every land and on every sea. But these and many other criticisms which the scientist or the literalist might level at the quotation are beside the point.

What gives rise to popular myths about modern nationalism, as, for example, the myths associated with the American Revolution, the myths fashioned and disseminated by our Congressman, is the same as what gave rise in the middle ages to the "Donation of Constantine" and the "pseudo-Isidorian decretals." These mediaeval documents, supercilious and unsympathetic moderns have branded by the ugly name of "forgeries," but they are forgeries only in the sense that many nationalist writings and speeches of recent times are forgeries. Both have sprung from a lively faith and a glowing imagination, and both have been justified on the common ground that they meet a contemporary need so perfectly that they must be true. They are products of piety, and how can piety be immoral? How can edification be untruthful? What really matters is that they are received by the masses on faith and are reverently embodied in the popular mythology.

The school-system of the national state is held to strict accountability for any lapse from the official theology or for any slur upon the popular mythology. Here and there a bold teacher or a tactless textbook writer may suggest an explanation of some episode in early national history not in full harmony with the nationalist faith; such a person, as is well established in these latter days, is liable to denunciation by some zealous patriotic society and to trial and degradation by an Inquisitorial Board of Education – functioning as a kind of modern Dominican Order – and the offensive texts are put on a nationalist *Index Librorum Prohibitorum* and thenceforth the civil

arm may ban them from public libraries and burn them in public squares amid the plaudits of the faithful.

For there is a chronic fear among nationalists, as among most religious enthusiasts, that the masses are on the point of losing their faith, and a firm determination, therefore, that only such information should be imparted to them as will strengthen that faith and promote popular devotion to it. As the "Committee on Studies and Textbooks" of the public schools of New York City (consisting of principals and teachers) declared in their report of March 27, 1922:

> "The textbook must contain no statement in derogation or in disparagement of the achievements of American heroes. It must not question the sincerity of the aims and purposes of the founders of the Republic or of those who have guided its destinies. ... [In discussing the American Revolution], everything essential is accomplished when it is made plain to the pupils: that the Colonists had just grievances; that they rebelled because they could obtain no redress; that they were inspired by a fierce love of liberty; that they counted neither the cost nor the odds against them; that the dominating spirit of the Revolution is found in the words of Nathan Hale: 'I regret that I have but one life to lose for my country'." [10]

Thus is it sought to keep the minds of the young pure and uncontaminated from knowledge of the full truth which, it is assumed, might weaken, if not destroy, the nationalist faith. For the preservation of the faith, the common people should be kept in ignorance. The argument has been imputed to mediaeval Christians less justifiably than to modern nationalists.

6

Human beings do not normally and willingly give the lives for economic gain. The supreme sacrifice is oftenest paid in behalf of an

ideal and in response to the "religious sense." And perhaps the surest proof of the religious character of modern nationalism is the zeal with which all manner of its devotees have laid down their lives on battlefields of the last hundred years. At this very moment there are hundreds of thousands of little whitewashed crosses all over northern France, each bearing the simple black inscription "*Mort pour la Patrie*." Vastly more men perished in the recent four-years War of the Nations than in the four centuries of mediaeval Christian Crusades.

A faith that inspires the noblest sacrifices is apt to be intolerant in some of its manifestations, and the similarity in this respect between modern nationalism and mediaeval Christianity is striking. The mediaeval Christian was not the supremely intolerant person that prejudiced moderns imagine; he distinguished between various kinds of unbelievers, and treated them accordingly; he was harsher to heretics than to infidels, pagans, and Jews; he dealt more severely with the ignorant than with the learned and more excitedly with the popular propagandist than with the closet philosopher. And it is even so with the modern nationalist.

Towards pagans and infidels in their own distant homes, that is, towards inhabitants of foreign countries, our attitude varies all the way from amused interest or contempt to dislike and fear and hatred; if we think our vital interests or our "national honour" to be threatened we preach a crusade against them, but otherwise we tolerantly let them survive as curious aberrations of Providence. Towards pagans and infidels in our midst, that is, towards unnaturalised immigrants, our attitude differs according as they are few or numerous. If they are few, we pity or despise them, but we do not directly persecute them; rather, we hope and work for their conversion to our faith, for their naturalisation in our national state. On the other hand, if they are numerous, and especially if they are recalcitrant about conversion, we grow fearful, lament the failure of the "melting-pot," and erect social, sometimes legislative, barriers against them.

Heretics are fellow countrymen who have lapsed from the pure faith and gospel, depraved beings who, having had the advantage of belonging to us and of experiencing our nationalism, have failed to appreciate it and have fallen into error or doubt. There are several gradations of national heresy. The outright traitor — the apostate who fights against us in our crusades — is the worst; he excites in us hatred and horror. If we catch him we put him to ignominious death, and if we don't catch him we use his name forever after as a by-word. In popular American thought Benedict Arnold (*) has long since ceased to be human and become a satanic spirit. The heretic who is a plain and simple pervert, that is, who lives abroad and takes out naturalisation papers in a foreign country, is exceptional and can be merely despised and reproached; we assuage our wounded vanity by imagining that he did the wicked thing under compulsion or for financial profit.

But the most perplexing and troublesome kinds of heretic are the crypto-heretics, the persons who are so indecorous in their external acts of devotion, so critical of the "Fathers" and "scriptures," or so indifferent to their patriotic obligations, that they are suspected of harbouring interior devotion to some other nationality, or, what is worse, to no nationality at all. These unfortunates in times of great excitement, as in our modern national crusades, we ferret out by methods which would astound a Torquemada or a Cotton Mather (**), and either banish or jail, often on the flimsiest evidence. In ordinary times, however, we allow crypto-heretics some freedom of physical movement and even a little liberty of speech and publication, provided, of course, that they are university professors or other "cranks," far removed from public life and without direct influence on the formation of public opinion. But even in ordinary times, we must take cognisance of crypto-heretics who teach children or write for the masses; these are very dangerous, for they imperil the nationalist souls of the little ones; they may lawfully be penalised by the officials of the land, or they may be left to be handled beyond the law

by ultra-patriotic private organisations, such as Black Hundreds (***) or Fascisti or Ku Klux Klans.

"My country, right or wrong, my country!" Thus responds the faithful nationalist to the magisterial call of his religion, and thereby he intends nothing dubious or immoral. He is merely making a subtle distinction between governmental officials who may go wrong and a nation which, from the inherent nature of things, must ever be right. It would sound pedantic for him to say, "my nation, indicatively right or subjunctively wrong (contrary to fact), my nation!" Indeed, to the national state are now popularly ascribed infallibility and impeccability. We moderns are prepared to grant that all our fellow countrymen may individually err in conduct and judgement, but we are loath to admit that our nation as a whole can make mistakes. We are willing to assail the policies and even the characters of some of our politicians, but we are stopped by the faith that is in us from doubting the Providential guidance of our national state. This is the final mark of the religious nature of modern nationalism.

The most impressive fact about the present age is the universality of the religious aspects of nationalism. Not only in the United States does the religious sense of the whole people find expression in nationalism, but also, in slightly different form but perhaps to an even greater degree, in France, England, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Russia, the Scandinavian and Baltic countries, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, the Balkans, Greece, and the Latin-American republics. Nor does the religion of nationalism thrive only on traditionally Christian soil; it now flourishes in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, India, Korea, and is rearing its altars in China. Nationalism has a large number of particularly quarrelsome sects, but as a whole it is the latest and nearest approach to a world-religion.

7

Nationalism is a religion now common to the great majority of mankind. But this is not to say that older religions have been obliterated by nationalism. Buddhism and Hinduism still exist. So does Mohammedanism. So does Christianity — Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant. What is actually occurring is a new religious syncretism, by virtue of which very many persons continue nominally to adhere to the faith of their ancestors and even to practice its cult, whilst they adapt it to the exigencies of nationalist worship and discipline. Some extreme (and, let us grant, logical) nationalists abandon and assail other religions. Some devotees of other religions criticise and condemn nationalism. But the bulk of nationalists, and a growing number of Christians, Mohammedans, and Buddhists, proceed more or less unreflectively to effect a compromise between the old faith and the new. And the compromise is increasingly favourable to the religion of nationalism.

Judaism is still a potent force in the lives of many Jews, but there can be little doubt that in recent times, with the development of scepticism about the divine inspiration of the Hebrew Scriptures and the rise of "reform movements" and the consequently less strict observance of the Mosaic law and of the ceremonial of the orthodox synagogue, an ever augmenting number of Jews are expressing their religious sense in nationalism, either in devotion to the nationalism of the people among whom they live or in service and sacrifice in behalf of their own peculiar Zionism. Ancient Judaism was a religion which centred the hopes and aspirations of a "chosen people" upon a supernatural God, the God Yahweh, and anyone who believed in Yahweh and abided by His commandments was "chosen." Modern Zionism is a religion which transfers the object of worship from Yahweh to the chosen people, and none is chosen who is wilfully ignorant of the Hebrew language.

Buddhism is still a powerful factor in the lives of myriad Orientals, and in the quaint forms of Theosophy it is exerting a little direct influence upon the Occident, but in Japan, at any rate, it has latterly been subordinated to nationalist Shinto, and in China certain intellectuals are attempting an amalgam of it with Confucianism and Christianity in order to produce a Chinese national religion. Mohammedanism is still a great and aggressive religion, with far-flung missionary enterprise in the East Indies and in central Africa, but the followers of Mustapha Kemal Pasha have proved themselves Turkish nationalists first and Moslems afterwards, and Mohammedan Arabs are fraternising with Christian Arabs in a common supreme devotion to Arab nationalism against the threats of established Zionism. In India both Mohammedanism and Hinduism are ebbing before a rising Indian nationalism.

Christianity has more nominal followers today than ever before in its history, and possibly there are more sincere and devout Christians – Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant — in the twentieth century than in any earlier century. But it is manifest to us who live in the West that Christianity for enormous numbers of people has become an adjunct to nationalism. The Orthodox Churches of the East, the Armenian Church, the Coptic Church, the remnant of the Nestorian Church, are auxiliaries to nationalist fervour and nationalist endeavour. Westminster Abbey is a holy fane of the Church of England and, much more so, of British nationalism; and the Protestant cathedrals of England and Scotland and Ireland, and of Prussia too, are adorned not so plentifully or so conspicuously with statues of Christian saints as with images of national heroes, military or naval, and with national battle-flags. In France, the sacred remains of Napoleon Bonaparte lie close to a Catholic altar, and the magnificent Christian church of Sainte Geneviève has been transformed into the National Pantheon.

Christianity in the United States is becoming more and more nationalist, – and naturally so. The Protestant majority, in holding their

own and seeking the conversion of divers immigrants, constantly affirm that America is Protestant, and that Protestantism is American. The Catholic minority, not to be outdone by such an attractive plea, are bent on "Americanising" themselves and their immigrants. All this promotes the religion of Americanism, not quite as a substitute for Christianity, but rather as a most impressive supplement to it. The process is fostered, moreover, by the very fact that American Protestantism is divided into numerous sects and denominations. No Protestant sect is strong enough — and certainly the Catholic Church is not strong enough (even if it were so minded) — to establish itself as the official church of the United States. Hence there can be in a common Christianity no oneness of faith and worship for the whole American people. Consequently the spiritual unity, which almost everyone deems desirable, must be sought in nationalism. American Protestants may differ about the literal interpretation of the first chapter of the Book of Genesis, or about the manner of administering baptism, or about the orders of the ministry and the number of sacraments, but they do not differ essentially in their homage to the national state. In most Protestant churches in the United States a big American flag hangs resplendent over the pulpit or communion-table, and in most localities Protestant clergy and their faithful hold "union services" at least on Thanksgiving Day, on Decoration Day, on Washington's Birthday, and on the Fourth of July. Is there not some justification for the prophecy of Mr. Israel Zangwill that "America will doubtless be the first to fuse its 186 denominations and its countless crank creeds into a single American religion"? [11]

A good deal has been said and written of late by agnostically inclined gentlemen about the decay of Protestantism in America, and it has been pointed out that only about thirty per cent. of the American people attend church. This, in my opinion, is a most superficial estimate of the situation.

Protestantism of the sixteenth-century Lutheran or Calvinistic type may be decaying — I don't know, and I am reluctant to guess — but Protestantism as a vehement protest against historic Catholic Christianity and as an important element in the contemporary syncretic religion of nationalism is certainly alive and thriving. In this sense far more than thirty per cent. of the American people are Protestants – and nationalists. And it is undoubtedly true that many Catholic Americans would resent any imputation that they are less devout in the worship of nationalism than are their Protestant fellow countrymen.

Syncretism of nationalism and Christianity go on apace in the United States. At one extreme, a group of Catholics of French-Canadian extraction in the diocese of Providence (Rhode Island) are so intent upon exalting nationalism as an indispensable prop for their traditional Christianity that, upon being refused the use of a Catholic church and hall for a nationalist demonstration, they denounce their bishop, call him unseemly names, defy his authority, and obtain from a priest in Quebec words of encouragement for their cause and conduct. At the other extreme the modernist pastor of a Unitarian church in New York, a clergyman of English descent, declares that it is an absurd anachronism for American children to be studying the folk-tales of the alien Hebrew people, and announces that the Sunday-school attached to his church will henceforth teach the "American Holy Bible" — the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the biographies of our national heroes. [12] "Fundamentalists" appear to apprehend a prop to their literal Biblical faith in the parallel between the early chosen Hebrews and the later chosen Americans. "Modernists" seem to thicken Americanism in measure as they dilute Christianity.

[...]

Though it is likely to be a long time before the new religion completely ousts the old, the syncretism now proceeding is far more favourable, in our opinion, to nationalism than to Christianity, Mohammedanism, or any other supernatural world-religion. The weaker grows the element of Christianity, for example, the stronger becomes the element of *la Patrie*,

> "supplying as it does channels for both devotion and sacrifice, and even an after-life in the life of the nation. Thus already we see Professor Loisy, in his new book *Mors et Vita*, reacting from his thwarted hope of a reformed Christendom, to a religion of France, and this though he himself exposes the nationalist spuriousness of French neo-Catholicism." [13]

8

I would not have anyone gather from what I have said that I condemn nationalism because it is an expression of man's "religious sense." I am too convinced a believer in the inherently religious character of man to make light of religion; and to condemn nationalism because it depends on religious emotion would seem to me as futile as to condemn vegetation because it thrives on sunlight. I would suggest, however, that there are many, many ways in which man may express his religious sense, and that religious emotion, like any other instinctive emotion, is always susceptible and often needful of conscious direction and control. Some forms of religion are superior to others, and when we recognise the religious nature of modern nationalism we have still to ask ourselves whether it is the form or religion most conducive to human betterment.

Most great religious systems of the past have been unifying, rather than disintegrating, forces in the history of the human race. Buddhism gave rise to a common type of constructive civilisation among the teeming millions of Burma, Siam, China, and Japan.

Mohammedanism drew together in a common bond and inspired with a common zeal the most diverse tribesmen of Arabia, India, Persia, Turkey, the Malay archipelago, and Africa. Christianity bound together in a cultural community all kinds of European peoples, regardless of their habitat, breed, and native language. And especially in the case of Christianity, the forms and ceremonies which attended the expression of man's religious sense were constant symbols of a universal striving for a kingdom that was not of this world, for the sacrifice of self, and the assurance of peace on earth to men of good will.

Modern nationalism, while evolving customs and ceremonies which externally are very reminiscent of rites and practices of Christianity, has developed quite a different spirit, and set itself quite a different goal. Despite the universality of the general concept of nationalism, its cult is based on a tribal idea and is, therefore, in its practical manifestations, peculiar to circumscribed areas and to persons of the same language. The good at which it aims is a good for one's own nation only, not for all mankind. The desires which it inspires in an Englishman or a German or a Japanese are not the same as the desires which it inspires in a Frenchman, a Pole, or an American.

Nationalism as a religion represents a reaction against historic Christianity, against the universal mission of Christ; it re-enshrines the earlier tribal mission of a chosen people. The ancient reflective Roman imagined that one chosen people – the Hebrew nation – was one too many for general comfort and safety; the thoughtful modern Christian may be pardoned for being a bit pessimistic about a world devoid of a Roman Empire and replete with dozens upon dozens of chosen peoples.

Nationalism as a religion inculcates neither charity nor justice; it is proud, not humble; and it signally fails to universalise human aims. It repudiates the revolutionary message of St. Paul and proclaims anew the primitive doctrine that there shall be Jew and Greek, only that

now there shall be Jew and Greek more quintessentially than ever. Nationalism's kingdom is frankly of this world, and its attainment involves tribal selfishness and vainglory, a particularly ignorant and tyrannical intolerance, – and war. That nationalism brings not peace but the sword, we propose next to show.

Notes by the author

[1] The reader will recall that long ago this opinion was voiced by Gibbon with devastating rhetoric and mordant wit. Cf. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. vi (ed. J. B. Bury), pp. 125-126.

[2] I do not wish to be understood as implying that there are no essential differences between Paganism and Christianity or between Catholicism and Protestantism or "neo-Protestantism." I explicitly disclaim any connection with that large and lazy sect of recent times who profess that "one religion is as good or as true (or false) as another." Here, however, I am not attempting to establish or even to assert the superiority of any particular religion; my present purpose is much more modest, merely to point out that all these religions appeal, like "natural religion," to man's inherent "religious sense."

[3] A. Bayet et F. Albert, *Les Ecrivains politiques du XVIIIème siècle* (1904), pp. 388-390.

[4] The words are Barnave's. Cf. A. Mathiez, *Les Origines des Cultes Revolutionnaires* (1904), p. 22.

[5] A. Mathiez, op. cit. p. 27.

[6] Ibid., p. 31.

[7] A. Aulard, *Le Culte de la Raison et le Culte de l'Être Supreme* (1892), p. 35;

[8] Ibid., p. 45.

[9] Article VI of the "Thirty-nine Articles;" *Book of Common Prayer*.

[10] *The Historical Outlook*, vol. xiii, pp. 250-255 (October, 1922).

[11] Israel Zangwill, *The Principle of Nationalities* (1917), p. 87.

[12] Rev. C. F. Potter, *New York Times*, February 28, 1924.

[13] Israel Zangwill, *The Principle of Nationalities* (1917), pp. 85-86. Cf. also Bertrand Russell, *Why Men Fight* (1917), pp. 56-58.

Notes to the text

(*) Benedict Arnold (1740 – 1801) was a general during the American Revolutionary War who originally fought for the American Continental Army but defected to the British Army.

(**) Cotton Mather (1663 - 1728) was a socially and politically influential New England Puritan minister, prolific author and pamphleteer; he is often remembered for his role in the Salem witch trials.

(***) Black Hundreds was an ultra-nationalist movement in Russia in the early 20th century. It was a staunch supporter of the House of Romanov and opposed any retreat from the autocracy of the reigning tsar.

Rudolf Rocker

State Nationalism (1937)

The theme of State Nationalism is dealt by Rocker with profound insights that unmask the idiocies, manufactured by the State, with which we are imbued from an early age. To get rid of those idiocies is the task of each of us in order to became intelligent human beings instead of remaining moronic Nation-State subjects.

Source: Rudolf Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture,* from Book One, Chapter 13 and 15, 1937.

Cultural Nationalism (from Chapter 13)

All nationalism is reactionary in its nature, for it strives to enforce on the separate parts of the great human family a definite character according to a preconceived idea. In this respect, too, it shows the interrelationship of nationalistic ideology with the creed of every revealed religion. Nationalism creates artificial separations and partitions within that organic unity which finds its expression in the genus Man, while at the same time it strives for a fictitious unity

sprung only from a wish-concept; and its advocates would like to tune all members of a definite human group to one note in order to distinguish it from other groups still more obviously. In this respect, so-called "cultural nationalism" does not differ at all from political nationalism, for whose political purposes as a rule it serves as a fig-leaf. The two cannot be spiritually separated; they merely represent two different aspects of the same endeavour.

Cultural nationalism appears in its purest form when people are subjected to a foreign rule, and for this reason cannot pursue their own plans for political power. In this event, "national thought" prefers to busy itself with the culture-building activities of the people and tries to keep the national consciousness alive by recollections of vanished glory and past greatness. Such comparisons between a past which has already become legend and a slavish present make the people doubly sensitive to the injustice suffered; for nothing affects the spirit of man more powerfully than tradition. But if such groups of people succeed sooner or later in shaking off the foreign yoke and themselves appear as a national power, then the cultural phase of their effort steps only too definitely into the background, giving place to the sober reality of their political objectives. In the recent history of the various national organisms in Europe created after the war are found telling witnesses for this.

In Germany, also, the national strivings both before and after the "wars of liberation" were strongly influenced by romanticism, whose advocates tried to make the traditions of a vanished age live again among the people and to make the past appear to them in a glorified light. When, later, the last hopes which the German patriots had rested on liberation from the foreign yoke had burst like over-blown bubbles, their spirits sought refuge in the moonlit magic night and the fairy world of dreamy longing conjured up for them by romanticism, in order to forget the gray reality of life and its shameful disappointments.

In culture-nationalism, as a rule, two distinct sentiments merge, which really have nothing in common: for home sentiment is not patriotism, is not love of the state, not love which has its roots in the abstract idea of the nation. It needs no laboured explanation to prove that the spot of land on which a man has spent the years of his youth is deeply intergrown with his profoundest feeling. The impressions of childhood and early youth which are the most permanent and have the most lasting effect upon his soul. Home is, so to speak, man's outer garment; he is most intimately acquainted with its every fold and seam. This home sentiment brings in later years some yearning after a past long buried under ruins; and it is this which enables the romantic to look so deeply within.

With so-called "national consciousness" this home sentiment has no relationship; although both are often thrown into the same pot and, after the manner of counterfeiters, given out as of the same value. In fact, true home sentiment is destroyed at its birth by "national consciousness," which always strives to regulate and force into a prescribed form every impression man receives from the inexhaustible variety of the homeland. This is the unavoidable result of those mechanical efforts at unification which are in reality only the aspirations of the nationalistic states.

The attempt to replace man's natural attachment to the home by a dutiful love of the state — a structure which owes its creation to all sorts of accidents and in which, with brutal force, elements have been welded together that have no necessary connection — is one of the most grotesque phenomena of our time. The so-called "national consciousness" is nothing but a belief propagated by considerations of political power which have replaced the religious fanaticism of past centuries and have today come to be the greatest obstacle to cultural development. The love of home has nothing in common with the veneration of an abstract patriotic concept. Love of home knows no "will to power"; it is free from that hollow and dangerous attitude of superiority to the neighbour which is one of the strongest

characteristics of every kind of nationalism. Love of home does not engage in practical politics nor does it seek in any way to support the state. It is purely an inner feeling as freely manifested as man's enjoyment of nature, of which home is a part. When thus viewed, the home feeling compares with the governmentally ordered love of the nation as does a natural growth with an artificial substitute.

Modern Nationalism (from Chapter 15)

Modern nationalism, which has found its fullest expression in Italian fascism and German National Socialism, is the mortal enemy of every liberal thought. The complete elimination of all libertarian thought is for its advocates the first preliminary to the "awakening of the nation," whereby in Germany, most strangely, liberalism and Marxism are thrown into one pot — a fact which, however, need no longer surprise us when we know how violently the heralds of the Third Reich deal with facts, ideas and persons. That Marxism, like democracy and nationalism, proceeds in its fundamental ideas from a collective concept, namely from the class, and for this very reason can have no relationship with liberalism, does not trouble its pious Hitlerite opponents of today in the least.

That modern nationalism in its extreme fanaticism for the state has no use for liberal ideas is readily understandable. Less clear is the assertion of its leaders that the modern state is thoroughly infected with liberal ideas and has for this reason lost its former political significance. The fact is that the political development of the last hundred and fifty years was not along the lines that liberalism had hoped for. The idea of reducing the functions of the state as much as possible and of limiting its sphere to a minimum has not been realised. The state's field of activity was not laid fallow; on the contrary, it was mightily extended and multiplied, and the so-called "liberal parties," which gradually got deeper and deeper into the current of democracy, have contributed abundantly to this end. In

reality the state has not become liberalised but only democratised. Its influence on the personal life of man has not been reduced; on the contrary it has steadily grown. There was a time when one could hold the opinion that the "sovereignty of the nation" was quite different from the sovereignty of the hereditary monarch and that, therefore, the power of the state would be weakened. While democracy was still fighting for recognition, such an opinion might have had a certain justification. But that time is long past; nothing has so confirmed the internal and external security of the state as the religious belief in the sovereignty of the nation, confirmed and sanctioned by the universal franchise. That this is also a religious concept of political nature is undeniable. Even Clemenceau when, innerly lonely and embittered, he reached the end of his career, expressed himself in this wise: "The popular vote is a toy of which one soon tires; but one must not say this aloud, for the people must have a religion. Sad it is. . . . Sad but true." [1]

Liberalism was the outcry of the human personality against the all-levelling endeavours of absolute rule, and later against the extreme centralism and blind belief in the state of Jacobinism and its various democratic offshoots. In this sense it was still conceived by Mill, Buckle and Spencer. Even Mussolini, now the bitterest enemy of liberalism, was not so long ago one of the most passionate advocates of liberal ideas; he wrote:

> The state, with its monstrous terrific machine, gives us a feeling of suffocation. The state was endurable for the individual as long as it was content to be soldier and policeman; today the state is everything, banker, usurer, gambling den proprietor, shipowner, procurer, insurance agent, postman, railroader, entrepreneur, teacher, professor, tobacco merchant, and countless other things in addition to its former functions of policeman, judge, jailer, and tax collector. The state, this Moloch of frightful countenance, receives everything, does everything, knows everything, and ruins every-

> thing. Every state function is a misfortune. State art is a misfortune, state ownership of shipping, state victualizing — the litany could be extended indefinitely.... If men had but a faint idea of the abyss toward which they are moving the number of suicides would increase, for we are approaching a complete destruction of human personality. The state is that frightful machine which swallows living men and spews them out again as dead ciphers. Human life has now no secrets, no intimacy, neither in material affairs nor in spiritual; all corners are smelled into, all movements measured; everyone is locked into his cell and numbered, just as in a prison. [2]

This was written a few years before the "March on Rome"; the new revelation therefore, came quite quickly to Mussolini, as so many others; in fact the so-called "state concept of fascism" put in an appearance only after Il Duce had attained power. Until then the fascist movement glittered in all the colours of the rainbow as, not so long ago, did National Socialism in Germany. It really had no definite character. Its ideology was a motley mixture of intellectual elements from all sorts of sources. What gave it power was the brutality of its methods. Its reckless violence could have no regard for the opinions of others just because it had none of its own. What the state still lacked of being a perfect prison the fascist dictatorship has given it in abundance. Mussolini's liberal clamour stopped immediately as soon as the dictator had the state power in Italy firmly in his hands. Viewing Mussolini's rapid change of opinion about the meaning of the state one involuntarily remembers the expression of the youthful Marx:

> "No man fights against freedom; at the most he fights against the freedom of others. Every kind of freedom has, therefore, always existed; sometimes as special privilege, at other times as general right." (Karl Marx, *On Freedom of the Press*, Rheinische Zeitung, May 12, 1842)

Mussolini has in fact made of freedom a privilege for himself, and to do this has brought about the most brutal suppression of all others; for freedom which tries to replace man's responsibility towards his fellow men by the senseless dictum of authority is sheer wilfulness and a denial of all justice and all humanity. But even despotism needs to justify itself to the people whom it violates. To meet this necessity the state concept of fascism was born.

At the meeting in Berlin of the *International Hegel Congress* in 1931, Giovanni Gentile, the state-philosopher of fascist Italy, developed his conception of the nature of the state, culminating in the idea of the so-called "totalitarian state." Gentile hailed Hegel as the first and real founder of the state concept, and compared his state theory with the concept of the state as based on natural right and mutual agreement. The state, he maintained, is in the light of the latter concept merely the limit with which the natural and immediate freedom of the individual must be content if anything like a communal life is to be made possible. According to this doctrine the state is only a means for the improvement of man's condition, which in its natural origin is not maintainable — is, therefore, something negative, a virtue born of necessity. Hegel overthrew this centuries-old doctrine. He was the first to regard the state as the highest form of the objective intellect. He was the first to understand that only in the state can truly ethical self-consciousness be realised. But Gentile was not content with this endorsement of Hegel's state concept; he tried even to excel it. He criticised Hegel because, while he regarded the state as the highest form of the objective intellect, he still placed over the objective intellect the sphere of the absolute intellect; so that art, religion, philosophy, which according to Hegel belong to the latter intellectual realm, were in a certain conflict with the state. The modern state theory, Gentile held, should so work out these conflicts that the values of art, religion and philosophy would also be the property of the state. Only then could the state be regarded as the highest form of the human intellect, being founded not on separateness, but

on the common, the eternal, will and the highest form of generality. [3]

The purpose of the fascist state-philosopher is quite clear. If for Hegel the state was "God on earth," then Gentile would like to raise it to the position of the eternal and only God, who will endure no other gods above him, or even beside him, and absolutely dominates every field of human thought and human activity. This is the last word of a trend of political thought which in its abstract extreme loses sight of everything human and has concern for the individual only in so far as he serves as a sacrifice to be thrown into the glowing arms of the insatiable Moloch. Modern nationalism is only will-toward-the-state-at-any-price and complete absorption of man in the higher ends of power. It is of the utmost significance that modern nationalism does not spring from love towards one's own country or one's own people. On the contrary, it has its roots in the ambitious plans of a minority lusting for dictatorship and determined to impose upon the people a certain form of the state, even though this be entirely contrary to the will of the majority. Blind belief in the magic power of a national dictatorship is to replace for man the love of home and the feeling of the spiritual culture of his time; love of fellow man is to be crushed by "the greatness of the state," for which individuals are to serve as fodder.

Here is the distinction between the nationalism of a past age, which found its representatives in men like Mazzini and Garibaldi, and the definitely counterrevolutionary tendencies of modern fascism which today raises its head ever more threateningly. In his famous manifesto of June 6, 1862, Mazzini opposed the government of Victor Emmanuel, accusing it of treason and counterrevolutionary efforts against the unity of Italy, thus clearly making a distinction between the nation and Italian unity. His slogan, "God and the People!" — whatever one may think of it — was meant to inform the world that the ideas he followed emanated from the people and were endorsed by them. Undoubtedly Mazzini's doctrine contained the germ of a

new form of human slavery, but he acted in good faith and could not foresee the historic development of his work for national democracy. How honestly he was devoted to this is most clearly shown by the difference between him and Cavour, who fully realised the significance of the national unification movement and therefore on principle opposed the "political romanticism" of Mazzini. Mazzini, Cavour said, forgot the State in his constant affirmation of freedom.

It is certain that the patriots of that time regarded the state and the nationalistic aims of the people as quite different things. This attitude doubtless sprang from an erroneous interpretation of historical facts, but it is just this erroneous conclusion which brings these men of "Young Europe" humanly closer to us, for no one will doubt their sincere love of the people. Modern nationalism is wholly lacking in such love, and though its representatives utter the word ever so frequently one always perceives its false ring and realises that there is no genuine feeling in it. The nationalism of today swears only by the state and brands its own fellow-folk as traitors to their country if they resist the political aims of the national dictatorship or even merely refuse to endorse its plans.

The influence of the liberal ideas of the last century had at least brought it about that even the conservative elements in society were convinced that the state existed for the citizens. Fascism, however, announces with brutal frankness that the purpose of the individual consists in being useful to the state. "Everything for the State, nothing outside of the State, nothing against the State!" as Mussolini has expressed it. This is the last word of a nationalist metaphysics which in the fascist movements of the present has assumed a frightfully concrete form. While this has always been the hidden meaning of all nationalist theories, it has now become their clearly expressed aim. That they have so definitely outlined this aim is the only merit of its present representatives, who in Italy, and even more in Germany, are so dearly loved and so freely supported by the owners of the capitalistic economic system because they have been so

subservient to the new monopoly capitalism and have with all their power furthered its plans for the erection of a system of industrial serfdom.

Notes by the author

[1] Jean Martet, *Clémenceau Speaks*, Berlin, 1930, p. 151

[2] *Il Popolo d'Italia*, April 6, 1920

[3] We are following the reports of the Congress in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, evening edition of October 21, 1931.

Elie Kedourie

Nationalism (1960)

Elie Kedourie's classic essay on Nationalism provides insightful analysis of the phenomenon and a wealth of information on the theme. For this reasons it should be read not only for personal knowledge but also as a powerful antidote to the recurrent spread, by politicians of all sects, of the nationalistic virus.

Source: Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, Chapter 1: Politics in a new style, 1960.

Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organization of a society of states.

Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can

be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government.

Not the least triumph of this doctrine is that such propositions have become accepted and are thought to be self-evident, that the very word nation has been endowed by nationalism with a meaning and a resonance which until the end of the eighteenth century it was far from having.

These ideas have become firmly naturalized in the political rhetoric of the West which has been taken over for the use of the whole world. But what now seems natural once was unfamiliar, needing argument, persuasion, evidences of many kinds; what seems simple and transparent is really obscure and contrived, the outcome of circumstances now forgotten and preoccupations now academic, the residue of metaphysical systems sometimes incompatible and even contradictory. To elucidate this doctrine it is necessary to enquire into the fortunes of certain ideas in the philosophical tradition of Europe, and how they came to prominence at this particular period.

The fortunes of ideas, like those of men, depend as much on accident as on their own worth and character, and if the doctrine of nationalism came into prominence at the turn of the eighteenth century, this was the result not only of a debate in which the philosophers were engaged, but also of events which invested the philosophical issues with immediate and obvious relevance.

The philosophy of the Enlightenment prevalent in Europe in the eighteenth century held that the universe was governed by a uniform, unvarying law of Nature. With reason man could discover and comprehend this law, and if society were ordered according to its provisions, it would attain ease and happiness. The law was universal, but this did not mean that there were no differences between men; it meant rather that there was something common to them all which was more important than any differences. It might be said that all men are

born equal, that they have a right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, or, alternatively, that men are under two sovereign masters, Pain and Pleasure, and that the best social arrangements are those which maximize pleasure and minimize pain: whichever way the doctrine is phrased, certain consequences can be drawn from it.

The state, on this philosophical view, is a collection of individuals who live together the better to secure their own welfare, and it is the duty of rulers so to rule as to bring about — by means which can be ascertained by reason — the greatest welfare for the inhabitants of their territory. This is the social pact which unites men together, and defines the rights and duties of rulers and subjects. Such is not only the view of the *philosophes*, for which they claimed universal validity, but also the official doctrine of Enlightened Absolutism.

According to this doctrine, the enlightened ruler regulates the economic activities of his subjects, provides them with education, looks after health and sanitation, supplies uniform and expeditious justice, and generally concerns himself — if need be even against their wishes — with his subjects' welfare, because the greatness of a state is the glory of its ruler, and a state can become great only in proportion to its population and to their prosperity. In this sense is to be understood the saying of Frederick the Great of Prussia, that a king is the first servant of the state.

A small work cast in the form of letters between *Anapistemon* and *Philopatros*, written by Frederick himself, *Letters on the Love of the Fatherland* (1779), may illustrate these views. The author seeks to show that love of the fatherland is a rational sentiment and to rebut the idea, attributed to 'some encyclopaedist' , that since the earth is the common habitation of our race, the wise man must be a citizen of the world. Of course, *Philopatros* concedes that men are brothers and should love one another; but this benevolence at large itself argues the existence of a duty more pressing and more specific, that towards the particular society with which the individual is linked by the

social pact. 'The good of society' — *Philopatros* informs *Anapistemon* — 'is yours. Without realizing it, you are so strongly tied to your fatherland, that you can neither isolate, nor separate yourself from it without feeling the consequence of your mistake. If the government is happy, you prosper; if it suffers harm, its misfortune will react on you. Similarly if the citizens enjoy an honest opulence, the Sovereign prospers, and if the citizens are overwhelmed with poverty, the condition of the Sovereign will be worthy of pity. Love of the fatherland is not therefore a mere concept of reason, it exists really.'

And *Philopatros* goes on to point out that the integrity of all the state's provinces touches the citizen directly. 'Do you not see' — he asks — 'that if the government were to lose these provinces, it would thereby become enfeebled, and losing consequently the resources it had drawn from them, would be less able than now to help you, in case of need?'

On this view, then, the cohesion of the state, and loyalty to it, depend on its capacity to ensure the welfare of the individual, and in him, love of the fatherland is a function of benefits received. Side by side with the King's argument, we may set that of a private person. Goethe, reviewing in 1772 a book entitled *On the Love of the Fatherland*, written to promote loyalty to the Habsburgs in the Holy Roman Empire, had this to say: 'Have we a fatherland? If we can find a place where we can rest with our possessions, a field to sustain us, a home to cover us, have we not there a fatherland?'

Such was the current opinion in Europe at the outbreak of the French Revolution. It is essential to remember the significance of this event. It was not merely a civil disturbance, a *coup d'état*, which replaced one set of rulers by another. This was familiar to Europe, and the French Revolution was indeed widely taken at the outset to be one such commotion, or else an attempt to realize the programme of reforms which Enlightened Absolutism had officially made its own. But as became increasingly apparent the French Revolution

introduced new possibilities in the use of political power, and transformed the ends for which rulers might legitimately work. The Revolution meant that if the citizens of a state no longer approved of the political arrangements of their society, they had the right and the power to replace them by others more satisfactory. As the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* had it: 'The principle of sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation; no body of men, no individual, can exercise authority that does not emanate expressly from it.'

Here, then, is one prerequisite without which a doctrine such as nationalism is not conceivable. Such a doctrine would want to lay down how best a society should conduct its politics, and realize its aims, if need be by radical changes: the French Revolution showed, in a resounding manner, that such an enterprise was feasible. In this, it greatly strengthened a tendency for political restlessness implicit in the reforms preached by the Enlightenment and ostensibly adopted by Enlightened Absolutism. These reforms were to be made according to a plan; and they were not to cease until society in all its particulars conformed to this plan. There grew, thus, an eager expectation of change, a prejudice in its favour, and a belief that the state stagnated unless it was constantly innovating. Such a climate of thought was necessary for the development and spread of doctrines like nationalism.

'The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation.' What, then, was meant by a nation? *Natio* in ordinary speech originally meant a group of men belonging together by similarity of birth, larger than a family, but smaller than a clan or a people. Thus, one spoke of the *Populus Romanus* and not of the *natio romanorum*. The term applied particularly to a community of foreigners. Medieval universities were, it is well known, divided into 'nations': the University of Paris had four nations: *l'honorable nation de France, la fidele nation de Picardie, la venerable nation de Normandie,* and *la constante nation de Germanie*; these distinctions in use within the

university, indicated places of provenance, but in no way corresponded either to modern geographical divisions, or indeed to what is now understood by 'nations'. Thus the *nation de France* referred to speakers of Romance languages including Italians and Spaniards; the *nation de Picardie* referred to the Dutch, that of Normandie to those originating from North-Eastern Europe, and that of *Germanie* to Englishmen as well as to Germans proper.

By extension, the word came to be used as a collective noun, sometimes in a pejorative sense. Thus Machiavelli speaks of the ghibelline nation, and Montesquieu refers to monks as the pietistic nation. This use of the word as a collective noun persists into the eighteenth century, and we find Hume stating in his essay *Of National Characters* that 'a nation is nothing but a collection of individuals' who, by constant intercourse, came to acquire some traits in common, and Diderot and D'Alembert in the *Encyclopédie* defining 'nation' as 'a collective word used to denote a considerable quantity of those people who inhabit a certain extent of country defined within certain limits, and obeying the same government'. But the word also developed in time a special political meaning. A nation came to be understood as that body of persons who could claim to represent, or to elect representatives for, a particular territory at councils, diets, or estates. Church Councils were divided into nations; the Estates General of France meeting in 1484 comprised six nations; at the Peace of Szatmar of 1711, which ended the fighting between the Imperial forces and the Hungarians, the parties to the settlement were the Habsburg dynasty and the Hungarian nation: in such a context 'nation' did not mean the generality of the people inhabiting the territory of Hungary, but the 'barons, prelates, and nobles of Hungary', an exceedingly small part of the population, who nevertheless constituted to use Guizot's fruitful distinction, at once the *pays legal* and the *pays reel*. Such is the sense in which Montesquieu uses the term in *The Spirit of the Laws*, when he says that 'under the first two dynasties [in France] the nation was often called together,

that is the lords and the bishops'. Therefore, when the revolutionaries stated that 'the principle of sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation' they may be taken to have asserted that the Nation was more than the King and the Aristocracy.

This is the claim implicit in Diderot's and D'Alembert's definition just quoted, and later made quite explicit by Sieyès. 'What is a nation?' asked Sieyès. 'A body of associates living under one common law and represented by the same legislature.'

Such a claim is both simple and comprehensive. A nation is a body of people to whom a government is responsible through their legislature; any body of people associating together, and deciding on a scheme for their own government, form a nation, and if, on this definition, all the people of the world decided on a common government, they would form one nation. But such an inference, though correct, is merely academic. Another inference could, however, be drawn, the effects of which were not as negligible. Suppose a number of individuals, living under a certain government, decide that they no longer wish to continue under it; since the sovereignty is theirs, they may now form a new government and constitute a nation on their own. Such a principle introduced into eighteenth-century Europe was bound to create turmoil. Relations between its states were the outcome of accidents, wars, or dynastic arrangements, and were regulated by the play of conflicts and alliances, of friendships and antagonisms which somehow managed to produce a balance of power. It may be that such a balance had no intrinsic merits of its own, that it was neither a principle of order nor a guarantee of rights, but a mere empirical contrivance liable to frequent and serious breakdown. But the working of such a balance rested on an assumption which itself served to limit and control any breakdown.

This assumption was that the title of any government to rule did not depend on the origin of its power. Thus the society of European states admitted all varieties of republics, of hereditary and elective

monarchies, of constitutional and despotic regimes. But on the principle advocated by the revolutionaries, the title of all governments then existing was put in question; since they did not derive their sovereignty from the nation, they were usurpers with whom no agreement need be binding, and to whom subjects owed no allegiance. It is clear that such a doctrine would envenom international quarrels, and render them quite recalcitrant to the methods of traditional statecraft; it would indeed subvert all international relations as hitherto known.

Soon enough an issue arose which exhibited to the world the consequences of this new doctrine. When Alsace was joined to the French kingdom in the seventeenth century, the position of the nobility in the province was regulated by international treaty. Those among them who owned estates both in Alsace and in the Holy Roman Empire owed allegiance to the King of France in respect of their Alsatian estates, and, on the other hand, in respect of their Imperial territories, enjoyed the status to which they were entitled under the constitution of the Empire. Shortly after the outbreak of the Revolution all feudal privileges were abolished in France, and the rights of the Alsace nobility came into question. They owed, it is true, allegiance to the King and were therefore, to this extent, bound by French laws, but this allegiance, on the other hand, had been created by an international treaty and their privileges, it was argued, were guaranteed by the same treaty. These privileges, it was represented, could not be touched unless the revolutionary government was prepared to commit a breach of the treaty.

The revolutionaries recognized that special considerations applied and offered, as an act of grace, to compensate the Alsace nobility for the privileges they had abolished. But this unilateral action did not satisfy the Alsatian nobles: if their privileges were to be tampered with, let the French government negotiate, in the proper way, a new settlement, instead of handing down arbitrary decrees. The debate went on; and what was said on the French side is worthy of notice.

The Constituent Assembly had referred the question to a special committee, and its *rapporteur* began his report by defining the new principle on which France would henceforth conduct her foreign policy. The incorruptible representatives of the French people, he said, having proclaimed the sacred and inalienable rights of the nations, recognize no other rule but that of Justice. Therefore all previous treaties and conventions which are the fruit of the error in which kings and their ministers were lost will no longer have force. The old international law was one thing, and the new one quite another. According to the old principles, the nobles of Alsace could rightly claim compensation under the treaty, but in the new era all is changed. The French nation had declared itself sovereign, and the people of Alsace, by an act of their will, united themselves to the French people and shared in their sovereignty. The union of France and Alsace is now legitimate not by virtue of any treaty, but by virtue of the manifest will of the people. The nobles have no right to compensation, since the will of the people has not stipulated that they should be offered any. 'Has the free union of one people with another', asked Robespierre in a debate, 'anything in common with conquest?' Similarly, what would have been confiscation before 1789 was, afterwards, a mere entering into lawful possession. Such were the miracles possible under the new dispensation.

The revolutionaries, then, were claiming the pacific exercise of an obvious natural right, and in the process, offering to the world a new international law which, they stated, would necessarily lead to peace. Article VI of the Constitution of 1790 declared: 'The French Nation renounces all wars of conquest, and will never employ her forces against the freedom of any people.' But the principle apparently admitted of an elastic interpretation, for it could still be used to justify the use of armies outside France. Barely two years after these categorical declarations, a decree of the Convention declared that the French nation, while it would not embark on a war against another nation, deemed it right to defend a free people against the

unjust aggression of a king, and a later decree directed the executive power to give help to peoples struggling in the cause of liberty. The new international law, then, could not abolish quarrels and wars. France was still France, a state among European states with ambitions and views, and possessing the power to enforce them on other weaker states.

What the new principles did was to introduce a new style of politics in which the expression of will overrode treaties and compacts, dissolved allegiance, and, by mere declaration, made lawful any act whatever. By its very nature, this new style ran to extremes. It represented politics as a fight for principles, not the endless composition of claims in conflict. But since principles do not abolish interests, a pernicious confusion resulted. The ambitions of a state or the designs of a faction took on the purity of principle, compromise was treason, and a tone of exasperated intransigence became common between rivals and opponents. Consciousness of right bred a righteousness which excesses could never destroy, but only confirm. Terrorism became the hallmark of purity: 'There, is nothing', exclaimed St Just, 'which so much resembles virtue as a great crime.'

It seemed, indeed, as though great crimes were the only way to ensure justice: 'There is something terrible', St Just also said, 'in the sacred love of the fatherland; it is so exclusive as to sacrifice everything to the public interest, without pity, without fear, without respect for humanity ... What produces the general good is always terrible.'

This style, spread and established by a successful revolution, found increasing favour in Europe after 1789. Under its influence doctrines like nationalism were developed and perfected. But it was not the French Revolution only which tended to such a result. Another revolution, in the realm of ideas [national self-determination], worked powerfully to second its action.

Alexander Passerin d'Entrèves

Country and Nation (1967)

This is an extremely interesting text on the concept and reality of nationhood.

It highlights various central aspects of the topic. First of all, it shows that in the past the concept of nation did not exist, at least if we consider large populations and vast territories. Secondly, the author accepts the thesis, developed by others, that the territorial State is at the origin of the concept of nation through the invention of common traditions and the imposition of a single language. Finally, for making the idea of Nation a reality, the State had to associate the concept of Nation to that of a Mother or Father Country (Patria, Patrie, Fatherland), arousing feelings and passions that have affected entire populations and have represented the sure path to the construction of Nation States.

Source: Alexander Passerin d'Entrèves, *The Notion of the State*, Part III, Chapter 3: Country and Nation, 1967.

The ideas of nation and nationality are entirely absent from the definitions of the State which can be found in the writings of the three great thinkers who first mapped out the new landscape of the modern political world.

To begin with Machiavelli, it is quite clear that the State was to him something different and distinct from the nation. The great rhetorical peroration of the last chapter of *The Prince* should not deceive us. Machiavelli was no 'nationalist' in the modern sense of the word. What he had in mind was the setting up of a strong political unit in Central Italy. This alone could secure the liberation of the Peninsula from its 'barbarian' invaders. Indeed, it may even be doubted whether Machiavelli conceived of the whole of Italy as a 'nation'. He rarely uses that word. The State was to him exclusively a matter of force. It may face greater odds when its subjects are not all of the same region and language (*della medesima provincia e della medesima lingua*). But such odds can be overcome by a skilful ruler. The Romans managed to do so, and, according to Machiavelli, the Romans were always right.

Hobbes seems to hold a very similar view. He frankly admits that when the 'right of governing' is in the hand of 'strangers', this may be the cause of 'great inconvenience'. But, he adds, such inconvenience 'proceedeth not necessarily from the subjection to a stranger's government, but from the unskilfulness of the governors, ignorant of the true rules of politics.' It would seem, therefore, that, by observing those rules, even men 'not used to live under the same government, nor speaking the same language' can be moulded together into a common bond of citizenship: 'and this was it our most wise King, King James, aimed at, in endeavouring the union of his two realms of England and Scotland.' Neither language nor ethnic homogeneity is mentioned in the list drawn up by Hobbes of the elements that constitute the State. This too is significant. Clearly, Hobbes's State is not a Nation-state.

Of our three authors, Bodin is the most emphatic in asserting the irrelevance of what we nowadays call the 'national' element to the existence of the State. Power, he believes, is the one and only requisite. 'Wherefore of many citizens . . . is made a Conmonweale, when they are governed by the puissant sovereignty of one or many rulers: albeit that they differ among themselves in laws, language, customs, religions, and diversity of nations.'

The question, then, can only be put in the following terms: when, in what way, and for what reasons did State and nation come to be so closely linked together as to turn the principle of nationality into the ultimate principle of legitimacy in the modern State?

But this question presupposes another: what is meant by *'nation'* and *'nationality'*? And here further difficulties arise. For indeed, apart from the strictly technical meaning of *'nationality'* in English and in some other languages (where it is also taken in a more restricted sense as merely equivalent to citizenship), we cannot but agree with those scholars who, in trying to unravel the concepts of nation and nationality, have warned us against all sorts of pitfalls which make those concepts most difficult to define. In the end, the only competent guides in the jungle of so many different meanings are the linguists and the historians. It is to them that we must turn for help.

Now most of these scholars would agree that, contrary to the opinion which was generally held in the nineteenth century, the concepts of nation and nationality are a comparatively recent product of history. There is no denying, of course, that national consciousness has much deeper roots, and that it was the result of a long and obscure process which takes us back to the very beginnings of our European community. It is certainly possible to find in the Middle Ages a clear awareness of the ethnical, linguistic, and, if we wish to call them so, the 'national' differences existing in Europe — provided we do not overlook the fact that the word 'nation' is used in medieval sources in a sense markedly different from ours. The suggestion has been made

that a reference to such national distinctiveness can be found in very old expressions such as *romanae nationis ac linguae;* indeed, that one of the first assertions of the great divisions of Europe was the treaty of 887 which sanctioned the break-up of the Carolingian Empire *inter teutonicos et latinos Francos*.

But one point alone is sufficient to show how remote this awareness of a national difference was from national consciousness in its modern acceptation. The recognition of the diversities of language, of stock, of customs, did not lead, at any rate for a long time, to a denial of a higher unity, that of the *Republica Christiana*. Rather, such diversities were thought of as the natural differences within a large family, or as a distribution of functions and roles — even if particular 'nations' could claim that the task laid upon them was higher and nobler than that laid upon others, or that they were entrusted with a special mission, as was claimed by the French in the proud phrase *gesta Dei per Francos*. Perhaps the best illustration of this peculiar way of conceiving nationality is to be found in Dante. No one could possibly deny that Dante had a very strong national feeling. Italy stands out in his vision as a well-defined unit, with features, a language, a heritage of her own. But all his love for Italy did not prevent Dante from championing a supra-national political programme: the unity of the Empire, in which he was content to reserve for his country merely a privileged place. Dante's case is important, were it only because it provides further proof of the separation between the two concepts, of State and of nation, which we have already noticed in Machiavelli. Both Dante and Machiavelli, however different their reasons, seem to conceive the bond of nationality as something quite distinct from, perhaps even irrelevant to, the bond of citizenship, the political bond.

Nevertheless, it is precisely in the period which separates Dante from Machiavelli, if not indeed earlier, that the ideas of nation and State can be seen gradually converging towards closer ties. But perhaps, in order to understand this process correctly, it would be as

well to avoid such terms altogether when referring to that stage. The Swiss historian Werner Kaegi has recently suggested that 'nations' in the modern sense would probably not have come into being in Europe but for the unifying, centralizing action of political power. The determining factor in our history was the existence of 'centres of power', not nationality. This is a bold theory, but it is borne out by the facts. France is the classic example of a nation slowly shaped by the patient work of a dynasty bent on securing, unifying, and rounding off as it were, 'with a grandiose peasant mentality', that 'square plot of land' — the *precarré* — which was the Kingdom of France. The job took eight hundred years to complete, but the result, at any rate for the French, was rewarding, and it still draws admiring comment from Frenchmen who in other respects are anything but friendly to the *ancien régime*. The case of England is both similar and different. Here the cohesive element was provided by Parliament, where what we call 'England' was forged. 'Parliament, indeed,' wrote Pollard, 'has been the means of making the English nation and the English state. It is really co-eval with them both. There was, it is true, an England centuries before there was a parliament, but that England was little more than a geographical expression. It was hardly a nation, still less a state.'

No wonder then if, being itself partly a creation of power, national feeling was a weapon in the hands of those who actually held power and, by skilfully using it, laid the foundations of the modern State. Here again the process may have begun very early ('early modern nationalism,' says Professor Post, 'arose, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, at the King's command'): but it is at the close of the Middle Ages that its main lines are more clearly discernible, and the ideas of State and nation come into direct contact. At the beginning of the modern era the 'new principality' undoubtedly knew how to make advantageous use of national consciousness; yet it also contrived to mould and to direct that consciousness to the pursuit of certain peculiar ends. 'New princes' unscrupulously exploited its dynamic possi-

bilities: by doing so they also helped to bring into being that modern phenomenon, the Nation-state. To this process Machiavelli is a decisive witness. His sober realism never even contemplated the possibility of a complete unification of Italy. Yet he did not hesitate to advise his prince to appeal to Italian national sentiment: this, indeed, is the clue to the passionate rhapsody which concludes his otherwise cynical and bitter little book.

But that coincidence of State and nation which was unthinkable in Italy was being carried out, in Machiavelli's own day, in other parts of Europe. The sixteenth century, the time of the birth of the great Nation-states in Europe, was also the spring-time of European nationalism. England alone offers ample evidence on this point. Here, indeed, towards the close of the century, we are confronted with a real explosion of feelings that are at one and the same time political and national: for it is hard to say which plays a greater role, the pride of independence or the consciousness of unity. They are the feelings which find their highest expression in Shakespeare's immortal line: 'This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England.' (*Richard II*, 1597) They were the outcome of many factors: England's geographical position, her comparative ethnic homogeneity, the breach with Rome, the religious Reformation, indeed even the menace from abroad. But above all they found both a pattern and a stimulus in the exceptional personality of that typical 'new prince', the great Elizabeth I, past-master in the art of channelling the growing nationalism of her subjects within the range of her crude power-politics, as well as of practising the most ruthless personal rule, whilst at the same time scrupulously respecting the most deeply rooted English political tradition, that which saw Parliament as the representative of the entire nation united round the Crown.

It might, therefore, seem rather puzzling that writers, such as Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes, should have passed over in silence so important an element as nationality in their definition of the State. But the puzzle can be explained when we remember that the conver-

gence of State and nation, which had at least in part taken place in their days, was closely tied to the pursuit of a particular programme, and ultimately depended on the 'will to power' of the new princes and the new States. Any change in that programme, and the two concepts could again fall apart. This is what actually happened when from national unification the rulers of Europe embarked on territorial expansion and on power-politics pure and simple. New ideologies were called upon to provide justification of the State's new course. The balance of power, dynastic succession, natural frontiers, all called a halt to the convergence of nation and State: for the balance of power, with its related theory of 'compensations', meant that 'peoples' could be bartered like flocks of sheep; while dynastic succession provided means for creating big multi-national units simply by the arts of diplomacy and marriage (*tu felix Austria nube!*); and the so-called natural frontiers, hardly ever corresponding to ethnical or linguistic boundaries, could not but lead to the inclusion of heterogeneous minorities inside the national State. Paradoxically, the idea of nationality seems to suffer eclipse at the very moment when the modern State was coming of age and the map of Europe was taking its familiar shape. Eighteenth-century statesmen neatly severed the practice of politics from nationalistic emotions. It was the century of Cosmopolitanism, the age of 'reason' and of 'lights'. And yet it is precisely in this century that the process of unification and centralization of the Nation-state received new impetus, and that the principle of nationality burst forth with a force hitherto unknown.

According to a view which is still largely held on the Continent, the modern doctrine of Nationalism is closely linked to a vision of history which profoundly altered the traditional view of man's place in the world. As against the old conviction of the basic immutability of human nature, and more especially as against the old aspiration to stress uniformity and regularity in order to enunciate laws which should be universally valid for all places and all times, the focus of interest shifted to what is peculiar and different, to individuality as

the pivot and culmination of all historical events. Cosmopolitanism would have been superseded by Nationalism for this very reason: because the nation is all that is unique in the life of a people, its language, its traditions, its past. Hence the doctrine of Nationalism is also usually seen as an offshoot of Romanticism, of that great spiritual revolution whose roots are to be found in the eighteenth century, but whose full impact was perceived only in the nineteenth.

To this interpretation many serious objections have been raised: I am here concerned with one only. The rediscovery of the past and the emotional appeal of uniqueness, which were certainly a feature of Romanticism, would not alone account for the birth of a new political consciousness, nor for the virulent explosion of a new kind of fanaticism, equal to, and perhaps even greater in vigour than, that shown by religious fanaticism in the past. Above all they would not account for the definite absorption of the principle of nationality into the notion of the State. In the most recently published study of *State and Nation* Professor Akzin has rightly cautioned us against the 'shallow' equation of Romanticism with Nationalism. Irrationalism, traditionalism, organicism, all the paraphernalia of the new philosophy which swept Europe at the turn of the century, did not necessarily lead to Nationalism, or at any rate they did not lead to Nationalism alone. In a certain sense the Holy Alliance was just as 'romantic' as Mazzini's *Young Europe*: what divided them and set them against each other was a different conception of the nature and purposes of the State. Nationalism transformed nationality from an historical fact into a political ideology, into the one exclusive principle of legitimation of the State. In order to do so it was necessary to affirm not only that nations existed as separate and well-determined units, but that national unity was an ideal to be sought after and fostered, and that the only 'good' State was the Nation-state. Thus was the nation raised to a dignity it had never possessed in the past, or rather to a dignity which had been given a name in past ages, whenever there was a question of locating the ultimate focus of alle-

giance and loyalty, the highest good for which men could be called upon to sacrifice their life. The Romans had called it *patria*. The nearest equivalent in English is, I believe, not so much 'fatherland' as 'country'. Consider how revealing daily language can be on that score. Not even the most ardent nationalist would ever speak of a duty to 'die for the nation'. But there is no need to be a nationalist to admit the existence of a duty towards one's own country, a duty which clearly indicates the attribution of a value to the Nation-state. Thus, as Federico Chabod [*L'idea di nazione*, 1943-1944] has admirably shown, it was the notion of *patria* or country which mediated between the idea of the nation and that of the State. Patriotism provided the emotional and sentimental halo which to this day surrounds the national State.

Like the idea of the nation and like that of the State, the idea of country has a long history and a respectable pedigree. *Patria* is an inheritance from classical culture. It is held out as the highest object of love in a number of famous writings which, like Cicero's *De Officiis*, provided the mainstay of education in the West. Patriotism existed long before there were nations, let alone Nation-states. It was not unknown even at the time of the worst dismemberment of Europe. It gained new impetus from the reading of the classics as well as from the leadership of kings in the new States. But patriotism was not necessarily linked to national consciousness or to political allegiance, even though in at least some parts of Europe it came to be associated fairly soon with the latter. *Pugnare pro rege et patria* [Fight for king and country] was a familiar phrase in the Middle Ages; it has survived in English usage down to the present day. Not even personal loyalty, however, is an essential ingredient of patriotism. As always, Machiavelli's attitude is revealing. His *patria* was Florence, the city-state. His new prince was a lonely figure, trusting only to the sword. Nevertheless, Machiavelli's pages are filled with expressions of passionate love of country. Indeed, realist as Machiavelli certainly pretends to be, the emotion of patriotism carries

evident weight in his work. His words to Guicciardini are often quoted: 'I love my country more than my soul.' The sweeping statement in the *Discourses* should also be remembered: 'When the safety of the country is ultimately in question, there must be no thought of justice or injustice, of mercy or cruelty, of praise or ignominy.' It is such statements as these, as I have pointed out, that turn Machiavelli's hypothetical imperatives into categorical ones. The safety of the country is the end and the justification of the State.

But once again the confluence may have been purely accidental. Here is a typical eighteenth-century writer, a citizen of what was at the time the biggest and most powerful State in Europe. What does France mean to him? *'Un grand Royaume, et point de Patrie!'* [A great Kingdom, and no fatherland] (D'Aguesseau). Listen to another writer, closer to Italy in space if not in spirit: 'II mio nome è Vittorio Alfieri: il luogo dov'io son nato, l'Italia: nessuna terra mi è patria.' [My name is Vittorio Alfieri; the place where I was born, Italy; I have no country anywhere]. (*Il Misogallo*, 1789-1798)

For these men the ideas of State, nation, and country in no sense coincide. No State, however great and powerful, could provide them with a fatherland. The nation to which they belonged because they happened to have been born in it was not properly their country. *Patria* was that place only, that community, that 'State', where a man could find the things he truly valued. Hence, as the *Grande Encyclopédie* forcibly put it, patriotism has no place under the yoke of a tyrant. Hence also, as Voltaire gleefully concluded, one's country is wherever one lives happily and well. *Ubi bene, ibi patria;* just as the nation is the fruit of circumstance, and the State a conventional institution, so one's country is the result of a choice. Such was the message of the age of enlightenment, the conclusion against which Edmund Burke was soon to launch one of his most bitter attacks.

Yet it was precisely this emphasis on choice, on a judgement of value, which left the door open to portentous change. Burke might appeal

to a very different notion of the State by defining it as a 'partnership . . . between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are to be born.' [*Reflections on the Revolution in France*, 1790] There still remained the need to explain how that partnership could be 'consecrated', and for what reasons it should be the object of dedication and love. This is what the doctrine of Nationalism set out to do. And we shall never appreciate the tremendous importance of the French Revolution unless we realize that it was that revolution which gave the concept of nation an entirely new meaning, transforming it, as it were, from a mere product of history into a deliberate construction, a partnership not only of *mores* but of wills. This is the time when we witness the final coincidence of the three ideas we have followed throughout their erratic, independent course. 'The nation becomes the country', but it does so because the nation is the expression of self-determination, because the State no longer consists in the mere whim of the autocrat or in the consolidation of the interests of a few privileged classes, but in the sovereignty of the 'general will'. Chabod is perfectly right in stressing that, even more than the French revolutionaries, the true proclaimer of the new doctrine was Rousseau. Rousseau may not yet have had before his eyes the clear and coherent picture of national character which the doctrine of nationalism outlined in the romantic age; but he certainly was the prophet of the new religion which was henceforth to dominate the modern world. Still more than the *Social Contract,* his advice to the Poles is significant on that score. Patriotism is the true way to salvation, for the individual as well as for the group. But patriotism is both pride of nation and love of liberty, self-assertion and respect for the law. The old adage *ubi bene, ibi patria* is here completely reversed. It now reads *ubi libertas, ibi patria* and *ubi patria, ibi bene.* A new world is dawning, where Democracy joins hands with Nationalism, and the State, hitherto the sum of cold calculations of power, gathers to itself a power hitherto unknown. For that power is no less than the outcome of a whole people's participation in those decisions which were at one time the privilege of the few.

Such, as I see them, were the reasons why nationality turned into one of the foremost grounds of legitimation in the modern State. And yet, in spite of the common background and the similarity of themes, there was soon once again to be a parting of the ways in this new world too. It was to come particularly as a consequence of the wholly different development of States and nations in the several parts of Europe, a difference which Sir Lewis Namier has very aptly emphasized. In those parts where amalgamation of State and nation had long been achieved, patriotism could find expression in a proud assertion of liberty, of the liberty won and sanctioned by means of free institutions which were held out for the admiration of the world. This may be said to have been the case with Britain, the 'mother of Parliaments'; it certainly was the case with revolutionary France. *'Ici commence le pays de la liberté'* read a placard once posted on the left bank of the Rhine. But where nations were still broken up into a multiplicity of political units, patriotism could not but take the shape primarily of a demand for unity and independence. The cause of liberty could wait. 'Germany is no longer a State', wrote Hegel in 1802: the supreme necessity, on which Fichte was to harp only a few years later in his *Addresses to the German Nation,* was that Germany should become one. In Italy, the priority given to independence over liberty was one of the most fateful choices of the *Risorgimento.* It may well have been one of the causes why free institutions were so precariously grounded in that part of the world.

But for the parting of the roads yet another reason can be given. To quote once again one of Chabod's illuminating suggestions, there would seem to have been from the beginning two possible ways of conceiving the nation: one based on purely 'natural' factors, the other on 'spiritual' elements; the one on something given, the other on something desired. The first of these two conceptions may have begun by merely stressing linguistic and ethnical differentiation as the distinguishing factors of nationality. It ended by extolling the most dubious biological factors, blood and race. The second concep-

tion, on the contrary, was based on the recognition of the importance of the cultural bond. It stressed the necessity of active individual participation if the nation was to be a living, spiritual unit; indeed, in Renan's famous phrase, a nation is nothing but a choice, a plebiscite of every day. Such a conception of nationality is not necessarily conducive to antagonism and hatred. On the contrary, it may permit the possibility of reconciling national differences with the complexity of human civilization as a whole. This possibility should be taken into account before a final judgement is passed on what it is the fashion nowadays to call the 'ideology' of the national State.

Certainly this peculiar ideology, even when it is not openly disparaged or deliberately condemned, cannot but appear to modern eyes — at any rate in Europe — as a thing of the past. But one lesson can be learnt from the very sketchy analysis I have attempted to give of it. This is that the 'State' cannot be understood simply as a structure of power, nor justified only by the help of abstract philosophical theorems. Its legitimation is interwoven with historical elements and irrational, emotional factors. We often hear it said that the new, the supra-national State, which is invoked and longed for today by so many, will be the signal for the final disappearance of those nationalisms which have brought Europe to the brink of ruin. But one thing at least can be said with certainty. Whenever the new State arises and establishes itself as a working proposition, it too will need an 'ideology' on which to lean, a faith capable of kindling men's imagination and warming their hearts. It will be essential, in other words, for this State to inspire men with a spirit of dedication as great as that inspired by the 'old' State, and for it to acquire in the eyes of its new citizens the value of a new and better *communis patria*.

Imperialism - Colonialism

The image conveyed by social scientist and popular publicists about imperialism and colonialism is that it was the result either (a) of greedy capitalists in search of placement for their money or of markets for their goods or (b) of compassionate missionaries and benevolent civil servants aiming at civilizing backward populations.

The extracts here collected present a different view that identify the source of imperialist ventures in the avidity of State rulers for power and prestige. In a situation of competing States Sovereignties, the acquisition of power and prestige was linked to territorial expansion and dominance even if that meant a squandering of human and material resources, a reality that emerges from any serious analysis of imperialistic State policies.

John A. Hobson

Moral and sentimental defence of Imperialism (1902)

In this short extract the author highlights and condemns the manufactured deception of politicians and financiers in covering their imperialistic ventures under the benevolent mark of a civilising mission.

Source: John A. Hobson, *Imperialism. A Study*, Part II Chapter 3, 1902.

Analysis of the actual course of modern Imperialism has laid bare the combination of economic and political forces which fashions it. These forces are traced to their sources in the selfish interests of certain industrial, financial, and professional classes, seeking private advantages out of a policy of imperial expansion, and using this same policy to protect them in their economic, political, and social privileges against the pressure of democracy. It remains to answer the question, "Why does Imperialism escape general recognition for the narrow, sordid thing it is?" Each nation, as it watches from outside

the Imperialism of its neighbours, is not deceived; the selfish interests of political and commercial classes are seen plainly paramount in the direction of the policy. So every other European nation recognises the true outlines of British Imperialism and charges us with hypocrisy in feigning blindness. This charge is false; no nation sees its own shortcomings; the charge of hypocrisy is seldom justly brought against an individual, against a nation never. Frenchmen and Germans believe that our zeal in promoting foreign missions, putting down slavery, and in spreading the arts of civilisation is a false disguise conveniently assumed to cover naked national self-assertion. The actual case is somewhat different. [1]

There exists in a considerable though not a large proportion of the British nation a genuine desire to spread Christianity among the heathen, to diminish the cruelty and other sufferings which they believe exist in countries less fortunate than their own, and to do good work about the world in the cause of humanity. Most of the churches contain a small body of men and women deeply, even passionately, interested in such work, and a much larger number whose sympathy, though weaker, is quite genuine. Ill-trained for the most part in psychology and history, these people believe that religion and other arts of civilisation are portable commodities which it is our duty to convey to the backward nations, and that a certain amount of compulsion is justified in pressing their benefits upon people too ignorant at once to recognise them.

Is it surprising that the selfish forces which direct Imperialism should utilise the protective colours of these disinterested movements? Imperialist politicians, soldiers, or company directors, who push a forward policy by portraying the cruelties of the African slave raids, or the infamous tyranny of a Prempeh [2] or a Thebaw [3], or who open out a new field for missionary enterprise in China or the Soudan, do not deliberately and consciously work up these motives in order to incite the British public. They simply and instinctively attach to themselves any strong, genuine elevated feeling which is of

service, fan it and feed it until it assumes fervour, and utilise it for their ends. The politician always, the business man not seldom, believes that high motives qualify the political or financial benefits he gets: it is certain that Lord Salisbury [4] really believes that the South African war, for which his Government is responsible, has been undertaken for the benefit of the people of South Africa and will result in increased liberty and happiness; it is quite likely that Earl Grey [5] thinks that the Chartered Company which he directs is animated by a desire to improve the material and moral condition of the natives of Rhodesia and that it is attaining this object.

So Leopold, King of the Belgians, has claimed for his government of the Congo – "Our only programme is that of the moral and material regeneration of the country." It is difficult to set any limit upon the capacity of men to deceive themselves as to the relative strength and worth of the motives which affect them: politicians, in particular, acquire so strong a habit of setting their projects in the most favourable light that they soon convince themselves that the finest result which they think may conceivably accrue from any policy is the actual motive of that policy. As for the public, it is only natural that it should be deceived. All the purer and more elevated adjuncts of Imperialism are kept to the fore by religious and philanthropic agencies: patriotism appeals to the general lust of power within a people by suggestions of nobler uses, adopting the forms of self-sacrifice to cover domination and the love of adventure. So Christianity becomes "imperialist" to the Archbishop of Canterbury, a "going out to all the world to preach the gospel"; trade becomes "imperialist" in the eyes of merchants seeking a world market.

It is precisely in this falsification of the real import of motives that the gravest vice and the most signal peril of Imperialism reside. When, out of a medley of mixed motives, the least potent is selected for public prominence because it is the most presentable, when issues of a policy which was not present at all to the minds of those who formed this policy are treated as chief causes, the moral currency of

the nation is debased. The whole policy of Imperialism is riddled with this deception. Although no candid student of history will maintain for a moment that the entrance of British power into India, and the chief steps leading to the present British Empire there, were motived by considerations other than our own political and commercial aggrandisement, nothing is more common than to hear the gains which it is alleged the natives of the country have received from British rule assigned as the moral justification of our Indian Empire. The case of Egypt is a still more striking one. Though the reasons openly assigned for the British occupation of Egypt were military and financial ones affecting our own interests, it is now commonly maintained that we went there in order to bestow the benefits which Egyptians have received from our sway, and that it would be positively wicked of us to keep the pledge we gave to withdraw within a short term of years from the country. When the ordinary Englishman reads how "at no previous period of his history has the fellah lived under a Government so careful to promote his interests or to preserve his rights," he instinctively exclaims, "Yes, that is what we went to Egypt for," though, in point of fact, the play of "Imperialism" which carried us there was determined by quite other considerations. Even if one supposes that the visible misgovernment of Egypt, in its bearing on the life of the inhabitants, did impart some unselfish element to our conduct, no one would suggest that as an operative force in the direction of our imperial policy such motive has ever determined our actions.

Not even the most flamboyant Imperialist contends that England is a knight-errant, everywhere in search of a quest to deliver oppressed peoples from oppressive governments, regardless of her own interests and perils. Though perhaps not so inefficient, the Russian tyranny is quite as oppressive and more injurious to the cause of civilisation than the government of the Khedive, but no one proposes that we should coerce Russia, or rescue Finland from her clutches. The case of Armenia, again, attests the utter feebleness of the higher motives.

Both the Government and the people of Great Britain were thoroughly convinced of the atrocious cruelties of Turkey, public opinion was well informed and thoroughly incensed, Great Britain was expressly pledged by the Cyprus Convention to protect Armenia; but the "cause of humanity" and the "mission of civilisation" were powerless either for interference or for effective protest.

Aggressive Imperialism, as our investigation has shown, is virtually confined to the coercion by stronger or better-armed nations of nations which are, or seem to be, weaker and incapable of effective resistance; everywhere some definite economic or political gain is sought by the imperial aggressor. The chivalrous spirit of Imperialism leads neither Great Britain nor any other Western nation to assail a powerful State however tyrannous or to assist a weak State reputed to be poor.

The blending of strong interested with weak disinterested forces is indeed characteristic of the age. It is the homage which Imperialism pays to humanity. But just as the mixture known as "philanthropy and 5 per cent" is distrusted in the ordinary business world, so in the larger policy of nations the same combination is by right suspect. When business is harnessed with benevolence the former is commonly allowed to determine the direction and to set the pace. Doubtless it says something for the moral sensibility of a nation that a gainful course is rendered more attractive by a tincture of disinterestedness. But the theory and the practice in modern history often border so closely on hypocrisy that we cannot feel surprise that unfriendly foreigners apply the term to them.

Notes

[1] Portraying Imperialism as a civilising mission was the task not only of politicians and businessmen but also of artists and writers. The most famous example of this aim is the poem composed by

Rudyard Kipling, *The White Man's Burden*, 1899, to exhort and justify the control and annexation of the Philippine Islands by the United States following the Philippine-American war (1899-1902).

[2] Prempeh was the thirteenth ruler of the Ashanti Empire, now modern Ghana. He ruled from 1888 until his death in 1931, and fought an Ashanti war against Britain in 1895-1896.

[3] Thebaw was the last king of Burma. His reign ended when the Royal Burmese armed forces were defeated by the British army in the Third Anglo-Burmese war on November 1885.

[4] Lord Salisbury (1830-1903) was a conservative politician who served three times as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

[5] Albert Grey (1851-1917) was for a time member of the board of directors of the British South Africa Company and administrator of Rhodesia.

Rudolf Hilferding

Finance Capital (1910)

In this extract Rudolf Hilferding portrays the transformation of the liberal bourgeois from champion of free trade to advocate of protectionism at home and imperialism abroad. The industrial capitalist entrepreneur who has accumulated enormous profits becomes then a financial rentier and speculator that needs a powerful State to protect his financial loans and investments in all corners of the world. Then, the modern "liberal" State, that under the banner of nationalism "recognized the right of all nations to independent existence as States" transforms itself into an imperialist machine whose nation and race is destined, by presumed nature and by manufactured history, to dominate the world.

Source: Rudolf Hilferding, *Das Finanzkapital*, Chapter 22, 1910.

In the struggle against economic mercantilism and political absolutism, the bourgeoisie was the champion of opposition to the

State. Liberalism was in reality a destructive force involving the 'overthrow' of State power and the dissolution of old social bonds. The whole painfully constructed system of dependent relationships on the land, and of guild associations with their complex superstructure of privileges and monopolies in the towns, was thrown overboard. The victory of liberalism meant first of all an enormous reduction in the power of the State. Henceforth, at least in principle, economic life was to be excluded entirely from the sphere of State regulation, and politically the State was to confine itself to the maintenance of public order and the establishment of civil equality.

Thus liberalism was purely negative, in sharp contrast to the State during the mercantilist period of early capitalism which, in principle, wanted to regulate everything, and also to all socialist systems which seek constructively rather than destructively to replace anarchy and the freedom of competition by a conscious regulation of economic life, and a self-organizing society. It is only natural that the liberal principle should have been realized first in England where it was championed by a bourgeoisie committed to free trade which had to appeal to the power of the State only for short periods of time in its conflict with the proletariat. But even in England its realization encountered opposition, not only from the old aristocracy which pursued a protectionist policy and therefore opposed the principle of liberalism, but also, to some extent, from the merchant class and from the banking capital involved in investment abroad, which requested above all the maintenance of England's control of the seas, a demand which was most vigorously supported by all those groups which had an interest in the colonies.

On the continent, however, the liberal view of the State had to be considerably modified from the very outset before it was able to prevail. In a characteristic contrast between ideology and reality, continental liberalism, developed in the classical manner by the French, drew all the theoretical consequences for all areas of political

and intellectual life with much greater boldness and consistency than its English counterpart. This because its later emergence provided it with a completely different body of scientific knowledge than the English version, and so its formulation was far more comprehensive. On the contrary, English liberalism was essentially based on economics and its practical realization was subject, from the very beginning, to definite limitations.

Indeed, how could the liberal demand for the restriction of State power be put into effect by a bourgeoisie which, in economic terms, needed the State as the most powerful lever of its development and for which it was a matter not of abolishing the State, but of transforming it from an obstacle into a vehicle of its own development?

What the continental bourgeoisie needed above all was to overcome the plethora of petty states and to substitute for the impotence of these petty states the supreme power of a unified State. The need to create a National State was bound to make the bourgeoisie from the very beginning a champion of the State. On the continent, however, it was a matter of land power, not sea power. The modern army, however, is entirely different from a navy as a means of establishing the power of the State *vis-à-vis* society. It means fundamentally that those who control the army have the State power at their disposal without restraint. On the other hand, universal military conscription, which arms the mass of the people, was bound to persuade the bourgeoisie very quickly that if the army were not to become a menace to its rule, a strictly hierarchical organisation was required, based upon a closed officers' corps which would be a pliable instrument of the State.

If liberalism was thus unable to carry out its political programme in countries such as Germany, Italy and Austria, its efforts were also curbed in France, where the French bourgeoisie could not dispense with the help of the State in matters of commercial policy. Further-

more, the victory of the French Revolution necessarily involved France in a war on two fronts. She had to defend the revolutionary achievements against continental feudalism; and on the other hand the creation of a new empire of modern capitalism was a threat to the established position which England held on the world market, forcing France to fight England for world market dominance. Her defeat enhanced the power of the landed gentry, and of commercial, bank, and colonial capital in England, and along with it the power of the State over industrial capital, thereby delaying the final rise of English industrial capital and the victory of free trade. On the other hand, England's victory necessarily led industrial capital in continental Europe to support the protective tariff, totally frustrated the advance of economic liberalism, and created the conditions needed for a rapid development of finance capital on the continent.

Thus from the outset, the ideology and the conception of the State held by the bourgeoisie in Europe encountered few obstacles in their adaptation to the needs of finance capital. Moreover, the fact that the unification of Germany was accomplished in a counter-revolutionary way was bound to reinforce very strongly the position of the State in the consciousness of the people, whereas in France the military defeat led to a concentration of all available forces upon the task of restoring State power. Thus the needs of finance capital found various ideological elements to hand which could easily be used for creating a new ideology in harmony with its own interests.

This ideology, however, is completely opposed to that of liberalism. Finance capital does not want freedom, but domination; it has no regard for the independence of the individual capitalist, but demands his allegiance. It detests the anarchy of competition and wants organization, but only so that it can compete at ever higher levels. But in order to achieve these ends, and to maintain and enhance its predominant position, it needs the State which can guarantee its domestic market through a protective tariff policy and facili-

tate the conquest of foreign markets. It needs a politically powerful State which does not have to take account of the conflicting interests of other States in its commercial policy. Ultimately, it needs a strong State to assert its financial interests abroad and use its political power to force smaller states to sign favourable supply contracts and trade agreements. A State which can intervene in every corner of the globe and transform the whole world into a sphere of investment for its own finance capital. Finally, finance capital needs a State which is strong enough to pursue an expansionist policy and the annexation of new colonies. Liberalism opposed State power politics, and only wanted to secure its own rule against the old forces of aristocracy and bureaucracy by granting them the least possible access to State power. Finance capital, on the contrary, demands unlimited power politics, and this would be the case even if military and naval expenditures did not directly assure the most powerful capitalist groups of important markets, which provide in most cases monopolistic profits.

The demand for an expansionist policy revolutionizes the whole world view of the bourgeoisie, which ceases to be peace-loving and humanitarian. The old free traders believed in free trade not only as the best economic policy but also as the beginning of an era of peace. Finance capital abandoned this belief long ago. It has no faith in the harmony of capitalist interests, and knows well that competition is becoming increasingly a political power struggle. The ideal of peace is fading, and the idea of humanity is being replaced by the ideal of the greatness and power of the State. The modern State arose as a realization of the aspiration of nations for unity. The national idea, which found a natural limit in the constitution of a State based upon the nation, because it recognized the right of all nations to independent existence as States, and hence regarded the frontiers of the State as being determined by the natural boundaries of the nation, is now transformed into the notion of elevating one's own nation above all others. The ideal now is to secure for one's own nation the domi-

nation of the world, an aspiration which is as unbounded as the capitalist lust for profit from which it springs. Capital becomes the conqueror of the world, and with every new country that it conquers there are new territories to be invaded.

These efforts become an economic necessity, because every failure to advance reduces the profit and the competitiveness of finance capital, and may finally turn the smaller economic territory into a mere tributary of a larger one. They have an economic basis, but are then justified ideologically by an extraordinary perversion of the national idea, which no longer recognizes the right of every nation to political self-determination and independence, and ceases to express, with regard to nations, the democratic creed of the equality of all members of the human race. Instead the economic preference for monopoly is reflected in the privileged position that must be accorded to one's own nation, which is represented as a 'chosen nation'. Since the subjection of foreign nations takes place by force — that is, in a very natural way — it appears to the ruling nation that this domination is due to some special natural qualities, in short to its racial characteristics. Thus there emerges in racist ideology, cloaked in the garb of natural science, a justification for finance capital's lust for power, which is thus shown to have the specificity and necessity of a natural phenomenon. An oligarchic ideal of domination has replaced the democratic ideal of equality.

While this ideal appears to encompass the entire nation in the realm of foreign policy, in the realm of domestic policy it shifts to emphasising the position of the ruling class as against the working class. At the same time the increasing power of the workers intensifies the efforts of capital to reinforce the power of the State as a bulwark against proletarian demands.

Thus the ideology of imperialism arises on the ruins of the old liberal ideals, whose naivety it derides. What an illusion to believe in harmony of interests in the world of capitalist struggle, where the

superiority of weapons alone decides everything. What an illusion to expect the reign of eternal peace and to preach international law in a world where power alone decides the fate of peoples. What folly to want to extend the regulation of legal relations within states beyond national borders, what irresponsible disruption of business is this humanitarian sentimentality that has made of workers an issue, invented social reform at home, and wants to abolish contract slavery in the colonies, the only means of rational exploitation. Eternal justice is a beautiful dream, but morality builds no railways, not even at home. How are we to conquer the world if we have to wait for our competitors to undergo a spiritual conversion?

But imperialism only dissolves the faded ideals of the bourgeoisie in order to put in their place a new and greater illusion. It is clear-headed and sober in evaluating the real conflicts among capitalist interest groups, and it conceives all politics as a matter of capitalist syndicates either fighting or combining with each other. But it is carried away and becomes intoxicated when it unveils its own ideal. The imperialist wants nothing for himself, but he is also no visionary and dreamer who would dissolve the inextricable tangle of races at all stages of development and of potentiality for further development into the bloodless concept of 'humanity' instead of seeing it as a colourful reality.

He observes with a cold and steady eye the medley of peoples and sees his own nation standing over all of them. For him this nation is real; it lives in the ever increasing power and greatness of the State, and its enhancement deserves every ounce of his effort. The subordination of individual interests to a higher general interest, which is a prerequisite for every vital social ideology, is thus achieved; and the State, which is alien to the people, is bound together with the nation in unity, while the national idea is placed at the service of politics as a driving force. Class antagonisms have disappeared and been transcended in the service of the collectivity. The common action of the nation, united by a common goal of national greatness, has taken the

place of class struggle, so dangerous and fruitless for the possessing classes.

This ideal, which seems to provide a new bond for the strife-ridden bourgeois society, will doubtless meet with an increasingly enthusiastic reception as the process of disintegration of bourgeois society continues.

Joseph Schumpeter

State Imperialism and Capitalism (1919)

The analysis of Imperialism by Schumpeter is in total antithesis with that of Lenin. Imperialism is not seen as the most advanced stage of capitalism but as the clear sign that pre-capitalistic (i.e. feudal) aspects survive in capitalism. This results from the subservience of the capitalists to state rulers from whom they ask for "protection against external and even domestic enemies. The bourgeoisie seeks to win over the state for itself, and in return serves the state and state interests that are different from its own."

Another consequence of this subservience is that "nationalism and militarism, while not creatures of capitalism, become 'capitalized' and in the end draw their best energies from capitalism." In the end, it is this imperialistic, nationalistic, militaristic capitalism that would dominate large part of the XX century. For clarity sake, it should then be better to drop the term capitalism and define that period of history with the more appropriate name of statism.

Source: Joseph Schumpeter, *Zur Soziologie der Imperialismen*, 1919.

Free Trade in the interest of the citizens

It may be stated as being beyond controversy that where free trade prevails *no* class has an interest in the forcible expansion as such. For in such a case the citizens and goods of every nation can move in foreign countries as freely as though those countries were politically their own — free trade implying far more than mere freedom from tariffs. In a genuine state of free trade, foreign raw materials and foodstuffs are as accessible to each nation as though they were within its own territory. Where the cultural backwardness of a region makes normal economic intercourse dependent on colonization, it does not matter, assuming free trade, which of the 'civilized' nations undertakes the task of colonization. Dominion of the seas, in such a case, means little more than a maritime traffic police. Similarly, it is a matter of indifference to a nation whether a railway concession in a foreign country is acquired by one of its own citizens or not — just so long as the railway *is* built and put into efficient operation. For citizens of any country may use the railway, just like the fellow countrymen of its builder — while in the event of war it will serve whoever controls it in the military sense, regardless of who built it. It is true, of course, that profits and wages flowing from its construction and operation will accrue, for the greater part, to the nation that built it. But capital and labour that go into the railway have to be taken from somewhere, and normally the other nations fill the gap. It is a fact that in a regime of free trade the essential advantages of international intercourse are clearly evident. The gain lies in the enlargement of the commodity supply by means of the division of labour among nations, rather than in the profits and wages of the export industry and the carrying trade. For these profits and wages would be reaped even if there were no export, in which case import, the necessary complement, would also vanish. Not even monopoly interests — if they existed — would be disposed toward imperialism

in such a case. For under free trade only *international* cartels would be possible. Under a system of free trade there would be conflicts in economic interest neither among different nations nor among the corresponding classes of different nations. And since protectionism is not an essential characteristic of the capitalist economy — otherwise the English national economy would scarcely be capitalist — it is apparent that any economic interest in forcible expansion on the part of a people or a class is not necessarily a product of capitalism.

Protectionism as a weapon of the states

Protective tariffs alone — and harassment of the alien and of foreign commodities — do not basically change this situation as it affects interests. True, such barriers move the nations economically farther apart, making it easier for imperialist tendencies to win the upper hand; they line up the entrepreneurs of the different countries in battle formation against one another, impeding the rise of peaceful interests; they also hinder the flow of raw materials and foodstuffs and thus the export of manufactures, or conversely, the import of manufactures and the export of raw materials and foodstuffs, possibly creating an interest in — sometimes forcible — expansion of the customs area; they place entrepreneurs in a position of dependence on regulations of governments that may be serving imperialist interests, giving these governments occasion to pervert economic relations for purposes of sharpening economic conflicts, for adulterating the competitive struggle with diplomatic methods outside the field of economics, and, finally, for imposing on people the heavy sacrifices exacted by a policy of autarchy, thus accustoming them to the thought of war by constant preparation for war. Nevertheless, in this case the basic alignment of interests remains essentially what it was under free trade. We might reiterate our example of railway construction, though in the case of mining concessions, for example, the situation is somewhat different. Colonial possessions acquire

more meaning in this case, but the exclusion from the colonies of aliens and foreign capital is not altogether good business since it slows down the development of the colonies. The same is true of the struggle for third markets. When, for example, France obtains more favourable tariff treatment from the Chinese government than England enjoys, this will avail only those French exporters who are in a position to export the same goods as their English *confrères*; the others are only harmed. It is true, of course, that protectionism adds another form of international capital movement to the kind that prevails under free trade — or rather, a modification of it — namely, the movement of capital for the founding of enterprises inside the tariff wall, in order to save customs duties. But this capital movement too has no aggressive element; on the contrary, it tends toward the creation of peaceful interests. Thus an aggressive economic policy on the part of a country with a unified tariff — with preparedness for war always in the background — serves the economy only seemingly rather than really. Actually, one might assert that the economy becomes a weapon in the political struggle, a means for unifying the nation, for severing it from the fabric of international interests, for placing it at the disposal of state power.

The alliance state rulers-national capitalists in favour of protectionism

This becomes especially clear when we consider which strata of the capitalist world are actually economically benefited by protective tariffs. They do harm to both workers and capitalists — in contrast to entrepreneurs — not only in their role as consumers, but also as producers. The damage to consumers is universal, that to producers almost so. As for entrepreneurs, they are benefited only by the tariff that happens to be levied on their own product. But this advantage is substantially reduced by the countermeasures adopted by other countries — universally except in the case of England — and by the

effect of the tariff on the prices of other articles, especially those which they require for their own productive process. Why, then, are entrepreneurs so strongly in favour of protective tariffs? The answer is simple. Each industry hopes to score *special* gains in the struggle of political intrigue, thus enabling it to realize a net gain. Moreover, every decline in freight rates, every advance in production abroad, is likely to affect the economic balance, making it necessary for domestic enterprises to adapt themselves, indeed often to turn to other lines of endeavour. This is a difficult task to which not everyone is equal. Within the industrial organism of every nation there survive antiquated methods of doing business that would cause enterprises to succumb to foreign competition — because of poor management rather than lack of capital, for before 1914 the banks were almost forcing capital on the entrepreneurs. If, still, in most countries virtually all entrepreneurs are protectionists, this is owing to a reason which we shall presently discuss. Without that reason, their attitude would be different. The fact that all industries today demand tariff protection must not blind us to the fact that even the entrepreneur interest is not unequivocally protectionist. For this demand is only the consequence of a protectionism already in existence, of a protectionist spirit springing from the economic interests of relatively small entrepreneur groups and from non-capitalist elements — a spirit that ultimately carried along all groups, occasionally even the representatives of working-class interests. Today the protective tariff confers its full and immediate benefits — or come close to conferring them — only on the large landowners.

A protectionist policy, however, does facilitate the formation of cartels and trusts. And it is true that this circumstance thoroughly alters the alignment of interests.

[...]

The economic cartels and the fight amongst national capitalists

Union in a cartel or trust confers various benefits on the entrepreneur — a saving in costs, a stronger position as against the workers — but none of these compares with this one advantage: a monopolistic price policy, possible to any considerable degree *only* behind an adequate protective tariff.

Now the price that brings the maximum monopoly profit is generally far above the price that would be fixed by fluctuating competitive costs, and the volume that can be marketed at that maximum price is generally far below the output that would be technically and economically feasible. Under free competition that output *would* be produced and offered, but a trust cannot offer it, for it could be sold only at a competitive price. Yet the trust *must* produce it — or approximately as much — otherwise the advantages of large-scale enterprise remain unexploited and unit costs are likely to be uneconomically high. The trust thus faces a dilemma. Either it renounces the monopolistic policies that motivated its founding; or it fails to exploit and expand its plant, with resultant high costs. It extricates itself from this dilemma by producing the full output that is economically feasible, thus securing low costs, and offering in the protected domestic market only the quantity corresponding to the monopoly price — insofar as the tariff permits: while the rest is sold, or 'dumped' abroad at a lower price, sometimes (but not necessarily) *below* cost.

What happens when the entrepreneurs successfully pursue such a policy is something that did not occur in the cases discussed so far — a conflict of interests between nations that becomes so sharp that it cannot be overcome by the existing basic community of interests. Each of the two groups of entrepreneurs and each of the two states seeks to do something that is rendered illusory by a similar policy on the part of the other. In the case of protective tariffs *without*

monopoly formation, an understanding is sometimes possible, for only a few would be destroyed, while many would stand to gain; but when monopoly rules it is very difficult to reach an agreement for it would require self-negation on the part of the new rulers. All that is left to do is to pursue the course once taken, to beat down the foreign industry wherever possible, forcing it to conclude a favourable 'peace.' This requires sacrifices. The excess product is dumped on the world market at steadily lower prices. Counterattacks that grow more and more desperate must be repulsed on the domestic scene. The atmosphere grows more and more heated. Workers and consumers grow more and more troublesome.

[...]

Monopoly capitalism out of the alliance of big banks with big business

Although the relation between capitalists and entrepreneurs is one of the typical and fundamental *conflicts* of the capitalist economy, monopoly capitalism has virtually fused the big banks and cartels into one. Leading bankers are often leaders of the national economy. Here capitalism has found a central organ that supplants its automatism by conscious decisions. In the second place, the interests of the big banks coincide with those of their depositors even less than do the interests of cartel leaders with those of the firms belonging to the cartel. The policies of high finance are based on control of a *large* proportion of the national capital, but they are in the actual interest of only a *small* proportion and, indeed, with respect to the alliance with big business, sometimes not even in the interest of capital as such at all. The ordinary 'small' capitalist foots the bill for a policy of forced exports, rather than enjoying its profits. He is a tool; his interests do not really matter. This possibility of laying all the sacrifices connected with a monopoly policy on one part of capital, while removing them from another, makes capital exports far more lucra-

tive for the favoured part than they would otherwise be. Even capital that is independent of the banks is thus often forced abroad — forced into the role of a shock troop for the real leaders, because cartels successfully impede the founding of new enterprises. Thus the customs area of a trustified country generally pours a huge wave of capital into new countries. There it meets other, similar waves of capital, and a bitter, costly struggle begins but never ends.

In such a struggle among "dumped" products and capitals, it is no longer a matter of indifference who builds a given railroad, who owns a mine or a colony. Now that the law of costs is no longer operative, it becomes necessary to fight over such properties with desperate effort and with every available means, including those that are not economic in character, such as diplomacy. The concrete objects in question often become entirely subsidiary considerations; the anticipated profit may be trifling, because of the competitive struggle — a struggle that has very little to do with normal competition. What matters is to gain a foothold of some kind and then to exploit this foothold as a base for the conquest of new markets. This costs all the participants dear — often more than can be reasonably recovered, immediately or in the future. Fury lays hold of everyone concerned — and everyone sees to it that his fellow countrymen share his wrath. Each is constrained to resort to methods that he would regard as evidence of unprecedented moral depravity in the other.

[...]

Capitalism, concentration and protectionism

The character of capitalism leads to large-scale production, but with few exceptions large-scale production does *not* lead to the kind of unlimited concentration that would leave but one or only a few firms in each industry. On the contrary, any plant runs up against limits to its growth in a given location; and the growth of combinations, which would make sense under a system of free trade, encounters limits of

organizational efficiency. Beyond these limits there is no tendency toward combination inherent in the competitive system. In particular, the rise of trusts and cartels — a phenomenon quite different from the trend to large-scale production with which it is often confused — can never be explained by the automatism of the competitive system. This follows from the very fact that trusts and cartels can attain their primary purpose — to pursue a monopoly policy — only behind protective tariffs, without which they would lose their essential significance. But protective tariffs do not automatically grow from the competitive system. They are the fruit of political action — *a type of action that by no means reflects the objective interests of all those concerned* but that, on the contrary, becomes impossible as soon as the majority of those whose consent is necessary realize their true interests. To some extent it is obvious, and for the rest it will be presently shown, that the interests of the minority, quite appropriately expressed in support of a protective tariff, do not stem from capitalism as such. It follows that *it is a basic fallacy to describe imperialism as a necessary phase of capitalism, or even to speak of the development of capitalism into imperialism.* We have seen before that the mode of life of the capitalist world does not favour imperialist attitudes. We now see that the alignment of interests in a capitalist economy — even the interests of its upper strata — by no means points unequivocally in the direction of imperialism. We now come to the final step in our line of reasoning.

Since we cannot derive even export monopolism from any tendencies of the competitive system toward big enterprise, we must find some other explanation. A glance at the original purpose of tariffs provides what we need. Tariff sprang from the financial interests of the monarchy. They were a method of exploiting the trader which differed from the method of the robber baron in the same way that the royal chase differed from the method of the poacher. They were in line with the royal prerogatives of safe conduct, of protection for the Jews, of the granting of market rights, and so forth. From the thir-

teen century onward this method was progressively refined in the autocratic state, less and less emphasis being placed on the direct monetary yield of customs revenues, and more and more on their indirect effect in creating productive taxable objects. In other words, while the protective value of a tariff counted, it counted only from the viewpoint of the ultimate monetary advantage of the sovereign. It does not matter, for our purposes, that occasionally this policy, under the influence of lay notions of economics, blundered badly in the choice of its methods. (From the viewpoint of autocratic interest, incidentally, such measures were not nearly so self-defeating as they were from the viewpoint of the national economy). Every custom house, every privilege conferring the right to produce, market, or store, thus created a new economic situation which deflected trade and industry into 'unnatural' channels. All tariffs, rights, and the like became the seed bed for economic growth that could have neither sprung up nor maintained itself without them. Further, all such economic institutions dictated by autocratic interest were surrounded by manifold interests of people who were dependent on them and now began to demand their continuance — a wholly paradoxical though at the same time quite understandable situation.

The bourgeoisie and its feudal traits: territorialism and nationalism

The trading and manufacturing bourgeoisie was all the more aware of its dependence on the sovereign, since it needed his protection against the remaining feudal powers; and the uncertainties of the times, together with the lack of great consuming centres, impeded the rise of free economic competition. Insofar as commerce and manufacturing came into being at all, therefore, they arose under the sign of monopolistic interest. Thus the bourgeoisie willingly allowed itself to be moulded into one of the power instruments of the monarchy, both in a territorial and in a national sense. It is even true that

the bourgeoisie, because of the character of its interests and the kind of economic outlook that corresponded to those interests, made an essential contribution to the emergence of modern nationalism. Another factor that worked in the same direction was the financial relation between the great merchant houses and the sovereign. This theory of the nature of the relationship between the autocratic state and the bourgeoisie is not refuted by pointing out that it was precisely the mercantile republics of the Middle Ages and the early modern period that initially pursued a policy of mercantilism. They were no more than enclaves in a world pervaded by the struggle among feudal powers. The Hanseatic League and Venice, for example, could maintain themselves only as military powers, could pursue their business only by means of fortified bases, warehousing privileges, protective treaties. This forced the people to stand shoulder to shoulder, made the exploitation of political gains with a corporate and monopolistic spirit. Wherever autocratic power vanished at an early date — as in the Netherlands and later in England — and the protective interest receded into the background, they swiftly discovered that trade must be free — "free to the nethermost recesses of hell."

Trade and industry of the early capitalist period thus remained strongly pervaded with pre-capitalist methods, bore the stamp of autocracy, and served its interests, either willingly or by force. With its traditional habits of feeling, thinking, and acting moulded along such lines, the bourgeoisie entered the Industrial Revolution. It was shaped, in other words, by the needs and interests of an environment that was essentially non-capitalist, or at least pre-capitalist — needs stemming not from the nature of the capitalist economy as such but from the fact of the coexistence of early capitalism with another and at first overwhelmingly powerful mode of life and business. Established habits of thought and action tend to persist, and hence the spirit of guild and monopoly at first maintained itself, and was only slowly undermined, even where capitalism was in sole possession of

the field. Actually capitalism did not fully prevail *anywhere* on the Continent. Existing economic interests, 'artificially' shaped by the autocratic state, remained dependent on the 'protection' of the state. The industrial organism, such as it was, would not have been able to withstand free competition. Even where the old barriers crumbled in the autocratic state, the people did not all at once flock to the clear track. They were creatures of mercantilism and even earlier periods, and many of them huddled together and protested against the affront of being forced to depend on their own ability. They cried for paternalism, for protection, for forcible restraint of strangers, and above all for tariffs. They met, with partial success, particularly because capitalism failed to take radical action in the agrarian field. Capitalism did bring about many changes on the land, springing in part from its automatic mechanisms, in part from the political trends it engendered — abolition of serfdom, freeing the soil from feudal entanglements, and so on — but initially it did not alter the basic outlines of the social structure of the countryside. Even less did it affect the spirit of the people, and least of all their political goals. This explains why the features and trends of autocracy — including imperialism — proved so resistant, why they exerted such a powerful influence on capitalist development, why the old export monopolism could live on and merge into the new.

The feudal substance of Europe

These are facts of fundamental significance to an understanding of the soul of modern Europe. Had the ruling class of the Middle Ages — the war-oriented nobility — changed its profession and function and become the ruling class of the capitalist world; or had developing capitalism swept it away, put it out of business, instead of merely clashing head-on with it in the agrarian sphere — then much would have been different in the life of modern peoples. But as things actually were, neither eventuality occurred; or, more correctly, both are

taking place, only at a very slow pace. The two groups of landowners remain social classes clearly distinguishable from the groupings of the capitalist world. The social pyramid of the present age has been formed, not by the substance and laws of capitalism alone, but by two different social substances, and by the laws of two different epochs. Whoever seeks to understand Europe must not forget this and concentrate all attention on the indubitably basic truth that one of these substances tends to be absorbed by the other and thus the sharpest of all class conflicts tends to be eliminated. Whoever seeks to understand Europe must not overlook that even today its life, its ideology, its politics are greatly under the influence of the feudal 'substance,' that while the bourgeoisie can asserts its interests everywhere, it 'rules' only in exceptional circumstances, and then only briefly. The bourgeois outside his office and the professional man of capitalism outside his profession cut a very sorry figure. Their spiritual leader is the rootless 'intellectual,' a slender reed open to every impulse and a prey to unrestrained emotionalism. The 'feudal' elements, on the other hand, have both feet on the ground, even psychologically speaking. Their ideology is as stable as their mode of life. They believe certain things to be really true, others to be really false. This quality of possessing a definite character and cast of mind as a class, this simplicity and solidity of social and spiritual position extends their power far beyond their actual bases, gives them the ability to assimilate new elements, to make others serve their purposes — in a word, gives them *prestige*, something to which the bourgeois, as is well known, always looks up, something with which he tends to ally himself, despite all actual conflicts.

The nobility entered the modern world in the form into which it had been shaped by the autocratic state — the same state that had also moulded the bourgeoisie. It was the sovereign who disciplined the nobility, instilled loyalty into it, 'statized' it, and, as we have shown, imperialized it. He turned its nationalist sentiments — as in the case of the bourgeoisie — into an aggressive nationalism, and then made it

a pillar of his organization, particularly his war machine. It had not been that in the immediately preceding period. Rising absolutism had at first availed itself of much more dependent organs. For that very reason, in his position as leader of the feudal powers and as warlord, the sovereign survived the onset of the Industrial Revolution, and as a rule — except in France — won victory over political revolution.

The bourgeoisie servant of the state

The bourgeoisie did not simply supplant the sovereign, nor did it make him its leader, as did the nobility. It merely wrested a portion of its power from him and for the rest submitted to him. It did not take over from the sovereign the state as an abstract form of organization. The state remained a special social power, confronting the bourgeoisie. In some countries it has continued to play that role to the present day.

It is in the *state* that the bourgeoisie with its interests seeks refuge, protection against external and even domestic enemies. The bourgeoisie seeks to win over the state for itself, and in return serves the state and state interests that are different from its own.

Imbued with the spirit of the old autocracy, trained by it, the bourgeoisie often takes over its ideology, even where, as in France, the sovereign is eliminated and the official power of the nobility has been broken. Because the sovereign needed soldiers, the modern bourgeois — at least in his slogans — is an even more vehement advocate of an increasing population. Because the sovereign was in a position to exploit conquests, needed them to be a victorious warlord, the bourgeoisie thirsts for national glory — even in France, worshiping a headless body, as it were. Because the sovereign found a large gold hoard useful, the bourgeoisie even today cannot be swerved from its bullionist prejudices. Because the autocratic state paid attention to

the trader and manufacturer chiefly as the most important sources of taxes and credits, today even the intellectual who has not a shred of property looks on international commerce, not from the viewpoint of the consumer, but from that of the trader and exporter. Because pugnacious sovereigns stood in constant fear of attack by their equally pugnacious neighbours, the modern bourgeois attributes aggressive designs to neighbouring peoples. All such modes of thought are essentially non-capitalist. Indeed, they vanish most quickly wherever capitalism fully prevails. They are survivals of the autocratic alignment of interests, and they endure wherever the autocratic state endures on the old basis and with the old orientation, even though more and more democratized and otherwise transformed. They bear witness to the extent to which essentially imperialist absolutism has patterned not only the economy of the bourgeoisie but also its mind — in the interests of autocracy and against those of the bourgeoisie itself. This significant dichotomy in the bourgeois mind — which in part explains its wretched weakness in politics, culture, and life, generally earns it the understandable contempt of the Left and the Right and proves the accuracy of our diagnosis — is best exemplified by two phenomena that are very close to our subject: present-day nationalism and militarism.

Nationalism and militarism supported by capitalism

Nationalism is affirmative awareness of national character, together with an aggressive sense of superiority. It arose from the autocratic state. In conservatives, nationalism in general is understandable as an inherited orientation, as a mutation of the battle instincts of the medieval knights, and finally as a political stalking horse on the domestic scene; and conservatives are fond of reproaching the bourgeois with a lack of nationalism which, from their point of view, is evaluated in a positive sense. Socialists, on the other hand, equally understandably exclude nationalism from their general ideology,

because of the essential interests of the proletariat, and by virtue of their domestic opposition to the conservative stalking horse; they, in turn, not only reproach the bourgeoisie with an excess of nationalism (which they, of course, evaluate in a negative sense) but actually identify nationalism and even the very idea of the nation with bourgeois ideology. The curious thing is that both of these groups are right in their criticism of the bourgeoisie. For, as we have seen, the mode of life that flows logically from the nature of capitalism necessarily implies an anti-nationalist orientation in politics and culture. This orientation actually prevails. We find a great many anti-nationalist members of the middle class, and even more, who merely parrot the catchwords of nationalism. In the capitalist world it is actually not big business and industry at all that are the carriers of nationalist trends, but the intellectual, and the content of his ideology is explained not so much from definite class interests as from chance emotion and individual interest. But the submission of the bourgeoisie to the powers of autocracy, its alliance with them, its economic and psychological patterning by them — all these tend to push the bourgeois in a nationalist direction; and this too we find prevalent, especially among the chief exponents of export monopolism.

The relationship between the bourgeoisie and militarism is quite similar. Militarism is not necessarily a foregone conclusion when a nation maintains a large army, but only when high military circles become a political power. The criterion is whether leading generals as such wield political influence and whether the responsible statesmen can act only with their consent. That is possible only when the officer corps is linked to a definite social class, as in Japan, and can assimilate to its position individuals who do not belong to it by birth. Militarism too is rooted in the autocratic state. And again the same reproaches are made against the bourgeois from both sides — quite properly too. According to the 'pure' capitalist mode of life, the bourgeois is unwarlike. The alignment of capitalist interests

should make him utterly reject military methods, put him in opposition to the professional soldier. Significantly, we see this in the example of England where, first, the struggle against a standing army generally and, next, opposition to its elaboration, furnished bourgeois politicians with their most popular slogan: 'retrenchment.' Even naval appropriations have encountered resistance. We find similar trends in other countries, though they are less strongly developed. The continental bourgeois, however, was used to the sight of troops. He regarded an army almost as a necessary component of the social order, ever since it had been his terrible taskmaster in the Thirty Years' War. He had no power at all to abolish the army. He might have done so if he had had the power; but not having it, he considered the fact that the army might be useful to him. In his 'artificial' economic situation and because of his submission to the sovereign, he thus grew disposed toward militarism, especially where export monopolism flourished. The intellectuals, many of whom still maintained special relationships with feudal elements, were so disposed to an even greater degree.

Just as we once found a dichotomy in the social pyramid, so now we find everywhere, in every aspect of the bourgeois portion of the modern world, a dichotomy of attitudes and interests. Our examples also show in what way the two components work together.

Nationalism and militarism, while not creatures of capitalism, become 'capitalized' and in the end draw their best energies from capitalism. Capitalism involves them in its working and thereby keeps them alive, politically as well as economically. And they, in turn, affect capitalism, cause it to deviate from the course it might have followed alone, support many of its interests.

Imperialism as expression of the autocratic state in alliance with capitalism

Here we find that we have penetrated to the historical as well as the sociological sources of modern imperialism. It does not coincide with nationalism and militarism, though it fuses with them by supporting them as it is supported by them. It too is — not only historically, but also sociologically — a heritage of the autocratic state, of its structural elements, organizational forms, interest alignments, and human attitudes, the outcome of pre-capitalist forces which the autocratic state has reorganized, in part by the methods of early capitalism. It would never have been evolved by the 'inner logic' of capitalism itself. This is true even of mere export monopolism. It too has its sources in absolutist policy and the action habits of an essentially pre-capitalist environment. That it was able to develop to its present dimensions is owing to the momentum of a situation once created, which continued to engender ever new 'artificial' economic structures, that is, those which maintain themselves by political power alone. In most of the countries addicted to export monopolism it is also owing to the fact that the old autocratic state and the old attitude of the bourgeoisie toward it were so vigorously maintained. But export monopolism, to go a step further, is not yet imperialism. And even if it had been able to arise without protective tariffs, it would never have developed into imperialism in the hands of an unwarlike bourgeoisie. If this did happen, it was only because the heritage included the war machine, together with its socio-psychological aura and aggressive bent, and because a class oriented toward war maintained itself in a ruling position. This class clung to its domestic interest in war, and the pro-military interests among the bourgeoisie were able to ally themselves with it. This alliance kept alive war instincts and ideas of overlordship, male supremacy, and triumphant glory — ideas that would have otherwise long since died. It led to social conditions that, while they ultimately stem from the conditions of production, cannot be explained from capitalist production methods alone. And it often

impresses its mark on present-day politics, threatening Europe with the constant danger of war.

This diagnosis also bears the prognosis of imperialism.

The pre-capitalist elements in our social life may still have great vitality; special circumstances in national life may revive them from time to time; but in the end the climate of the modern world must destroy them. This is all the more certain since their props in the modern capitalist world are not of the most durable material. Whatever opinion is held concerning the vitality of capitalism itself, whatever the life span predicted for it, it is bound to withstand the onslaughts of its enemies and its own irrationality much longer than essentially untenable export monopolism — untenable even from the capitalist point of view. Export monopolism may perish in revolution, or it may be peacefully relinquished; this may happen soon, or it may take some time and require desperate struggle; but one thing is certain — it *will* happen. This will immediately dispose of neither warlike instincts nor structural elements and organizational forms oriented toward war — and it is to their dispositions and domestic interests that, in my opinion, much more weight must be given in every concrete case of imperialism than to export monopolist interests, which furnish the financial 'outpost skirmishes' — a most appropriate term — in many wars. But such factors will be politically overcome in time, no matter what they do to maintain among the people a sense of constant danger of war, with the war machine forever primed for action. And with them, imperialisms will wither and die.

It is not within the scope of this study to offer an ethical, aesthetic, cultural, or political evaluation of this process. Whether it heals sores or extinguishes suns is a matter of utter indifference from the viewpoint of this study. It is not the concern of science to judge that. The only point at issue here was to demonstrate, by means of an important example, the ancient truth that the dead always rule the living.

Parker Thomas Moon

The Spread of Imperialism (1936)

The scramble for world dominance by some States is briefly depicted and quantified in this extract, quite celebratory of these historical events. The reality was, on the contrary, very disturbing from a moral point of view, and catastrophic, socially and economically, for all concerned.

Source: Parker Thomas Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, Chapter XIX: Conclusions, 1936.

To view modern imperialism in proper perspective, one must in some way sum up the aggregate results of such varied events as the partition of Persia, the conquest of Tunis, the Hawaiian revolution, the Agadir crisis, the Riffian revolt, intervention in Haiti, the Boer War, the Twenty-One Demands, and the thousand and one other episodes that have gone into the making of this chapter in contemporary world history. What these things have meant in terms of human hopes and fears, of cultural enrichment, of spiritual stimulus and

strife, no statistics can ever reveal, nor can the historian do much more than guess. One can measure, however, some aspects of imperialism. One can gauge the size of empires, at any rate.

Ten imperialist nations of to-day possess colonies and protectorates which, taken together, are seven times the size of Europe and half the earth's total land surface. Six hundred million human beings, a third of the human race, are directly subject to imperialist domination. Even these figures, astonishingly large as they may appear, are admittedly incomplete. Yet it is problematical whether one should add Norway's recent acquisition of Spitsbergen, or Denmark's colony of Greenland, or Iceland. On the other hand, we have omitted countries such as China, Persia, Turkey, Abyssinia, Afghanistan, and several Latin-American states which have been very definitely affected by imperialism, though at the moment they may be considered independent. If they were included in our totals, we would have about two-thirds of the world, with more than a billion inhabitants, in colonies, protectorates, and "backward countries" which have been subject to European, American, or Japanese imperialism.

The relative importance of modern imperialist conquests may be suggested by comparing them with achievements which bulk large in conventional histories. Republican France has outdone the warlike Charlemagne. The "New World" discovered by Columbus was less extensive than the realm conquered by modern imperialism. The empire of Julius Casar was much smaller than that of George V. More extensive than Napoleon's conquests were the territories won for Britain by Cecil Rhodes.

A survey of existing empires discloses the fact that while in general modern imperialism has accompanied industrialism, the results have not ben proportionate to the economic importance, or to the size and power, of the empire-building nations. The present distribution of colonies can be explained by no simple principle, but only by that

complex interweaving of forces which — for want of a better name — we sometimes call chance.

While Spain has lost all but a poor remnant of her vast dominions, Portugal, her less powerful neighbor, retains two very large African colonies, besides several smaller possessions. Though she ranks fourth on the list of empires, Portugal is unable to develop her colonies or even to give them good government, for the mother-country is lacking in the industrial and financial resources and the political capacity for large-scale imperialism. Indeed, the Portuguese colonies are being invaded by British and other foreign capital and are so insecurely held that, before 1914, Great Britain and Germany planned their partition.

Holland, too, possesses in the East Indies an empire quite out of proportion to her own magnitude in area, population, or industry. In population the Dutch empire ranks third, in commerce fourth, in area seventh. It is doubtful whether the Netherlands could have secured so generous a portion in the nineteenth-century rivalry of world-powers, had the East Indies not been inherited as a legacy from the period, centuries ago, when Holland had one of the foremost navies.

Belgium has in Congo an empire even larger, though much less valuable, carved out of virgin territory by a foresighted king [*], before the appetites of the Great Powers had been thoroughly whetted. Belgium was able to purchase the Congo from her king in 1908, because rivalry among the Great Powers permitted none to interfere, but had there been interference Belgium would have been too weak to defend her claims. In such fashion Belgium fell heir to a colonial empire larger than either Japan, or Italy, or the United States possesses, and almost as large as the one Germany held before the Great War.

While Portugal, Holland, and Belgium have disproportionately large shares, three Great Powers — Germany, Japan, and Italy — were

peculiarly unsuccessful in attempting to occupy their proper places in the sun. In the period from 1871 to 1914 Germany was clearly superior to France in power, population, and industrial development, and yet this puissant Germany could obtain hardly more than a fourth of the colonial area that a weakened and humiliated French Republic was able to appropriate. In population, in commerce, in potential value, the German colonies were not to be compared with those of France or those of Britain. In part this anomaly was due to Bismarck's caution; in part, to clumsy diplomacy which enabled France, Russia, Britain, and Italy to combine against Germany on colonial questions. The hope of rectifying the situation was one of the will-o'-the-wisps that German statesmen pursued during the Great War, but the will-o'-the-wisp vanished "somewhere in France." After 1919, having lost even her former colonies, Germany stood alone among the industrial giants of Europe, the only Great Power without an empire.

Japan's phenomenal rise to power and dramatic entry into the area of world politics might easily give rise to the false impression that the vigorous island empire of the East has made large conquests. As a matter of fact, despite the three wars she fought at ten-year intervals, Japan still stands at the foot of the list as regards the area, and in fifth place as regards the population and commercial value, of her colonies, whereas her population of sixty millions and her rank among the Great Powers might entitle her — if there were any principles in the matter — to a large an empire as the French, or at least as valuable an empire as the Dutch. To be sure, if we include the Japanese sphere of interests in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, Japan's share appears less niggardly, and if Japanese imperialists had succeeded in their design of bringing China under Japanese tutelage, as the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 stipulated, their empire would have been second only to that of Great Britain.

The most striking case is that of Italy, a Great Power second to none in national pride or imperial ambition, boasting an African empire —

Libia, Eritrea and Somaliland — which impressively covers 780,000 square miles, as seen on the map, but which includes so much desert land that its total population is less than two million souls. Commercially, it is the least valuable of all the ten empires. If the Fascisti have set apart April 21 as a "National Colonial Day," and if in 1926 no less a personage than *il Duce*, Mussolini himself, visited Tripoli with pomp and circumstance, urging Italian emigrants and Italian capital to develop the empire, it is because Italian imperialism is founded less on accomplished facts than on a faith which sees populous provinces and prosperous plantations in a parched and unpopulated wilderness.

Note

[*] The "foresighted" King here alluded to is Leopold II of Belgium who extracted a fortune from his personal colony, the Congo Free State, through a brutal rapacious administration that committed all sort of atrocities and massacres toward the local population (see: Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost*, 1998).

Carlton J. H. Hayes

From Nationalism to Imperialism (1941)

The direct link between nationalism and imperialism is here well highlighted and documented. A useful reminder for those who think that international capitalism is the single or main factor behind imperialism and gloss over the State machine and the State factions that are, actually, the real engine of any imperialistic venture.

Source: Carlton J. H. Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900*, Chapter 6, 1941.

Basically the new imperialism was a nationalistic phenomenon. It followed hard upon the national wars which created an all powerful Germany and a united Italy, which carried Russia within sight of Constantinople, and which left England fearful and France eclipsed. It expressed a resulting psychological reaction, an ardent desire to maintain or recover national prestige. France sought compensation for European loss in oversea gain. England would offset her European isolation by enlarging and glorifying the British Empire.

Russia, halted in the Balkans, would turn anew to Asia, and before long Germany and Italy would show the world that the prestige they had won by might inside Europe they were entitled to enhance by imperial exploits outside. The lesser powers, with no great prestige at stake, managed to get on without any new imperialism, though Portugal and Holland displayed a revived pride in the empires they already possessed and the latter's was administered with renewed vigor. [1]

Public agitation for extending overseas the political dominion of European national states certainly began with patriotic intellectuals. As early as 1867 Lothar Bucher, one of Bismarck's associates in the Prussian foreign office, published in the influential *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* a series of articles endorsing and advertising the hitherto neglected counsels of Friederich List:

> "Companies should be founded in the German seaports to buy lands in foreign countries and settle them with German colonies; also companies for commerce and navigation whose object would be to open new markets abroad for German manufacturers and to establish steamship lines. . . . Colonies are the best means of developing manufactures, export and import trade, and finally a respectable navy." [2]

The next year Otto Kersten, traveler and explorer, founded at Berlin a "Central Society for Commercial Geography and German Interests Abroad," with an official journal, *Der Export*. Simultaneously the "Royal Colonial Institute" was founded at London; and a brilliant young English gentleman, Sir Charles Dilke, returning from a trip around the world, published his patriotic and immensely popular *Greater Britain*. [3] Two years later, in the midst of the Franco-Prussian War, the redoubtable Froude scored his fellow Englishmen in the pages of *Fraser's Magazine* for their blindness to imperial glories. In 1872 Disraeli practically committed the Conser-

vative party in Britain to a program of imperialism, and in 1874 Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, dean of political economists in France and implacable foe of tariff protection, plumped for French imperialism in a "scientific" treatise, *De la Colonisation chez les peuples modernes*.

These were foretastes. Heartier fare was served immediately after the Russo-Turkish War and the Congress of Berlin. In 1879 Friedrich Fabri, a pious promoter of Christian foreign missions, asked rhetorically "Does Germany need Colonies?" and answered with a resounding "Yes!" Germany's surplus population, he argued, should have places where it could go and still buy German goods and share in the other blessings of German *Kultur*. Fabri was eloquently seconded in 1881 by Hübbe-Schleiden, a lawyer and sometime explorer in equatorial Africa, who now insisted that through imperialistic endeavors "a country exhibits before the world its strength or weakness as a nation." [4] In like vein the historian Treitschke edified his student audiences at the University of Berlin with the moral that "every virile people has established colonial power."

In 1882 a frankly propagandist "Colonial Society" was formed in Germany through the joint efforts of a naturalist, a geographer, and a politician [5], while in France Professor Leroy-Beaulieu brought out a new edition of his classic with the dogmatic addendum that

> "colonization is for France a question of life and death: either France will become a great African power, or in a century or two she will be no more than a secondary European power; she will count for about as much in the world as Greece and Rumania in Europe."

The following year Professor John Seeley published his celebrated Cambridge lectures on the *Expansion of England*. The book took the British public by storm. It sold 80,000 copies within a brief time and

won for its author the warm discipleship of Lord Rosebery and a knighthood.

In 1883 the stridently imperialistic "Primrose League" was launched by Tory Democrats, and soon afterwards the more sedate "Imperial Federation League" by nationalistic Liberals. In 1883, also, was founded a "Society for German Colonization." And capping the academic contributions to the imperialist cause, Froude published *Oceana* in 1885, while Alfred Rambaud, historian of Russia and first occupant of the chair in contemporary history at the Sorbonne, edited in 1886 a co-operative work on *La France coloniale*.

Already, statesmen were following the professors and proclaiming that commerce and investments should follow the flag. If Gladstone hesitated, Disraeli and Salisbury did not; nor did such "new" Liberals as Rosebery, Chamberlain, and Grey. Jules Ferry surely did not hesitate. Replying to parliamentary critics of his aggressive policy in Tunis and Tonkin, he marshaled in speeches from 1881 to 1885 all the professorial arguments: that superior races have a civilizing mission to inferior races; that an industrial nation needs colonial markets; that coaling stations are requisite for navy and mercantile marine; and that if France refrained from imperialism, she would "descend from the first rank to the third or fourth." [6]

Bismarck seemed to hesitate more than he actually did. [7] He privately expressed sympathy with imperialist ambitions in 1876 and publicly backed them, at least in the case of Samoa, in 1879. By 1884-85 he was persuading the Reichstag that colonies were vital to national economy. "Colonies would mean the winning of new markets for German industries, the expansion of trade, and a new field for German activity, civilization, and capital." [8]

Most simply, the sequence of imperialism after 1870 appears to have been, first, pleas for colonies on the ground of national prestige; second, getting them; third, disarming critics by economic argument;

and fourth, carrying this into effect and relating the results to the neo-mercantilism of tariff protection and social legislation at home.

There were, of course, complexities in the imperialistic movement. In so far as it was economic, it did not affect the "capitalist class" as a whole, but only particular business interests: exporters and manufacturers of certain commodities such as calico and cheap alcoholic beverages; importers of rubber, raw cotton, coffee, copra, etc.; shipping magnates; some bankers, though a very small percentage of all; and those "parasites of imperialism," the makers of arms and uniforms, the producers of telegraph and railway material, etc. But these last did not "cause" imperialism; they merely throve on it.

Christian missions provided an important adjunct to imperialism. They spread and multiplied in the second half of the nineteenth century as never before, in part as a reaction, we have suggested elsewhere, to the prevalent materialism in Europe, and in larger part because of the immensely improved means of travel and communication throughout the world. A missionary might have gone his way, like a merchant, the one conveying spiritual and the other material goods to heathen peoples, without any thought of raising a national flag over them or subjecting them to European rule. Actually, however, missionaries like merchants lived in a nationalistic age, and many of them were quite willing, on occasion, to invoke the naval or military protection of their respective national states. Not a few of Europe's footholds in other Continents were obtained as penalties for the persecution of Christian missionaries. Even where missionaries did not directly prompt the extension of European dominion, they frequently paved the way for adventurers who did; and stories published back home by them or about them stimulated popular interest in, and support of, imperial undertakings. About David Livingstone, for example, something like a cult grew up in England, so that when he died in the wilds of Africa on May Day, 1873, his body was borne with hierophantic solemnity all the way to Zanzibar and thence under naval escort to England, where finally it was

deposited amid Britain's national heroes in Westminster Abbey on April 18, 1874. The year was that of Disraeli's accession to the premiership, and for the popular favor accorded his subsequent imperial activities, he should have thanked the dead Livingstone more than any live merchant or banker.

It was a time, too, when evolutionary biology was beginning to occupy a central place in European thought, when hundreds of naturalists, emulating Darwin, engaged in scientific expeditions to strange distant regions and furnished millions of ordinary stay-at-homes with fascinating descriptions of the extraordinary flora and fauna they had observed. Already in 1861 the Franco-American Du Chaillu had reported from Gabon in equatorial Africa his amazing discovery of the gorilla, which was readily imagined to be the "missing link" between ape and man. In 1867 he published an account of a race of pygmies he had found, and for years afterwards his pen poured out popular tales of African adventure. Meanwhile, in the early '70's, Faidherbe was exploring upper Egypt, Nachtigal was visiting Khartum, De Brazza was following Du Chaillu into the hinterland of Gabon, Skobelev with notebook in hand was investigating the borders of Turkestan, Evelyn Baring (the later Lord Cromer) was describing the natural wonders of India, and Henry Morton Stanley was "finding" Livingstone for the New York *Herald* and an avid public, and then heading an Anglo-American scientific expedition into the vast Congo basin. Presently George Goldie was exploring the Niger country, Joseph Thomson was leading an expedition into east-central Africa, Harry Johnston was traversing Angola and meeting Stanley on the Congo, and Frederick Lugard, a young veteran of the Afghan War, was penetrating Nyasaland and Uganda.

Of these explorers, the majority had military training. Faidherbe was a French general, former governor of Senegal, and Skobelev a Russian general who was to win laurels in the Russo-Turkish War. Nachtigal was a German army surgeon, De Brazza a French naval officer. Cromer and Goldie and Lugard had all been British soldiers.

As a group they were intensely patriotic, and they nicely combined with scientific interests a zeal to serve the political, economic, and military interests of their respective nations. They were prime promoters of imperialism, and most of them remained as pro-consuls of provinces they charted and helped to appropriate.

Sheer love of adventure was a potent lure to imperialism. Africa in particular, by reason of the widespread advertising its marvels and dangers received at the beginning of the '70's, beckoned to bold and venturesome spirits in Europe, and some of the boldest became empire-builders in the grand style, in a few cases acquiring fabulous personal wealth, in all cases experiencing that sense of power which comes from great achievement.

Stanley was patently an adventurer. He had no surplus goods to sell, no surplus capital to invest. He was a self-made man, if ever there was one. A Welshman by birth, with the original name of Rowlands, he ran away from home and school at an early age to find work in Liverpool, first in a haberdasher's shop, then with a butcher. When this grew tedious he worked his way across the Atlantic to New Orleans and fell in with a merchant by the name of Henry Morton Stanley, who adopted him. At the outbreak of the American Civil War he enlisted in the Confederate army, only to be taken prisoner at the battle of Shiloh; then,

> "with ready versatility he joined the Union army to fight against his former comrades-in-arms. Toward the close of the war he discovered a latent talent for journalism, which, when peace returned, led him to Salt Lake City to describe the extraordinary customs of the Mormons, then to Asia Minor in search of thrilling adventure, then with General Hancock against the Indians, with the British against Abyssinia, and to Crete, and Spain." [9]

He went to central Africa in 1871 because he was sent, but he remained to build a huge empire for another and the queerest kind of

adventurer — a man who was not self-made and who never set foot in Africa, but who was as hypnotized by African dreams as by female realities — Leopold of the Belgians, Leopold of the Congo Free State.

But the adventurer-imperialist *par excellence* was Cecil Rhodes, and his extraordinary career began by accident. A sickly youth, son of an Anglican clergyman and intended for the church, he was bundled off in 1870, for purposes of health, to an elder brother's farm in southern Africa. He arrived just when diamonds were discovered in the nearby Kimberley fields. He joined other diggers, dug more industriously and successfully, and within a year found himself wealthy and healthy. He returned to England for study at Oxford, but the study was desultory and he was soon back permanently in South Africa, adding gold mines to diamond mines, running Cape politics, projecting British sway the entire length of the Continent up to Cairo, and doing much to realize it.

The star German adventurer was Carl Peters. Son of a Lutheran clergyman and graduate of the University of Berlin, he contracted imperialist fever on a visit to England and set out in 1884 in disguise and under an alias — he was still in his twenties — to build an empire in East Africa. His method was simple, and the results startling, even to Bismarck. By a judicious distribution of toys plus injudicious application of grog, he got twelve big black chieftains, within ten days, to make their X's on documents conveying to Germany a total of 60,000 square miles. But that was only a start. Peters kept right on enlarging German East Africa until an Anglo-German convention of 1890 set bounds to his activity.

Explorers and adventurers gave rise to a peculiar species of organizer and administrator, despotic and ruthless and most devotedly imperialistic. Peters and Rhodes were transmuted by the African environment into this species, and so too were Cromer in Egypt and Milner at the Cape. For the glory of themselves and their countries, such local potentates carried on without too much regard for merely

economic considerations or for the international engagements of their distant home governments. They were on the spot and knew better than London or Berlin or any other capital what had to be done, and they usually did it in an expansive way.

The actual course of empire — the order in which distant areas were appropriated by European powers — was determined less by design than by chance. Murder of a missionary or trader and consequent forceful intervention might occur anywhere. In some instances, curiously frequent in Moslem countries, native rulers practically invited intervention by living far beyond their means and contracting debts which they were unable to repay. Such was the basis of European imperialism in Egypt, Tunis, Persia, and to a large extent in Turkey. For example, the Khedive Ismail of Egypt, a squat, red-bearded gentleman with a passion for ostentation and the externals of European culture, spent half a billion dollars in the twelve years after his accession in 1863, running up the Egyptian public debt from 16 million to 342 million and continuing to borrow money from European bankers at ever more onerous rates. In 1875 he could only get a quarter of the face value of short-term bonds bearing 20 per cent interest. In 1876 he sold his shares of Suez Canal Company stock to England, and consented to joint supervision of his finances by representatives of England, France, Italy, and Austria. Soon this control was narrowed to England and France, and in 1882 to England alone. No doubt bankers and investors egged on both the khedive to spend and the English government to collect, but a less prodigal khedive, and one more intelligently concerned with the welfare of his subjects, might have staved off foreign rule. The contemporary Mikado of Japan did.

Especially active in directing the course of empire after 1870 were the European colonists already settled in Algeria, South Africa, and Australasia. These performed the same function in the latter part of the nineteenth century as their prototypes in the America of the eighteenth century. French settlers in Algeria were more eager than

the government at Paris to make all adjacent African lands French. British and Dutch settlers in South Africa had almost a psychosis about others getting anywhere near them, and from the former, rather than from London, came the main drive for British expansion northward. Australians and New Zealanders were continually pressing the home government to forestall alien seizure of South Sea islands.

In many instances European flags were hoisted as a sport — a competitive sport — with about the same indifference to economic motives as characterized the later planting of American and other flags on cakes of ice around the North or South Pole. As one reads of successive French flag raisings in oases of the Sahara and on coral reefs of the Pacific, one gets a lively impression that it was all *pour le sport*.

Some capitalists undoubtedly promoted imperialism, and more profited by it. But in the last analysis it was the nationalistic masses who made it possible and who most vociferously applauded and most constantly backed it. Disraeli and Joseph Chamberlain were good politicians as well as patriots, and with a clairvoyance greater than Gladstone's, they perceived that in a country where the masses were patriotic, literate, and in possession of the ballot, a political party which frankly espoused imperialism would have magnetic attraction for them. So it proved. An unwonted popularity attended the Conservative parties of Britain and Germany during the '80's and '90's. The masses, of course, had no immediate economic interest in the matter, and it would have required an extraordinary act of faith on their part to believe the predictions of imperialistic intellectuals that somehow, sometime, everybody would be enriched from the Congo or the Niger or Tahiti. Rather, the masses were thrilled and stirred by front-page news in the popular press of far-off things and battles still to come. They devoured the yarns of a Rider Haggard - he had been secretary to the governor of Natal in the '70's and he *knew* his Africa. They learned by heart the vulgar verses of a

Rudyard Kipling — he had lived in India and been a chum of doughty, swearing British soldiers. And the sporting impulse which drew crowds to prize fights and to football and cricket matches, evoked a whole nation's lusty cheers for its "team" in the mammoth competitive game of imperialism.

Into the imperial-mindedness of the masses, scarcely less than into that of Rhodes or Peters, Ferry or Chamberlain, fitted neatly the preaching of Darwinian sociology, that human progress depends upon struggle between races and nations and survival of the fittest. Obviously most eligible for the "fittest" were the white peoples of Europe, who therefore owed it to science as well as to civilization (and religion) to establish their supremacy over inferior populations in all other continents. Which of them would ultimately be adjudged the absolutely fittest would depend on the outcome of conflict among themselves as well as with lesser breeds. This preaching justified competitive imperialism and cloaked attendant ruthlessness in the mantle of idealistic devotion to duty. It was summarized by Kipling at the close of the generation (1899) in his famous lines:

Take up the White Man's Burden –
Send forth the best ye breed –
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need;
To wait in heavy harness,
On fluttered fold and wild –
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half-devil and half-child.

Notes by the author

[1] For fuller treatment of national prestige as the basic factor in imperialism, and incidentally for devastating criticism of the Marxian interpretation, see Arthur Salz, *Das Wesen des Imperial-*

ismus (Leipzig. 1931), and Walter Sulzbach, *Nationales Gemeinschaftsgefühl und wirtschaftliches Interesse* (Leipzig, 1929). A kindred "atavistic" theory has been propounded by Professor Joseph Schumpeter in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, XLVI (1918-9). 1-39. 275-310.

[2] Friedrich List, *National System of Political Economy*, English translation by Lloyd (London, 1916), 347.

[3] Dilke anticipated what was to come by emphasizing the economic and military value of "uncivilized" colonies in the tropics, while disparaging the alleged worth of such "white" colonies as Canada. His book reached an eighth edition in 1885.

[4] Friedrich Fabri, *Bedarf Deutschland der Ko1onien?* (Gotha, 1879); Wilhelm Hübbe Schleiden, *Deutsche Kolonisation* (Hamburg, 1881).

[5] Freiherr von Maltzan, Herr von der Brüggen, and Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg. Cf. See, *Die deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft, 1882-1907* (Berlin, 1908).

[6] The economic arguments of Ferry were clearly *ex post facto*. They were stressed in his preface to Leon Sentahéry's *Le Tonkin et la Mère Patrie* (Paris, 1890).

[7] See M. E. Townsend, *The Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire* (New York, 1932), and, for a somewhat different view, H. R. Rudin, *Germans in the Cameroons*, 1884-1914 (New Haven, 1938).

[8] *Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages*, March 16, 1885, p. 1864; Jan. 10, 1885. p. 524; June 26, 1884, p. 1073.

[9] P. T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (New York, 1926), 65.

Hannah Arendt

State Power and the Bourgeoisie (1951)

In this extract there are some noteworthy aspects linked to the growth of imperialism supported by imperialistic State Policies:

1. The rise of financial capitalism, that is money begetting money.

2. Politics aiming at a continuous expansion of power as an end in itself, "separated from the political community which it should serve."

3. The final reach by the imperialistic bourgeoisie of State Power, with the unification of politics and economics.

Source: Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Part two: Imperialism, 1951.

What imperialists actually wanted was expansion of political power without the foundation of a body politic. Imperialist expansion had been touched off by a curious kind of economic crisis, the overproduction of capital and the emergence of "superfluous" money, the

result of oversaving, which could no longer find productive investment within the national borders. For the first time, investment of power did not pave the way for investment of money, but export of power followed meekly in the train of exported money, since uncontrollable investments in distant countries threatened to transform large strata of society into gamblers, to change the whole capitalist economy from a system of production into a system of financial speculation, and to replace the profits of production with profits in commissions. The decade immediately before the imperialist era, the seventies of the last century, witnessed an unparalleled increase in swindles, financial scandals, and gambling in the stock market.

The pioneers in this pre-imperialist development were those Jewish financiers who had earned their wealth outside the capitalist system and had been needed by the growing nation-states for internationally guaranteed loans. With the firm establishment of the tax system that provided for sounder government finances, this group had every reason to fear complete extinction. Having earned their money for centuries through commissions, they were naturally the first to be tempted and invited to serve in the placement of capital which could no longer be invested profitably in the domestic market. The Jewish international financiers seemed indeed especially suited for such essentially international business operations. What is more, the governments themselves, whose assistance in some form was needed for investments in faraway countries, tended in the beginning to prefer the well-known Jewish financiers to newcomers in international finance, many of whom were adventurers.

After the financiers had opened the channels of capital export to the superfluous wealth, which had been condemned to idleness within the narrow framework of national production, it quickly became apparent that the absentee shareholders did not care to take the tremendous risks which corresponded to their tremendously enlarged profits. Against these risks, the commission-earning financiers, even with the benevolent assistance of the state, did not

have enough power to insure them: only the material power of a state could do that.

As soon as it became clear that export of money would have to be followed by export of government power, the position of financiers in general, and Jewish financiers in particular, was considerably weakened, and the leadership of imperialist business transactions and enterprise was gradually taken over by members of the native bourgeoisie. Very instructive in this respect is the career of Cecil Rhodes in South Africa, who, an absolute newcomer, in a few years could supplant the all-powerful Jewish financiers in first place. In Germany, Bleichroeder, who in 1885 had still been a co-partner in the founding of the *Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft*, was superseded along with Baron Hirsch when Germany began the construction of the Bagdad railroad, fourteen years later, by the coming giants of imperialist enterprise, Siemens and the Deutsche Bank. Somehow the government's reluctance to yield real power to Jews and the Jews' reluctance to engage in business with political implication coincided so well that, despite the great wealth of the Jewish group, no actual struggle for power ever developed after the initial stage of gambling and commission-earning had come to an end.

The various national governments looked with misgiving upon the growing tendency to transform business into a political issue and to identify the economic interests of a relatively small group with national interests as such. But it seemed that the only alternative to export of power was the deliberate sacrifice of a great part of the national wealth. Only through the expansion of the national instruments of violence could the foreign-investment movement be rationalized, and the wild speculations with superfluous capital, which had provoked gambling of all savings, be reintegrated into the economic system of the nation. The state expanded its power because, given the choice between greater losses than the economic body of any country could sustain and greater gains than any people

left to its own devices would have dreamed of, it could only choose the latter.

The first consequence of power export was that the state's instruments of violence, the police and the army, which in the framework of the nation existed beside, and were controlled by, other national institutions, were separated from this body and promoted to the position of national representatives in uncivilized or weak countries. Here, in backward regions without industries and political organization, where violence was given more latitude than in any Western country, the so-called laws of capitalism were actually allowed to create realities. The bourgeoisie's empty desire to have money beget money as men beget men had remained an ugly dream so long as money had to go the long way of investment in production; not money had begotten money, but men had made things and money. The secret of the new happy fulfillment was precisely that economic laws no longer stood in the way of the greed of the owning classes. Money could finally beget money because power, with complete disregard for all laws — economic as well as ethical — could appropriate wealth. Only when exported money succeeded in stimulating the export of power could it accomplish its owners' designs. Only the unlimited accumulation of power could bring about the unlimited accumulation of capital.

Foreign investments, capital export which had started as an emergency measure, became a permanent feature of all economic systems as soon as it was protected by export of power. The imperialist concept of expansion, according to which expansion is an end in itself and not a temporary means, made its appearance in political thought when it had become obvious that one of the most important permanent functions of the nation-state would be expansion of power. The state-employed administrators of violence soon formed a new class within the nations and, although their field of activity was far away from the mother country, wielded an important influence on the body politic at home. Since they were actually nothing but

functionaries of violence they could only think in terms of power politics. They were the first who, as a class and supported by their everyday experience, would claim that power is the essence of every political structure.

The new feature of this imperialist political philosophy is not the predominant place it gave violence, nor the discovery that power is one of the basic political realities. Violence has always been the *ultima ratio* in political action and power has always been the visible expression of rule and government. But neither had ever before been the conscious aim of the body politic or the ultimate goal of any definite policy. For power left to itself can achieve nothing but more power, and violence administered for power's (and not for law's) sake turns into a destructive principle that will not stop until there is nothing left to violate.

This contradiction, inherent in all ensuing power politics, however, takes on an appearance of sense if one understands it in the context of a supposedly permanent process which has no end or aim but itself. Then the test of achievement can indeed become meaningless and power can be thought of as the never-ending, self-feeding motor of all political action that corresponds to the legendary unending accumulation of money that begets money. The concept of unlimited expansion that alone can fulfill the hope for unlimited accumulation of capital, and brings about the aimless accumulation of power, makes the foundation of new political bodies — which up to the era of imperialism always had been the upshot of conquest — well-nigh impossible. In fact, its logical consequence is the destruction of all living communities, those of the conquered peoples as well as of the people at home. For every political structure, new or old, left to itself develops stabilizing forces which stand in the way of constant transformation and expansion. Therefore all political bodies appear to be temporary obstacles when they are seen as part of an eternal stream of growing power.

While the administrators of permanently increasing power in the past era of moderate imperialism did not even try to incorporate conquered territories, and preserved existing backward political communities like empty ruins of bygone life, their totalitarian successors dissolved and destroyed all politically stabilized structures, their own as well as those of other peoples. The mere export of violence made the servants into masters without giving them the master's prerogative: the possible creation of something new. Monopolistic concentration and tremendous accumulation of violence at home made the servants active agents in the destruction, until finally totalitarian expansion became a nation-and a people-destroying force.

Power became the essence of political action and the center of political thought when it was separated from the political community which it should serve. This, it is true, was brought about by an economic factor. But the resulting introduction of power as the only content of politics, and of expansion as its only aim, would hardly have met with such universal applause, nor would the resulting dissolution of the nation's body politic have met with so little opposition, had it not so perfectly answered the hidden desires and secret convictions of the economically and socially dominant classes. The bourgeoisie, so long excluded from government by the nation-state and by their own lack of interest in public affairs, was politically emancipated by imperialism.

Imperialism must be considered the first stage in political rule of the bourgeoisie rather than the last stage of capitalism. It is well known how little the owning classes had aspired to government, how well contented they had been with every type of state that could be trusted with protection of property rights. For them, indeed, the state had always been only a well-organized police force. This false modesty, however, had the curious consequence of keeping the whole bourgeois class out of the body politic; before they were subjects in a monarchy or citizens in a republic, they were essentially private persons. This privateness and primary concern with money-

making had developed a set of behavior patterns which are expressed in all those proverbs — "nothing succeeds like success," "might is right," "right is expediency," etc. — that necessarily spring from the experience of a society of competitors.

When, in the era of imperialism, businessmen became politicians and were acclaimed as statesmen, while statesmen were taken seriously only if they talked the language of successful businessmen and "thought in continents," these private practices and devices were gradually transformed into rules and principles for the conduct of public affairs. The significant fact about this process of revaluation, which began at the end of the last century and is still in effect, is that it began with the application of bourgeois convictions to foreign affairs and only slowly was extended to domestic politics. Therefore, the nations concerned were hardly aware that the recklessness that had prevailed in private life, and against which the public body always had to defend itself and its individual citizens, was about to be elevated to the one publicly honored political principle.

A. J. P. Taylor

The State drive to Imperialism (1952)

This is a superb essay on Imperialism, dispelling myths and fabrications that have been associated to the topic by politicians and some political scientists in order to divert the attention from State power (the real source and engine of imperialism). Taylor explains very clearly why Power (i.e. State power) not Profit (i.e. capitalist gains) was the driving force of imperialism.

Source: A. J. P. Taylor, *Essays in English History,* 1976.

Ideas live longer than men, and the writer who can attach his name to an idea is safe for immortality. Darwin will live as long as Evolution, Marx be forgotten only when there are no class-struggles. In the same way, no survey of the international history of the twentieth century can be complete without the name of J. A. Hobson. He it was who found an economic motive for Imperialism. Lenin took over Hobson's explanation, which thus became the basis for Communist foreign policy to the present day. Non-Marxists were equally

convinced, and contemporary history has been written largely in the light of Hobson's discovery. This discovery was an off-shoot from his general doctrine of under-consumption. The capitalists cannot spend their share of the national production. Saving makes their predicament worse. They demand openings for investment outside their saturated national market, and they find these openings in the undeveloped parts of the world. This is Imperialism. In Hobson's words, 'the modern foreign policy of Great Britain has been primarily a struggle for profitable markets of investment' — and what applied to Great Britain was equally true of France or Germany. Brailsford put it a few years later in a sharper way:

> Working men may proceed to slay each other in order to decide whether it shall be French or German financiers who shall export the surplus capital (saved from their own wages bill) to subdue and exploit the peasants of Morocco.

This idea is now so embedded in our thought that we cannot imagine a time when it did not exist. Yet the earlier Radical opponents of Imperialism knew nothing of it. They supposed that Imperialism sprang from a primitive greed for territory or a lust for conquest. The more sophisticated held that it was designed to provide jobs for the younger sons of the governing classes (a theory which James Mill invented and himself practised and which Hobson did not discard). Marx had no theory of Imperialism. In classical Marxist theory, the state exists solely to oppress the working classes — to silence their grievances, destroy their trade unions and force them ever nearer to the point of absolute starvation. Marx jeered at the 'night-watchman' theory of the state, but the only difference in his conception was that it stayed awake in the day-time. Hobson added a true Marxist refinement. Marx had demonstrated that the capitalist, however benevolent personally, was condemned by economic law to rob the worker at the point of production. Similarly Hobson showed that the capitalist, however pacific, must seek foreign investment and therefore be

driven into imperialist rivalry with the capitalists of other states. Previously Marxists had condemned capitalism as being pacific and particularly for preventing the great war of liberation against Russia. Now all wars became 'capitalistic', and war the inevitable outcome of the capitalist system. It is not surprising that, when the first world war had broken out, Lenin seized on Hobson's 'bourgeois-pacifist' theory and made it the cornerstone of neo-Marxism. Like most prophets he boasted of his foresight only when his visions had become facts.

Hobson wrote his book immediately after the partition of Africa and when the experiences of the Boer war were fresh in everyone's mind. For him, Imperialism was mainly acquisition of tropical lands, and what he foresaw next was the partition, or perhaps the joint exploitation, of China. In the spring of 1914 Brailsford applied similar doctrines to a wider field. *The War of Steel and Gold* (1914) is a more brilliant book than Hobson's, written with a more trenchant pen and with a deeper knowledge of international affairs. Though less remembered now, it had probably a stronger influence on its own generation, and American historians between the wars, in particular, could hardly have got on without it. Our own thought is still unconsciously shaped by it. Brailsford speaks more to our condition. The aggressive, self-confident Imperialism of the Boer war seems remote to us; the competition of great armaments is ever-present in our lives.

Both writers wrote with Radical passion. The first sensation in rereading them is to cry out: 'Would that we had such writers nowadays!' Take Hobson's peroration:

> Imperialism is a depraved choice of national life, imposed by self-seeking interests which appeal to the lusts of quantitative acquisition and of forceful domination surviving in a nation from early centuries of animal struggle for existence. . . It is the besetting sin of all successful States, and its penalty is unalterable in the order of nature.

Or Brailsford's:

> Let a people once perceive for what purposes its patriotism is prostituted, and its resources misused, and the end is already in sight. When that illumination comes to the masses of the three Western Powers, the fears which fill their barracks and stoke their furnaces will have lost the power to drive. A clear-sighted generation will scan the horizon and find no enemy. It will drop its armour, and walk the world's highways safe.

These are heavyweights of political combat. The intellectual diet of the mid twentieth century cannot nourish such stamina. But we must stay the flood of our admiration with some doubting questions. Was the Hobsonian-Leninist analysis of international capitalism a true picture either then or now? Has the struggle for overseas investments ever been the mainspring of international politics?

The export of capital was certainly a striking feature of British economic life in the fifty years before 1914. But its greatest periods were before and after the time of ostensible Imperialism. What is more, there was little correspondence between the areas of capitalist investment and political annexation. Hobson cheats on this, and Lenin after him. They show, in one table, that there has been a great increase in British investments overseas; in another that there has been a great increase in the territory of the British Empire. Therefore, they say, the one caused the other. But did it? Might not both have been independent products of British confidence and strength? If openings for investment were motive of British Imperialism, we should surely find evidence for this in the speeches of British imperialists, or, if not in their public statements, at any rate in their private letters and opinions. We don't. They talked, no doubt quite mistakenly, about securing new markets and even more mistakenly, about new openings for emigration; they regarded investment as a casual instrument. Their measuring-stick was Power, not Profit. When they

disputed over tropical African territory or scrambled for railway concessions in China, their aim was to strengthen their respective empires, not to benefit the financiers of the City. Hobson showed that Imperialism did not pay the nation. With longer experience, we can even say that it does not pay the investors. But the proof, even if convincing, would not have deterred the advocates of Imperialism. They were thinking in different terms.

The economic analysis breaks down in almost every case which has been examined in detail. Morocco has often been treated as a classical case of finance imperialism, by Brailsford himself and in more detail by E. D. Morel. In fact, the French financiers were forced to invest in Morocco much against their will, in order to prepare the way for French political control. They knew they would lose their money, and they did. But Morocco became a French protectorate. Again, Brailsford made much play with the British investment in Egypt, which Cromer had promoted. But Cromer promoted these investments in order to strengthen British political control, and not the other way round. The British held on to Egypt for the sake of their empire; they did not hold their empire for the sake of Egypt. Even the Boer war was not purely a war for financial gain. British policy in South Africa would have been exactly the same if there had been no gold-mines. The only difference is that, without the profits from the dynamite-monopoly, the Boers would have been unable to put up much resistance. Rhodes was a great scoundrel in Radical eyes, and quite rightly. But not for the reasons that they supposed. Rhodes wanted wealth for the power that it brought, not for its own sake. Hence he understood the realities of politics better than they did.

Those who explained Imperialism in terms of economics were rationalists themselves and therefore sought a rational explanation for the behaviour of others. If capitalists and politicians were as rational as Hobson and Brailsford, this is how they would behave. And of course a minority did. They took their profits, agreed with their enemy in

the way and died quietly in their beds. But they did not set the pattern of events. It is disturbing that, while Hobson and Brailsford were so penetrating about the present, they were wrong about the future. Hobson ignored Europe altogether — rightly, since he was discussing colonial affairs. He expected the international capitalists to join in the exploitation of China and even to recruit Chinese armies with which to hold down the workers of Europe. Brailsford looked to Europe only to reject it. He wrote — this in March 1914: 'the dangers which forced our ancestors into European coalitions and Continental wars have gone never to return'. And again, 'it is as certain as anything in politics can be, that the frontiers of our modern national states are finally drawn. My own belief is that there will be no more wars among the six Great Powers.' Even if there were a war, 'it is hard to believe that ... German Socialists would show any ardour in shooting down French workmen. The spirit which marched through Sedan to Paris could not be revived in our generation.'

It may be unfair to judge any writer in the light of what came after. Yet men with far less of Brailsford's knowledge and intellectual equipment foresaw the conflict of 1914, and even the shape that it would take. The true vision of the future was with Robert Blatchford, when he wrote his pamphlet, *Germany and England*, for the *Daily Mail*.

This is a sad confession. Hobson and Brailsford are our sort. We think like them, judge like them, admire their style and their moral values. We should be ashamed to write like Blatchford, though he was in fact the greatest popular journalist since Cobbett. Yet he was right, and they were wrong. Their virtues were their undoing. They expected reason to triumph. He knew that men love Power above all else. This, not Imperialism, is the besetting sin. Lenin knew it also. Hence, though a rationalist by origin, he turned himself into a wielder of power. Thanks to him, there is nothing to choose between Rhodes and a Soviet commissar. Nothing except this: the capitalist may be sometimes corrupted and softened by his wealth; the Soviet

dictators have nothing to wear them down. If the evils which Hobson and Brailsford discovered in capitalism had been in fact the greatest of public vices, we should now be living in an easier world. It is the high-minded and inspired, the missionaries not the capitalists, who cause most of the trouble. Worst of all the men of Power who are missionaries as well.

Walt Whitman Rostow

Colonialism
(1960)

In this extract the author disposes of the thesis that colonialism-imperialism was based on purely economic motives. As a matter of fact, colonialism came out as a result of a strange mix of power and commerce, where State power was the decisive factor insofar as national prestige, deriving from territorial aggrandizement, was the intrinsic push to action by State rulers. As remarked by the author: "The colonial game had thus become a reflex not of economic imperatives, but of inherently competitive sovereignties."

Source: Walt Whitman Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, Chapter 8, 1960.

Colonialism arose, in part, of course, because from the fifteenth century on, a world arena of power existed in which the European nation states competed in various overseas areas for trade; for bases of military advantage; and for what was then military potential: that is, for bullion, naval stores, and the like. As Charles Wilson points

out, in his essay on *Mercantilism*, Josiah Child counselled that 'Profit and Power ought', in such circumstances, 'jointly to be considered'.

The element of power, however, was initially often remote and derivative so far as the day-to-day business of the then major powers was concerned. The proximate goal — for example, in the famous Anglo-Dutch competition of the seventeenth century — was trade; and, especially, it was that form of trade which was highly regarded by the major nations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: that is, trade which permitted the import of bullion and raw materials and a favourable balance of exports — if possible, the export of manufactures. The favourable trade balances such commerce was designed to foster did relate, in contemporary thought, to relative national power; but the operating goal was trade.

Why, then, was not trade conducted without the creation of colonies? The answer to this fundamental question has two elements that need to be sharply distinguished; although they tend to get intermixed in the flow of history.

First, the struggle for trade took place in a framework where the major powers were postured, by the nature of history, as competitors. It is no accident that the major wars of the eighteenth century were wars of succession. The nations were caught up, by historical inheritance, so to speak, in an inherently competitive system of power — not, in the first instance, economic power, but military and political power. And in part the wars in the colonies derived from those larger competitive compulsions: the compulsion not merely to advance a national interest positively, but to advance a national interest negatively by denying a source of power to another nation. The creation of a trade monopoly in a colonial area was one way to do this, once the new areas were discovered or old areas rediscovered.

But there was a second reason, as well, for the application of military power in the colonies; and this second reason relates not to the power structure of Europe, but to the societal condition of the colonial areas

themselves. Colonies were often established initially not to execute a major objective of national policy, nor even to exclude a rival economic power, but to fill a vacuum; that is, to organize a traditional society incapable of self-organization (or unwilling to organize itself) for modern import and export activity, including production for export. Normal trade between equals would often have fulfilled the initial motivation of the intruding power, and a large part of its continuing motivation; for the traditional society had nothing but raw materials to export. And normal trade would have been in many cases tidier, more rational, and even, less costly. In the four centuries preceding 1900, however, the native societies of America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East were, at various stages, structured and motivated neither to do business with Western Europe nor to protect themselves against Western European arms; and so they were taken over and organized.

Colonies were founded, then, not mainly as a purposeful goal of national policy in pursuit of power, but for two more oblique reasons. First, as a reflex of the power struggle built into the European arena. Second, colonies were founded because of the following sequence: because some economic group wanted to expand its purchases or sales; it encountered difficulty in arranging the conditions for efficient business; it encountered also gross military weakness; and it persuaded a government which looked kindly on its efforts to take responsibility for organizing a suitable political framework to ensure, at little cost, the benefits of expanded trade.

Once colonial responsibility was accepted by the nation concerned, however, the whole affair was transformed. It moved from the essentially peaceful terrain of business to the area of national prestige and power where more primitive and general national interests and motives held sway.

Two specific consequences flowed from this transfer from the world of book-keeping to that of the flag. First, certain non-colonial powers

came, as a matter of prestige and style, to desire colonial possessions as a symbol of their coming of age. For example, nothing in the capital markets of the Atlantic world or in their trading patterns justified much ado about colonies, on strictly economic grounds, from, say, 1873 to 1914 [*]. A little more could be said for certain colonial positions on military or strategic grounds in the nineteenth century. But the competition for colonies was conducted for reasons that were unilaterally rational on neither economic nor military grounds: the competition occurred essentially because competitive nationalism was the rule of the world arena and colonies were an accepted symbol of status and power within that arena.

As the United States discovered, for example, when it found itself to its surprise and discomfiture owning the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, there was no way of relinquishing a colony which had not modernized its society, without turning it over to another colonial power. The colonial game had thus become a reflex not of economic imperatives, but of inherently competitive sovereignties. This kind of mixture of profit and power — which Josiah Child probably had in mind — holds for the pre-1914 imperialist competition, as well as for that of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

But there was a second kind of mix-up of profit and power which Child may not have perceived, because it was only to become fully apparent in later times. The second consequence of shifting colonies from a limited economic to major symbolic status, in an oligopolistic arena of power, was that withdrawal from a colony became a matter of national prestige, and thus extremely difficult. Almost without exception colonial positions were acquired at relatively little cost, at the behest of limited interests which might not have commanded national support if much blood and treasure had been initially required for the enterprise. Even when wars were fought to transfer the control of sovereignty over colonies they were generally limited wars. But the exit from imperial status, with a few exceptions, took the form of bitter, bloody war, or it was accompanied by major polit-

ical and diplomatic crises at home. The experience of colonial administration created not merely ties of economic advantage but human memories of cumulative effort, and achievement and status — as well as of national power and prestige — extraordinarily difficult to sever: as Britain, France, and the Netherlands have all found since 1945.

So far as colonial wars are concerned, then, the stages-of-growth offer only a partial and limited insight. On the one hand they were partially a reflex of competitive nationalism which led nations to take the plunge into colonies as part of dynastic or other power competition; and this link of colonialism to non-economic dimensions of nationalism helps explain the psychological pain of withdrawal.

In part, however, it was of the nature of the initial relation between a traditional and a more advanced society that the doing of efficient business required a type of administration the traditional society could not supply. But once the commitment to administer was made, a host of non-economic motives became mixed up in the affair which, again, made withdrawal difficult.

The ability of the colonial peoples to force withdrawal is, however, more directly related to the stages-of-growth. Although imperial powers usually set up administrations and pursued policies which did not optimize the creation of the preconditions for take-off, they could not avoid bringing about transformations in thought, knowledge, and institutions — as well as in trade and in the supply of social overhead capital — which moved the colonial society along the path towards take-off; and the colonial powers often included modernization of a sort as one object of colonial policy. By positive and negative demonstration effects a version of the preconditions period was thus set in motion. Above all a concept of nationalism, transcending the old ties to clan or region, inevitably crystallized around an accumulating resentment of colonial rule.

In the end, out of these semi-modernized settings, local coalitions emerged which generated political and, in some cases, military pressure capable of forcing withdrawal. The wars of independence which dot colonial history, from 1776 in America to 1959 in Algeria, are thus, to a degree, related to the stages-of-growth. Specifically, they are related to the dynamics of the preconditions period.

Note by the author

[*] There was, incidentally, a somewhat more rational economic case for colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, before the industrial revolution took hold in Europe, than in the late nineteenth century. Before the industrial revolution the total supply of foodstuffs and raw materials (or the total supply of colonies) could be regarded, in a sense, as fixed and finite; that is, what one nation had was intrinsically a denial to others. Once the flow of modern technology was under way, under nineteenth-century conditions, where supplies could be drawn in trade with sovereign nations (for example, the United States), the possibility existed of using applied technology to substitute for imports (for example, chemical fertilizers), or to generate exports which would permit their economical acquisition from accessible foreign markets.

Militarism - Bellicism

The making of war is intrinsic to the nature of the State. The well-known statement by the historian Charles Tilly that "The State makes War, and War makes the State" should not be taken as a paradoxical affirmation but as an historical matter of fact.

The same with the statement by Randolph Bourne that "War is the Health of the State." In fact, as pointed out by another writer: "War is the condition in which centralized government finds itself more fully in control, more secure in its authority, and most readily able to command undisputed public allegiance." (Alex Comfort, *Authority and Delinquency in the Modern State*, 1950)

It is then quite predictable that, in a situation in which the States find themselves in dire straits (morally, politically, economically, culturally) militarism and bellicose postures are re-proposed as a way out. And a new general war or a permanent state of war become for them the only possible solution.

Sigmund Freud

The State as the Monopolist of Violence (1915)

In this essay, written about six months after the outbreak of the First World War, Freud expresses his disillusionment about human nature and of the presumedly supreme institution of the civilized world, namely the State. Referring to the State he writes that: "The individual citizen can with horror convince himself in this war of what would occasionally cross his mind in peace-time — that the State has forbidden to the individual the practice of wrong-doing, not because it desires to abolish it, but because it wants to monopolize it, like salt and tobacco. A belligerent State permits itself every such misdeed, every such act of violence, as would disgrace the individual." These words constitute one of the most powerful representations and condemnations of that entity called 'the State'.

Source: Sigmund Freud, *Zeitgemäßes über Krieg und Tod*, 1915.

In the confusion of wartime in which we are caught up, relying as we must on one-sided information, standing too close to the great

changes that have already taken place or are beginning to, and without a glimmering of the future that is being shaped, we ourselves are at a loss as to the significance of the impressions which bear down upon us and as to the value of the judgements which we form. We cannot but feel that no event has ever destroyed so much that is precious in the common possessions of humanity, confused so many of the clearest intelligences, or so thoroughly debased what is highest. Science herself has lost her passionless impartiality; her deeply embittered servants seek for weapons from her with which to contribute towards the struggle with the enemy. Anthropologists feel driven to declare that enemy inferior and degenerate, psychiatrists issue a diagnosis of his disease of mind or spirit. Probably, however, our sense of these immediate evils is disproportionately strong, and we are not entitled to compare them with the evils of other times which we have not experienced.

The individual who is not himself a combatant — and so is a cog in the gigantic machine of war — feels bewildered in his orientation, and inhibited in his powers and activities. I believe that he will welcome any indication, however slight, which will make it easier for him to find his bearings within himself at least. I propose to pick out two among the factors which are responsible for the mental distress felt by non-combatants, against which it is such a heavy task to struggle, and to treat of them here: the disillusionment which this war has evoked, and the altered attitude towards death which this — like every other war — forces upon us.

When I speak of disillusionment, everyone will know at once what I mean. One need not be a sentimentalist; one may perceive the biological and psychological necessity for suffering in the economy of human life, and yet condemn war both in its means and ends and long for the cessation of all wars. We have told ourselves, no doubt, that wars can never cease so long as nations live under such widely differing conditions, so long as the value of individual life is so vari-

ously assessed among them, and so long as the animosities which divide them represent such powerful motive forces in the mind.

We were prepared to find that wars between the primitive and the civilized people, between the races who are divided by the colour of their skin — wars, even, against and among the nationalities of Europe whose civilization is little developed or has been lost — would occupy mankind for some time to come. But we permitted ourselves to have other hopes. We had expected the great world-dominating nations of white race upon whom the leadership of the human species has fallen, who were known to have world-wide interests as their concern, to whose creative powers were due not only our technical advances towards the control of nature but the artistic and scientific standards of civilization — we had expected these people to succeed in discovering another way of settling misunderstandings and conflicts of interest. Within each of these nations there prevailed high norms of moral conduct for the individual, to which his manner of life was bound to conform if he desired to take part in a civilized community. These ordinances, often too stringent, demanded a great deal of him — much self-restraint, much renunciation of instinctual satisfaction. He was above all forbidden to make use of the immense advantages to be gained by the practice of lying and deception in the competition with his fellow-men.

The civilized states regarded these moral standards as the basis of their existence. They took serious steps if anyone ventured to tamper with them, and often declared it improper even to subject them to examination by a critical intelligence. It was to be assumed, therefore, that the state itself would respect those moral standards, and would not think of undertaking anything against them which would contradict the basis of its own existence. Observation showed, to be sure, that embedded in these civilized states there were remnants of certain other people, which were universally unpopular and had therefore been only reluctantly, and even so not fully, admitted to participation in the common task of civilization, for which they had

shown themselves suitable enough. But the great nations themselves, it might have been supposed, would have acquired so much comprehension of what they had in common, and so much tolerance for their differences, that 'foreigner' and 'enemy' could no longer be merged, as they still were in classical antiquity, into a single concept.

Relying on this unity among the civilized people, countless men and women have exchanged their native home for a foreign one, and made their existence dependent on the intercommunication between friendly nations. Moreover anyone who was not by stress of circumstance confined to one spot could create for himself out of all the advantages and attractions of these civilized countries a new and wider fatherland, in which he would move about without hindrance or suspicion. In this way he enjoyed the blue sea and the grey; the beauty of snow-covered mountains and of green meadow lands; the magic of northern forests and the splendour of southern vegetation; the mood evoked by landscapes that recall great historical events, and the silence of untouched nature.

This new fatherland was a museum for him, too, filled with all the treasures which the artists of civilized humanity had in the successive centuries created and left behind. As he wandered from one gallery to another in this museum, he could recognize with impartial appreciation what varied types of perfection a mixture of blood, the course of history, and the special quality of their mother-earth had produced among his compatriots in this wider sense. Here he would find cool, inflexible energy developed to the highest point; there, the graceful art of beautifying existence; elsewhere, the feeling for orderliness and law, or others among the qualities which have made mankind the lords of the earth.

Nor must we forget that each of these inhabitants of the civilized world had created for himself a 'Parnassus' and a 'School of Athens' of his own. From among the great thinkers, writers and artists of all nations he had chosen those to whom he considered he owed the best

of what he had been able to achieve in enjoyment and understanding of life, and he had venerated them along with the immortal ancients as well as with the familiar masters of his own tongue. None of these great figures had seemed to him foreign because they spoke another language — neither the incomparable explorer of human passions, nor the intoxicated worshipper of beauty, nor the powerful and menacing prophet, nor the subtle satirist; and he never reproached himself on that account for being a renegade towards his own nation and his beloved mother-tongue.

The enjoyment of this common civilization was disturbed from time to time by warning voices, which declared that old traditional differences made wars inevitable, even among the members of a community such as this. We refused to believe it; but if such a war were to happen, how did we picture it? We saw it as an opportunity for demonstrating the progress of comity among human beings since the era when the Greek Amphictyonic Council proclaimed that no city of the league might be destroyed, nor its olive-groves cut down, nor its water-supply stopped; we pictured it as a chivalrous passage of arms, which would limit itself to establishing the superiority of one side in the struggle, while as far as possible avoiding acute suffering that could contribute nothing to the decision, and granting complete immunity for the wounded who had to withdraw from the contest, as well as for the doctors and nurses who devoted themselves to their recovery. There would, of course be the utmost consideration for the non-combatant classes of the population — for women who take no part in war-work, and the children who, when they are grown up, should become on both sides one another's friends and helpers. And again, all the international undertakings and institutions in which the common civilization of peace-time had been embodied would be maintained.

Even a war like this would have produced enough horror and suffering; but it would not have interrupted the development of ethical

relations between the collective units of mankind — the peoples and the states.

Then the war in which we had refused to believe broke out, and it brought disillusionment. Not only is it more bloody and more destructive than any war of other days, because of the enormously increased perfection of weapons of attack and defence; it is at least as cruel, as embittered, as implacable as any that has preceded it. It disregards all the restrictions known as International Law, which in peace-time the states had bound themselves to observe; it ignores the prerogatives of the wounded and the medical service, the distinction between civil and military sections of the population, the claims of private property. It tramples in blind fury on all that comes in its way as though there were to be no future and no peace among men after it is over. It cuts all the common bonds between the contending peoples, and threatens to leave a legacy of embitterment that will make any renewal of those bonds impossible for a long time to come.

Moreover, it has brought to light an almost incredible phenomenon: the civilized nations know and understand one another so little that one can turn against the other with hate and loathing. Indeed, one of the great civilized nations [Germany] is so universally unpopular that the attempt can actually be made to exclude it from the civilized community as 'barbaric', although it has long proved its fitness by the magnificent contributions to that community which it has made. We live in hopes that the pages of an impartial history will prove that that nation, in whose language we write and for whose victory our dear ones are fighting, has been precisely the one which has least transgressed the laws of civilization. But at such a time who dares to set himself up as judge in his own cause?

People are more or less represented by the states which they form, and these states by the governments which rule them. The individual citizen can with horror convince himself in this war of what would occasionally cross his mind in peace-time — that the state

has forbidden to the individual the practice of wrong-doing, not because it desires to abolish it, but because it wants to monopolize it, like salt and tobacco. A belligerent state permits itself every such misdeed, every such act of violence, as would disgrace the individual. It makes use against the enemy not only of the accepted stratagems of war, but of deliberate lying and deception as well — and to a degree which seems to exceed the usage of former wars. The state exacts the utmost degree of obedience and sacrifice from its citizens, but at the same time it treats them like children by maintaining an excess of secrecy and a censorship upon news and expressions of opinion which leaves the spirits of those whose intellects it thus suppresses defenceless against every unfavourable turn of events and every sinister rumour. It absolves itself from the guarantees and treaties by which it was bound to other states, and makes unabashed confession of its own rapacity and lust for power, which the private individual has then to sanction in the name of patriotism.

It should not be objected that the state cannot refrain from wrong-doing, since that would place it at a disadvantage. It is no less disadvantageous, as a general rule, for the individual to conform to the standards of morality and refrain from brutal and arbitrary conduct; and the state seldom proves able to indemnify him for the sacrifices it exacts. Nor should it be a matter for surprise that this relaxation of all the moral ties between the collective beings of mankind should have had repercussions on the morality of individuals; for our conscience is not the inflexible judge that ethical teachers declare it, but in its origin is 'social anxiety' and nothing else. When the community no longer raises objections, there is an end, too, to the suppression of evil passions, and people perpetrate deeds of cruelty, fraud, treachery and barbarity so incompatible with their level of civilization that one would have thought them impossible.

Well may the citizen of the civilized world of whom I have spoken stand helpless in a world that has grown strange to him — his great

fatherland disintegrated, its common estates laid waste, his fellow-citizens divided and debased!

There is something to be said, however, in criticism of his disappointment. Strictly speaking it is not justified, for it consists in the destruction of an illusion. We welcome illusions because they spare us emotional distress, and enable us instead to indulge in gratification. We must not complain, then, if now and again they come into collision with some portion of reality and are shattered against it.

Two things in this war have aroused our sense of disillusionment: the low morality shown externally by states which in their internal relations pose as the guardians of moral standards, and the brutality shown by individuals whom, as participants in the highest human civilization, one would not have thought capable of such behaviour.

Randolph Bourne

War is the Health of the State (1918)

A very powerful analysis of the genetic link between State and War, and about the exploitation of War by the State in order to bring to the fore the herd instinct of the people. This because wars manufacture obedient frightened masses and so are fully functional to the role and interests of the State, being the State "the organization of the entire herd."

Source: Randolph Bourne, *The State*, 1918.

War is the health of the State.

It automatically sets in motion throughout society those irresistible forces for uniformity, for passionate co-operation with the Government in coercing into obedience the minority groups and individuals which lack the larger herd sense. The machinery of government sets and enforces the drastic penalties, the minorities are either intimidated into silence or brought slowly around by a subtle process of

persuasion which may seem to them really to be converting them. Of course the ideal of perfect loyalty, perfect uniformity is never attained. The classes upon whom the amateur work of coercion falls are unwearied in their zeal, but often their agitation, instead of converting, merely serves to stiffen their resistance. Minorities are rendered sullen, and some intellectual opinion, bitter and satirical. But in general, the nation in war-time attains a uniformity of feeling, a hierarchy of values, culminated at the undisputed apex of the State ideal, which could not possibly be produced trough any other agency than war. Other values such artistic creation, knowledge, reason, beauty, the enhancement of life, are instantly and almost unanimously sacrificed and the significant classes who have constituted themselves the amateur agents of the State are engaged not only in sacrificing these values for themselves but in coercing all other persons into sacrificing them.

War — or at least modern war waged by a democratic republic against a powerful enemy — seems to achieve for a nation almost all that the most inflamed political idealist could desire. Citizens are no longer indifferent to their Government but each cell of the body politic is brimming with life and activity. We are at last on the way to full realization of that collective community in which each individual somehow contains the virtue of the whole. In a nation at war, every citizen identifies himself with the whole, and feels immensely strengthened in that identification. The purpose and desire of the collective community live in each person who throws himself wholeheartedly into the cause of war. The impeding distinction between society and the individual is almost blotted out. At war, the individual becomes almost identical with his society. He achieves a superb self-assurance, an intuition of the rightness of all his ideas and emotions, so that in the suppression of opponents or heretics he is invincibly strong; he feels behind him all the power of the collective community. The individual as social being in war seems to have

achieved almost his apotheosis. Not for any religious impulse could the American nation have been expected to show such devotion *en masse,* such sacrifice and labor. Certainly not for any secular good, such as universal education or the subjugation of nature, would it have poured forth its treasure and its life, or would it have permitted such stern coercive measures to be taken against it, such as conscripting its money and its men. But for the sake of a war of offensive self-defence, undertaken to support a difficult cause to the slogan of "democracy," it would reach the highest level ever known of collective effort.

For these secular goods, connected with the enhancement of life, the education of man and the use of the intelligence to realize reason and beauty in the nation's communal living, are alien to our traditional ideal of the State. The State is intimately connected with war, for it is the organization of the collective community when it acts in a political manner, and to act in a political manner towards a rival group has meant, throughout all history — war.

There is nothing invidious in the use of the term "herd," in connection with the State. It is merely an attempt to reduce closer to first principles the nature of this institution in the shadow of which we all live, move and have our being. Ethnologists are generally agreed that human society made its first appearance as the human pack and not as a collection of individuals or of couples. The herd is in fact the original unit, and only as it was differentiated did personal individuality develop. All the most primitive surviving types of men are shown to live in a very complex but very rigid social organization where opportunity for individuation is scarcely given.

These tribes remain strictly organized herds, and the difference between them and the modern State is one of degree of sophistication and variety of organization, and not of kind.

Psychologists recognize the gregarious impulse as one of the strongest primitive pulls which keeps together the herds of the different

species of higher animals. Mankind is no exception. Our pugnacious evolutionary history has prevented the impulse from ever dying out. This gregarious impulse is the tendency to imitate, to conform, to coalesce together, and is most powerful when the herd believes itself threatened with attack. Animals crowd together for protection, and men become most conscious of their collectivity at the threat of war. Consciousness of collectivity brings confidence and a feeling of massed strength, which in turn arouses pugnacity and the battle is on. In civilized man, the gregarious impulse acts not only to produce concerted action for defence, but also to produce identity of opinion. Since thought is a form of behaviour, the gregarious impulse floods up into its realm and demands that sense of uniform thought which wartime produces so successfully. And it is in this flooding of the conscious life of society that gregariousness works its havoc.

For just as in modern societies the sex-instinct is enormously over-supplied for the requirements of human propagation, so the gregarious impulse is enormously over-supplied for the work of protection which it is called upon to perform. It would be quite enough if we were gregarious enough to enjoy the companionship of others, to be able to co-operate with them, and to feel a slight malaise at solitude. Unfortunately however, this impulse is not content with these reasonable and healthful demands, but insists that like-mindedness shall prevail everywhere, in all departments of life. So that all human progress, all novelty, and non-conformity, must be carried against the resistance of this tyrannical herd-instinct which drives the individual into obedience and conformity with the majority. Even in the most modern and enlightened societies this impulse shows little sign of abating. As it is driven by inexorable economic demand out of the sphere of utility, it seems to fasten itself even more fiercely in the realm of feeling and opinion, so that conformity comes to be a thing aggressively desired and demanded.

The gregarious impulse keeps its hold all the more virulently because when the group is in motion or is taking any positive action,

this feeling of being with and supported by the collective herd very greatly feeds that will to power, the nourishment of which the individual organism so constantly demands. You feel powerful by conforming, and you feel forlorn and helpless if you are out of the crowd. While even if you do not get any access of power by thinking and feeling just as everybody else in your group does, you get at least the warm feeling of obedience, the soothing irresponsibility of protection.

Joining as it does to these very vigorous tendencies of the individual — the pleasure in power and the pleasure in obedience — this gregarious impulse becomes irresistible in society. War stimulates it to the highest possible degree, sending the influences of its mysterious herd-current with its inflations of power and obedience to the farthest reaches of the society, to every individual and little group that can possibly be affected. And it is these impulses which the State — the organization of the entire herd, the entire collectivity — is founded on and makes use of.

There is, of course, in the feeling toward the State a large element of pure filial mysticism. This sense of insecurity, the desire for protection, sends one's desire back to the father and mother, with whom is associated the earliest feeling of protection. It is not for nothing that one's State is still thought of as Fatherland or Motherland, that one's relation towards it is conceived in terms of family affection. The war has shown that nowhere under the shock of danger have these primitive childlike attitudes failed to assert themselves again, as much in this country as anywhere. If we have not the intense Father-sense of the German who worships his *Vaterland*, at least in Uncle Sam we have a symbol of protecting, kindly authority, and in the many Mother-posts of the Red Cross, we see how easily in the more tender functions of war services, the ruling organization is conceived in family terms. A people at war have become in the most literal sense obedient, respectful, trustful children again, full of that naive faith in

the all-wisdom and all-power of the adult who takes care of them, imposes his mild but necessary rule upon them and in whom they lose their responsibility and anxieties. In this recrudescence of the child, there is great comfort, and a certain influx of power. On most people the strain of being an independent adult weighs heavily, and upon none more than those members of the significant classes who have had bequeathed to them or have assumed the responsibilities of governing.

The State provides the most convenient of symbols under which these classes can retain all the actual pragmatic satisfaction of governing, but can rid themselves of the psychic burden of adulthood. They continue to direct industry and government and all the institutions of society pretty much as before, but in their own conscious eyes and in the eyes of the general public, they are turned from their selfish and predatory ways, and have become loyal servants of society, or something greater than they — the State. The man who moves from the direction of a large business in New York to a post in the war management industrial services in Washington does not apparently alter very much his power or his administrative technique. But psychically, what a transfiguration has occurred! His is now not only the power but the glory! And his sense of satisfaction is directly proportional not to the genuine amount of personal sacrifice that may be involved in the change but to the extent to which he retains his industrial prerogative and sense of command.

From members of this class a certain insuperable indignation arises if the change from private enterprise to State service involves any real loss of power and personal privilege. If there is to be pragmatic sacrifice, let it be, they feel, on the field of honour, in the traditional acclaimed deaths by battle, in that detour of suicide, as Nietzsche calls war. The State in wartime supplies satisfaction for this very craving, but its chief value is the opportunity it gives for this regression to infantile attitudes. In your reaction to an imagined attack in your country or an insult to its government, you draw closer to the

herd for protection, you conform in word and deed, and you insist vehemently that everybody else shall think, speak and act together. And you fix your adoring gaze upon the State, with a truly filial look, as upon the Father of the flock, the quasi-personal symbol of your definite action and ideas.

Smedley D. Butler

War is a Racket
(1935)

Smedley Darlington Butler (West Chester, Pennsylvania, July 30, 1881 - Philadelphia, June 21, 1940), was a Major General in the U.S. Marine Corps and, at the time of his death, the most decorated Marine in U.S. history. The small book *War is a racket* appeared in 1935 and consolidated the fame of the general as a non-conventional person. His direct experience in the military sector constitutes the best corroboration for the views exposed in this text. Those views anticipate, in a much stronger way, some of the considerations that will be later expressed by another General (Dwight Eisenhower) in his *Farewell Address* (January 17, 1961) as president of the United States, about the military-industrial complex.

Source: Smedley D. Butler, *War is a Racket*, 1935.

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1. WAR IS A RACKET

WAR is a racket. It always has been.

It is possibly the oldest, easily the most profitable, surely the most vicious. It is the only one international in scope. It is the only one in which the profits are reckoned in dollars and the losses in lives.

A racket is best described, I believe, as something that is not what it seems to the majority of the people. Only a small "inside" group knows what it is about. It is conducted for the benefit of the very few, at the expense of the very many. Out of war a few people make huge fortunes.

In the World War [I] a mere handful garnered the profits of the conflict. At least 21,000 new millionaires and billionaires were made in the United States during the World War. That many admitted their huge blood gains in their income tax returns. How many other war millionaires falsified their tax returns no one knows.

How many of these war millionaires shouldered a rifle? How many of them dug a trench? How many of them knew what it meant to go hungry in a rat-infested dug-out? How many of them spent sleepless, frightened nights, ducking shells and shrapnel and machine gun bullets? How many of them parried a bayonet thrust of an enemy? How many of them were wounded or killed in battle?

Out of war nations acquire additional territory, if they are victorious. They just take it. This newly acquired territory promptly is exploited by the few — the selfsame few who wrung dollars out of blood in the war. The general public shoulders the bill.

And what is this bill?

This bill renders a horrible accounting. Newly placed gravestones. Mangled bodies. Shattered minds. Broken hearts and homes. Economic instability. Depression and all its attendant miseries. Back-breaking taxation for generations and generations.

For a great many years, as a soldier, I had a suspicion that war was a racket; not until I retired to civil life did I fully realize it. Now that I

see the international war clouds gathering, as they are today, I must face it and speak out.

Again they are choosing sides. France and Russia met and agreed to stand side by side. Italy and Austria hurried to make a similar agreement. Poland and Germany cast sheep's eyes at each other, forgetting for the nonce, their dispute over the Polish Corridor.

The assassination of King Alexander of Jugoslavia complicated matters. Jugoslavia and Hungary, long bitter enemies, were almost at each other's throats. Italy was ready to jump in. But France was waiting. So was Czechoslovakia. All of them are looking ahead to war. Not the people — not those who fight and pay and die — only those who foment wars and remain safely at home to profit.

There are 40,000,000 men under arms in the world today, and our statesmen and diplomats have the temerity to say that war is not in the making.

Hell's bells! Are these 40,000,000 men being trained to be dancers?

Not in Italy, to be sure. Premier Mussolini knows what they are being trained for. He, at least, is frank enough to speak out. Only the other day, Il Duce in "International Conciliation," the publication of the *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, said:

> "And above all, Fascism, the more it considers and observes the future and the development of humanity quite apart from political considerations of the moment, believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace ... War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the people who have the courage to meet it."

Undoubtedly Mussolini means exactly what he says. His well-trained army, his great fleet of planes, and even his navy are ready for war — anxious for it, apparently. His recent stand at the side of

Hungary in the latter's dispute with Jugoslavia showed that. And the hurried mobilization of his troops on the Austrian border after the assassination of Dollfuss showed it too. There are others in Europe too whose sabre rattling presages war, sooner or later.

Herr Hitler, with his rearming Germany and his constant demands for more and more arms, is an equal if not greater menace to peace. France only recently increased the term of military service for its youth from a year to eighteen months.

Yes, all over, nations are camping in their arms. The mad dogs of Europe are on the loose. In the Orient the manoeuvring is more adroit. Back in 1904, when Russia and Japan fought, we kicked out our old friends the Russians and backed Japan. Then our very generous international bankers were financing Japan. Now the trend is to poison us against the Japanese. What does the "open door" policy to China mean to us? Our trade with China is about $90,000,000 a year. Or the Philippine Islands? We have spent about $600,000,000 in the Philippines in thirty-five years and we (our bankers and industrialists and speculators) have private investments there of less than $200,000,000.

Then, to save that China trade of about $90,000,000, or to protect these private investments of less than $200,000,000 in the Philippines, we would be all stirred up to hate Japan and go to war — a war that might well cost us tens of billions of dollars, hundreds of thousands of lives of Americans, and many more hundreds of thousands of physically maimed and mentally unbalanced men.

Of course, for this loss, there would be a compensating profit — fortunes would be made. Millions and billions of dollars would be piled up. By a few. Munitions makers. Bankers. Ship builders. Manufacturers. Meat packers. Speculators. They would fare well.

Yes, they are getting ready for another war. Why shouldn't they? It pays high dividends.

But what does it profit the men who are killed? What does it profit their mothers and sisters, their wives and their sweethearts? What does it profit their children?

What does it profit anyone except the very few to whom war means huge profits?

Yes, and what does it profit the nation?

Take our own case. Until 1898 we didn't own a bit of territory outside the mainland of North America. At that time our national debt was a little more than $1,000,000,000. Then we became "internationally minded." We forgot, or shunted aside, the advice of the Father of our country. We forgot George Washington's warning about "entangling alliances." We went to war. We acquired outside territory. At the end of the World War period, as a direct result of our fiddling in international affairs, our national debt had jumped to over $25,000,000,000. Our total favorable trade balance during the twenty-five-year period was about $24,000,000,000. Therefore, on a purely bookkeeping basis, we ran a little behind year for year, and that foreign trade might well have been ours without the wars.

It would have been far cheaper (not to say safer) for the average American who pays the bills to stay out of foreign entanglements. For a very few this racket, like bootlegging and other underworld rackets, brings fancy profits, but the cost of operations is always transferred to the people — who do not profit.

2. WHO MAKES THE PROFITS?

The World War, rather our brief participation in it, has cost the United States some $52,000,000,000. Figure it out. That means $400 to every American man, woman, and child. And we haven't paid the debt yet. We are paying it, our children will pay it, and our children's children probably still will be paying the cost of that war.

The normal profits of a business concern in the United States are six, eight, ten, and sometimes twelve percent. But war-time profits - ah! that is another matter — twenty, sixty, one hundred, three hundred, and even eighteen hundred per cent — the sky is the limit. All that traffic will bear. Uncle Sam has the money. Let's get it.

Of course, it isn't put that crudely in war time. It is dressed into speeches about patriotism, love of country, and "we must all put our shoulders to the wheel," but the profits jump and leap and skyrocket — and are safely pocketed. Let's just take a few examples:

Take our friends the du Ponts, the powder people — didn't one of them testify before a Senate committee recently that their powder won the war? Or saved the world for democracy? Or something? How did they do in the war? They were a patriotic corporation. Well, the average earnings of the du Ponts for the period 1910 to 1914 were $6,000,000 a year. It wasn't much, but the du Ponts managed to get along on it. Now let's look at their average yearly profit during the war years, 1914 to 1918. Fifty-eight million dollars a year profit we find! Nearly ten times that of normal times, and the profits of normal times were pretty good. An increase in profits of more than 950 per cent.

Take one of our little steel companies that patriotically shunted aside the making of rails and girders and bridges to manufacture war materials. Well, their 1910-1914 yearly earnings averaged $6,000,000. Then came the war. And, like loyal citizens, Bethlehem Steel promptly turned to munitions making. Did their profits jump — or did they let Uncle Sam in for a bargain? Well, their 1914-1918 average was $49,000,000 a year!

Or, let's take United States Steel. The normal earnings during the five-year period prior to the war were $105,000,000 a year. Not bad. Then along came the war and up went the profits. The average yearly profit for the period 1914-1918 was $240,000,000. Not bad.

There you have some of the steel and powder earnings. Let's look at something else. A little copper, perhaps. That always does well in war times.

Anaconda, for instance. Average yearly earnings during the pre-war years 1910-1914 of $10,000,000. During the war years 1914-1918 profits leaped to $34,000,000 per year.

Or Utah Copper. Average of $5,000,000 per year during the 1910-1914 period. Jumped to an average of $21,000,000 yearly profits for the war period.

Let's group these five, with three smaller companies. The total yearly average profits of the pre-war period 1910-1914 were $137,480,000. Then along came the war. The average yearly profits for this group skyrocketed to $408,300,000.

A little increase in profits of approximately 200 per cent.

Does war pay? It paid them. But they aren't the only ones. There are still others. Let's take leather.

For the three-year period before the war the total profits of Central Leather Company were $3,500,000. That was approximately $1,167,000 a year. Well, in 1916 Central Leather returned a profit of $15,000,000, a small increase of 1,100 per cent. That's all. The General Chemical Company averaged a profit for the three years before the war of a little over $800,000 a year. Came the war, and the profits jumped to $12,000,000. A leap of 1,400 per cent.

International Nickel Company — and you can't have a war without nickel — showed an increase in profits from a mere average of $4,000,000 a year to $73,000,000 yearly. Not bad? An increase of more than 1,700 per cent.

American Sugar Refining Company averaged $2,000,000 a year for the three years before the war. In 1916 a profit of $6,000,000 was recorded.

Listen to Senate Document No. 259. The Sixty-Fifth Congress, reporting on corporate earnings and government revenues. Considering the profits of 122 meat packers, 153 cotton manufacturers, 299 garment makers, 49 steel plants, and 340 coal producers during the war. Profits under 25 per cent were exceptional. For instance the coal companies made between 100 per cent and 7,856 per cent on their capital stock during the war. The Chicago packers doubled and tripled their earnings.

And let us not forget the bankers who financed the great war. If anyone had the cream of the profits it was the bankers. Being partnerships rather than incorporated organizations, they do not have to report to stockholders. And their profits were as secret as they were immense. How the bankers made their millions and their billions I do not know, because those little secrets never become public — even before a Senate investigatory body.

But here's how some of the other patriotic industrialists and speculators chiselled their way into war profits.

Take the shoe people. They like war. It brings business with abnormal profits. They made huge profits on sales abroad to our allies. Perhaps, like the munitions manufacturers and armament makers, they also sold to the enemy. For a dollar is a dollar whether it comes from Germany or from France. But they did well by Uncle Sam too. For instance, they sold Uncle Sam 35,000,000 pairs of hobnailed service shoes. There were 4,000,000 soldiers. Eight pairs, and more, to a soldier. My regiment during the war had only one pair to a soldier. Some of these shoes probably are still in existence. They were good shoes. But when the war was over Uncle Sam has a matter of 25,000,000 pairs left over. Bought — and paid for. Profits recorded and pocketed.

There was still lots of leather left. So the leather people sold your Uncle Sam hundreds of thousands of McClellan saddles for the cavalry. But there wasn't any American cavalry overseas! Somebody

had to get rid of this leather, however. Somebody had to make a profit in it — so we had a lot of McClellan saddles. And we probably have those yet.

Also somebody had a lot of mosquito netting. They sold your Uncle Sam 20,000,000 mosquito nets for the use of the soldiers overseas. I suppose the boys were expected to put it over them as they tried to sleep in muddy trenches — one hand scratching cooties on their backs and the other making passes at scurrying rats. Well, not one of these mosquito nets ever got to France!

Anyhow, these thoughtful manufacturers wanted to make sure that no soldier would be without his mosquito net, so 40,000,000 additional yards of mosquito netting were sold to Uncle Sam.

There were pretty good profits in mosquito netting in those days, even if there were no mosquitoes in France. I suppose, if the war had lasted just a little longer, the enterprising mosquito netting manufacturers would have sold your Uncle Sam a couple of consignments of mosquitoes to plant in France so that more mosquito netting would be in order.

Airplane and engine manufacturers felt they, too, should get their just profits out of this war. Why not? Everybody else was getting theirs. So $1,000,000,000 — count them if you live long enough — was spent by Uncle Sam in building airplane engines that never left the ground! Not one plane, or motor, out of the billion dollars worth ordered, ever got into a battle in France. Just the same the manufacturers made their little profit of 30, 100, or perhaps 300 per cent.

Undershirts for soldiers cost 14 cents to make and uncle Sam paid 30 cents to 40cents each for them — a nice little profit for the undershirt manufacturer. And the stocking manufacturer and the uniform manufacturers and the cap manufacturers and the steel helmet manufacturers — all got theirs.

Why, when the war was over some 4,000,000 sets of equipment — knapsacks and the things that go to fill them — crammed warehouses on this side. Now they are being scrapped because the regulations have changed the contents. But the manufacturers collected their wartime profits on them — and they will do it all over again the next time.

There were lots of brilliant ideas for profit making during the war.

One very versatile patriot sold Uncle Sam twelve dozen 48-inch wrenches. Oh, they were very nice wrenches. The only trouble was that there was only one nut ever made that was large enough for these wrenches. That is the one that holds the turbines at Niagara Falls. Well, after Uncle Sam had bought them and the manufacturer had pocketed the profit, the wrenches were put on freight cars and shunted all around the United States in an effort to find a use for them. When the Armistice was signed it was indeed a sad blow to the wrench manufacturer. He was just about to make some nuts to fit the wrenches. Then he planned to sell these, too, to your Uncle Sam.

Still another had the brilliant idea that colonels shouldn't ride in automobiles, nor should they even ride on horseback. One has probably seen a picture of Andy Jackson riding in a buckboard. Well, some 6,000 buckboards were sold to Uncle Sam for the use of colonels! Not one of them was used. But the buckboard manufacturer got his war profit.

The shipbuilders felt they should come in on some of it, too. They built a lot of ships that made a lot of profit. More than $3,000,000,000 worth. Some of the ships were all right. But $635,000,000 worth of them were made of wood and wouldn't float! The seams opened up — and they sank. We paid for them, though. And somebody pocketed the profits.

It has been estimated by statisticians and economists and researchers that the war cost your Uncle Sam $52,000,000,000. Of this sum,

$39,000,000,000 was expended in the actual war itself. This expenditure yielded $16,000,000,000 in profits. That is how the 21,000 billionaires and millionaires got that way. This $16,000,000,000 profits is not to be sneezed at. It is quite a tidy sum. And it went to a very few.

The Senate (Senator Gerald Nye) committee probe of the munitions industry and its wartime profits, despite its sensational disclosures, hardly has scratched the surface.

Even so, it has had some effect. The State Department has been studying "for some time" methods of keeping out of war. The War Department suddenly decides it has a wonderful plan to spring. The Administration names a committee — with the War and Navy Departments ably represented under the chairmanship of a Wall Street speculator — to limit profits in war time. To what extent isn't suggested. Hmmm. Possibly the profits of 300 and 600 and 1,600 per cent of those who turned blood into gold in the World War would be limited to some smaller figure.

Apparently, however, the plan does not call for any limitation of losses — that is, the losses of those who fight the war. As far as I have been able to ascertain there is nothing in the scheme to limit a soldier to the loss of but one eye, or one arm, or to limit his wounds to one or two or three. Or to limit the loss of life.

There is nothing in this scheme, apparently, that says not more than 12 per cent of a regiment shall be wounded in battle, or that not more than 7 per cent in a division shall be killed.

Of course, the committee cannot be bothered with such trifling matters.

3. WHO PAYS THE BILLS?

Who provides the profits — these nice little profits of 20, 100, 300, 1,500 and 1,800 per cent? We all pay them — in taxation. We paid the bankers their profits when we bought Liberty Bonds at $100.00 and sold them back at $84 or $86 to the bankers. These bankers collected $100 plus. It was a simple manipulation. The bankers control the security marts. It was easy for them to depress the price of these bonds. Then all of us — the people — got frightened and sold the bonds at $84 or $86. The bankers bought them. Then these same bankers stimulated a boom and government bonds went to par — and above. Then the bankers collected their profits.

But the soldier pays the biggest part of the bill.

If you don't believe this, visit the American cemeteries on the battlefields abroad. Or visit any of the veteran's hospitals in the United States. On a tour of the country, in the midst of which I am at the time of this writing, I have visited eighteen government hospitals for veterans. In them are a total of about 50,000 destroyed men — men who were the pick of the nation eighteen years ago. The very able chief surgeon at the government hospital at Milwaukee, where there are 3,800 of the living dead, told me that mortality among veterans is three times as great as among those who stayed at home.

Boys with a normal viewpoint were taken out of the fields and offices and factories and classrooms and put into the ranks. There they were remoulded; they were made over; they were made to "about face"; to regard murder as the order of the day. They were put shoulder to shoulder and, through mass psychology, they were entirely changed. We used them for a couple of years and trained them to think nothing at all of killing or of being killed.

Then, suddenly, we discharged them and told them to make another "about face" ! This time they had to do their own readjustment, *sans* [without] mass psychology, *sans* officers' aid and advice and *sans*

nation-wide propaganda. We didn't need them any more. So we scattered them about without any "three-minute" or "Liberty Loan" speeches or parades. Many, too many, of these fine young boys are eventually destroyed, mentally, because they could not make that final "about face" alone.

In the government hospital in Marion, Indiana, 1,800 of these boys are in pens! Five hundred of them in a barracks with steel bars and wires all around outside the buildings and on the porches. These already have been mentally destroyed. These boys don't even look like human beings. Oh, the looks on their faces! Physically, they are in good shape; mentally, they are gone.

There are thousands and thousands of these cases, and more and more are coming in all the time. The tremendous excitement of the war, the sudden cutting off of that excitement — the young boys couldn't stand it.

That's a part of the bill. So much for the dead — they have paid their part of the war profits. So much for the mentally and physically wounded — they are paying now their share of the war profits. But the others paid, too — they paid with heartbreaks when they tore themselves away from their firesides and their families to don the uniform of Uncle Sam — on which a profit had been made. They paid another part in the training camps where they were regimented and drilled while others took their jobs and their places in the lives of their communities. The paid for it in the trenches where they shot and were shot; where they were hungry for days at a time; where they slept in the mud and the cold and in the rain — with the moans and shrieks of the dying for a horrible lullaby.

But don't forget — the soldier paid part of the dollars and cents bill too.

Up to and including the Spanish-American War, we had a prize system, and soldiers and sailors fought for money. During the Civil

War they were paid bonuses, in many instances, before they went into service. The government, or states, paid as high as $1,200 for an enlistment. In the Spanish-American War they gave prize money. When we captured any vessels, the soldiers all got their share — at least, they were supposed to. Then it was found that we could reduce the cost of wars by taking all the prize money and keeping it, but conscripting the soldier anyway. Then soldiers couldn't bargain for their labor. Everyone else could bargain, but the soldier couldn't.

Napoleon once said,

> "All men are enamoured of decorations ... they positively hunger for them."

So by developing the Napoleonic system — the medal business — the government learned it could get soldiers for less money, because the boys liked to be decorated. Until the Civil War there were no medals. Then the Congressional Medal of Honor was handed out. It made enlistments easier. After the Civil War no new medals were issued until the Spanish-American War.

In the World War, we used propaganda to make the boys accept conscription. They were made to feel ashamed if they didn't join the army.

So vicious was this war propaganda that even God was brought into it. With few exceptions our clergymen joined in the clamor to kill, kill, kill. To kill the Germans. God is on our side ... it is His will that the Germans be killed.

And in Germany, the good pastors called upon the Germans to kill the allies ... to please the same God. That was a part of the general propaganda, built up to make people war conscious and murder conscious.

Beautiful ideals were painted for our boys who were sent out to die. This was the "war to end all wars." This was the "war to make the world safe for democracy." No one mentioned to them, as they marched away, that their going and their dying would mean huge war profits. No one told these American soldiers that they might be shot down by bullets made by their own brothers here. No one told them that the ships on which they were going to cross might be torpedoed by submarines built with United States patents. They were just told it was to be a "glorious adventure."

Thus, having stuffed patriotism down their throats, it was decided to make them help pay for the war, too. So, we gave them the large salary of $30 a month.

All they had to do for this munificent sum was to leave their dear ones behind, give up their jobs, lie in swampy trenches, eat canned willy [corned beef] (when they could get it) and kill and kill and kill ... and be killed.

But wait!

Half of that wage (just a little more than a riveter in a shipyard or a laborer in a munitions factory safe at home made in a day) was promptly taken from him to support his dependents, so that they would not become a charge upon his community. Then we made him pay what amounted to accident insurance — something the employer pays for in an enlightened state — and that cost him $6 a month. He had less than $9 a month left.

Then, the most crowning insolence of all — he was virtually blackjacked into paying for his own ammunition, clothing, and food by being made to buy Liberty Bonds. Most soldiers got no money at all on pay days.

We made them buy Liberty Bonds at $100 and then we bought them back — when they came back from the war and couldn't find work —

at $84 and $86. And the soldiers bought about $2,000,000,000 worth of these bonds!

Yes, the soldier pays the greater part of the bill. His family pays too. They pay it in the same heart-break that he does. As he suffers, they suffer. At nights, as he lay in the trenches and watched shrapnel burst about him, they lay home in their beds and tossed sleeplessly — his father, his mother, his wife, his sisters, his brothers, his sons, and his daughters.

When he returned home minus an eye, or minus a leg or with his mind broken, they suffered too — as much as and even sometimes more than he. Yes, and they, too, contributed their dollars to the profits of the munitions makers and bankers and shipbuilders and the manufacturers and the speculators made. They, too, bought Liberty Bonds and contributed to the profit of the bankers after the Armistice in the hocus-pocus of manipulated Liberty Bond prices.

And even now the families of the wounded men and of the mentally broken and those who never were able to readjust themselves are still suffering and still paying.

4. HOW TO SMASH THIS RACKET!

WELL, it's a racket, all right.

A few profit — and the many pay. But there is a way to stop it. You can't end it by disarmament conferences. You can't eliminate it by peace parleys at Geneva. Well-meaning but impractical groups can't wipe it out by resolutions. It can be smashed effectively only by taking the profit out of war.

The only way to smash this racket is to conscript capital and industry and labor before the nations manhood can be conscripted. One month before the Government can conscript the young men of the nation — it

must conscript capital and industry and labor. Let the officers and the directors and the high-powered executives of our armament factories and our munitions makers and our shipbuilders and our airplane builders and the manufacturers of all the other things that provide profit in war time as well as the bankers and the speculators, be conscripted — to get $30 a month, the same wage as the lads in the trenches get.

Let the workers in these plants get the same wages — all the workers, all presidents, all executives, all directors, all managers, all bankers — yes, and all generals and all admirals and all officers and all politicians and all government office holders — everyone in the nation be restricted to a total monthly income not to exceed that paid to the soldier in the trenches!

Let all these kings and tycoons and masters of business and all those workers in industry and all our senators and governors and majors pay half of their monthly $30 wage to their families and pay war risk insurance and buy Liberty Bonds.

Why shouldn't they?

They aren't running any risk of being killed or of having their bodies mangled or their minds shattered. They aren't sleeping in muddy trenches. They aren't hungry. The soldiers are!

Give capital and industry and labor thirty days to think it over and you will find, by that time, there will be no war. That will smash the war racket — that and nothing else.

Maybe I am a little too optimistic. Capital still has some say. So capital won't permit the taking of the profit out of war until the people — those who do the suffering and still pay the price — make up their minds that those they elect to office shall do their bidding, and not that of the profiteers.

Another step necessary in this fight to smash the war racket is the limited plebiscite to determine whether a war should be declared. A

plebiscite not of all the voters but merely of those who would be called upon to do the fighting and dying. There wouldn't be very much sense in having a 76-year-old president of a munitions factory or the flat-footed head of an international banking firm or the cross-eyed manager of a uniform manufacturing plant — all of whom see visions of tremendous profits in the event of war — voting on whether the nation should go to war or not. They never would be called upon to shoulder arms — to sleep in a trench and to be shot. Only those who would be called upon to risk their lives for their country should have the privilege of voting to determine whether the nation should go to war.

There is ample precedent for restricting the voting to those affected. Many of our states have restrictions on those permitted to vote. In most, it is necessary to be able to read and write before you may vote. In some, you must own property. It would be a simple matter each year for the men coming of military age to register in their communities as they did in the draft during the World War and be examined physically. Those who could pass and who would therefore be called upon to bear arms in the event of war would be eligible to vote in a limited plebiscite. They should be the ones to have the power to decide — and not a Congress few of whose members are within the age limit and fewer still of whom are in physical condition to bear arms. Only those who must suffer should have the right to vote.

A third step in this business of smashing the war racket is to make certain that our military forces are truly forces for defense only.

At each session of Congress the question of further naval appropriations comes up. The swivel-chair admirals of Washington (and there are always a lot of them) are very adroit lobbyists. And they are smart. They don't shout that "We need a lot of battleships to war on this nation or that nation." Oh no. First of all, they let it be known that America is menaced by a great naval power. Almost any day, these admirals will tell you, the great fleet of this supposed enemy

will strike suddenly and annihilate 125,000,000 people. Just like that. Then they begin to cry for a larger navy. For what? To fight the enemy? Oh my, no. Oh, no. For defense purposes only.

Then, incidentally, they announce manoeuvres in the Pacific. For defense. Uh, huh.

The Pacific is a great big ocean. We have a tremendous coastline on the Pacific. Will the manoeuvres be off the coast, two or three hundred miles? Oh, no. The manoeuvres will be two thousand, yes, perhaps even thirty-five hundred miles, off the coast.

The Japanese, a proud people, of course will be pleased beyond expression to see the United States fleet so close to Nippon's shores. Even as pleased as would be the residents of California were they to dimly discern through the morning mist, the Japanese fleet playing at war games off Los Angeles.

The ships of our navy, it can be seen, should be specifically limited, by law, to within 200 miles of our coastline. Had that been the law in 1898 the Maine would never have gone to Havana Harbor. She never would have been blown up. There would have been no war with Spain with its attendant loss of life. Two hundred miles is ample, in the opinion of experts, for defense purposes. Our nation cannot start an offensive war if its ships can't go further than 200 miles from the coastline. Planes might be permitted to go as far as 500 miles from the coast for purposes of reconnaissance. And the army should never leave the territorial limits of our nation.

To summarize: Three steps must be taken to smash the war racket.

1. We must take the profit out of war.

2. We must permit the youth of the land who would bear arms to decide whether or not there should be war.

3. We must limit our military forces to home defense purposes.

5. TO HELL WITH WAR!

I am not a fool as to believe that war is a thing of the past. I know the people do not want war, but there is no use in saying we cannot be pushed into another war.

Looking back, Woodrow Wilson was re-elected president in 1916 on a platform that he had "kept us out of war" and on the implied promise that he would "keep us out of war." Yet, five months later he asked Congress to declare war on Germany.

In that five-month interval the people had not been asked whether they had changed their minds. The 4,000,000 young men who put on uniforms and marched or sailed away were not asked whether they wanted to go forth to suffer and die.

Then what caused our government to change its mind so suddenly?

Money.

An allied commission, it may be recalled, came over shortly before the war declaration and called on the President. The President summoned a group of advisers. The head of the commission spoke. Stripped of its diplomatic language, this is what he told the President and his group:

> "There is no use kidding ourselves any longer. The cause of the allies is lost. We now owe you (American bankers, American munitions makers, American manufacturers, American speculators, American exporters) five or six billion dollars.
>
> If we lose (and without the help of the United States we must lose) we, England, France and Italy, cannot pay back this money ... and Germany won't.
>
> So ..."

Had secrecy been outlawed as far as war negotiations were concerned, and had the press been invited to be present at that conference, or had radio been available to broadcast the proceedings, America never would have entered the World War. But this conference, like all war discussions, was shrouded in utmost secrecy. When our boys were sent off to war they were told it was a "war to make the world safe for democracy" and a "war to end all wars."

Well, eighteen years after, the world has less of democracy than it had then. Besides, what business is it of ours whether Russia or Germany or England or France or Italy or Austria live under democracies or monarchies? Whether they are Fascists or Communists? Our problem is to preserve our own democracy.

And very little, if anything, has been accomplished to assure us that the World War was really the war to end all wars.

Yes, we have had disarmament conferences and limitations of arms conferences. They don't mean a thing. One has just failed; the results of another have been nullified. We send our professional soldiers and our sailors and our politicians and our diplomats to these conferences. And what happens?

The professional soldiers and sailors don't want to disarm. No admiral wants to be without a ship. No general wants to be without a command. Both mean men without jobs. They are not for disarmament. They cannot be for limitations of arms. And at all these conferences, lurking in the background but all-powerful, just the same, are the sinister agents of those who profit by war. They see to it that these conferences do not disarm or seriously limit armaments.

The chief aim of any power at any of these conferences has not been to achieve disarmament to prevent war but rather to get more armament for itself and less for any potential foe.

There is only one way to disarm with any semblance of practicability. That is for all nations to get together and scrap every ship, every

gun, every rifle, every tank, every war plane. Even this, if it were possible, would not be enough.

The next war, according to experts, will be fought not with battleships, not by artillery, not with rifles and not with machine guns. It will be fought with deadly chemicals and gases.

Secretly each nation is studying and perfecting newer and ghastlier means of annihilating its foes wholesale. Yes, ships will continue to be built, for the shipbuilders must make their profits. And guns still will be manufactured and powder and rifles will be made, for the munitions makers must make their huge profits. And the soldiers, of course, must wear uniforms, for the manufacturer must make their war profits too.

But victory or defeat will be determined by the skill and ingenuity of our scientists.

If we put them to work making poison gas and more and more fiendish mechanical and explosive instruments of destruction, they will have no time for the constructive job of building greater prosperity for all peoples. By putting them to this useful job, we can all make more money out of peace than we can out of war — even the munitions makers.

So ... I say,

TO HELL WITH WAR!

Harold D. Lasswell

The Garrison State (1941)

Twenty years before the warning by President Eisenhower of the rise of the military-industrial complex, Harold Lasswell predicted the birth of the Garrison State characterised by "the duty to obey, to serve the State, to work."

Source: Harold D. Lasswell, *The Garrison State*, 1941.

To speak of a Garrison State is not to predict something wholly new under the sun. Certainly there is nothing novel to the student of political institutions about the idea that specialists on violence may run the State. On the contrary, some of the most influential discussions of political institutions have named the Military State as one of the chief forms of organized society. Auguste Comte saw history as a succession (and a progression) that moved, as far as it concerned the State, through military, feudal, and industrial phases. Herbert Spencer divided all human societies into the military type, based on force, and the industrial type, based on contract and free consent.

What is important for our purposes is to envisage the possible emergence of the Military State under present technical conditions. There are no examples of the Military State combined with modern technology. During emergencies the great powers have given enormous scope to military authority, but temporary acquisitions of authority lack the elements of comparative permanence and acceptance that complete the Garrison State. Military dictators in States marginal to the creative centers of Western civilization are not integrated with modern technology; they merely use some of its specific elements.

The military men who dominate a modern technical society will be very different from the officers of history and tradition. It is probable that the specialists on violence will include in their training a large degree of expertness in many of the skills that we have traditionally accepted as part of modern civilian management.

The distinctive frame of reference in a fighting society is fighting effectiveness. All social change is translated into battle potential. Now there can be no realistic calculation of fighting effectiveness without knowledge of the technical and psychological characteristics of modern production processes. The function of management in such a society is already known to us; it includes the exercise of skill in supervising technical operations, in administrative organization, in personnel management, in public relations. These skills are needed to translate the complicated operations of modern life into every relevant frame of reference — the frame of fighting effectiveness as well as of pecuniary profit.

This leads to the seeming paradox that, as modern States are militarized, specialists on violence are more preoccupied with the skills and attitudes judged characteristic of nonviolence. We anticipate the merging of skills, starting from the traditional accoutrements of the professional soldier, moving toward the manager and promoter of large-scale civilian enterprise.

In the Garrison State, at least in its introductory phases, problems of morale are destined to weigh heavily on the mind of management. It is easy to throw sand in the gears of the modem assembly line; hence, there must be a deep and general sense of participation in the total enterprise of the State if collective effort is to be sustained.

When we call attention to the importance of the "human factor" in modem production, we sometimes fail to notice that it springs from the multiplicity of special environments that have been created by modern technology. Thousands of technical operations have sprung into existence where a few hundred were found before. To complicate the material environment in this way is to multiply the focuses of attention of those who live in our society. Diversified focuses of attention breed differences in outlook, preference, and loyalty. The labyrinth of specialized "material" environments generates profound ideological divergencies that cannot be abolished, though they can be mitigated, by the methods now available to leaders in our society.

As long as modern technology prevails, society is honeycombed with cells of separate experience, of individuality, of partial freedom. Concerted action under such conditions depends upon skilfully guiding the minds of men; hence the enormous importance of symbolic manipulation in modern society. The importance of the morale factor is emphasized by the universal fear which it is possible to maintain in large populations through modern instruments of warfare. The growth of aerial warfare in particular has tended to abolish the distinction between civilian and military functions. It is no longer possible to affirm that those who enter the military service take the physical risk while those who remain at home stay safe and contribute to the equipment and the comfort of the courageous heroes at the front. Indeed, in some periods of modern warfare, casualties among civilians may outnumber the casualties of the armed forces. With the socialization of danger as a permanent characteristic of modern violence the nation becomes one unified technical enter-

prise. Those who direct the violence operations are compelled to consider the entire gamut of problems that arise in living together under modem conditions.

There will be an energetic struggle to incorporate young and old into the destiny and mission of the State. It is probable that one form of this symbolic adjustment will be the abolition of "the unemployed." This stigmatizing symbol will be obsolete in the Garrison State. It insults the dignity of millions, for it implies uselessness. This is so, whether the "unemployed" are given a "dole" or put on "relief" projects. Always there is the damaging stigma of superfluity. No doubt the Garrison State will be distinguished by the psychological abolition of unemployment — "psychological" because this is chiefly a matter of redefining symbols.

In the Garrison State there must be work — and the duty to work — for all. Since all work becomes public work, all who do not accept employment flout military discipline. For those who do not fit within the structure of the State there is but one alternative — to obey or die. Compulsion, therefore, is to be expected as a potent instrument for internal control of the Garrison State.

The use of coercion can have an important effect upon many more people than it reaches directly; this is the propaganda component of any "propaganda of the deed." The spectacle of compulsory labor gangs in prisons or concentration camps is a negative means of conserving morale — negative since it arouses fear and guilt. Compulsory labor groups are suitable popular scapegoats in a Military State. The duty to obey, to serve the State, to work — these are cardinal virtues in the Garrison State. Unceasing emphasis upon duty is certain to arouse opposing tendencies within the personality structure of all who live under a Garrison Regime. Everyone must struggle to hold in check any tendencies, conscious or unconscious, to defy authority, to violate the code of work, to flout the incessant

demand for sacrifice in the collective interest. From the earliest years youth will be trained to subdue — to disavow, to struggle against — any specific opposition to the ruling code of collective exactions.

The conscience imposes feelings of guilt and anxiety upon the individual whenever his impulses are aroused, ever so slightly, to break the code. When the coercive threat that sanctions the code of the Military State is internalized in the consciences of youth, the spectacle of labor gangs is profoundly disturbing. A characteristic response is self-righteousness — quick justification of coercive punishment, tacit acceptance of the inference that all who are subject to coercion are guilty of antisocial conduct. To maintain suspended judgment, to absolve others in particular instances, is to give at least partial toleration to countermores tendencies within the self. Hence, the quick substitute responses — the self-righteous attitude, the deflection of attention. Indeed, a characteristic psychic pattern of the Military State is the "startle pattern," which is carried over to the internal as well as to the external threat of danger. This startle pattern is overcome and stylized as alert, prompt, commanding adjustment to reality. This is expressed in the authoritative manner that dominates military style — in gesture, intonation, and idiom.

[...]

In the Garrison State all organized social activity will be governmentalized; hence, the role of independent associations will disappear, with the exception of secret societies (specifically, there will be no organized economic, religious, or cultural life outside of the duly constituted agencies of government). Government will be highly centralized, though devolution may be practiced in order to mitigate "bureaucratism." There is so much outspoken resistance to bureaucratism in modern civilization that we may expect this attitude to

carry over to the Garrison State. Not only will the administrative structure be centralized, but at every level it will tend to integrate authority in a few hands. The leadership principle will be relied upon; responsibility as a rule will be focused upon individual "heads."

We have sketched some of the methods at the disposal of the ruling Elites of the Garrison State — the management of propaganda, violence, goods, practices. Let us consider the picture from a slightly different standpoint. How will various kinds of influence be distributed in the State? Power will be highly concentrated, as in any dictatorial regime. We have already suggested that there will be a strong tendency toward equalizing the distribution of safety throughout the community (that is, negative safety, the socialization of threat in modern war). In the interest of morale there will be some moderation of huge differences in individual income, flattening the pyramid at the top, bulging it out in the upper-middle and middle zones. In the Garrison State the respect pyramid will probably resemble the income pyramid. (Those who are the targets of compulsory labor restrictions will be the principal recipients of negative respect and hence will occupy the bottom levels.) So great is the multiplicity of functions in modern processes of production that a simple scheme of military rank is flagrantly out of harmony with the facts. Even though a small number of ranks are retained in the Military State, it will be recognized that the diversity of functions exercised by each rank is so great that the meaning of a specific classification will be obscure. Summarizing, the distribution of safety will be most uniform throughout the community; distribution of power will show the largest inequalities. The patterns of income and respect will fall between these two, showing a pronounced bulge in the upper-middle and middle strata. The lower strata of the community will be composed of those subject to compulsory labor, tending to constitute a permanent pariah caste.

What about the capacity of the Garrison State to produce a large volume of material values? The elites of the Garrison State, like the elites of recent Business States, will confront the problem of holding in check the stupendous productive potentialities of modern science and engineering. We know that the ruling elites of the modern Business State have not known how to control productive capacity; they have been unwilling to adopt necessary measures for the purpose of regularizing the tempo of economic development. Hence, modern society has been characterized by periods of orgiastic expansion, succeeded by periods of flagrant underutilization of the instruments of production.

The rulers of the Garrison State will be able to regularize the rate of production, since they will be free from many of the conventions that have stood in the way of adopting measures suitable to this purpose in the Business State. The business elite has been unwilling to revise institutional practices to the extent necessary to maintain a continually rising flow of investment. The institutional structure of the Business State has called for flexible adjustment between governmental and private channels of activity and for strict measures to maintain price flexibility. Wherever the business elite has not supported such necessary arrangements, the Business State itself has begun to disintegrate.

Although the rulers of the Garrison State will be free to regularize the rate of production, they will most assuredly prevent full utilization of modern productive capacity for nonmilitary consumption purposes. The elite of the Garrison State will have a professional interest in multiplying gadgets specialized to acts of violence. The rulers of the Garrison State will depend upon war scares as a means of maintaining popular willingness to forego immediate consumption. War scares that fail to culminate in violence eventually lose their value; this is the point at which ruling classes will feel that bloodletting is needed in order to preserve those virtues of sturdy acquiescence in the regime which they so much admire and from

which they so greatly benefit. We may be sure that if ever there is a rise in the production of nonmilitary consumption goods, despite the amount of energy directed toward the production of military equipment, the ruling class will feel itself endangered by the growing "frivolousness" of the community.

Emmanuel Goldstein (George Orwell)

War is Peace
(1949)

This is Chapter III of *The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism* by Emmanuel Goldstein, the book that Winston Smith was reading in George Orwell's "Nineteen Eighty-Four" before being arrested. If somebody wants to know where the current idea of a never ending war comes from, here is the answer. A lucid analysis of the function of war and why war will forever be with us unless we deal with and dispose of States and Super-States power once for all.

Source: George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, 1949.

The splitting-up of the world into three great Super-States was an event which could be and indeed was foreseen before the middle of the twentieth century. With the absorption of Europe by Russia and of the British Empire by the United States, two of the three existing powers, Eurasia and Oceania, were already effectively in being. The third, Eastasia, only emerged as a distinct unit after another decade of confused fighting. The frontiers between the three Super-States

are in some places arbitrary, and in others they fluctuate according to the fortunes of war, but in general they follow geographical lines. Eurasia comprises the whole of the northern part of the European and Asiatic land-mass, from Portugal to the Bering Strait. Oceania comprises the Americas, the Atlantic islands including the British Isles, Australasia, and the southern portion of Africa. Eastasia, smaller than the others and with a less definite western frontier, comprises China and the countries to the south of it, the Japanese islands and a large but fluctuating portion of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet.

In one combination or another, these three super-states are permanently at war, and have been so for the past twenty-five years. War, however, is no longer the desperate, annihilating struggle that it was in the early decades of the twentieth century. It is a warfare of limited aims between combatants who are unable to destroy one another, have no material cause for fighting and are not divided by any genuine ideological difference. This is not to say that either the conduct of war, or the prevailing attitude towards it, has become less bloodthirsty or more chivalrous. On the contrary, war hysteria is continuous and universal in all countries, and such acts as raping, looting, the slaughter of children, the reduction of whole populations to slavery, and reprisals against prisoners which extend even to boiling and burying alive, are looked upon as normal, and, when they are committed by one's own side and not by the enemy, meritorious. But in a physical sense war involves very small numbers of people, mostly highly-trained specialists, and causes comparatively few casualties. The fighting, when there is any, takes place on the vague frontiers whose whereabouts the average man can only guess at, or round the Floating Fortresses which guard strategic spots on the sea lanes. In the centres of civilisation war means no more than a continuous shortage of consumption goods, and the occasional crash of a rocket bomb which may cause a few scores of deaths. War has in fact changed its character. More exactly, the reasons for which war is

waged have changed in their order of importance. Motives which were already present to some small extent in the great wars of the early twentieth century have now become dominant and are consciously recognised and acted upon.

To understand the nature of the present war — for in spite of the regrouping which occurs every few years, it is always the same war — one must realise in the first place that it is impossible for it to be decisive. None of the three super-states could be definitively conquered even by the other two in combination. They are too evenly matched, and their natural defences are too formidable. Eurasia is protected by its vast land spaces. Oceania by the width of the Atlantic and the Pacific, Eastasia by the fecundity and industriousness of its inhabitants. Secondly, there is no longer, in a material sense, anything to fight about. With the establishment of self-contained economies, in which production and consumption are geared to one another, the scramble for markets which was a main cause of previous wars has come to an end, while the competition for raw materials is no longer a matter of life and death. In any case each of the three super-states is so vast that it can obtain almost all the materials that it needs within its own boundaries. In so far as the war has a direct economic purpose, it is a war for labour power. Between the frontiers of the super-states, and not permanently in the possession of any of them, there lies a rough quadrilateral with its corners at Tangier, Brazzaville, Darwin, and Hong Kong, containing within it about a fifth of the population of the earth. It is for the possession of these thickly-populated regions, and of the northern ice-cap, that the three powers are constantly struggling. In practice no one power ever controls the whole of the disputed area. Portions of it are constantly changing hands, and it is the chance of seizing this or that fragment by a sudden stroke of treachery that dictates the endless changes of alignment.

All of the disputed territories contain valuable minerals, and some of them yield important vegetable products such as rubber which in

colder climates it is necessary to synthesise by comparatively expensive methods. But above all they contain a bottomless reserve of cheap labour. Whichever power controls equatorial Africa, or the countries of the Middle East, or Southern India, or the Indonesian Archipelago, disposes also of the bodies of scores or hundreds of millions of ill-paid and hard-working coolies. The inhabitants of these areas, reduced more or less openly to the status of slaves, pass continually from conqueror to conqueror, and are expended like so much coal or oil in the race to turn out more armaments, to capture more territory, to control more labour power, to turn out more armaments, to capture more territory, and so on indefinitely. It should be noted that the fighting never really moves beyond the edges of the disputed areas. The frontiers of Eurasia flow back and forth between the basin of the Congo and the northern shore of the Mediterranean; the islands of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific are constantly being captured and recaptured by Oceania or by Eastasia; in Mongolia the dividing line between Eurasia and Eastasia is never stable; round the Pole all three powers lay claim to enormous territories which in fact are largely uninhabited and unexplored: but the balance of power always remains roughly even, and the territory which forms the heartland of each super-state always remains inviolate. Moreover, the labour of the exploited peoples round the Equator is not really necessary to the world's economy. They add nothing to the wealth of the world, since whatever they produce is used for purposes of war, and the object of waging a war is always to be in a better position in which to wage another war. By their labour the slave populations allow the tempo of continuous warfare to be speeded up. But if they did not exist, the structure of world society, and the process by which it maintains itself, would not be essentially different.

The primary aim of modern warfare (in accordance with the principles of *doublethink*, [1] this aim is simultaneously recognised and not recognised by the directing brains of the Inner Party) is to use up the products of the machine without raising the general standard of

living. Ever since the end of the nineteenth century, the problem of what to do with the surplus of consumption goods has been latent in industrial society. At present, when few human beings even have enough to eat, this problem is obviously not urgent, and it might not have become so, even if no artificial processes of destruction had been at work. The world of today is a bare, hungry, dilapidated place compared with the world that existed before 1914, and still more so if compared with the imaginary future to which the people of that period looked forward. In the early twentieth century, the vision of a future society unbelievably rich, leisured, orderly, and efficient — a glittering antiseptic world of glass and steel and snow-white concrete — was part of the consciousness of nearly every literate person. Science and technology were developing at a prodigious speed, and it seemed natural to assume that they would go on developing. This failed to happen, partly because of the impoverishment caused by a long series of wars and revolutions, partly because scientific and technical progress depended on the empirical habit of thought, which could not survive in a strictly regimented society. As a whole the world is more primitive today than it was fifty years ago. Certain backward areas have advanced, and various devices, always in some way connected with warfare and police espionage, have been developed, but experiment and invention have largely stopped, and the ravages of the atomic war of the nineteen-fifties have never been fully repaired. Nevertheless the dangers inherent in the machine are still there. From the moment when the machine first made its appearance it was clear to all thinking people that the need for human drudgery, and therefore to a great extent for human inequality, had disappeared. If the machine were used deliberately for that end, hunger, overwork, dirt, illiteracy, and disease could be eliminated within a few generations. And in fact, without being used for any such purpose, but by a sort of automatic process — by producing wealth which it was sometimes impossible not to distribute — the machine did raise the living standards of the average human being very greatly over a period of about fifty years

at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries.

But it was also clear that an all-round increase in wealth threatened the destruction — indeed, in some sense was the destruction — of a hierarchical society. In a world in which everyone worked short hours, had enough to eat, lived in a house with a bathroom and a refrigerator, and possessed a motor-car or even an aeroplane, the most obvious and perhaps the most important form of inequality would already have disappeared. If it once became general, wealth would confer no distinction. It was possible, no doubt, to imagine a society in which *wealth*, in the sense of personal possessions and luxuries, should be evenly distributed, while *power* remained in the hands of a small privileged caste. But in practice such a society could not long remain stable. For if leisure and security were enjoyed by all alike, the great mass of human beings who are normally stupefied by poverty would become literate and would learn to think for themselves; and when once they had done this, they would sooner or later realise that the privileged minority had no function, and they would sweep it away. In the long run, a hierarchical society was only possible on a basis of poverty and ignorance. To return to the agricultural past, as some thinkers about the beginning of the twentieth century dreamed of doing, was not a practicable solution. It conflicted with the tendency towards mechanisation which had become quasi-instinctive throughout almost the whole world, and moreover, any country which remained industrially backward was helpless in a military sense and was bound to be dominated, directly or indirectly, by its more advanced rivals.

Nor was it a satisfactory solution to keep the masses in poverty by restricting the output of goods. This happened to a great extent during the final phase of capitalism, roughly between 1920 and 1940. The economy of many countries was allowed to stagnate, land went out of cultivation, capital equipment was not added to, great blocks of the population were prevented from working and kept half

alive by State charity. But this, too, entailed military weakness, and since the privations it inflicted were obviously unnecessary, it made opposition inevitable. The problem was how to keep the wheels of industry turning without increasing the real wealth of the world. Goods must be produced, but they must not be distributed. And in practice the only way of achieving this was by continuous warfare.

The essential act of war is destruction, not necessarily of human lives, but of the products of human labour. War is a way of shattering to pieces, or pouring into the stratosphere, or sinking in the depths of the sea, materials which might otherwise be used to make the masses too comfortable, and hence, in the long run, too intelligent. Even when weapons of war are not actually destroyed, their manufacture is still a convenient way of expending labour power without producing anything that can be consumed. A Floating Fortress, for example, has locked up in it the labour that would build several hundred cargo-ships. Ultimately it is scrapped as obsolete, never having brought any material benefit to anybody, and with further enormous labours another Floating Fortress is built. In principle the war effort is always so planned as to eat up any surplus that might exist after meeting the bare needs of the population. In practice the needs of the population are always underestimated, with the result that there is a chronic shortage of half the necessities of life; but this is looked on as an advantage. It is deliberate policy to keep even the favoured groups somewhere near the brink of hardship, because a general state of scarcity increases the importance of small privileges and thus magnifies the distinction between one group and another. By the standards of the early twentieth century, even a member of the Inner Party lives an austere, laborious kind of life. Nevertheless, the few luxuries that he does enjoy — his large, well-appointed flat, the better texture of his clothes, the better quality of his food and drink and tobacco, his two or three servants, his private motor-car or helicopter — set him in a different world from a member of the Outer Party, and the members of the Outer Party have a similar advantage

in comparison with the submerged masses whom we call 'the proles'. The social atmosphere is that of a besieged city, where the possession of a lump of horseflesh makes the difference between wealth and poverty. And at the same time the consciousness of being at war, and therefore in danger, makes the handing-over of all power to a small caste seem the natural, unavoidable condition of survival.

War, it will be seen, not only accomplishes the necessary destruction, but accomplishes it in a psychologically acceptable way. In principle it would be quite simple to waste the surplus labour of the world by building temples and pyramids, by digging holes and filling them up again, or even by producing vast quantities of goods and then setting fire to them. But this would provide only the economic and not the emotional basis for a hierarchical society. What is concerned here is not the morale of masses, whose attitude is unimportant so long as they are kept steadily at work, but the morale of the Party itself. Even the humblest Party member is expected to be competent, industrious, and even intelligent within narrow limits, but it is also necessary that he should be a credulous and ignorant fanatic whose prevailing moods are fear, hatred, adulation, and orgiastic triumph. In other words it is necessary that he should have the mentality appropriate to a state of war. It does not matter whether the war is actually happening, and, since no decisive victory is possible, it does not matter whether the war is going well or badly. All that is needed is that a state of war should exist. The splitting of the intelligence which the Party requires of its members, and which is more easily achieved in an atmosphere of war, is now almost universal, but the higher up the ranks one goes, the more marked it becomes. It is precisely in the Inner Party that war hysteria and hatred of the enemy are strongest. In his capacity as an administrator, it is often necessary for a member of the Inner Party to know that this or that item of war news is untruthful, and he may often be aware that the entire war is spurious and is either not happening or is being waged for purposes quite other than the declared ones: but such knowledge is easily

neutralised by the technique of *doublethink*. Meanwhile no Inner Party member wavers for an instant in his mystical belief that the war is real, and that it is bound to end victoriously, with Oceania the undisputed master of the entire world.

All members of the Inner Party believe in this coming conquest as an article of faith. It is to be achieved either by gradually acquiring more and more territory and so building up an overwhelming preponderance of power, or by the discovery of some new and unanswerable weapon. The search for new weapons continues unceasingly, and is one of the very few remaining activities in which the inventive or speculative type of mind can find any outlet. In Oceania at the present day, Science, in the old sense, has almost ceased to exist. In Newspeak there is no word for 'Science'. The empirical method of thought, on which all the scientific achievements of the past were founded, is opposed to the most fundamental principles of Ingsoc [2]. And even technological progress only happens when its products can in some way be used for the diminution of human liberty. In all the useful arts the world is either standing still or going backwards. The fields are cultivated with horse-ploughs while books are written by machinery. But in matters of vital importance — meaning, in effect, war and police espionage — the empirical approach is still encouraged, or at least tolerated. The two aims of the Party are to conquer the whole surface of the earth and to extinguish once and for all the possibility of independent thought. There are therefore two great problems which the Party is concerned to solve. One is how to discover, against his will, what another human being is thinking, and the other is how to kill several hundred million people in a few seconds without giving warning beforehand. In so far as scientific research still continues, this is its subject matter. The scientist of today is either a mixture of psychologist and inquisitor, studying with real ordinary minuteness the meaning of facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice, and testing the truth-producing effects of drugs, shock therapy, hypnosis, and physical torture; or he is chemist, physi-

cist, or biologist concerned only with such branches of his special subject as are relevant to the taking of life. In the vast laboratories of the Ministry of Peace, and in the experimental stations hidden in the Brazilian forests, or in the Australian desert, or on lost islands of the Antarctic, the teams of experts are indefatigably at work. Some are concerned simply with planning the logistics of future wars; others devise larger and larger rocket bombs, more and more powerful explosives, and more and more impenetrable armour-plating; others search for new and deadlier gases, or for soluble poisons capable of being produced in such quantities as to destroy the vegetation of whole continents, or for breeds of disease germs immunised against all possible antibodies; others strive to produce a vehicle that shall bore its way under the soil like a submarine under the water, or an aeroplane as independent of its base as a sailing-ship; others explore even remoter possibilities such as focusing the sun's rays through lenses suspended thousands of kilometres away in space, or producing artificial earthquakes and tidal waves by tapping the heat at the earth's centre.

But none of these projects ever comes anywhere near realisation, and none of the three super-states ever gains a significant lead on the others. What is more remarkable is that all three powers already possess, in the atomic bomb, a weapon far more powerful than any that their present researches are likely to discover. Although the Party, according to its habit, claims the invention for itself, atomic bombs first appeared as early as the nineteen-forties, and were first used on a large scale about ten years later. At that time some hundreds of bombs were dropped on industrial centres, chiefly in European Russia, Western Europe, and North America. The effect was to convince the ruling groups of all countries that a few more atomic bombs would mean the end of organised society, and hence of their own power. Thereafter, although no formal agreement was ever made or hinted at, no more bombs were dropped. All three powers merely continue to produce atomic bombs and store them up against

the decisive opportunity which they all believe will come sooner or later. And meanwhile the art of war has remained almost stationary for thirty or forty years. Helicopters are more used than they were formerly, bombing planes have been largely superseded by self-propelled projectiles, and the fragile movable battleship has given way to the almost unsinkable Floating Fortress; but otherwise there has been little development. The tank, the submarine, the torpedo, the machine gun, even the rifle and the hand grenade are still in use. And in spite of the endless slaughters reported in the Press and on the telescreens, the desperate battles of earlier wars, in which hundreds of thousands or even millions of men were often killed in a few weeks, have never been repeated.

None of the three Super-States ever attempts any manoeuvre which involves the risk of serious defeat. When any large operation is undertaken, it is usually a surprise attack against an ally. The strategy that all three powers are following, or pretend to themselves that they are following, is the same. The plan is, by a combination of fighting, bargaining, and well-timed strokes of treachery, to acquire a ring of bases completely encircling one or other of the rival states, and then to sign a pact of friendship with that rival and remain on peaceful terms for so many years as to lull suspicion to sleep. During this time rockets loaded with atomic bombs can be assembled at all the strategic spots; finally they will all be fired simultaneously, with effects so devastating as to make retaliation impossible. It will then be time to sign a pact of friendship with the remaining world-power, in preparation for another attack. This scheme, it is hardly necessary to say, is a mere daydream, impossible of realisation. Moreover, no fighting ever occurs except in the disputed areas round the Equator and the Pole: no invasion of enemy territory is ever undertaken. This explains the fact that in some places the frontiers between the super-states are arbitrary. Eurasia, for example, could easily conquer the British Isles, which are geographically part of Europe, or on the other hand it would be possible for Oceania to push its frontiers to the

Rhine or even to the Vistula. But this would violate the principle, followed on all sides though never formulated, of cultural integrity. If Oceania were to conquer the areas that used once to be known as France and Germany, it would be necessary either to exterminate the inhabitants, a task of great physical difficulty, or to assimilate a population of about a hundred million people, who, so far as technical development goes, are roughly on the Oceanic level. The problem is the same for all three super-states. It is absolutely necessary to their structure that there should be no contact with foreigners, except, to a limited extent, with war prisoners and coloured slaves. Even the official ally of the moment is always regarded with the darkest suspicion. War prisoners apart, the average citizen of Oceania never sets eyes on a citizen of either Eurasia or Eastasia, and he is forbidden the knowledge of foreign languages. If he were allowed contact with foreigners he would discover that they are creatures similar to himself and that most of what he has been told about them is lies. The sealed world in which he lives would be broken, and the fear, hatred, and self-righteousness on which his morale depends might evaporate. It is therefore realised on all sides that however often Persia, or Egypt, or Java, or Ceylon may change hands, the main frontiers must never be crossed by anything except bombs.

Under this lies a fact never mentioned aloud, but tacitly understood and acted upon: namely, that the conditions of life in all three super-states are very much the same. In Oceania the prevailing philosophy is called Ingsoc, in Eurasia it is called Neo-Bolshevism, and in Eastasia it is called by a Chinese name usually translated as Death-Worship, but perhaps better rendered as Obliteration of the Self. The citizen of Oceania is not allowed to know anything of the tenets of the other two philosophies, but he is taught to execrate them as barbarous outrages upon morality and common sense. Actually the three philosophies are barely distinguishable, and the social systems which they support are not distinguishable at all. Everywhere there is the same pyramidal structure, the same

worship of semi-divine leader, the same economy existing by and for continuous warfare. It follows that the three super-states not only cannot conquer one another, but would gain no advantage by doing so. On the contrary, so long as they remain in conflict they prop one another up, like three sheaves of corn. And, as usual, the ruling groups of all three powers are simultaneously aware and unaware of what they are doing. Their lives are dedicated to world conquest, but they also know that it is necessary that the war should continue everlastingly and without victory. Meanwhile the fact that there is no danger of conquest makes possible the denial of reality which is the special feature of Ingsoc and its rival systems of thought. Here it is necessary to repeat what has been said earlier, that by becoming continuous war has fundamentally changed its character.

In past ages, a war, almost by definition, was something that sooner or later came to an end, usually in unmistakable victory or defeat. In the past, also, war was one of the main instruments by which human societies were kept in touch with physical reality. All rulers in all ages have tried to impose a false view of the world upon their followers, but they could not afford to encourage any illusion that tended to impair military efficiency. So long as defeat meant the loss of independence, or some other result generally held to be undesirable, the precautions against defeat had to be serious. Physical facts could not be ignored. In philosophy, or religion, or ethics, or politics, two and two might make five, but when one was designing a gun or an aeroplane they had to make four. Inefficient nations were always conquered sooner or later, and the struggle for efficiency was inimical to illusions. Moreover, to be efficient it was necessary to be able to learn from the past, which meant having a fairly accurate idea of what had happened in the past. Newspapers and history books were, of course, always coloured and biased, but falsification of the kind that is practised today would have been impossible. War was a sure safeguard of sanity, and so far as the ruling classes were concerned it

was probably the most important of all safeguards. While wars could be won or lost, no ruling class could be completely irresponsible.

But when war becomes literally continuous, it also ceases to be dangerous. When war is continuous there is no such thing as military necessity. Technical progress can cease and the most palpable facts can be denied or disregarded. As we have seen, researches that could be called scientific are still carried out for the purposes of war, but they are essentially a kind of daydreaming, and their failure to show results is not important. Efficiency, even military efficiency, is no longer needed. Nothing is efficient in Oceania except the Thought Police. Since each of the three super-states is unconquerable, each is in effect a separate universe within which almost any perversion of thought can be safely practised. Reality only exerts its pressure through the needs of everyday life — the need to eat and drink, to get shelter and clothing, to avoid swallowing poison or stepping out of top-storey windows, and the like. Between life and death, and between physical pleasure and physical pain, there is still a distinction, but that is all. Cut off from contact with the outer world, and with the past, the citizen of Oceania is like a man in interstellar space, who has no way of knowing which direction is up and which is down. The rulers of such a state are absolute, as the Pharaohs or the Caesars could not be. They are obliged to prevent their followers from starving to death in numbers large enough to be inconvenient, and they are obliged to remain at the same low level of military technique as their rivals; but once that minimum is achieved, they can twist reality into whatever shape they choose.

The war, therefore, if we judge it by the standards of previous wars, is merely an imposture. It is like the battles between certain ruminant animals whose horns are set at such an angle that they are incapable of hurting one another. But though it is unreal it is not meaningless. It eats up the surplus of consumable goods, and it helps to preserve the special mental atmosphere that a hierarchical society needs. War, it will be seen, is now a purely internal affair. In the past,

the ruling groups of all countries, although they might recognise their common interest and therefore limit the destructiveness of war, did fight against one another, and the victor always plundered the vanquished. In our own day they are not fighting against one another at all. The war is waged by each ruling group against its own subjects, and the object of the war is not to make or prevent conquests of territory, but to keep the structure of society intact. The very word 'war', therefore, has become misleading. It would probably be accurate to say that by becoming continuous war has ceased to exist. The peculiar pressure that it exerted on human beings between the Neolithic Age and the early twentieth century has disappeared and been replaced by something quite different. The effect would be much the same if the three super-states, instead of fighting one another, should agree to live in perpetual peace, each inviolate within its own boundaries. For in that case each would still be a self-contained universe, freed for ever from the sobering influence of external danger. A peace that was truly permanent would be the same as a permanent war. This — although the vast majority of Party members understand it only in a shallower sense — is the inner meaning of the Party slogan:

War is Peace

Notes

[1] Doublethink is a process of indoctrination in which subjects are expected to simultaneously accept two conflicting beliefs as truth.

[2] Ingsoc, short for English Socialism, is the totalitarian ideology of the ruling Party in Oceania.

Dwight David Eisenhower

On the Military-Industrial Complex (1961)

This is the famous Farewell Address in which the outgoing U.S.A. President, Dwight Eisenhower, warned his fellow countrymen and all the human beings about the risks represented by the industrial-military complex that was growing in weight and was already in control of huge sums of money and a large number of people.

President Eisenhower warned also about the dominance by the federal government of universities and research laboratories that were more and more depending on federal funds for their activities. This collusion between the government and the universities was likely to compromise the free search for truth that should characterize every scholar, reducing him to the role of obedient employee and servant of the Federal State.

Source: Dwight David Eisenhower, *Farewell Address*, January 17, 1961.

Good evening, my fellow Americans.

Three days from now, after half a century in the service of our country, I shall lay down the responsibilities of office as, in traditional and solemn ceremony, the authority of the Presidency is vested in my successor.

This evening I come to you with a message of leave-taking and farewell, and to share a few final thoughts with you, my countrymen.

Like every other citizen I wish the new President, and all who will labor with him, Godspeed. I pray that the coming years will be blessed with peace and prosperity for all.

Our people expect their President and the Congress to find essential agreement on issues of great moment, the wise resolution of which will better shape the future of the Nation.

My own relation with the Congress, which began on a remote and tenuous basis when, long ago, a member of the Senate appointed me to West Point, have since ranged to the intimate during the war and immediate post-war period, and finally, to the mutually interdependent during these past eight years.

In this final relationship, the Congress and the Administration have, on most vital issues, cooperated well, to serve the nation good rather than mere partisanship, and so have assured that the business of the Nation should go forward. So, my official relationship with the Congress ends in a feeling, on my part, of gratitude that we have been able to do so much together.

We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major wars among great nations. Three of these involved our own country. Despite these holocausts America is today the strongest, the most influential, and most productive nation in the world. Understandably proud of this pre-eminence, we yet realize that America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our

unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment.

Throughout America's adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to keep the peace, to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among peoples and among nations. To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance or our lack of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt, both at home and abroad.

Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology, global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily, the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint, the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle — with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward permanent peace and human betterment.

Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defenses; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research — these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.

But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs, balance between the private and the public economy, balance

between cost and hoped for advantage, balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.

The record of many long years stands as proof that our people and their government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well, in the face of stress and threat. But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention two only.

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or, indeed, by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense. We have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security alone more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, even spiritual — is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to

comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades.

In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists, in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of new ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the great costs involved, a government contract becomes, virtually, a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present — and is gravely to be regarded.

Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.

It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system, ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into society's future, we — you and I, and our government — must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering for our own ease and convenience the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.

Down the long lane of the history yet to be written, America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.

Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, and military strength. That table, though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield.

Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together, we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent, I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war, as

one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years, I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.

Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been made. But, so much remains to be done! As a private citizen, I shall never cease to do what little I can to help the world advance along that road.

So, in this my last good night to you as your President, I thank you for the many opportunities you have given me for public service in war and peace. I trust that in that service you find some things worthy; as for the rest of it, I know you will find ways to improve performance in the future.

You and I, my fellow citizens, need to be strong in our faith that all nations, under God, will one day reach the goal of peace with justice. May we be ever unswerving in devotion to principle, confident but humble with power, diligent in pursuit of the Nation's great goals.

To all the peoples of the world, I once more give expression to America's prayerful and continuing aspiration:

We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have their great human needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to enjoy it to the full; that all who yearn for freedom may experience its spiritual blessings; that those who have freedom will understand, also, its heavy responsibilities; that all who are insensitive to the needs of others will learn charity; that the scourges of poverty, disease and ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth; and that, in the goodness of time, all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of mutual respect and love.

Leonard C. Lewin

The Functions of War (1967)

In this extract are listed the various functions of war in our society, examined in a very ironic and sarcastic way. At the same time this text should make us aware of the liberating possibilities of technology and of the immoral and insane way to which it is put to use.

Source: Leonard C. Lewin, *Report from Iron Mountain on the Possibility and Desirability of Peace*, Section 5, 1967.

As we have indicated, the preeminence of the concept of war as the principal organizing force in most societies has been insufficiently appreciated. This is also true of its extensive effects throughout the many nonmilitary activities of society. These effects are less apparent in complex industrial societies like our own than in primitive cultures, the activities of which can be more easily and fully comprehended.

We propose in this section to examine these nonmilitary, implied, and usually invisible functions of war, to the extent that they bear on

the problems of transition to peace for our society. The military, or ostensible, function of the war system requires no elaboration; it serves simply to defend or advance the "national interest" by means of organized violence. It is often necessary for a national military establishment to create a need for its unique powers — to maintain the franchise, so to speak. And a healthy military apparatus requires "exercise," by whatever rationale seems expedient, to prevent its atrophy.

The nonmilitary functions of the war system are more basic. They exist not merely to justify themselves but to serve broader social purposes. If and when war is eliminated, the military functions it has served will end with it. But its nonmilitary functions will not. It is essential, therefore, that we understand their significance before we can reasonably expect to evaluate whatever institutions may be proposed to replace them.

ECONOMIC

The production of weapons of mass destruction has always been associated with economic "waste." The term is pejorative, since it implies a failure of function. But no human activity can properly be considered wasteful if it achieves its contextual objective. The phrase "wasteful but necessary," applied not only to war expenditures but to most of the "unproductive" commercial activities of our society, is a contradiction in terms.

> "...The attacks that have since the time of Samuel's criticism of King Saul been levelled against military expenditures as waste may well have concealed or misunderstood the point that some kinds of waste may have a larger social utility." (Arthur I. Waskow, *Toward the Unarmed Forces of the United States*, Washington, Institute for Policy Studies, 1966, p. 9).

In the case of military "waste," there is indeed a larger social utility. It derives from the fact that the "wastefulness" of war production is exercised entirely outside the framework of the economy of supply and demand. As such, it provides the only critically large segment of the total economy that is subject to complete and arbitrary central control. If modern industrial societies can be defined as those which have developed the capacity to produce more than is required for their economic survival (regardless of the equities of distribution of goods within them), military spending can be said to furnish the only balance wheel with sufficient inertia to stabilize the advance of their economies. The fact that war is "wasteful" is what enables it to serve this function. And the faster the economy advances, the heavier this balance wheel must be.

This function is often viewed, oversimply, as a device for the control of surpluses. One writer on the subject puts it this way:

> "Why is war so wonderful? Because it creates artificial demand ... the only kind of artificial demand, moreover, that does not raise any political issues: *war, and only war, solves the problem of inventory*." (David T. Bazelon, "The Politics of the Paper Economy," *Commentary*, November 1962, p. 409).

The reference here is to shooting war, but it applies equally to the general war economy as well.

> "It is generally agreed," concludes, more cautiously, the report of a panel set up by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "that the greatly expanded public sector since World War II, resulting from heavy defense expenditures, has provided additional protection against depressions, since this sector is not responsive to contraction in the private sector and has provided a sort of buffer or balance wheel in the economy." (*The Economic Impact of Disarmament*, Washington: USGPO, January 1962, p. 409).

The *principal* economic function of war, in our view, is that it provides just such a flywheel. It is not to be confused in function with the various forms of fiscal control, none of which directly engages vast numbers of men and units of production. It is not to be confused with massive government expenditures in social welfare programs; once initiated, such programs normally become integral parts of the general economy and are no longer subject to arbitrary control.

But even in the context of the general civilian economy war cannot be considered wholly "wasteful." Without a long-established war economy, and without its frequent eruption into large-scale shooting war, most of the major industrial advances known to history, beginning with the development of iron, could never have taken place. Weapons technology structures the economy.

According to the writer cited above,

> "Nothing is more ironic or revealing about our society than the fact that hugely destructive war is a very progressive force in it. ... War production is progressive because it is production that would not otherwise have taken place. (It is not so widely appreciated, for example, that the civilian standard of living rose during World War II.)" (David T. Bazelon, "The Scarcity Makers," *Commentary*, October 1962, p. 298).

This is not "ironic or revealing," but essentially a simple statement of fact.

It should also be noted that the war production has a dependably stimulating effect outside itself. Far from constituting a "wasteful" drain on the economy, war spending, considered pragmatically, has been a consistently positive factor in the rise of gross national product and of individual productivity. A former Secretary of the Army has carefully phrased it for public consumption thus:

> "If there is, as I suspect there is, a direct relation between the stimulus of large defense spending and a substantially increased rate of growth of gross national product, it quite simply follows that defense spending *per se* might be countenanced *on economic grounds alone* [emphasis added] as a stimulator of the national metabolism." (Frank Pace, Jr., in an *Address before the American Banker's Association*, September 1957).

Actually, the fundamental nonmilitary utility of war in the economy is far more widely acknowledged than the scarcity of such affirmations as that quoted above would suggest.

But *negatively* phrased public recognitions of the importance of war to the general economy abound. The most familiar example is the effect of "peace threats" on the stock market, e.g.,

> "Wall Street was shaken yesterday by news of an apparent peace feeler from North Vietnam, but swiftly recovered its composure after about an hour of sometimes indiscriminate selling." (A random example, taken in this case from a story by David Deitch in the *New York Herald Tribune*, 9 February 1966).

Savings banks solicit deposits with similar cautionary slogans, e.g., "If peace breaks out, will you be ready for it?" A more subtle case in point was the recent refusal of the Department of Defense to permit the West German government to substitute nonmilitary goods for unwanted armaments in its purchase commitments from the United States; the decisive consideration was that the German purchases should not affect the general (nonmilitary) economy. Other incidental examples are to be found in the pressures brought to bear on the Department when it announces plans to close down an obsolete facility (as a "wasteful" form of "waste") and in the usual coordination of stepped-up military activities (as in Vietnam in 1965) with dangerously rising unemployment rates.

Although we do not imply that a substitute for war in the economy cannot be devised, no combination of techniques for controlling employment, production, and consumption has yet been tested that can remotely compare to it in effectiveness. It is, and has been, the essential economic stabilizer of modern societies.

POLITICAL

The political functions of war have been up to now even more critical to social stability. It is not surprising, nevertheless, that discussions of economic conversion for peace tend to fall silent on the matter of political implementation, and that disarmament scenarios, often sophisticated in their weighing of international political factors, tend to disregard the political functions of the war system within individual societies.

These functions are essentially organizational. First of all, the existence of a society as a political "nation" requires as part of its definition an attitude of relationship toward other "nations." This is what we usually call a foreign policy. But a nation's foreign policy can have no substance if it lacks the means of enforcing its attitude toward other nations. It can do this in a credible manner only if it implies the threat of maximum political organization for this purpose — which is to say that it is organized to some degree for war. War, then, as we have defined it to include all national activities that recognize the possibility of armed conflict, is itself the defining element of any nation's existence *vis-a-vis* any other nation. Since it is historically axiomatic that the existence of any form of weaponry insures its use, we have used the word "peace" as virtually synonymous with disarmament. By the same token, "war" is virtually synonymous with nationhood. The elimination of war implies the inevitable elimination of national sovereignty and the traditional nation-state.

The war system not only has been essential to the existence of nations as independent political entities, but has been equally indispensable to their stable internal political structure. Without it, no government has ever been able to obtain acquiescence in its "legitimacy," or right to rule its society. The possibility of war provides the sense of external necessity without which no government can long remain in power. The historical record reveals one instance after another where the failure of a regime to maintain the credibility of a war threat led to its dissolution, by the forces of private interest, or reactions to social injustice, or of other disintegrative elements.

The organization of a society for the possibility of war is its principal political stabilizer. It is ironic that this primary function of war has been generally recognized by historians only where it has been expressly acknowledged — in the pirate societies of the great conquerors.

The basic authority of a modern state over its people resides in its war powers. (There is, in fact, good reason to believe that codified law had its origins in the rules of conduct established by military victors for dealing with the defeated enemy, which were later adapted to apply to all subject populations). (*Vide* L. Gumplowicz, in *Geschichte der Staatstheorien*, Innsbruck, Wagner, 1905 and earlier writings).

On a day-to-day basis, it is represented by the institution of police, armed organizations charged expressly with dealing with "internal enemies" in a military manner.

Like the conventional "external" military, the police are also substantially exempt from many civilian legal restraints on their social behavior. In some countries, the artificial distinction between police and other military forces does not exist.

On the long-term basis, a government's emergency war powers — inherent in the structure of even the most libertarian of nations —

define the most significant aspect of the relation between state and citizen.

In advanced modern democratic societies, the war system has provided political leaders with another political-economic function of increasing importance: it has served as the last great safeguard against the elimination of necessary social classes. As economic productivity increases to a level further and further above that of minimum subsistence, it becomes more and more difficult for a society to maintain distribution patterns insuring the existence of "hewers of wood and drawers of water." The further progress of automation can be expected to differentiate still more sharply between "superior" workers and what Ricardo called "menials," while simultaneously aggravating the problem of maintaining an unskilled labor supply.

The arbitrary nature of war expenditures and of other military activities make them ideally suited to control these essential class relationships. Obviously, if the war system were to be discarded, new political machinery would be needed at once to serve this vital subfunction. Until it is developed, the continuance of the war system must be assured, if for no other reason, among others, than to preserve whatever quality and degree of poverty a society requires as an incentive, as well as to maintain the stability of its internal organization of power.

SOCIOLOGICAL

Under this heading, we will examine a nexus of functions served by the war system that affect human behavior in society. In general, they are broader in application and less susceptible to direct observation than the economic and political factors previously considered.

The most obvious of these functions is the time-honored use of military institutions to provide antisocial elements with an acceptable

role in the social structure. The disintegrative, unstable social movements loosely described as "fascist" have traditionally taken root in societies that have lacked adequate military or paramilitary outlets to meet the needs of these elements. This function has been critical in periods of rapid change. The danger signals are easy to recognize, even though the stigmata bear different names at different times. The current euphemistic clichés — "juvenile delinquency" and "alienation" — have had their counterparts in every age. In earlier days these conditions were dealt with directly by the military without the complications of due process, usually through press gangs or outright enslavement. But it is not hard to visualize, for example, the degree of social disruption that might have taken place in the United States during the last two decades if the problem of the socially disaffected of the post-World War II period had not been foreseen and effectively met. The younger, and more dangerous, of these hostile social groupings have been kept under control by the Selective Service System.

This system and its analogues elsewhere furnish remarkably clear examples of disguised military utility. Informed persons in this country have never accepted the official rationale for a peacetime draft — military necessity, preparedness, etc. — as worthy of serious consideration. But what has gained credence among thoughtful men is the rarely voiced, less easily refuted, proposition that the institution of military service has a "patriotic" priority in our society that must be maintained for its own sake. Ironically, the simplistic official justification for selective service comes closer to the mark, once the non-military functions of military institutions are understood. As a control device over the hostile, nihilistic, and potentially unsettling elements of a society in transition, the draft can again be defended, and quite convincingly, as a "military" necessity.

Nor can it be considered a coincidence that overt military activity, and thus the level of draft calls, tend to follow the major fluctuations in the unemployment rate in the lower age groups. This rate, in turn,

is a time-tested herald of social discontent. It must be noted also that the armed forces in every civilization have provided the principal state-supported haven for what we now call the "unemployable." The typical European standing army (of fifty years ago) consisted of

> "...troops unfit for employment in commerce, industry, or agriculture, led by officers unfit to practice any legitimate profession or to conduct a business enterprise." (K. Fischer, *Das Militar*, Zurich, Steinmetz Verlag, 1932, pp. 42-43).

This is still largely true, if less apparent. In a sense, this function of the military as the custodian of the economically or culturally deprived was the forerunner of most contemporary civilian social-welfare programs, from the W.P.A. to various forms of "socialized" medicine and social security. It is interesting that liberal sociologists currently proposing to use the Selective Service System as a medium of cultural upgrading of the poor consider this a *novel* application of military practice.

Although it cannot be said absolutely that such critical measures of social control as the draft require a military rationale, no modern society has yet been willing to risk experimentation with any other kind. Even during such periods of comparatively simple social crisis as the so-called Great Depression of the 1930s, it was deemed prudent by the government to invest minor make-work projects, like the "Civilian" Conservation Corps, with a military character, and to place the more ambitious National Recovery Administration under the direction of a professional army officer at its inception. Today, at least one small Northern European country, plagued with uncontrollable unrest among its "alienated youth," is considering the expansion of its armed forces, despite the problem of making credible the expansion of a non-existent external threat.

Sporadic efforts have been made to promote general recognition of broad national values free of military connotation, but they have

been ineffective. For example, to enlist public support of even such modest programs of social adjustment as "fighting inflation" or "maintaining physical fitness" it has been necessary for the government to utilize a patriotic (i.e. military) incentive. It sells "defense" bonds and it equates health with military preparedness. This is not surprising; since the concept of "nationhood" implies readiness for war, a "national" program must do likewise.

In general, the war system provides the basic motivation for primary social organization. In so doing, it reflects on the societal level the incentives of individual human behavior. The most important of these, for social purposes, is the individual psychological rationale for allegiance to a society and its values.

Allegiance requires a cause; a cause requires an enemy. This much is obvious; the critical point is that the enemy that defines the cause must seem genuinely formidable. Roughly speaking, the presumed power of the "enemy" sufficient to warrant an individual sense of allegiance to a society must be proportionate to the size and complexity of the society. Today, of course, that power must be one of unprecedented magnitude and frightfulness.

It follows, from the patterns of human behavior, that the credibility of a social "enemy" demands similarly a readiness of response in proportion to its menace.

In a broad social context, "an eye for an eye" still characterizes the only acceptable attitude toward a presumed threat of aggression, despite contrary religious and moral precepts governing personal conduct. The remoteness of personal decision from social consequence in a modern society makes it easy for its members to maintain this attitude without being aware of it. A recent example is the war in Vietnam; a less recent one was the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In each case, the extent and gratuitousness of the slaughter were abstracted into political formulae by most Americans, once the proposition that the victims were "ene-

mies" was established. The war system makes such an abstracted response possible in nonmilitary contexts as well. A conventional example of this mechanism is the inability of most people to connect, let us say, the starvation of millions in India with their own past conscious political decision-making. Yet the sequential logic linking a decision to restrict grain production in America with an eventual famine in Asia is obvious, unambiguous, and unconcealed.

What gives the war system its preeminent role in social organization, as elsewhere, is its unmatched authority over life and death. It must be emphasized again that the war system is not a mere social extension of the presumed need for individual human violence, but itself in turn serves to rationalize most nonmilitary killing. It also provides the precedent for the collective willingness of members of a society to pay a blood price for institutions far less central to social organization that war. To take a handy example,

> "... rather than accept speed limits of twenty miles an hour we prefer to let automobiles kill forty thousand people a year." (Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 42).

A Rand analyst puts it in more general terms and less rhetorically:

> "I am sure that there is, in effect, a desirable level of automobile accidents — desirable, that is, from a broad point of view; in the sense that it is a necessary concomitant of things of greater value to society." (John D. Williams, "The Nonsense about Safe Driving," *Fortune*, September 1958).

The point may seem too obvious for iteration, but it is essential to an understanding of the important motivational function of war as a model for collective sacrifice.

A brief look at some defunct pre-modern societies is instructive. One of the most noteworthy features common to the larger, more complex, and more successful of ancient civilizations was their widespread use of the blood sacrifice. If one were to limit consideration to those cultures whose regional hegemony was so complete that the prospect of "war" had become virtually inconceivable — as was the case with several of the great pre-Columbian societies of the Western Hemisphere — it would be found that some form of ritual killing occupied a position of paramount social importance in each. Invariably, the ritual was invested with mythic or religious significance; as with all religious and totemic practice, however, the ritual masked a broader and more important social function.

In these societies, the blood sacrifice served the purpose of maintaining a vestigial "earnest" of the society's capability and willingness to make war — i.e., kill and be killed — in the event that some mystical — i.e., unforeseen — circumstance were to give rise to the possibility. That the "earnest" was not an adequate substitute for genuine military organization when the unthinkable enemy, such as the Spanish conquistadores, actually appeared on the scene in no way negates the function of the ritual. It was primarily, if not exclusively, a symbolic reminder that war had once been the central organizing force of the society, and that this condition might recur.

It does not follow that a transition to total peace in modern societies would require the use of this model, even in less "barbaric" guise. But the historical analogy serves as a reminder that a viable substitute for war as a social system cannot be a mere symbolic charade. It must involve risk of real personal destruction, and on a scale consistent with the size and complexity of modern social systems. Credibility is the key. Whether the substitute is ritual in nature or functionally substantive, unless it provides a believable life-and-death threat it will not serve the socially organizing function of war.

The existence of an accepted external menace, then, is essential to social cohesiveness as well as to the acceptance of political authority. The menace must be believable, it must be of a magnitude consistent with the complexity of the society threatened, and it must appear, at least, to affect the entire society.

ECOLOGICAL

Men, like all other animals, is subject to the continuing process of adapting to the limitations of his environment. But the principal mechanism he has utilized for this purpose is unique among living creatures. To forestall the inevitable historical cycles of inadequate food supply, post-Neolithic man destroys surplus members of his own species by organized warfare.

Ethologists (*Vide* most recently K. Lorenz, in *Das Sogenannte Bose: zur Naturgeschichte der Aggression*, Vienna, G. Borotha-Schoeler Verlag, 1964) have often observed that the organized slaughter of members of their own species is virtually unknown among other animals. Man's special propensity to kill his own kind (shared to a limited degree with rats) may be attributed to his inability to adapt anachronistic patterns of survival (like primitive hunting) to his development of "civilizations" in which these patterns cannot be effectively sublimated. It may be attributed to other causes that have been suggested, such as a maladapted "territorial instinct," etc. Nevertheless, it exists and its social expression in war constitutes a biological control of his relationship to his natural environment that is peculiar to man alone.

War has served to help assure the *survival* of the human species. But as an evolutionary device to *improve* it, war is almost unbelievably inefficient. With few exceptions, the selective processes of other living creatures promote both specific survival and genetic improvement. When a conventionally adaptive animal faces one of its peri-

odic crises of insufficiency, it is the "inferior" members of the species that normally disappear. An animal's social response to such a crisis may take the form of a mass migration, during which the weak fall by the wayside. Or it may follow the dramatic and more efficient pattern of lemming societies, in which the weaker members voluntarily disperse, leaving available food supplies for the stronger. In either case, the strong survive and the weak fall. In human societies, those who fight and die in wars for survival are in general its biologically stronger members. This is natural selection in reverse.

The regressive genetic effort of war has been often noted (beginning with Herbert Spencer and his contemporaries, but largely ignored for nearly a century) and equally often deplored, even when it confuses biological and cultural factors (As in recent draft-law controversy, in which the issue of selective deferment of the culturally privileged is often carelessly equated with the preservation of the biologically "fittest"). The disproportionate loss of the *biologically* stronger remains inherent in traditional warfare. It serves to underscore the fact that survival of the species, rather than its improvement, is the fundamental purpose of natural selection, if it can be said to have a purpose, just as it is the basic premise of this study.

But as the polemologist Gaston Bouthoul (in *La Guerre*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1953) has pointed out, other institutions that were developed to serve this ecological function have proved even less satisfactory. (They include such established forms as these: infanticide, practiced chiefly in ancient and primitive societies; sexual mutilation; monasticism; forced emigration; extensive capital punishment, as in old China and eighteenth-century England; and other similar, usually localized, practices).

Man's ability to increase his productivity of the essentials of physical life suggests that the need for protection against cyclical famine may be nearly obsolete. It has thus tended to reduce the apparent impor-

tance of the basic ecological function of war, which is generally disregarded by peace theorists.

Two aspects of it remain especially relevant, however. The first is obvious: current rates of population growth, compounded by environmental threat to chemical and other contaminants, may well bring about a new crisis of insufficiency. If so, it is likely to be one of unprecedented global magnitude, not merely regional or temporary. Conventional methods of warfare would almost surely prove inadequate, in this event, to reduce the consuming population to a level consistent with survival of the species.

The second relevant factor is the efficiency of modern methods of mass destruction. Even if their use is not required to meet a world population crisis, they offer, perhaps paradoxically, the first opportunity in the history of man to halt the regressive genetic effects of natural selection by war. Nuclear weapons are indiscriminate. Their application would bring to an end the disproportionate destruction of the physically stronger members of the species (the "warriors") in periods of war. Whether this prospect of genetic gain would offset the unfavorable mutations anticipated from post-nuclear radioactivity we have not yet determined. What gives the question a bearing on our study is the possibility that the determination may yet have to be made.

Another secondary ecological trend bearing on projected population growth is the regressive effect of certain medical advances. Pestilence, for example, is no longer an important factor in population control. The problem of increased life expectancy has been aggravated. These advances also pose a potentially more sinister problem, in that undesirable genetic traits that were formerly self-liquidating are now medically maintained. Many diseases that were once fatal at pre-procreational ages are now cured; the effect of this development is to perpetuate undesirable susceptibilities and mutations. It seems clear that a new quasi-eugenic function of war is now in process of

formation that will have to be taken into account in any transition plan. For the time being, the Department of Defense appears to have recognized such factors, as has been demonstrated by the planning under way by the Rand Corporation to cope with the breakdown in the ecological balance anticipated after a thermonuclear war. The Department has also begun to stockpile birds, for example, against the expected proliferation of radiation-resistant insects, etc.

CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC

The declared order of values in modern societies gives a high place to the so-called "creative" activities, and an even higher one to those associated with the advance of scientific knowledge. Widely held social values can be translated into political equivalents, which in turn may bear on the nature of a transition to peace. The attitudes of those who hold these values must be taken into account in the planning of the transition. The dependence, therefore, of cultural and scientific achievement on the war system would be an important consideration in a transition plan even if such achievement had no inherently necessary social function.

Of all the countless dichotomies invented by scholars to account for the major differences in art styles and cycles, only one has been consistently unambiguous in its application to a variety of forms and cultures. However it may be verbalized, the basic distinction is this: Is the work war-oriented or is it not?

Among primitive peoples, the war dance is the most important art form. Elsewhere, literature, music, painting, sculpture, and architecture that has won lasting acceptance has invariably dealt with a theme of war, expressly or implicitly, and has expressed the centricity of war to society. The war in question may be national conflict, as in Shakespeare plays, Beethoven's music, or Goya's paintings, or it may be reflected in the form of religious, social, or moral

struggle, as in the work of Dante, Rembrandt, and Bach. Art that cannot be classified as war-oriented is usually described as "sterile," "decadent," and so on. Application of the "war standard" to works of art may often leave room for debate in individual cases, but there is no question of its role as the fundamental determinant of cultural values. Aesthetic and moral standards have a common anthropological origin, in the exaltation of bravery, the willingness to kill and risk death in tribal warfare.

It is also instructive to note that the character of a society's culture has borne a close relationship to its war-making potential, in the context of its times. It is no accident that the current "cultural explosion" in the United States is taking place during an era marked by an unusually rapid advance in weaponry. This relationship is more generally recognized than the literature on the subject would suggest. For example, many artists and writers are now beginning to express concern over the limited creative options they envisage in the warless world they think, or hope, may be soon upon us. They are currently preparing for this possibility by unprecedented experimentation with meaningless forms; their interest in recent years has been increasingly engaged by the abstract pattern, the gratuitous emotion, the random happening, and the unrelated sequence.

The relationship of war to scientific research and discovery is more explicit. War is the principal motivational force for the development of science at every level, from the abstractly conceptual to the narrowly technological. Modern society places a high value on "pure" science, but it is historically inescapable that all the significant discoveries that have been made about the natural world have been inspired by the real or imaginary military necessities of their epochs. The consequences of the discoveries have indeed gone far afield, but war has always provided the basic incentive.

Beginning with the development of iron and steel, and proceeding through the discoveries of the laws of motion and thermodynamics to

the age of the atomic particle, the synthetic polymer, and the space capsule, no important scientific advance has not been at least indirectly initiated by an implicit requirement of weaponry. More prosaic examples include the transistor radio (an outgrowth of military communications requirements), the assembly line (from Civil War firearms needs), the steel-frame building (from the steel battleship), the canal lock, and so on. A typical adaptation can be seen in a device as modest as the common lawnmower; it developed from the revolving scythe devised by Leonardo da Vinci to precede a horse-powered vehicle into enemy ranks.

The most direct relationship can be found in medical technology. For example, a giant "walking machine," and amplifier of body motions invented for military use in difficult terrain, is now making it possible for many previously confined to wheelchairs to walk. The Vietnam war alone has led to spectacular improvements in amputation procedures, blood-handling techniques, and surgical logistics. It has stimulated new large-scale research on malaria and other typical parasite diseases; it is hard to estimate how long this work would otherwise have been delayed, despite its enormous nonmilitary importance to nearly half the world's population.

OTHER

We have elected to omit from our discussion of the nonmilitary functions of war those we do not consider critical to a transition program. This is not to say they are unimportant, however, but only that they appear to present no special problems for the organization of a peace-oriented social system.

They include the following:

War as a general social release. This is a psychosocial function, serving the same purpose for a society as do the holiday, the celebration, and the orgy for the individual — the release and redistribution

of undifferentiated tensions. War provides for the periodic necessary readjustment of standards of social behavior (the "moral climate") and for the dissipation of general boredom, one of the most consistently undervalued and unrecognized of social phenomena.

War as a generational stabilizer. This psychological function, served by other behavior patterns in other animals, enables the physically deteriorating older generation to maintain its control of the younger, destroying it if necessary.

War as an ideological clarifier. The dualism that characterized the traditional dialectic of all branches of philosophy and of stable political relationships stems from war as the prototype of conflict. Except for secondary considerations, there cannot be, to put it as simply as possible, more than two sides to a question because there cannot be more than two sides to a war.

War as the basis for the international understanding. Before the development of modern communications, the strategic requirements of war provided the only substantial incentive for the enrichment of one national culture with the achievements of another. Although this is still the case in many international relationships, the function is obsolescent.

We have also forgone extended characterization of those functions we assume to be widely and explicitly recognized. An obvious example is the role of war as controller of the quality and degree of unemployment. This is more than an economic and political subfunction; its sociological, cultural, and ecological aspects are also important, although often teleonomic. But none affect the general problem of substitution. The same is true of certain other functions; those we have included are sufficient to define the scope of the problem.

William McGaffin and Erwin Knoll

The Military-Industrial Complex Revisited (1969)

The authors of this text confirm the warnings and apprehensions of the President Eisenhower about the existence and expansion of a military-industrial complex that would dominate the life (moral, cultural, social, economic) of the American people. The result is now visible in the neglect of all types of infrastructures necessary for a decent (comfortable and meaningful) human life. But the long term result, as poignantly stated by the two authors in their final sentence, is that it "points us toward destruction."

Source: William McGaffin - Erwin Knoll, *Scandal in the Pentagon*, Chapter 1, 1969.

"This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, even spiritual — is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the Federal Government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to compre-

hend its grave implications. Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society."

"In the councils of Government we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together." (*Dwight Eisenhower, January, 17, 1961*)

The warning the President Eisenhower chose to deliver as the dominant theme of his farewell address was probably the most perceptive public utterance of his long career. To caution Americans in 1961 against the perils posed by the growth of "an immense military establishment and a large army industry" was a distinguished public service, particularly since the alarm was sounded by the most respected military leader of our time.

But to repeat that warning today, as it is repeated almost daily in the halls of Congress, is a redundancy and almost an evasion. The military-industrial complex is no longer a potential threat to America but a deeply entrenched reality. It had already acquired a dangerous degree of influence in the dozen Cold Wars years preceding Eisenhower's speech. Its power has grown and multiplied at a colossal rate in the decade of the 1960s.

Fuelled by huge and virtually uncontrolled appropriations that constitute the lion's share of the federal budget, defense contractors have assumed a dominant role in the nation's economy. Lured by almost limitless public subsidies, many of the country's best scientific

minds have been persuaded to devote their time and talent to the development of new devices of death and destruction. Encouraged by the easy availability of government grants, universities have lent their faculties and facilities to programs of military research. Seduced by the expanding payrolls of defense-related industries, labor leaders have acquiesced willingly — cheerfully — in the headlong militarization of American society. Supported by a people searching frantically for "security" in an age of constant nuclear danger, the military have steadily extended their power within the Federal Government and their influence in the body politic, exercising increasing jurisdiction even in such traditionally civilian preserves as the formation of foreign and domestic policy.

As it enters the decade of the 1970s and approaches the bicentennial anniversary of its independence, the United States *is* a military-industrial complex — the most formidable the world has ever known. Its military budget exceeds the arms spending of every other nation — exceeds, in fact, the total Gross National Product of all but eight other countries. Its domestic institutions and its foreign relations have been profoundly and perhaps irrevocably altered by a system of priorities that subordinates all the other goals to the purpose of "defense."

> "In many areas of the nation, — Senator Stephen M. Young of Ohio has observed, — a situation has been created whereby the local economy would virtually collapse if major military or so-called defense procurement were to end. If the political and social attitudes of a community do not conform to the philosophy of the Defense Department, the community may suddenly find itself without defense contracts and with hundred of thousands of jobless men and women hitherto employed in corporations with government defense contracts, so-called. An excuse or reason seems always to be advanced by the Defense Department officials for their

> actions and decisions, frequently made without any preliminary warning.
>
> Slowly, imperceptibly, and unconsciously Americans are becoming conditioned to the acceptance of regimentation, wiretapping, and snooping by large defense-related investigative agencies. Slowly Americans are accepting as natural an invasion of their individual privacy that their forefathers would have rebelled against. Unfortunately security investigations, background reports, questioning of attitudes and opinions have become a part of our way of life.
>
> Every facet of public life from politics to elementary and secondary school education to what is shown on motion pictures screens is beginning more and more to be influenced by the growing power of the Pentagon. Our children are being subtly taught not to question the views of their military leaders but to accept them as gospel. The military has been glorified on television and in motion pictures to the point where it is considered subversive by many citizens to criticize the Pentagon or the action and statements of military leaders."

It is, as President Eisenhower noted, a new phenomenon in the American experience. From the earliest days of the Republic the people of the United States have harbored a healthy skepticism of military power. When the drafters of the Constitution proclaimed the purposes of the Federal Union in the preamble, they said it was their aim

> "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, and," — last on the list — "to provide for the common defense."

Until recent years Americans held tenaciously to their antimilitary tradition. Although great military forces were amassed in times of war, they were swiftly demobilized with the advent of peace. The maintenance of huge standing armies was a practice alien to the

American ideal, and peacetime conscription was unthinkable. There was no place for military men in the processes of civilian decision making, and the maxim that even war is too important to be left to generals was quoted often and with approbation.

All that has changed. The nation's ideals as well as its institutions have been subverted by a vast accretion of power to the military-industrial complex. But, as Senator Young pointed out, the transformation has been imperceptible to most Americans. In the name of "security" — and in the absence of facts with which to challenge the unverified and the unverifiable assertions of the secretive military establishment — the people of the United States have accepted and even encouraged the growth of the military behemoth. When Richard M. Nixon was asked during his 1968 presidential campaign to comment on Eisenhower's warning against "the acquisition of unwarranted influence" by the military-industrial complex, he was able to respond with this bland assertion:

> "I do not think it will happen as long as you have in positions of leadership in the United States men who are aware of the danger."

Combined with such assurances has been the use of fear, the "most important factor" in the growth of military power, according to Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith. "Anything which relates to war, and equally to nuclear weapons and nuclear conflict, touches a deeply sensitive public nerve," Galbraith testified to a joint congressional subcommittee on June 3, 1969. "This is easily played on. The technique is to say, in effect, 'Give us what we ask; do as we propose, or you will be in mortal danger of nuclear annihilation.' "

As President Eisenhower lay dying at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in the early months of 1969, his eight-year-old warning was finally beginning to receive the attention it deserved. It

was cited prominently in the general's obituaries and became, at last, a topic for newspaper editorials. Disillusioned with the tragic and apparently endless military adventure in Vietnam, troubled by the shaky rationalizations offered in behalf of the antiballistic missile system and other new huge and costly proposed weapons programs, spurred by an incipient taxpayers' revolt, many members of Congress acquired for the first time in two decades the courage and determination to challenge the insatiable demands of the military. But even as a hopeful debate began on Capitol Hill, few Americans were aware of the extent to which the military-industrial complex had come to dominate their nation.

Few realized that about fifty-five cents of every dollar of appropriated federal expenditure was being allocated to current military costs; that spending for past and future wars (including veterans' benefits and interest payment on the war-incurred national debt) accounted for an additional twenty cents; that the *per capita* assessment on every man, woman, and child in the United States for military appropriations was more than $400, an increase of 60% in each citizen's bill over the previous five years.

> "It is not until we look at what is left to take care of domestic needs that the full impact of military spending becomes apparent," Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, pointed out. "Education is an example of such a need. Schools from kindergarten to graduate school are overcrowded and underfinanced. Nine billion dollars is *authorized* for the various programs of the Office of Education in the next fiscal year. Only about one-third of the amount authorized, $3.2 billion, is included in the budget."

Fulbright went on to note that the budget for fiscal 1970 proposed less for elementary and secondary education than it costs to assemble one attack carrier task force (the United States has fifteen); that more

was budgeted for chemical and biological weapons than for vocational education; that more would be spent on the Safeguard antiballistic missile system (even under the Pentagon's suspiciously low estimates) than would be invested in higher education; that five times as much would be spent on a nuclear aircraft carrier as would be provided for libraries and other community services.

> "This all adds up," Fulbright declared, "to the fact that less than $39 *per capita* is being invested by the Federal Government in the education and training of our citizens, about one-tenth the amount going to the military. I do not believe this is an accurate reflection of the real desires of the American people, but it does reflect the present distribution of power among the bureaucracies of Washington."

Whatever their real desires, Americans have consented to defense outlays totaling about $1,250,000,000,000 ($1.25 *trillion*) since the end of World War II. Military expenditures in the decade from 1959 to 1968 amounted to $551 billion — twice the total spent for new private and public housing in the United States during the same decade and nearly twice as much as federal, state, and local governments allocated to education.

Such astronomical military expenditures might be justifiable, or at least more acceptable, if they had done what they were suppose to do: purchase "security" for the people of the United States. Obviously they have done no such thing. Although it has been estimated that the United States and the Soviet Union have accumulated the equivalent of fifteen tons of high explosives for every human being on the face of the earth, though each of the superpowers now possesses the nuclear potential to obliterate its rival several times over, the goal of "security" is as elusive as it was at the outset of the frantic arms race. In fact the persistent neglect of urgent domestic problems that has been caused, or at least rationalized, by the extrav-

agant expenditures on defense, has contributed substantially to a new threat to security at home.

> "I believe that the turmoil on the campuses, the unrest in the cities, and the signs of a taxpayer revolt are not unrelated to the distortion in our national values that seeks world peace and tranquility through the force of arms," Senator Fulbright says.

What then have we purchased with our lavish military appropriations? We have bought standing military forces totaling about 3.5 million men — almost half of them stationed overseas. Even at the peak of American military involvement in Vietnam when 540,000 U.S. troops were engaged in the war, about twice that number were stationed at other foreign posts — 320,000 in Western Europe and Great Britain; 21,000 aboard the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean; 55,000 in Korea; 40,000 in Japan; 30,000 in Latin America; 30,000 in the Philippines; 45,000 in Thailand; 40,000 in Okinawa; and many thousands more at others of the 429 "major military installations or activities outside the United States" maintained by the Pentagon. In all, the "military presence" of the United States makes itself felt in at least sixty-eight foreign countries by means of full-blown Army, Navy, or Air Force bases as well as military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) that range from a four-man contingent in Tunisia to 116 men in Brazil. For "the Middle East and Africa" the Defense Department list 10,000 servicemen, although some sources report that there are at least 30,000 in Ethiopia, Turkey, and Iran alone, some out of uniform and on assignments that could be described as "delicate." In fact, the official accounting of the American military role abroad can safely be assumed to represent only a minimum of actual U.S. involvement; the American buildup in Thailand had been under way many months before the Congress and the public received even the first inkling of it from official sources.

At home military forces are deployed at thousands of major and minor installations within the borders of the United States. Defense is easily the nation's largest employer, accounting for one job in every nine. When the armed forces are added to the 1.3 million civilians employed by the Defense Department and 3.8 million on the payrolls of the 100,000 firms that contribute to defense production, and when the wives, children, and other dependents of all these people are taken into account, almost one fifth of the total population of the United States depends on the military establishment for its livelihood. In 1968 the defense budget of more than $78 billion accounted for almost 10 percent of the Gross National Product. More than half of the total went into ten states — California, Texas, New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Virginia, Massachusetts, Georgia, and Missouri. Military dollars constituted more than 20 percent pf total personal income in Connecticut and almost 30 percent in Alaska.

Among the 100,000 companies that share in the defense procurement business, a very few have a very large part of the pie. In 1968, 100 major corporations had more than two-thirds of all defense business and the top two of these, General Dynamics and Lockheed, had more than the smallest fifty. From 1961 through 1967 each of thirty-eight companies was awarded a contract amounting to more than $1 billion. Lockheed which headed the list with $10.62 billion, relied on the military for all but 12 percent of its sale. A dozen firms specializing almost completely in military business, together with General Electric and American Telephone and Telegraph, had a third of all defense contracts in 1968.

> "We should not be surprised that these corporations are interested in expanded defense spending any more than we should be shocked by the fact that most successful manufacturing firms conduct vigorous marketing programs," Senator George McGovern, the South Dakota Democrat, has pointed out. "Certainly it is not the

> role of defense contractors to make value judgments on national priorities. They are in business to sell, and they do. Members of Congress are asked to intercede when difficulties in negotiating contracts are encountered. Retired military officers are employed by defense contractors in order to maintain contact with the right people in the Pentagon."

The result of these efforts has been a genial partnership between Pentagon procurement officers — some 5,500 military and civilian personnel are employed in procurement — and their suppliers. It is a partnership in which no one except the taxpayer gets hurt. In hearings conducted by the Joint Economic Subcommittee on Economy in Government headed by Senator William Proxmire, Wisconsin Democrat, expert witnesses have produced evidence that major defense contractors earn profits about 70 per cent higher than the average for firms engaged primarily in nondefense work. A. W. Bueskin, a former Pentagon official, told the subcommittee that the $8 billion Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile program returned a 43 per cent before-tax profit based on net worth to the prime contractor, the Boeing Company. After taxes, he added, the profits on Minuteman would have been about 21 percent on net worth, about double the going rate in nondefense industries.

Proxmire called this record "appalling," but his subcommittee went on to prove that it was by no means exceptional. Although the Pentagon acknowledges that price competition in contract awards reduces costs by an average of 25 per cent, the volume of competitive bidding has been declining steadily, now accounting for less than 12 percent of the contracts awarded. About a third of the Pentagon's purchases are based on "competitive negotiated contracts" in which price may or may not be a factor, and more than half, including most of the largest contracts, involve no competition of any kind.

Official regulations governing defense procurement declare that price competition should be the rule, but there are exceptions —

seventeen kind of them by latest count — and they are generously invoked. One exception is "urgent need," and it covers most situations not encompassed by the other sixteen. The contract watchdog agency, the Renegotiation Board, is governed by exceptions too, including one that automatically exempts from scrutiny all companies that transact less than $1 million in defense business a year. Lawrence E. Hartwig, the chairman of the Renegotiation Board, has estimated that

> "if all the exemptions were lifted, we would have jurisdiction to check for excess profits on at least another $8 billion or $9 billion in government purchases, and it could go as high as $10 billion."

Despite the rising reaction in Congress and the country against mismanagement and waste, the multibillion dollar corporations that thrive on defense business are projecting still greater earnings in their business forecasts. "Our future planning is based on visible contracts. One must believe in the long-term threat," says James J. Ling, who presides over the $ 3.2 billion Ling-Temco-Vought conglomerate, the nation's eight-largest defense contractor. On the basis of that belief LTV Aerospace Corporation, Ling's prime defense subsidiary, predicts total sales of $ 1.3 billion in 1973, compared with $ 530 million in 1968. Its cheery forecast reflects industry-wide expectations. In a study of "The Post-Vietnam Defense and Space Market Environment," the Electronics Industries Association concluded in 1968 that arms control agreements "during the next decade are unlikely," that the "likelihood of limited war will increase," and that "thus for the electronics firms the outlook is good in spite of [the end of hostilities in] Vietnam."

To those Americans who cherish the concept of a free, competitive marketplace, the concentration of tremendous economic power in an ever-shrinking list of ever-growing defense-oriented corporations should be a matter of concern and consternation. That it is not

reflects, in part, the widespread assumption that our huge military expenditures are an essential component in the nation's prosperity. Yet economists across a broad ideological spectrum agree that this is not the case — that the growth of the military-industrial complex is, in fact, retarding the nation's economic growth over the long run.

John Kenneth Galbraith, the foremost economist of the Liberal Establishment, has asserted that "the common belief that all business benefits from weapons orders is quite wrong. For a few it is a rewarding source of business; the great multitude of business firms pay" — pay because bloated military budgets force up the prices of labor and material, as well as taxes. A leading conservative economist, Arthur F. Burns, who serves as President Nixon's closest adviser on domestic affairs, has pointed out that

> "if the defense sector has stimulated economic development in some directions, it has retarded growth in others. Many civilian-oriented laboratories of business firms have found it difficult to match the salaries or the equipment that subsidized defense firms offer to scientists and engineers. Research processes for the civilian economy has therefore been handicapped. Small firms have derived little benefit from military or space contracts."

The military-industrial complex, Burns added in a lecture at New York University, has drained needed manpower from the nation's work force and has led to the rise of a

> "new class of business executives ... men whose understanding of marketing and cost controls is often deficient, but who know how to negotiate effectively with government officials."

Burns' most important point was this: Unlike investments in education or new factories, expenditures for weapons "add nothing to the nation's capacity to produce."

The bloated military budget is a major cause — some economists say the only cause — of the spiraling inflation that has plagued the United States in recent years. Louis Stone, an economist for the New York securities firm of Hayden, Stone Inc., explains the effect this way:

> "When money is spent for productive purposes, theoretically there is just as much supply created as demand; when money is spent for war ... no marketable supply is created to offset the demand side of the equation, and the result is a bidding up of prices."

The *Wall Street Journal* has described the process thus:

> "Mr. Jones who builds washing machines and Mr. Smith who build bombs for the Air Force both earn $200 a week. But neither uses his income to buy bombs and both need washing machines. Result: Washing machine prices are bid up as the supply of funds available to buy washers grows much more rapidly than the supply of machines."

In interesting contrast to Senator Fulbright's suggestion that the nation's preoccupation with military matters has compounded its domestic problems is this comment from the 1969 policy statement of the U.S. Air Force Association:

> "Taken together, the military industrial team, which protects our national interest against foreign enemies, constitutes at the same time a vital national resource that contributes on an ever-increasing scale to solution for many of our domestic ills."

There can be no doubt that military influence has extended into civilian matters to a degree that would be unthinkable only a few years ago.

An example of the subtle shifts taking place within the Federal Government is the transformation of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), which describes itself as "the nation's chief *nonmilitary* emergency plans agency charged with overseeing contingency planning at all levels of government to ensure that the nation can meet any crisis." The director of the OEP sits on the National Security Council, designated to represent *civilian* needs and interests in its deliberations. As late as 1968 no military men held policy-making positions in the OEP. By the summer of 1969 seven of nine key officials of the agency were from the armed services. The executive director of OEP was a retired Army general. His executive assistant was a lieutenant colonel still on active duty with the Regular Army, although detached to the OEP. The chief of the Plans and Programs Branch of the Emergency Operations Office, which handles much of the classified work for the OEP was a retired Air Force colonel. Its Office for the Special Assistant for Planning, which "provides staff support to the director on National Security Council matters, and is charged with an overview and coordinating function with respect tom other OEP planning," was firmly under military control. It was headed by a colonel recently retired after twenty-seven years with the Regular Army and staffed by two Army lieutenant colonels and a Navy lieutenant, all on active duty.

> "These appointments," Senator Proxmire charged, "flaunt the basic purpose of the OEP. All of these men are very well trained, highly competent, and dedicated. But the problem remains that they have spent most of their formative years in the military and have been sensitized to military rather than civilian needs."

Men sensitized to military rather than civilian needs are actively being sought out by other branches of the government. "The war against organized crime now is getting help from the Pentagon," an Associated Press dispatch reported on May 29, 1969. "Charles H. Rogovin, head of the Justice Department's law enforcement

assistance administration, said two intelligence-gathering divisions of the Defense Department are providing technical assistance for an 'automated organized crime intelligence system.' " No details have been disclosed on the precise nature of the Pentagon's "technical assistance," but anyone familiar with the workings of military justice can gauge the likely impact on the traditional safeguards of due process.

In the fall of 1968 Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford decreed for the Pentagon an aggressive role in attacking the nation's domestic ills, declaring that the department "has a deep obligation to contribute far more than it has ever contributed before to the social needs of our country." Clifford's plan, which envisaged broad military programs in such areas as housing, health care, education, and employment, has been endorsed by his successor, Secretary Laird, who has appointed a Domestic Action Council intended to guide the military in making "a significant contribution in helping to solve some of the problems that afflict our urban areas." The kind of social consciousness that is likely to guide such Pentagon projects can be deduced from the department's energetic efforts to undermine the nationwide grape boycott mounted by California pickers in an effort to attain a living wage. In the face of the boycott the Pentagon increased its grape purchases for U.S. forces in Vietnam by 350 percent in 1968, explaining that it had suddenly discovered an acute craving for grapes among the troops.

More worrisome than any of these indications of encroachment into traditionally civilian preserves are the growing indications of military preparations to deal with internal insurrection within the United States — preparations that would be instantly recognizable in many foreign countries as preliminaries for the establishment of a Garrison State. By the summer of 1969 the Army was boasting that almost 700,000 of its men had received training for domestic riot duty and that it stood to cope with racial outbreaks in twenty-five cities at one time. One brigade (3,500 men) on the East Coast and one on the

West stood constantly ready to move into combat against Americans, with other units poised to follow.

In a new, $2.7 million operation center under the Pentagon's mall parking lot, round-the-clock teams surrounded by computers, switchboards, teletypes, and maps maintain surveillance on the nation's cities and constantly update dossiers containing information on assembly areas for troops, transportation facilities, concentration of Negro and other low-income residents, known "troublemakers," and sites that could be pressed into use as detention centers when conventional jails have been filled. The man in charge of the Pentagon's Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations Office is Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell, fresh from a tour of duty as commander of the 24th Corps in Vietnam.

The distortion of national priorities, the neglect of pressing social needs, the concentration of corporate power, the growing dependency of millions of Americans on the military-industrial complex, the erosion of liberty, the intrusion of the military into areas that have been and should be under civilian control — all these might be regarded as part of the price America must pay for survival in a dangerous age; they have, indeed, been routinely rationalized on just those terms by the supporters of the military establishment. Yet one need look no farther than to that dedicated champion of the military, Defense Secretary Laird, for persuasive testimony that vast arms expenditures have failed to produce security.

"Never have the challenges to our national security exceeded in number and gravity those which we found on taking office," Laird declared in his first "posture statement" to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Few corners of the world were omitted from his grim recitation of potential disasters. In Laos, he warned, 40,000 North Vietnamese troops stood poised to march "right up to the border of Thailand." In Korea, "peace hangs by a slender thread." Malaysia and Singapore represented "a potential security problem."

Looming large over all of Asia was China's "vast army and relatively large air and naval force ... on the verge of being supplemented by an operational nuclear capability." In the Middle East, Laird reported, "the Arab-Israeli conflict verges on an active state of war ... complicated by the continuous flow of Soviet arms to their Arab clients." In Europe he found the North Atlantic Treaty Organization "beset with both military and political problems of no small magnitude." The Soviet Union confronted the United States with "a marked increase in ... strategic weapons capability, both offensive and defensive, a challenge that is of serious import. There has been a distinct buildup in Soviet general purpose forces ... At the same time the Russian research and development effort is still going forward at a vigorous pace." From Wisconsin, Secretary Laird's mother telephoned to say, "Melvin, you're scaring people."

It was, indeed, a frightening catalogue, and one might suppose that it would prompt the nation's chief defense official to undertake a basic reappraisal of the policy assumption that had brought the United States — and the world — to such a perilous position. One would be wrong; Laird's prescription was for more of the same — more weapons, more expenditures, more reliance on military solutions. It was a consistent position for Laird to take. As a Congressman he had for years expressed abiding faith in the inevitability (and desirability) of a continuing Cold War; uncompromising rejection of the notion of nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union in favor of "American nuclear superiority"; eagerness to assign the top national priority to arms procurement; and contempt for the feeble efforts mounted by former Secretary Robert S. McNamara to apply a measure of "cost effectiveness" restraint to swollen military budgets.

As the civilian director of the military establishment, Laird had a marked weakness for the workings of the military mind. In his 1962 book, *A House Divided: America's Strategy Gap* (remembered chiefly for its ardent advocacy of an American "first-strike capability" against the Soviet Union), Laird complained about the tendency to

exclude the "highly intelligent citizens" in the military from the making of political policy. Had the "meaningful recommendations" of the brass been followed, Laird wrote, "the chances are that accelerated efforts in many areas where we later tried frantically to make up for lost time would have been undertaken when they should have been — years ago."

Americans have had ample opportunity in recent years to learn about the nature of the military's "meaningful recommendations." In his memoir of the Cuban missile crisis, *Thirteen Days*, the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy recalled how

> "one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, argued that we could use nuclear weapons on the basis that our adversaries would use theirs against us in an attack. I thought, as I listened, of the many times that I had heard the military take positions which, if wrong, had the advantage that no one would be around at the end to know."

The Joint Chiefs, Kennedy reported, "were unanimous in calling for immediate military action" in the Cuban crisis and one member, General Curtis E. Le May, the Air Force Chief of Staff, "argued strongly with the President that a military attack was essential" and insisted there would be no Soviet response to such an attack. The military, Kennedy added,

> "seemed always to assume that the Russians and the Cubans would not respond or, if they did, *that a war was in our national interest* [*emphasis added*]. One of the Joint Chiefs of Staff once said to me he believed in a preventive attack against the Soviet Union. On that fateful Sunday morning when the Russians answered they were withdrawing their missiles, it was suggested by one high military adviser that we attack on Monday in any case. Another felt that we had in some way been betrayed."

That military men should have profound faith in the use of military means is understandable. Waging war, is, after all, the trade to which they are trained and for which they are hired, and the one that leads to recognition and advancement in their chosen field. General David M. Shoup, the retired commandant of the Marine Corps, has pointed out that

> "civilians can scarcely understand or even believe that many ambitious military professionals truly yearn for wars and the opportunities for glory and distinction afforded only in combat. A career of peacetime duty is a dull and frustrating prospect for the normal regular officer to contemplate."

When such motivation is augmented by the powerful spur of primitive patriotism, the fear of real or imagined Communist aggression, the competitiveness of interservice rivalries, the blandishments of contract-hungry corporations, and the active or passive support of a heavily propagandized public, the result is a reckless momentum of increasing militarism — one whose purposes are rapidly transformed from the maintenance of defense to the advocacy of armed initiative and even preventive war in order to impose American hegemony on the rest of the world. "America, — says General Shoup, — has become a militaristic and aggressive nation."

A generation of retired Air Force generals, among them Nathan F. Twining, Thomas S. Power and Curtis E. LeMay, has given us embittered memoirs deploring the reluctance of the United States to make full use of air power, including its capacity to wage nuclear war, in order to create a *Pax Americana*. Their cosmic vision of unbridled military might has its counterpart in the other services and among the military's civilian sycophants. A typical comment came early in 1969 from Marine Corps Reserve Major General Charles F. Duchein, the president of the Navy League of the United States (which describes itself as "the *civilian* arm of the Navy"):

> "All of the great land mass of planet Earth can now be dominated from the sea. An oceanic doctrine, a maritime concept, is the crux of capitalizing on the oceans of the world."

There is but little comfort in the fact that the most extreme doctrines fancied by the military have not yet been translated into national policy or practice. The influence of these doctrines has steadily increased. In its determination to play the role of policeman to the world, the United States has in recent years mounted a disastrous invasion of Cuba, a "successful" incursion into the Dominican Republic, and a catastrophic intervention in Vietnam. At the same time it has, by deploying its forces around the globe and entering into "commitments" to scores of nations, created the potential for many more Vietnams. It is a paradox of American "security" planning that it contributes constantly to insecurity by creating new U.S. "interests" to be threatened and defended.

Now the United States stands on the brink of a new, costly, and dangerous round of escalation in the arms race. On one hand, the military plan to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system that represents the latest manifestation of an old dream, the dream of an "absolute defense" against foreign attack. On the other, the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) is being developed as the absolute offensive weapon. Unless the trend against which President Eisenhower warned in 1961 can be reversed, a world already confronted with the danger of instant annihilation will be moved still closer to the edge of the precipice.

> "We are caught up in a sequence of technology developments without any logical end," Dr. Herbert York who served for three years as the Pentagon's director of defense research and engineering told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 16, 1969.

> "The first step in this sequence was the ballistic missile. The second step is the antiballistic missile. The third is the anti-antiballistic missile or MIRV as we usually call it. In this sequence each step is more pointless and more treacherous than the one before it. If we continue to put all our faith in seeking security through military technology, we shall soon discover what the fourth step is, but we shall be still further from achieving genuine national security."

This is the great peril posed by the military-industrial complex in America: not that it is diverting the United States from its historic path; not that it is both costly and wasteful; not that it stifles democracy and distorts the economy. The great peril is that it points us toward destruction.

Corruption - Criminality

There are two aspects linked to power. The first is that it exerts a powerful attraction to individuals that are keen on dominating others, even on the bases of tendencies that might be considered altruistic and deeply humane. The second is that, as strongly highlighted by Lord Acton, "Power corrupts."

Besides that, there is a saying, attributed to Francis Bacon, stating that "Opportunity makes a thief." This statement should not be considered an absolute truth. However, given the fact that the power to dominate others offers plenty of opportunities to commit all sort of malevolent actions, it is a matter of fact, confirmed also by historical studies, that State rulers are affected by corruption and criminality at a level unknown by the general public of citizens.

That is why, cutting dow or even canceling the power of the State rulers could be the best way to produce a society in which recurrent misdemeanours are greatly reduced and abominable misdeeds are eventually erased from the face of the earth.

George Washington Plunkitt

Very Plain Talks on Very Practical Politics (1905)

At the beginning of the 20th century the Democratic senator of New York (District of Tammany), George Washington Plunkitt, made a series of talks on politics, recorded by the journalist William L Riordon. In those talks he presented the grass roots and common sense view on politics, namely the fact that the politicians are elected in order to provide jobs and favours to those who have worked for their election. And also to profit from knowing things before the general public.

This is, in plain and simple terms, the foundation of electoral democracy and of politics in general. However, unlike senator Plunkitt, not many politicians have the courage of qualifying the behaviour and the finalities of the elected representatives as "honest graft."

Source: William L. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*, 1905.

Honest Graft and Dishonest Graft

Everybody is talkin' these days about Tammany men growin' rich on graft, but nobody thinks of drawin' the distinction between honest graft and dishonest graft. There's all the difference in the world between the two. Yes, many of our men have grown rich in politics. I have myself. I've made a big fortune out of the game, and I'm gettin' richer every day, but I've not gone in for dishonest graft — blackmailin' gamblers, saloonkeepers, disorderly people, etc. — and neither has any of the men who have made big fortunes in politics.

There's an honest graft, and I'm an example of how it works. I might sum up the whole thing by sayin': "I seen my opportunities and I took 'em."

Just let me explain by examples. My party's in power in the city, and it's goin' to undertake a lot of public improvements. Well, I'm tipped off, say, that they're going to layout a new park at a certain place.

I see my opportunity and I take it. I go to that place and I buy up all the land I can in the neighborhood. Then the board of this or that makes its plan public, and there is a rush to get my land, which nobody cared particular for before.

Ain't it perfectly honest to charge a good price and make a profit on my investment and foresight? of course, it is. Well, that's honest graft.

Or supposin' it's a new bridge they're goin' to build. I get tipped off and I buy as much property as I can that has to be taken for approaches. I sell at my own price later on and drop some more money in the bank.

Wouldn't you? It's just like lookin' ahead in Wall Street or in the coffee or cotton market. It's honest graft, and I'm lookin' for it every day in the year. I will tell you frankly that I've got a good lot of it, too.

I'll tell you of one case. They were goin' to fix up a big park, no matter where. I got on to it, and went lookin' about for land in that neighborhood. I could get nothin' at a bargain but a big piece of swamp, but I took it fast enough and held on to it. What turned out was just what I counted on. They couldn't make the park complete without Plunkitt's swamp, and they had to pay a good price for it. Anything dishonest in that?

Up in the watershed I made some money, too. I bought up several bits of land there some years ago and made a pretty good guess that they would be bought up for water purposes later by the city.

Somehow, I always guessed about right, and shouldn't I enjoy the profit of my foresight? It was rather amusin' when the condemnation commissioners came along and found piece after piece of the land in the name of George Plunkitt of the Fifteenth Assembly District, New York City. They wondered how I knew just what to buy. The answer is — I seen my opportunity and I took it.

I haven't confined myself to land; anything that pays is in my line.

For instance, the city is repavin' a street and has several hundred thousand old granite blocks to sell. I am on hand to buy, and I know just what they are worth. How? Never mind that. I had a sort of monopoly of this business for a while, but once a newspaper tried to do me. It got some outside men to come over from Brooklyn and New Jersey to bid against me.

Was I done? Not much. I went to each of the men and said: "How many of these 250,000 stones do you want?" One said 20,000, and another wanted 15,000, and other wanted 10,000. I said: "All right, let me bid for the lot, and I'll give each of you all you want for nothin'."

They agreed, of course. Then the auctioneer yelled: "How much am I bid for these 250,000 fine pavin' stones?"

"Two dollars and fifty cents," says I.

"Two dollars and fifty cents!" screamed the auctioneer. "Oh, that's a joke! Give me a real bid."

He found the bid was real enough. My rivals stood silent. I got the lot for $2.50 and gave them their share. That's how the attempt to do Plunkitt ended, and that's how all such attempts end.

I've told you how I got rich by honest graft. Now, let me tell you that most politicians who are accused of robbin' the city get rich the same way.

They didn't steal a dollar from the city treasury. They just seen their opportunities and took them. That is why, when a reform administration comes in and spends a half million dollars in tryin' to find the public robberies they talked about in the campaign, they don't find them.

The books are always all right. The money in the city treasury is all right. Everything is all right. All they can show is that the Tammany heads of departments looked after their friends, within the law, and gave them what opportunities they could to make honest graft. Now, let me tell you that's never goin' to hurt Tammany with the people. Every good man looks after his friends, and any man who doesn't isn't likely to be popular. If I have a good thing to hand out in private life, I give it to a friend. Why shouldn't X do the same in public life?

Another kind of honest graft. Tammany has raised a good many salaries. There was an awful howl by the reformers, but don't you know that Tammany gains ten votes for everyone it lost by salary raisin'?

The Wall Street banker thinks it shameful to raise a department clerk's salary from $1500 to $1800 a year, but every man who draws a salary himself says: "That's all right. I wish it was me." And he feels

very much like votin' the Tammany ticket on election day, just out of sympathy.

Tammany was beat in 1901 because the people were deceived into believin' that it worked dishonest graft. They didn't draw a distinction between dishonest and honest graft, but they saw that some Tammany men grew rich, and supposed they had been robbin' the city treasury or levyin' blackmail on disorderly houses, or workin' in with the gamblers and lawbreakers.

As a matter of policy, if nothing else, why should the Tammany leaders go into such dirty business, when there is so much honest graft lyin' around when they are in power? Did you ever consider that?

Now, in conclusion, I want to say that I don't own a dishonest dollar. If my worst enemy was given the job of writin' my epitaph when I'm gone, he couldn't do more than write:

"George W. Plunkitt. He Seen His Opportunities,
and He Took 'Em."

Reciprocity in Patronage

Whenever Tammany is whipped at the polls, the people set to predictin' that the organization is goin' to smash. They say we can't get along without the offices and that the district leaders are goin' to desert wholesale. That was what was said after the throwdowns in 1894 and 1901. But it didn't happen, did it? Not one big Tammany man deserted, and today the organization is stronger than ever.

How was that? It was because Tammany has more than one string to its bow.

I acknowledge that you can't keep an organization together without patronage. Men ain't in politics for nothin'. They want to get somethin' out of it.

But there is more than one kind of patronage. We lost the public kind, or a greater part of it, in 1901, but Tammany has an immense private patronage that keeps things goin' when it gets a setback at the polls.

Take me, for instance. When Mayor Low came in, some of my men lost public jobs, but I fixed them all right. I don't know how many jobs I got for them on the surface and elevated railroads — several hundred.

I placed a lot more on public works done by contractors, and no Tammany man goes hungry in my district. Plunkitt's O.K. on an application for a job is never turned down, for they all know that Plunkitt and Tammany don't stay out long. See!

Let me tell you, too, that I got jobs from Republicans in office — Federal and otherwise. When Tammany's on top I do good turns for the Republicans. When they're on top they don't forget me.

Me and the Republicans are enemies just one day in the year — election day. Then we fight tooth and nail. The rest of the time it's live and let live with us.

On election day I try to pile up as big a majority as I can against George Wanmaker, the Republican leader of the Fifteenth. Any other day George and I are the best of friends. I can go to him and say: "George, I want you to place this friend of mine." He says: "All right, Senator." Or vice versa.

You see, we differ on tariffs and currencies and all them things, but we agree on the main proposition that when a man works in politics, he should get something out of it.

The politicians have got to stand together this way or there wouldn't be any political parties in a short time. Civil service would gobble up everything, politicians would be on the bum, the republic would fall and soon there would be the cry of "Vevey le roi!" ["Long live the king"].

The very thought of this civil service monster makes my blood boil. I have said a lot about it already, but another instance of its awful work just occurs to me.

Let me tell you a sad but true story. Last Wednesday a line of carriages wound into Cavalry Cemetery. I was in one of them. It was the funeral of a young man from my district — a bright boy that I had great hopes of.

When he went to school, he was the most patriotic boy in the district. Nobody could sing "The Star-Spangled Banner" like him, nobody was as fond of waving a flag, and nobody shot off as many firecrackers on the Fourth of July. And when he grew up he made up his mind to serve his country in one of the city departments. There was no way of gettin' there without passin' a civil service examination. Well, he went down to the civil service office and tackled the fool questions. I saw him next day — it was Memorial Day, and soldiers were marchin' and flags flyin' and people cheerin'.

Where was my young man? Standin' on the corner, scowlin' at the whole show. When I asked him why he was so quiet, he laughed in a wild sort of way and said: "What rot all this is!"

Just then a band came along playing "Liberty." He laughed wild again and said: "Liberty? Rats!"

I don't guess I need to make a long story of it. From the time that young man left the civil service office he lost all patriotism. He didn't care no more for his country. He went to the dogs.

He ain't the only one. There's a gravestone over some bright young man's head for everyone of them infernal civil service examinations. They are underminin' the manhood of the nation and makin' the Declaration of Independence a farce. We need a new Declaration of Independence — independence of the whole fool civil service business.

I mention all this now to show why it is that the politicians of two big parties help each other along, and why Tammany men are tolerably happy when not in power in the city. When we win I won't let any deservin' Republican in my neighborhood suffer from hunger or thirst, although, of course, I look out for my own people first.

Now, I've never gone in for nonpartisan business, but I do think that all the leaders of the two parties should get together and make an open, nonpartisan fight against civil service, their common enemy. They could keep up their quarrels about imperialism and free silver and high tariff. They don't count for much alongside of civil service, which strikes right at the root of the government.

The time is fast coming when civil service or the politicians will have to go. And it will be here sooner than they expect if the politicians don't unite, drop all them minor issues for a while and make a stand against the civil service flood that's sweepin' over the country like them floods out West.

James Peter Warbasse

State Atrocities (1915)

A powerful short text that highlights the fact that the brutalities and atrocities that the States were committing since the start of the First World War were not something new or unusual but were current practice of the same State rulers towards all the human beings living in the territories that they controlled and exploited.

Source: James Peter Warbasse, *Concerning Atrocities*, Mother Earth, New York, July 1915.

The air is surcharged with atrocities. Incriminations and recriminations are hurled hither and thither by press, post, wire, and wireless. The Germans have been atrocious in Belgium; the Russians in East Prussia; the Austrians, in Servia; and the English — nowhere, because they have not been able to invade the enemies' country, but in their own country they got themselves into practice upon their own innocent girlhood before they set sail for virgin foreign fields.

Atrocities are the order of the day. The crowning atrocity to date seems to be the sinking of the Lusitania. [1]

As one views this holocaust of fire, rapine, plunder, debauchery, and murder, one must be impressed with the observation that the atrocities themselves are less dreadful than their common causes. The distressing fact is that the causes of all of these atrocities existed before the Great War, and perpetrated quite as great atrocities; and, what is still more distressing, they will continue to provoke atrocities after the war is over. The world is making the grievous error of isolating the acts of this war from the rest of social conduct as though it were something unusual, unexpected, cataclysmic, unique. We hear the expressions that this war is "the failure of civilization," or "the breakdown of Christianity," or "the debauchery of governments." How foolish are these expressions. How can that fail which has not succeeded? How can that break down which has not been built up? How can that become debauched which already is debauched and debauching?

There is no new principle nor unique manifestation in the Great War. The atrocities which the Germans have committed in Belgium are no greater than those unspeakable atrocities which the Belgians committed in the Congo [2]. The atrocities which the Germans have committed against the English are incomparably trivial beside the brutalities which the English committed in the Sudan. As to the bestialities of the Russians in Eastern Prussia, Russia out-does them every day in times of peace against her own helpless people. The destruction by Germany of a hundred odd American citizens who were packed around a cargo of ammunition, is less atrocious than the atrocities which the United States perpetrates upon its own peaceful Indians [3].

The history of every one of these nations is a series of broken treaties and atrocities committed under the protection or by the instigation of government. Not one of these nations, which prates so glibly of the

sins of the others, is taking a step to abandon its own atrociousness. They are all committing greater atrocities at home than abroad. The United States officially and by executive fiat went upon its knees with a heart full of hypocrisy, prayed for peace; and then rose from its knees and proceeded with the production of shot and shell, to be employed in killing men, women, and children — all manufactured and exported with the knowledge, co-operation and approval of that same Government which had ordered the prayers for peace. Now that same hypocrisy, which stood calmly by while men, women, and children in Colorado were murdered in the interest of a privileged property-owning class, threatens to sacrifice thousands more of American lives in a world war, as though that might atone for those already lost!

This war is something more than a ruling-class enterprise. It is an expression of the governments which are maintained in the interest of the privileged property-owning class, and which in their brutal zeal for the interests of their pet class have fallen at one another's throats. Let us not make the mistake of holding German, English, French, Russian, or American human beings guilty. The people in all of these countries are better at heart than they act. The atrocities are more the atrocities of governments than of men and women. It has been government that has instigated and kept alive the militarism that has poisoned the minds of school children and now puts guns in their hands and sends them forth to commit atrocities.

Shooting men is not less of an atrocity than raping women, burning girls in Triangle fires [4], or drowning people at sea because of the inhuman quest for profits of a transatlantic transportation company. When the truth becomes known it will be discovered that the people who perished with the Lusitania could have been saved but for the ruthless disregard of means for saving lives which would have cost the company some small fraction of its profits.

Deprived of his liberty, coerced into becoming a wheel in a machine, which moves or stops at the word of command from the government above, the soldier and his doings are but the expressions of the State. In Belgium, it appears that the attacks upon non-combatants were instigated from above; they were manifestations of government. The free German, had he not been deprived of his liberties by the State, would prefer to remain at home, till his fields by day, and play with his children after supper.

There is one great atrocity in this wretched business of which we should not lose sight; that is the State. The State exists because there are privileged people, whose privileges would pass from them were they not protected by the powerful machinery of government. A privileged class means a class which enjoys advantages which others do not have; and there can be no class having advantages unless there is another class suffering disadvantages. The several governments, top-heavy with militarism, which they had built up for the protection of their privileged people, have toppled over into the vortex.

This is the historic fate of governments. It threatens to be the fate of the United States. When it becomes the interest of the privileged economic forces of the United States to have war with Mexico, we shall have it [5]. At present our property-privileged class desires the exploitation of the markets of South America, and the natural and human resources of that virgin country. Hence the Monroe doctrine [6]. But the Monroe doctrine is political buncombe, unless backed by a powerful navy. Still in the face of it our Government holds out to the world the hypocrisy that we are a non-belligerent nation. The day approaches when militarism will drag us into war, because the privileged interests require the State and the Monroe doctrine, and militarism is their natural offspring.

Hope lies in the abolition of the twin interests, privilege and the State, and supplanting them with a free society in which human brotherhood and mutual aid shall become the dominant forces.

Notes

[1] The Lusitania was a British-registered ocean liner that was torpedoed by an Imperial German Navy U-boat during the First World War on 7 May 1915. The attack took place in the declared maritime war zone around the UK, three months after unrestricted submarine warfare against the ships of the United Kingdom had been announced by the German State following the Allied powers' implementation of a naval blockade against Germany and the other Central Powers.

[2] See: Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost*, Mariner Books, 2020.

[3] See: Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee. An Indian History of the American West,* Random House, 1987.

[4] The *Triangle Shirtwaist Factory* fire in the Greenwich Village (New York) on Saturday, March 25, 1911, was the deadliest industrial disaster in the history of the city. Because the doors to the stairwells and exits were locked — a common practice at the time to prevent workers from taking unauthorized breaks — many of the workers could not escape from the burning building and died.

[5] There had already been an armed conflict between the United States and Mexico that lasted from April 1846 to February 1848. It was primarily driven by U.S. expansionist desires, particularly the belief in Manifest Destiny. This phrase, *Manifest Destiny*, was coined in 1845 to convey the idea that the United States was destined by God to expand its dominion and spread democracy and capitalism across the entire North American continent. The war resulted in significant territorial gains for the United States.

[6] The *Monroe Doctrine*, first articulated by President James Monroe on December 2, 1823, holds that any intervention in the political affairs of the American Continent (North and South) by foreign powers is a potentially hostile act against the United States.

Thorstein Veblen

National Politics as Sanctified Gangsterism (1923)

In this extract the author makes a devastating analysis of politics and of the nation-state as a "gang or clique of political hucksters whose concern it is to make use of the national establishment for the profit of some particular group of special business interests."

Clearly, in order to make this criminal behaviour acceptable by the people, myths had to be invented and rites had to be performed about democracy and national sovereignty. However, when "divested of this metaphysical figment of sovereignty and divine right, any national pretensions on the part of any democratic commonwealth become footless nonsense."

Source: Thorstein Veblen, *Absentee Ownership*, Chapter II, 1923.

The growth of national integrity has run a fairly unbroken course since the close of the Middle Ages. It has all the while gathered vigor and momentum, on the whole, and has grown gradually more definite in its aims and motives; and this course of growth and ripening

appears by no means to be concluded yet. As it bears on the questions involved in the present inquiry the spirit (or habit) of national integrity may be said to have taken its rise and assumed much of its distinctive character in those princely adventures in "state-making" that fill the political history of early modern times.

State-making was a competitive enterprise of war and politics, in which the rival princely or dynastic establishments, all and several, each sought its own advantage at the cost of any whom it might concern. Being essentially a predatory enterprise, its ways and means were fraud and force. The several princely and dynastic establishments took on a corporate existence, with a corporate interest, policy, and organisation; and each of them worked consistently at cross purposes with all other similar corporations engaged in the same line of adventure.

Among them were also principalities of the Faith, including the Holy See. The aim of it all centered in princely dominion and prestige, and in unearned incomes for the civil, military, and ecclesiastical personnel by whose concerted effort the traffic in state-making was carried on. Anyone of these dynastic corporations could gain further dominion and prestige only at the expense of others of their kind, and only at the cost of their underlying population.

It is a matter of course that the loss, damage, or discomfort of anyone counted as gain for the rest; all gains being differential gains. The traffic was carried on then as now by warfare and warlike diplomacy [1]; which always resolves itself into an expenditure of life and substance on the part of the underlying population of all contending parties. It was always, as it has always continued to be, an enterprise of intimidation which counted on an eventual recourse to arms — *ultima ratio principum* — and the business was always, then as now, worked out in terms of mutual damage and discomfort, the outcome being decided by the balance of damage and loss; the cost in life and substance falling, then as now, on the underlying population, and the

gains in dominion, prestige and goods going to the princely establishment and the kept classes.

This whole traffic in state-making is of a singularly ambiguous character and makes a sufficiently notorious chapter of history. And the States which it made were such as it might be expected to make. It was an enterprise in mutual defeat, quite unashamed. To the end that these adventures in damage, debauch and discomfort might be carried to a fitting conclusion, as they commonly have been, the several dynastic corporations claimed, and enforced, an undivided usufruct of their underlying populations and all their ways and works. So this unqualified usufruct of the underlying population became a perpetual and unalienable asset of the dynastic establishment, by Grace of God. In time, and indeed in a relatively short time, by force of strict and unremitting discipline and indoctrination the underlying population learned to believe that this princely usufruct of their persons and property by Grace of God was indispensably right and good, in the nature of things.

By law and custom the underlying population came to owe, and to own, an unbounded and unquestioning allegiance of service to the princely establishment in whose usufruct they are held. Therefore, servile allegiance has become not only a point of law but also a point of morals and honor. Such is the force of use and wont.

In the nature of things, these competitive princely corporations were always working at cross purposes and were imbued with an all-pervading spirit of enmity and distrust, suitable to that enterprise in mutual damage and discomfort for which they were organised and equipped; and in all this diligent pursuit of disaster it was recognised as a plain matter of course that there was no place for scruples of any kind. All is fair in war and politics. It is a game of force and fraud. There is said to be honor among thieves, but one does not look for such a thing among statesmen. And so this spirit of dynastic statecraft spread down and outward by diffusion, by

precept and example, throughout the underlying population until presently they were, all and several, bound together in the service of their predacious masters by an inveterate and unreflecting solidarity of national conceit, fear, hate, contempt, and an enthusiastically slavish obedience to the constituted authorities. Such has been the force of use and wont, and such is its institutional residues. [2]

By habituation through these bleak centuries of state-making this national integrity of hate, mischief and distrust has been ground into the texture of civilised life and thought, until it has become one of the sovereign facts in the established order of law and morals in all the civilised nations. So that when presently, under the pressure of altered material circumstances and consequent altered habits of life, a growth of democratic institutions set in, the ancient habitual solidarity of national conceit, fear, hate, contempt, and servility was carried over intact and unabated into the ideals of the democratic commonwealth, where it is still treasured as the essential substance of citizenship. It still remains the chief engine of dissension and distress at the hands of the national statesmen, whose chief end of endeavour continues to be mutual defeat. It is only that the right of the prince has passed over into the divine right of the Nation. The democratic corporations of national statesmen continue to carry on the traffic in war and politics on the same lines and by use of the same means and methods as the dynastic statesmen of the era of state-making in their time. And the ways and means of all is still the same dutiful usufruct of the underlying population, dedicated to this use by their corporate spirit of national vanity, fear, hate, contempt, and servility.

In the course of this era of state-making the prince became a "sovereign" by Grace of God, with tenure in perpetuity. His divine right to the usufruct of the underlying population was worked out and established by help of the interested connivance of the Church; and this appear to have been the only substantial contribution which

Church has made to the modern scheme of civil and political institutions.

The prince became a sovereign; that is to say, all men became subject and abjectly inferior to him, in the nature of things; and to him, for no reasoned cause, all men thereupon owed unquestioning and unqualified obedience and service, in the divine nature of things. This notion of "sovereignty" is essentially a proposition in theological metaphysics, according to which some sort of immaterial superiority is infused in the person of the sovereign by divine fiat; which invests him with an axiomatically authentic personal dominion over the underlying population and all their ways and works. The Freudians would presumably call it an inferiority complex with benefit of clergy

When and in so far as the democratic commonwealth has displaced the monarchical State, this theologico-metaphysical attribute of sovereignty is conceived by the experts in political law and speculation to have passed over intact to the Nation; so that the Grace of God in this bearing now invests the national establishment, conceived as a corporate personality, instead of the person of the prince. The retention of this princely sovereignty in behalf of the "sovereign people" marks the Nation as a successor of the dynastic State, chartered to do business on the same lines and with the same powers; very much as a modern oil corporation will take over all the powers and liabilities of any individual promoters whom it has bought out. The democratic Nation, therefore, is a sovereign by Grace of God, whatever other blessings it may enjoy. But the democratic Nation has no personal existence except in the several persons of its citizens.

So the experts in political speculation have drawn the logical consequence, to the effect that these democratic citizens are vested with this princely sovereignty, each and several, unalienably and in perpetuity. That is to say, these democratic citizens, each and several, by

grace of God hold sovereign dominion over the underlying population of which they each and several are abjectly servile components. So also it should apparently follow by force of the same metaphysics that each of these sovereign citizens, being at the same time a loyal member of the underlying population, by Grace of God owes unqualified and unalienable allegiance to his own person in perpetuity.

All this seems foolish, of course. But it has the merit of consistency. And it was for a democracy of this complexion that the world once was to have been made safe. So also of course it is at least extremely doubtful if any stretch of human fantasy could have designed and embroidered such an extraordinary conception of citizen-sovereignty, if it had not been that the maggoty conceit of princely divine right was ready to hand, — an institutional heirloom handed down to the democratic commonwealth from the days of the Grace of God; the days of dynastic state-making and princely bishops; when the Lord's anointed "tore each other in the slime" of political intrigue, while they visited upon the underlying population "the high justice, the middle, and the low."

When divested of this metaphysical figment of sovereignty and divine right, any national pretensions on the part of any democratic commonwealth become footless nonsense. The commonwealth in such a case would no longer be a political engine to be turned to account for political traffic by the politicians. It would be nothing to bluster and give off fumes about; nothing better, in fact, than an unsanctified workday arrangement for the common use of industrial ways and means. In fact the democratic commonwealths would in such event be in a fair way to become what they profess to be, — neighborly fellowships of ungraded masterless men given over to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" under the ancient and altogether human rule of Live and Let Live.

In that event loyal subjection to the national establishment of politicians would have no sacramental value, and patriotic fervor would be no more meritorious than any other display of intolerance. Treason and sedition would accordingly fall from their high estate as the chief of crimes, and would take rank as nothing better than scandalous dissension about matters of taste and opinion. However, that is not the way things have been arranged by the blind drift of habituation out of that sorry past. And as things now stand, thanks to that parlous legacy of despotism and predation by Grace of God, patriotic inflation is the chief of the civic virtues, and failure to abet the government's political intrigues is "high crimes and misdemeanors."

By grace of this ingrained bias of predacious enmity toward the outside and voluntary servitude within the Nation the constituted authorities of these democratic commonwealths have fallen neatly into the place once occupied by the dynastic statesmen, and so they have, quite as a matter of course, also fallen into the same lines of dreary traffic in competitive force and fraud, without material abatement. Therefore civilised mankind is still divided against itself in a predatory scramble to get something for nothing at the cost of any whom it may concern; which always foots up to mutual defeat at the cost of the underlying population.

This is the domain of External Politics; a domain created out of national animosities, by statecraft, for the pursuit of national prestige and unearned gain.

In internal affairs, on the other hand, it is loosely presumed that the statesmen will be actuated by principles of equity and fair dealing and will be occupied with a humane pursuit of the common good. But the more fully the commonwealth has come to realise its status as a Nation, the more does its external politics (war and diplomacy) take precedence of its domestic concerns. The exigencies of external politics are paramount, and the conduct of internal affairs therefore are, in effect, required to conform to the needs of the

nation's external policies. And the administration of external politics, being in the nature of an enterprise in chicane and coercion, is necessarily furtive, runs forever on sharp practice, carefully withholds "information that might be useful to the enemy," and habitually gives out information with intent to deceive. In effect, external politics is a blend of war and business and combines the peculiar traits of both.

So the shadow of external politics covers also the management of domestic affairs, with the result that the authorities of the democratic commonwealths habitually go about their work under a cover of reticence tempered with prevarication.

Now, this may seem a fault; but the strategy enforced by the paramount exigencies of national politics is a furtive business, in the nature of things, and will have to be accepted with the defects of its qualities, if the Republic is to fulfil its destiny as a dignified and self-respecting Nation. The needful screen of strategic reticence serves also as a useful cover for many interested transactions that would not bear the light of untempered publicity; and the reasonable officers who thrive under the shade of the screen will presumably be such as the circumstances call for. By selective elimination of artless persons the personnel of official life comes to be made up, in the main, of such persons as will feel at home in the resulting spiritual twilight of official life, by native gift or by sedulous training [3]. So it has also come about, under the stress of national strategy and political business enterprise, that any effectual distinction between honest politics and corrupt politics is an elusive difference of degree, not a difference in kind [4].

Due to the same causes it also follows that patriotic devotion to the national establishment will, in effect, come to much the same thing as partisan devotion to the fortunes of some particular gang or clique of political hucksters whose concern it is to make use of the national establishment for the profit of some particular group of special busi-

ness interests; which is called "party government" by those who theorise in Political Science.

Notes by the author

[1] The part of wise statecraft then as now was to "speak softly and carry a big stick," as the principle has been formulated by one of the greater democratic statesmen of a later time. [Theodore Roosevelt]

[2] Cf. e. g., Max Silvius Handman, "The Sentiment of Nationalism." *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1921. — No people can be a *bona-fide* Nation so long as it falls short in respect of this overhead of futilities and turpitudes.

[3] This will ordinarily imply a degree of arrested development, particularly of the moral faculty, such as goes to create what is called a "moron." Still, sedulous training will also do much.

[4] As seen, e. g., in the late election of a United States Senator from Michigan, where this question has been decided on a technicality.

David Loth

Public Plunder (1938)

The practice of graft, that is the fraudulent use of a public office to obtain personal profits or advantages, is very old. In this extract the author shows the origin of public plunder in the United States right from the moment the first colonists arrived from England. And graft is also strictly linked to the process of industrialisation of the United States.

Source: David Loth, *Public Plunder. A History of Graft in America*, Chapter 1, 1938.

Captain Samuel Argall brought the good ship George to anchor of Point Comfort on a calm May morning in 1617, and saw Opportunity lurking in the mists that lent the Virginia coastline a pleasant vagueness. Other men who had passed that way — Raleigh, Lord de la Warr, John Smith and their like — had also seen the vision. But to them it had appeared in a golden haze shot through with precious stones.

Captain Argall's dreams were of a more practical nature. He proposed as Governor of Virginia to achieve riches by prosaic administration of that post in the English manner. He had not been privileged to acquire experience in civil service, but he was an observant man. He had watched the King's servants rise from poverty to wealth in positions that ostensibly offered no more than a living wage, and he had longed for the chance to put the lesson into practice.

Thirty-odd years of an adventurous life had fitted him, he flattered himself, to make the most of his opportunities. Fifth son of a country squire, he had grown to manhood in the last years of Elizabeth's reign, absorbing the spirit of businesslike adventure that so distinguished the Virgin Queen's sailors. Navigating unknown seas, exploring uncharted shores, fighting or negotiating with savage tribes, he had kept constantly before him the goal of all his efforts — increased trade for England and a share of the spoil for Captain Argall.

So now, perspiring gently inside his breastplate, he impatiently hastened preparations for going ashore to wrest a fortune from the wilderness. In the process, and quite unconsciously, he established upon a new continent the principle of personal gain in public office, which was in his day as firmly fixed an element of British government as the English tradition of liberty. Both bloomed luxuriantly in the fertile soil of the New World, reacting so persistently upon each other that their development was inseparable.

Corruption, stemming from the early English model, but modified and amplified to meet the changing problems of exploiting so vast a territory, made possible some of the more generally admired features of our civilization. Its contributions to progress and reaction rather than its expositions of individual greed are the factors that demand serious consideration of the system in any study of the country's rise to greatness. Argall was the first of a long line of men who turned American politics to the service of personal interest. Without an

understanding of their activities, the history of the United States is a meaningless tale.

Later generations have applied the term "graft" to the wages paid by the entrepreneur (whether streetwalker or wizard of finance) to the servants of the state (from the policeman on the beat to the elder statesman in the Cabinet). We have scorned the grafter while offering profound homage to the triumphs of industrial and financial giantism which his graft protected and nourished. Corrupt politicians betrayed the noble sentiments which the people claimed as their ideals, but the betrayal was a necessary help in rearing that network of private enterprise to which they attributed their material progress. Whatever the popular slogan of the moment, the grafters and the "rugged individualists" have always moved hand in hand to create the massive, complex machinery of modern capitalism by which the world lives.

It was, therefore, more than a mere historical oddity that the first of the Thirteen Colonies, the first English settlement overseas, should have been the creation of a joint stock company organized for profit. English civilization in America was rooted in the commercial character of the Virginia Company of London and nurtured in the conflicts that made up the inglorious reign of James I.

Merchants, emerging from the status of medieval guildsmen, were introducing a progressive force into the static society to which conservative courtiers clung. Trading vessels fared forth in ever larger numbers from the mouth of Thames, carrying the products of a stimulated English industrial life. They returned freighted with the riches of the world, putting into the hands of their owners an economic influence which the merchants themselves were slow to realize. As yet the City men were content to exercise power indirectly, glad to depend upon the good will of titled gentlemen who had the ear of the King or the King's Ministers.

Ever since monarchs first surrounded themselves with cabinets and courts, the influence of these officials had been for sale. In England they reckoned their places as worth so much a year in gifts and fees. Many jobs were in the open market, passing from hand to hand like shares in a trading Company. The price was fixed by the graft that went with the post, the salaries being negligible, and the politicians considered their offices as a form of private property. In prosecuting claims through the agency of these persons, merchants trod a path worn smooth by generations of landed gentry before them. No one questioned the propriety of offering a purse of gold, a share in a profitable voyage, a pipe of wine or a service of plate to the public man who could facilitate deals between business and the state.

Success in these fields led the wealthier commercial figures to recognize their dominant role in making their country a world power. And, such is the ingratitude of man, as soon as they felt their strength they became resentful of limitations upon it. The familiar arguments about an Englishman's freedom were suddenly applied to his business as well as to his land or his person. A new conception of property rights rose to confront the vested interests of autocracy. Within a generation it was to sweep Britain into civil war. Meanwhile it found expression in graft.

The Virginia Company of London, chartered in the first decade of the seventeenth century, was an outgrowth of this movement's early phases — and of the lamentable ignorance of its incorporators. America to them meant the treasures of Mexico and Peru. Many of the shareholders were old enough to remember that a single one of Drake's voyages had paid a dividend of 4,700 per cent to the lucky persons who financed it. Vision of an annual Virginia plate fleet freighted with gold and silver, pearls and diamonds, floated enchantingly before the bemused merchants of London as they threaded the narrow streets from 'Change to counting house.

King James was brought to share the pleasant delusion. He freely bestowed upon the new venture his blessing, prayers of the Church of England and the North American continent between North Carolina and Maine. The promoters of the Virginia Company were not the men to belittle the princely gift in the telling. As they poured forth their eloquence to prospective buyers of stock, the carved wooden housefronts of the City seemed to become magically gilded with a precious American veneer. Shares were snatched at £12 10s. The salesmen, by no means novices, had already organized in similar fashion that model of corporate power, the East India Company. Samuel Insull [1] and Jay Gould [2] could have taught them nothing in the way of "conserving assets for the investing public." They were the authors of England's commercial supremacy, inheritors of the traditions of Italian and Hanseatic merchant princes, realists whose heirs would be able to smile at a Sun King's [Louis XIV of France] juvenile boast, "*L'état, c'est moi!*" [I am the State].

The earliest effective administration in what was to be the United States was conditioned by the conception of public service which the bourgeois pioneers would have applied in London had they dared. Their dawning belief that government should be in the interest of trade met no opposition in the wilderness, as it did at home, for government and trade were vested in one body — the Virginia Company.

Notes

[1] Samuel Insull (1859 - 1938) was a British American business magnate. He was active in setting up an integrated electrical infrastructure in the United States.

[2] Jay Gould (1836 - 1892) was an American railroad magnate and financial speculator. He is generally identified as one of the robber barons of the Gilded Age.

Albert Jay Nock

The Criminality of the State (1939)

In this essay the author highlights a very common aspect, namely the fact that, in general, people condemn atrocities committed by other States but ignore, belittle or even justify and condone those committed by the State to whom they feel allegiance. And so, all the State rulers consider themselves entitled to carry on atrocious misdeeds, quite confident that they will be forgotten by foreigners and forgiven by their subjects.

Source: Albert Jay Nock, *The Criminality of the State*, American Mercury, March 1939.

As well as I can judge, the general attitude of Americans who are at all interested in foreign affairs is one of astonishment, coupled with distaste, displeasure, or horror, according to the individual observer's capacity for emotional excitement. Perhaps I ought to shade this statement a little in order to keep on the safe side, and say that this is the most generally expressed attitude.

All our institutional voices — the press, pulpit, forum — are pitched to the note of amazed indignation at one or another phase of the current goings-on in Europe and Asia. This leads me to believe that our people generally are viewing with wonder as well as repugnance certain conspicuous actions of various foreign States; for instance, the barbarous behavior of the German State towards some of its own citizens; the merciless despotism of the Soviet Russian State; the ruthless imperialism of the Italian State [1]; the "betrayal of Czechoslovakia" by the British and French States [2]; the savagery of the Japanese State; the brutishness of the Chinese State's mercenaries; and so on, here or there, all over the globe — this sort of thing is showing itself to be against our people's grain, and they are speaking out about it in wrathful surprise.

I am cordially with them on every point but one. I am with them in repugnance, horror, indignation, disgust, but not in astonishment. The history of the State being what it is, and its testimony being as invariable and eloquent as it is, I am obliged to say that the naive tone of surprise wherewith our people complain of these matters strikes me as a pretty sad reflection on their intelligence. Suppose someone were impolite enough to ask them the gruff question, "Well, what do you expect?" — what rational answer could they give? I know of none.

Polite or impolite, that is just the question which ought to be put every time a story of State villainy appears in the news. It ought to be thrown at our public day after day, from every newspaper, periodical, lecture platform, and radio station in the land; and it ought to be backed up by a simple appeal to history, a simple invitation to look at the record. The British State has sold the Czech State down the river by a despicable trick; very well, be as disgusted and angry as you like, but don't be astonished; what would you expect? — just take a look at the British State's record! The German State is persecuting great masses of its people, the Russian State is holding a purge, the Italian State is grabbing territory, the Japanese State is buccaneering along

the Asiatic Coast; horrible, yes, but for Heaven's sake don't lose your head over it, for what would you expect? — look at the record!

That is how every public presentation of these facts ought to run if Americans are ever going to grow up into an adult attitude towards them. Also, in order to keep down the great American sin of self-righteousness, every public presentation ought to draw the deadly parallel with the record of the American State. The German State is persecuting a minority, just as the American State did after 1776; the Italian State breaks into Ethiopia, just as the American State broke into Mexico; the Japanese State kills off the Manchurian tribes in wholesale lots, just as the American State did the Indian tribes; the British State practices large-scale carpetbaggery, like the American State after 1864; the imperialist French State massacres native civilians on their own soil, as the American State did in pursuit of its imperialistic policies in the Pacific, and so on.

In this way, perhaps, our people might get into their heads some glimmering of the fact that the State's criminality is nothing new and nothing to be wondered at. It began when the first predatory group of men clustered together and formed the State, and it will continue as long as the State exists in the world, because the State is fundamentally an anti-social institution, fundamentally criminal. The idea that the State originated to serve any kind of social purpose is completely unhistorical. It originated in conquest and confiscation — that is to say, in crime. It originated for the purpose of maintaining the division of society into an owning-and-exploiting class and a propertyless dependent class — that is, for a criminal purpose.

No State known to history originated in any other manner, or for any other purpose. Like all predatory or parasitic institutions, its first instinct is that of self-preservation. All its enterprises are directed first towards preserving its own life, and, second, towards increasing its own power and enlarging the scope of its own activity. For the sake of this it will, and regularly does, commit any crime which

circumstances make expedient. In the last analysis, what is the German, Italian, French, or British State now actually doing? It is ruining its own people in order to preserve itself, to enhance its own power and prestige, and extend its own authority; and the American State is doing the same thing to the utmost of its opportunities.

What, then, is a little matter like a treaty to the French or British State? Merely a scrap of paper — Bethmann-Hollweg [3] described it exactly. Why be astonished when the German or Russian State murders its citizens? The American State would do the same thing under the same circumstances. In fact, eighty years ago it did murder a great many of them for no other crime in the world but that they did not wish to live under its rule any longer; and if that is a crime, then the colonists led by G. Washington were hardened criminals and the Fourth of July is nothing but a cutthroat's holiday.

The weaker the State is, the less power it has to commit crime. Where in Europe today does the State have the best criminal record? Where it is weakest: in Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Sweden, Monaco, Andorra. Yet when the Dutch State, for instance, was strong, its criminality was appalling; in Java it massacred 9,000 persons in one morning [4] which is considerably ahead of Hitler's record or Stalin's. It would not do the like today, for it could not; the Dutch people do not give it that much power, and would not stand for such conduct. When the Swedish State was a great empire, its record, say from 1660 to 1670, was fearful. What does all this mean but that if you do not want the State to act like a criminal, you must disarm it as you would a criminal; you must keep it weak. The State will always be criminal in proportion to its strength; a weak State will always be as criminal as it can be, or dare be, but if it is kept down to the proper limit of weakness — which, by the way, is a vast deal lower limit than people are led to believe — its criminality may be safely got on with.

So it strikes me that instead of sweating blood over the iniquity of foreign States, my fellow-citizens would do a great deal better by themselves to make sure that the American State is not strong enough to carry out the like iniquities here. The stronger the American State is allowed to grow, the higher its record of criminality will grow, according to its opportunities and temptations. If, then, instead of devoting energy, time, and money to warding off wholly imaginary and fanciful dangers from criminals thousands of miles away, our people turn their patriotic fervor loose on the only source from which danger can proceed, they will be doing their full duty by their country.

Two able and sensible American publicists — Isabel Paterson, of the *New York Herald Tribune*, and W. J. Cameron, of the Ford Motor Company — have lately called our public's attention to the great truth that if you give the State power to do something for you, you give it an exact equivalent of power to do something to you. I wish every editor, publicist, teacher, preacher, and lecturer would keep hammering that truth into American heads until they get it nailed fast there, never to come loose. The State was organized in this country with power to do all kinds of things for the people, and the people in their short-sighted stupidity, have been adding to that power ever since. After 1789, John Adams said that, so far from being a democracy of a democratic republic, the political organization of the country was that of "a monarchical republic, or, if you will, a limited monarchy"; the powers of its President were far greater than those of "an avoyer [5], a consul, a podestà, a doge, a stadtholder; nay, than a king of Poland; nay, than a king of Sparta." If all that was true in 1789 — and it was true — what is to be said of the American State at the present time, after a century and a half of steady centralization and continuous increments of power?

Power, for instance, to "help business" by auctioning off concessions, subsidies, tariffs, land grants, franchises; power to help business by ever encroaching regulations, supervisions, various forms of control.

All this power was freely given; it carried with it the equivalent power to do things to business; and see what a banditti of sharking political careerists are doing to business now! Power to afford "relief" to proletarians; and see what the State has done to those proletarians now in the way of systematic debauchery of whatever self-respect and self-reliance they may have had! Power this way, power that way; and all ultimately used against the interests of the people who surrendered that power on the pretext that it was to be used for those interests.

Many now believe that with the rise of the "totalitarian" State the world has entered upon a new era of barbarism. It has not. The totalitarian State is only the State; the kind of thing it does is only what the State has always done with unfailing regularity, if it had the power to do it, wherever and whenever its own aggrandizement made that kind of thing expedient. Give any State like power hereafter, and put it in like circumstances, and it will do precisely the same kind of thing. The State will unfailingly aggrandize itself, if only it has the power, first at the expense of its own citizens, and then at the expense of anyone else in sight. It has always done so, and always will.

The idea that the State is a social institution, and that with a fine upright man like Mr. Chamberlain [6] at the head of it, or a charming person like Mr. Roosevelt [7], there can be no question about its being honorably and nobly managed — all this is just so much sticky flypaper. Men in that position usually make a good deal of their honor, and some of them indeed may have some (though if they had any I cannot understand their letting themselves be put in that position) but the machine they are running will run on rails which are laid only one way, which is from crime to crime. In the old days, the partition of Czechoslovakia or the taking-over of Austria would have been arranged by rigmarole among a few highly polished gentlemen in stiff shirts ornamented with fine ribbons. Hitler simply arranged it the way old Frederick arranged his share in the first parti-

tion of Poland; he arranged the annexation of Austria the way Louis XIV arranged that of Alsace. There is more or less of a fashion, perhaps, in the way these things are done, but the point is that they always come out exactly the same in the end.

Furthermore, the idea that the procedure of the "democratic" State is any less criminal than that of the State under any other fancy name, is rubbish. The country is now being surfeited with journalistic garbage about our great sister democracy, England, its fine democratic government, its vast beneficent gift for ruling subject peoples, and so on; but does anyone ever look up the criminal record of the British State? The bombardment of Copenhagen [8]; the Boer War [9]; the Sepoy Rebellion [10]; the starvation of Germans by the post-Armistice blockade; the massacre of natives in India, Afghanistan, Jamaica; the employment of Hessians to kill off American colonists. What is the difference, moral or actual, between Kitchener's democratic concentration camps [11] and the totalitarian concentration camps maintained by Herr Hitler? The totalitarian general Badoglio [12] is a pretty hard-boiled brother, if you like, but how about the democratic general O'Dwyer [13] and Governor Eyre [14]? Any of the three stands up pretty well beside our own democratic virtuoso, Hell Roaring Jake Smith [15], in his treatment of the Filipinos; and you can't say fairer than that.

As for the British State's talent for a kindly and generous colonial administration, I shall not rake up old scores by citing the bill of particulars set forth in the Declaration of Independence; I shall consider India only, not even going into matters like the Kaffir war [16] or the Wairau incident in New Zealand [17]. Our democratic British cousins in India in the Eighteenth Century must have learned their trade from Pizarro and Cortez. Edmund Burke called them "birds of prey and passage." Even the directors of the East India Company admitted that "the vast fortunes acquired in the inland trade have been obtained by a scene of the most tyrannical and oppressive conduct that was ever known in any age or country."

Describing a journey, Warren Hastings wrote that "most of the petty towns and *serais* [18] were deserted at our approach"; the people ran off into the woods at the mere sight of a white man. There was the iniquitous salt monopoly; there was extortion everywhere, practiced by enterprising rascals in league with a corrupt police; there was taxation which confiscated almost half the products of the soil.

If it be said that Britain was not a sister democracy in those days, and has since reformed, one might well ask how much of the reformation is due to circumstances, and how much to a change of heart. Besides, the Black-and-Tans [19] were in our day; so was the post-Armistice blockade; General O'Dwyer's massacre was not more than a dozen years ago [20]; and there are plenty alive who remember Kitchener's concentration camps.

No, "democratic" State practice is nothing more or less than State practice. It does not differ from Marxist State practice, Fascist State practice, or any other. Here is the Golden Rule of sound citizenship, the first and greatest lesson in the study of politics: *you get the same order of criminality from any State to which you give power to exercise it; and whatever power you give the State to do things for you carries with it the equivalent power to do things to you*.

A citizenry which has learned that one short lesson has but little more left to learn.

Stripping the American State of the enormous power it has acquired is a full-time job for our citizens and a stirring one; and if they attend to it properly they will have no energy to spare for fighting communism, or for hating Hitler, or for worrying about South America or Spain, or for anything whatever, except what goes on right here in the United States.

Notes

[1] The Italian State had attacked and occupied Ethiopia in 1935-1936. The Italian army made extensive use of lethal gas against Ethiopian civilians and soldiers.

[2] The reference is to the Munich agreement of September 30, 1938 in which the English Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and the French Premier Edouard Daladier granted Hitler's demands and left Czechoslovakia defenceless.

[3] Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1856 - 1921) was a German politician and statesman who served as Chancellor of the German Empire from 1909 to 1917. He was particularly upset by Britain's declaration of war following German violation of Belgium's neutrality in the course of her invasion of France, reportedly asking the departing British Ambassador Goschen how Britain could go to war over a "mere scrap of paper" (the Belgian Neutrality Treaty of 1839).

[4] The 1740 massacre of Chinese in Java under Dutch control.

[5] An avoyer = a patron or protector.

[6] Neville Chamberlain (1869 - 1940) British Prime Minister from May 1937 to May 1940.

[7] Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882 - 1945) 32nd President of the United States of America.

[8] The British government decided to seize the Danish fleet to avoid its ending up in the hands of Napoleon and attacked Copenhagen without any declaration of war. A British fleet under Admiral James Gambier bombarded the city from the 2nd to the 5th of September 1807. More than 2,000 civilians were killed and 30% of the buildings were destroyed.

[9] The Boer War (1899 - 1902). The British High Commissioner of Cape Colony in South Africa, Alfred Milner, wanted to create a Cape-to-Cairo confederation of British colonies to dominate the African continent and so he precipitated a war with the Boers, which were South Africans of Dutch or Huguenot descent.

[10] The Sepoy Rebellion (1857) against British rule in India under the East India Company.

[11] Horatio Herbert Kitchener (24 June 1850 - 5 June 1916) was an Irish-born British Field Marshal, diplomat and statesman. During the Second Boer War (1899-1902), Kitchener's policy was to destroy Boer farms and move civilians into concentration camps whose conditions led to wide opprobrium in Britain and Europe.

[12] General Pietro Badoglio (1871 - 1956). He took part in the First World War and seems to have ordered atrocities against Austrians and Dalmatians. In Ethiopia as supreme commander he was responsible for the use of gas against civilians and soldiers. He succeeded Benito Mussolini as Prime Minister of Italy (Provisional Military Government), from July 25, 1943 to June 18, 1944.

[13] Sir Michael Francis O'Dwyer (1864 - 1940), was Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab from 1912 to 1919, where he oversaw the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre on April 13, 1919. According to official figures, 379 unarmed civilians were killed by Gurkha troops. Unofficial estimates place the figure much higher, at perhaps 2,000, with many more wounded. In the wake of the massacre O'Dwyer was relieved of his office.

[14] Edward John Eyre (1815 - 1901) was an English land explorer of the Australian continent and a controversial Governor of Jamaica, where he ruthlessly suppressed the Morant Bay Rebellion, and had many black peasants killed. He also authorized the judicial murder of George William Gordon, a mixed-race member of the colonial

assembly who was suspected of involvement in the insurrection. These events created great controversy in Britain, leading to calls for Eyre to be arrested and tried for Gordon's murder. John Stuart Mill organized the Jamaica Committee — comprised of such classical liberals as John Bright and Herbert Spencer — calling for his prosecution. Eyre was twice charged with murder, but the cases never proceeded.

[15] General Jacob Hurd Smith (1840 - 1918) was a veteran of the Wounded Knee massacre. As brigadier general in charge of the Samar campaign in the Philippine-American War (1899 - 1913), Smith became infamous for his orders to "kill everyone over the age of ten" and make the island "a howling wilderness." He was dubbed "Hell Roaring Jake" Smith, "The Monster," and "Howling Jake" by the newspapers.

[16] The Kaffir war or Cape Frontier wars consisted in 100 years (1779-1879) of intermittent warfare by the agricultural and pastoral people of Eastern Cape, in South Africa, against European intrusion and dominance. It ended with the annexation of those territories by the British Cape Colony.

[17] The Wairau incident in New Zealand (1843) originated by the pretence of the New Zealand Company to expropriate land used by the Maori people.

[18] Serais = palaces, mansions.

[19] The term "Black and Tans" refers to the Royal Irish Constabulary Reserve Force, which was one of two paramilitary forces employed by the Royal Irish Constabulary from 1920 to 1921, to suppress revolution in Ireland by targeting the IRA and the Sinn Féin.

[20] On March 13, 1940 — one year after Nock published this essay — Punjabi revolutionary Udham Singh shot O'Dwyer dead in Caxton Hall in London as an act of revenge for the massacre.

Alex Comfort

Criminal Lunacy Exposed (1945)

Between 13 and 15 February 1945, 772 heavy bombers of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and 527 of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) dropped more than 3,900 tons of high explosive bombs and incendiary devices on the city of Dresden, the capital of the German state of Saxony. It is this utter opprobrium that Alex Comfort defines as criminal lunacy and condemns with the utmost vigour, demanding the "condign punishment of the men who are responsible."

Source: Alex Comfort, *Criminal Lunacy Expose*d, War Commentary, 25th August 1945.

We have just witnessed an act of criminal lunacy which must be without parallel in recorded history. A city of 300,000 people has been suddenly and deliberately obliterated and its inhabitants murdered by the English and American governments. It is difficult to

express in coherent language the contempt and shame which we feel. That this thing should be done in our name makes us feel physically bespattered with the filth of it. Even a public slowly and deliberately accustomed by propaganda to acquiesce to irresponsible murder is stricken by it. We have dissented and protested in the past, but the time for dissent and protest are over. The men who did this are criminal lunatics. Unless this final atrocity is irrevocably and unquestionably brought home to them by public opinion, we have no claim to be human beings, we have no right to condemn any excess of the past or the future, we do not deserve any vestige of freedom.

No alliance of nations fostering such pretensions has ever covered itself with such utter disgrace. The sickening cant about indiscriminate bombardment, the lies about liberty and justice, have appeared for what they are — the restoration of moral order for what it is, a death's head. This action is not to be judged by men — men will be judged by it, as they were judged by the atrocities of Dachau: the only question that will be asked is — 'Did you resist it to your utmost?' One need only consider how last Monday's announcement would have affected the nation if it had been made in 1937 to realise how profoundly our responsibility has degenerated, and how much of the practice of fascism has been sold to us since then. An endless iteration of enemy brutality has been used to acclimatise us to crimes which have now reached the magnitude of this massacre.

The only remedy which is possible to us, if we are to remain human beings and not be lepers in the eyes of every decent person and every period of history, is the condign punishment of the men who are responsible. Not one political leader who has tolerated this filthy thing, or the indiscriminate bombardment of Germany which preceded it, should be permitted to escape the consequence of what he has done. Apart from the fantastic irresponsibility of scientists who are prepared to put such a weapon into the hands of our present rulers, the responsibility for seeing that no political or military figure

associated with this action shall be permitted to remain rests upon us. It is high time that we tried our own war criminals, or history will rightly and justly try and condemn us to permanent hatred and contempt.

Pitirim A. Sorokin and Walter A. Lunden

The Criminality of State Officials (1959)

This text confirms what many suspect, that the ruling élite presents a lower level of morality compared to the ruled population. This is substantiated by the data showing that, generally, the ruling groups have committed and still commit, on percentage, more crimes than the rest of the population. Only when strong limits are introduced to their power, the ruling elites reduce their level of criminality.

Sorokin's and Lunden's analysis confirms also Lord Acton's conviction that "power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely."

Source: Pitirim A. Sorokin and Walter A. Lunden, *Power and Morality*, 1959.

Chapter II: Morality and Mentality of Rulers

The results of our empirical study of moral behaviour and mentality of rulers and governments may be summed up in five generalizations. None of these pretends to be an exact, universal or perennial

formula applicable to every ruler or to all chiefs of governments. Every student of history knows well that there have been, and are, good and bad rulers, constructive and destructive governments. Our generalizations are but descriptions of five characteristics or uniformities typical of rulers taken as a group or stratum and compared with that of the ruled populations. In this chapter, for the sake of economy and continuity of our argument, only a few of the proofs are mentioned and only a bare minimum of the explanatory comments is given. The body of empirical evidence from which the generalizations are derived is given in the references found in this book.

1. Five Generalizations

1. *When the morality and mentality of rulers and the ruled are measured by the same moral and mental yardstick then the rulers' morality and minds appear to be marked by a much stronger dualism – by greater mental and moral schizophrenia than the morality and mentality of the members of the ruled population.*

2. *The ruling groups contain a larger proportion of the extreme mental types of the gifted and the mentally sick than the rank and file of the ruled populations.* Taken as a whole the ruling groups are more talented intellectually and more deranged mentally than the ruled population. Furthermore the ruling strata have a larger proportion of dominating, aggressive, highly selfish, bold and adventurous persons, men harsh and insensitive to other human beings, hypocrites and liars, and cynical manipulators of human relationships, than the strata of the ruled populations.

3. *The moral behaviour of ruling groups tends to be more criminal and sub-moral than that of the ruled strata of the same society.*

4. *The greater, more absolute, and coercive the power of rulers, political leaders, and big executives of business, labour and other organiza-*

tions, and the less freely this power is approved by the ruled population, the more corrupt and criminal such ruling groups and executives tend to be.

5. *With a progressive limitation of their power, criminality of rulers and executives tends to decrease qualitatively* (*by becoming less grave and murderous*) *and quantitatively* (*by decreasing the rate of criminal actions*). If and when the power of ruling bodies is greatly limited (legally and factually) and when the governments function amidst a strongly integrated and unified moral public opinion, their criminality may become equal or even fall below the criminality of their ruled populations.

2. Factors Responsible for these Characteristics

The nature of the ruling occupation and social selection are probably the main factors of these typical traits of ruling elite. This can be deduced from a careful analysis of the forms of social selection of rulers and the kind of activities contained in the business of ruling, including the focal social position of the magnates of power and the environment in which governing activities are carried on. This means that the five typical features of ruling groups are not so much an expression of rulers' personal wishes and fancies, but that these wishes, fancies, and characteristics are moulded and impressed into their mentality and behaviour by their occupational activities and by the kind of social selection of rulers prevailing in their societies or nations. Of course, the factors of biological heredity and marginal free choice also play some role, but this role finds its actual manifestation exactly through the mechanism of social selection and through their occupational functions. Therefore, these additional factors are taken into consideration and included among the factors responsible for the characteristics discussed. Let us now briefly comment on them.

3. Moral Dualism of Ruling Activities

Viewed from a moral standpoint, ruling functions consist of two profoundly different, even strikingly opposite, activities; some tend to morally ennoble rulers while others stimulate their demoralization and criminality.

Ennobling Activities of Rulers. There is no doubt that the occupational functions of rulers contain several morally ennobling activities such as: the protection of life, security, freedom and other rights of the citizens; defense of the country from foreign enemies, and of innocents from the attacks of aggressors; the discharge of justice and maintenance of law and order; the prevention and suppression of crimes; educational and social service work; the amelioration of economic and cultural conditions of the people; the stimulation of creativity and preservation of vital moral and mental well-being of the population; and the legion of other constructive, charitable and socially beneficial functions performed by executive, legislative, and judicial branches of governments. These and similar activities tend, almost automatically to develop the rulers' moral integrity, sense of justice and social responsibility, compassion, benevolence and unselfishness. One who daily performs this sort of activity for months and years can hardly escape some retroactive ennobling influence. For this reason, there almost always are, even in heartless and wicked rulers, a few important moral virtues habitually acquired in the process of their ennobling occupational work.

Long and regular discharge of these altruistic functions develops in the majority of rulers some notable virtues and, now and then, a moral nobility of the highest kind. However, for reasons indicated in the next paragraph, these virtues rarely permeate the whole personality of rulers and rarely manifest themselves in all their activities. As a rule, this moral excellence is confined within a limited portion of rulers' mentality and behaviour, beyond which they may remain immoral, even criminal. Nevertheless, within this ennobled part the

"soul" of rulers is indeed pure and sometimes even "holy," and their overt actions represent a true fulfilment of the noblest moral imperatives.

Criminalizing and Demoralizing Activities of Rulers. The discussed moralizing activities of rulers cover only a part of their total occupational functions. The other part of these activities exerts upon the rulers morally deadening and criminalizing effects rather than uplifting and ennobling ones. Let' us consider some of these criminalizing activities:

1. A considerable part of the criminalizing functions of rulers is represented by their violent, destructive and murderous activities — activities which characterize much of the total behaviour of governments. War activity can serve as an example of this kind of occupational function; the planning, preparing for, and carrying on of war has always been practically the main preoccupation of rulers. Stripped of its propaganda, war activity is the most terrible form of organized mass-murder supplemented with other acts of human bestiality, lust, and sadistic-masochistic destructiveness. No war activity can be carried on without throwing to the wind, at least temporarily, all the moral imperatives. No man preoccupied with war activities for years and years, can escape the demoralizing and criminalizing effects of this murderous business.

Other murderous activities of rulers deaden their moral sensitivity, and harden their souls and hearts towards the lives and values of human beings. Directly and retroactively these activities contribute to demoralization and criminalization of rulers. The activities of condemning and executing "criminals," exterminating dangerous "revolutionaries" and "subversives," eliminating possible competitors; suppressing disorders, riots and revolts; punishing the violators of law; sacrificing many an "expendable" human life in training for and performance of government functions by military, police, and other agencies of the government — these serve as examples of

violent and destructive actions. Practically no government of an empire or of other powerful organizations can help becoming a mass executioner and "legalized" murderer. Such an activity is inherent in and inseparable from the business of ruling vast organizations. And all the branches of government participate in this murderous activity — the legislative when it enacts the laws imposing capital and other punishments for violation of its statutes; a judge when he imposes the death sentence or other severe punishment upon the "guilty criminal"; an executive agent (beginning with monarch, president, general, admiral, and ending with a private, policeman, or warden) when he enforces the enacted laws and court-sentences; and all the branches together when they declare a war or other bloody reprisals against their collective enemies, criminals or opponents. This murderous activity comprises a large part of the business of practically all rulers of powerful, coercive organizations.

2. Another governing activity consists of what is called "diplomatic" actions and operations. These activities are sometimes performed for the protection and expansion of selfish interests — of the government and sometimes for the tribal interests of the governed group; sometimes to reconcile conflicting interests and mitigate clashes of various factions and persons or for the realization of other mainly egotistic purposes. Diplomatic operations exhibit a peculiar mixture of honest and dishonest techniques of influence by means of organized spying, skilful lies, hypocritical assurances, false promises, threats and bribes, semi-rational persuasions, limited coercion, cloak and dagger actions, cynical machinations, and other morally doubtful procedures.

By their very nature, the "murderous" and "diplomatic" activities of government are sub-moral and potentially criminal. Committed by a private person, they would be condemned as unlawful and therefore punishable.

3. The third criminalizing ingredient of governing consists in the incessant bombardment of government by a multitude of contradic-

tory interests of various persons and groups. The government is the focal point of the relentless pressures of clashing interests which the rulers, as legislators, judges, or executives, have incessantly to resolve. These pressures generate inner conflicts in the minds and conduct of the rulers. When one is subjected continuously to the contradictory stimuli of this sort, one's moral integrity and mental sanity tend to become fragmented, confused, and often self-contradictory. Pushed and pulled in opposite directions by these pressures, one's judgement and actions are bound to be more or less inconsistent and unsound, and one's personality increasingly neurotic.

In addition to this, many influential and rich parties reinforce their pressure by bribery of the rulers, offering economic and other advantages, by flattering and catering to their lusts, appetites, ambitions, and fancies; and even threatening them with retaliation (death, overthrow, etc.) if the rulers fail to decide the clash of interests in their favour. When one is continuously subjected to this kind of pressure, one is liable to succumb to some temptations and eventually allow his conduct to become determined mainly by unethical and unlawful motivations. In these two ways, this ingredient leads the rulers to moral and mental aberrations.

4. The fourth "criminalizing component" of governing activity is the enormous power which the rulers of vast organizations hold over millions of the ruled population. It is said that power intoxicates and a great coercive power intoxicates doubly. These observations were formulated long ago and, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, have been since reiterated by shrewd observers of human affairs and eminent social thinkers. In recent times similar propositions have been set forth by many a scholar and thinker. Fyodor Dostoyevsky's statement admirably sums up these conclusions:

> When a man has unlimited power over the flesh and blood of his fellow men, when a man is in a position to degrade another human being to the limit of degradation, he is unable to resist the tempta-

> tion to do wrong. Tyranny is a habit. In the end it becomes a disease. The best man in the world becomes so brutalized as to be undistinguishable from a wild beast. Blood intoxicates, the spirit becomes susceptible to the extreme abnormalities and these can turn to be enjoyable as the real joys. The possibility of such license sometimes becomes contagious in a whole people; and yet society which despises the official hangman, does not despise the hangman who is all powerful. (*House of the Dead*, 1862)

Thus power intoxication marks a large portion of the top rulers of the political empires in Ancient Egypt and Babylon, in Ancient Rome and Greece, Iran and India, China and Japan, Europe, the Americas, and of practically all the States and powerful political organizations. Before achieving supreme power many of these rulers (especially the revolutionary leaders) were normal; later, many of them became abnormal human beasts. Rulers' power generates in them (and in others, too), a belief that they are the chosen and anointed who are far above the ruled population and its common-herd moral and legal precepts of right and wrong, good and evil. Indeed, most of the powerful monarchs, dictators, "protectors of people," presidents of republics, senators, generals, and other political bosses believe themselves to be a superhuman or superior elite whose wishes and decisions create law. In brief, they see themselves as essentially free from the limitations of unpleasant legal obligations and moral imperatives. Such a freedom amounts to a moral and legal nihilism. In this way "power tends to corrupt" and "absolute power corrupts absolutely." (Lord Acton, *Letter to Mandell Creighton*, April 5, 1887)

These four components of governing activity generate and develop criminal and unethical tendencies in the rulers of powerful organizations. Systematic and continuous use of the outlined procedures by the members of ruling groups turn these practices into habits which eventually become part and parcel of their personalities and behaviour. Living in this atmosphere of murderous and "diplomatic"

activities, and practising them daily, subjected to incessant temptations and intoxicated with power, the ruling group cannot escape the inevitable contaminating and demoralizing effects. For comprehensible reasons, in their declarations the rulers naturally assert their unlimited devotion to the supreme and sacred value of individuals, but in their overt actions they rarely practise the precepts of their eloquently preached sermonets. They tend to regard their subjects as a mere number — cannon fodder, voting herd, or expendable material — for manipulation and realization of their tasks.

Such are some of the factors of amorality and criminality inherent in the governing activity of monarchs, presidents, dictators and bosses of powerful social organizations.

5. *These factors, inherent in the business of ruling, are reinforced by factors of social selection*. Not all types of individuals have an equally strong desire to become ruler; nor do all of the types have an equal chance to succeed in this ambition. Some are persons dominated by a lust for power, while others have no such ambition. Other conditions being equal, the non-ambitious type of person is bound to be less frequent among the rulers than the power-hungry type. Furthermore, individuals with high moral sensitivity, compassion, honesty, and altruism have much less chance to climb to the high rungs of the government ladder than those who are callous, unsympathetic, aggressively selfish, hypocritical, dishonest, and cynical manipulators of human relations.

Stern ruling or money making; conquest or dictatorial domination; building political or economic empires; spreading religion or revolution by bombs and murder; discharging acts of merciless justice; maintaining social order by cruel punitive measures; pitiless elimination by dishonest means of competitors for high political or economic position — these and other ruling functions demand for their successful performance the proverbial tiger's ferocity, rhinoceros' insensitivity, and fox's wiliness in handling their subjects and fellow-

men. A perfectly sincere man can hardly become a successful diplomat or a compassionate humanitarian a terrible conqueror; an honest person who makes no hyperbolic promises has little chance to be elected for a high political position; a businessman who unfailingly follows the Golden Rule can hardly build an economic empire in a cut-throat competitive business world. Insincerity, insensitivity, and a cynical manipulation of convictions and values seem to be necessary prerequisites for successful social climbing.

[...]

6. The Moral and Mental Dualism of Rulers

The preceding discussion shows that the business of ruling consists largely of two opposing kinds of activities in curious relation to each other. The ruler's noble actions in one area usually occur side-by-side with debasing criminal actions in another. Often these two conflicting elements are fused, as in the case of a ruler employing ignoble means to achieve humanitarian goals, or using noble actions as a facade to mask his baser intentions. These contradictory activities generate conflict in the character of the ruler which, when reinforced by the factors of social selection, creates a split in his personality, making him a sort of Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde. This basic dualism manifests itself in most rulers, making them appear at some times generous, altruistic and morally noble, and at others selfish, criminal, and inhuman; their behaviour seems to alternate between intelligence and folly, health and neuroticism. This does not occur in the same proportion among all governments and rulers. In some ruling groups the criminal tendencies prevail, while in others the morally ennobling properties are dominant. Despite this diversity, a moral and mental schizophrenia seems to characterize all forms of government which govern mainly by murderous, "diplomatic" and other compulsory means.

These conclusions seem to be verified by striking contrasts between the behaviour of a ruler in his ruling capacity and his behaviour in private life. Robespierre, as dictator of the Jacobin government in France, showed himself to be a blood-thirsty and merciless tyrant who sent hundreds of victims to the guillotine without compunction. Yet, in his private life, this same man proved to be so tender-hearted that he would weep over the sentimental novels of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre! Lenin, acting as a ruler, unhesitatingly ordered the shooting of thousands of innocent persons, yet in the privacy of his apartment, was deeply concerned over the health of a slightly sick kitten. Similar split personality was shown by Stalin, Hitler, Napoleon, Peter the Great, Cromwell, Charles V and Phillip II of Spain, Louis XIV, Henry VIII, Elizabeth I, Nero, Diocletian, Constantine the Great, Asoka, and by most monarchs, dictators, commanders, inquisitors, etc. In a milder form this moral schizophrenia also marks the high ranks of democratic government personnel, political and military leaders, top executives of big corporations, labour leaders, and even the hierarchy of vast religious and scientific organizations.

[...]

This prevalence of extremes among the rulers is at least partly due to the dualistic or schizophrenic nature of the governing activity (and partly to hereditary factors). Other studies have shown that the contradictory situations in daily governing activities tend either to develop inner conflicts and split personality within rulers, or to polarize them into the extreme mental, moral, and social types, or to turn them into confused, hesitating, and self-contradictory individual whose right hand denies what their left affirms.

Reading or listening to the important addresses of monarchs, presidents, and high dignitaries of States or other powerful organizations, one notices glaring contradictions within the same speech or declara-

tion. For instance, many them proudly declare themselves and their policies to be Christian, often quoting the *Sermon on The Mount* and other precepts of Jesus as the guide to their policies. A few minutes or lines later, without hesitation, they proclaim in effect: therefore, in the name of Jesus, let us crush and exterminate our enemies; let us reduce their cities and countryside to ashes; let our nuclear and bacteriological weapons teach them an unforgettable lesson, and so on. In the first chapter of the same work some of them (like Lenin) pompously declare that their purpose is the elimination of the State and coercive government, and in subsequent chapters they conclude: therefore we must establish the iron dictatorship of the totalitarian regime in which the Communist government regiments the whole life, conduct, and thought, of the ruled population.

In recent decades, practically all governments and the United Nations have repeatedly declared that their main task is the establishment of a lasting peace. Yet at the same moment, these rulers by their acts refute this goal for they limitlessly arm themselves, carry on cold wars, and thus prepare to exterminate hundreds of millions, at the risk of an Apocalyptic war which can terminate the very existence of life on this planet. Such speeches can be heard or read daily. Although their contradictory topics and precepts may vary, they display the peculiar "illogical logic" symptomatic of the split and sick soul.

This schizophrenic dualism can easily be seen in a comparison of the main principles of the rulers' addresses with their overt actions of implementation. Almost invariably an unbridgeable chasm is found to exist between these preachings and their practices. Any sincere believer in God or in the values of Truth, Justice, Beauty, Peace, Equality, Progress of Mankind, Wellbeing of Humanity, Democracy, Freedom, Brotherhood, Socialism, Communism, and so on, cannot help but deplore the utter distortion of these values in the practices of the rulers who preach them. Viewed dispassionately, many of the actions of crusaders of God are more sacrilegious and atheistic than

those of the avowed atheists and anti-religionists. Many an action of the ruling propagandists of the Dictatorship of Proletariat, Democracy, Freedom, Brotherhood, etc., are anti-proletarian, anti-democratic, tyrannical and anti-brotherly.

These and other proofs confirm our diagnosis of the mental and moral dualism of governing activities and its effect upon the personality and conduct of rulers and governments.

Chapter III: Criminality and Morality of Heads of State

The outlined moral and mental duality of ruling operations and governments does not necessarily mean that both the benign and the evil characteristics are equally powerful in every ruling individual or that they are distributed in the same proportion among all governments and rulers. There are ruling groups in which criminal tendencies prevail, and there are governments in which the benign nature is dominant. Whether one of the two souls is generally prevalent among all the rulers and governments remains largely unknown and needs to be studied further. A further inquiry is needed also to obtain a more accurate knowledge of what kind of ruler (and in what socio-cultural conditions) tends to be predominantly sunny-souled or dark-souled. Finally, the moral dualism of rulers and ruling activities tells little about the comparative criminality of the rulers and the ruled: which of these classes is the more criminal? The purpose of this chapter is to give a tentative answer to the last question and thereby to elucidate a little the other two.

The generalizations: Nos. 3, 4, 5, formulated at the beginning of Chapter II, give tentative answers to these questions. In their essentials these answers contend that when measured by the same stick, the moral behaviour of ruling groups tends to be more criminal than

that of the ruled population in the same society; and that with a progressive limitation of the power of rulers and executives their criminality tends to decrease in frequency as well as in gravity of crimes committed. This analysis of criminalizing factors of rulers and bosses of vast organizations gives deductive reasons for these generalizations, derived from the analysis of the nature of the ruling occupation and from the prevalent forms of social selection. Now these deductive conclusions must be tested and confirmed empirically through a study of the factual criminality of the ruling and the ruled strata.

1. Criminality of Monarchs

Of all big social organizations the State, as a rule, is the most cynical and most naked power-machinery. With rare exception, this machine of organized coercion is more powerful than that of almost any other organization. The sovereignty claimed by the State as its monopoly is the official term designating its supremacy over other social groups. The chiefs of States, especially when they are autocratic or absolutistic, are the most powerful rulers among the governing heads of other social bodies.

If our generalizations (Nos. 3, 4, 5) regarding the criminality and morality of rulers are correct, they should be confirmed by the actual conduct of the State rulers. This expectation is well supported by the relevant facts.

First of all, despite the lack of precise and systematic statistics, the existing data do not allow any doubt that *the powerful and/or autocratic rulers of the States display in general a much higher rate of patricides, matricides, fratricides, uxoricides, and murders of their relatives, than does their ruled population*. In regard to this crime, the powerful autocratic ruling groups are possibly the most criminal groups in the total population of most Nations or States. We must keep in mind that this particular form of murder is evaluated by prac-

tically all criminal codes as the gravest form of murder and is uniformly punished more severely than all other forms (except the murder of the rulers of the States and other power organizations). Second, the existing body of evidence shows also that *with a limitation of the autocratic or absolute power of the rulers, the gravity and the rate of their criminality tends to decline.* Murder and other bloody crimes against relatives, friends, and persons generally tend to be increasingly supplanted by the crimes against property, and by the lesser crimes against person. Criminality of these rulers whose power is greatly limited (like most of the recent constitutional monarchs and presidents of republics) tends to approach the criminality of their ruled population, though it still exceeds it.

Actually the criminality of the rulers remains much greater than the percentages show, when we compare the percent-ages of all kinds of murder (and not only the murder of relatives and friends hitherto discussed) committed by the rulers, with those of all kinds of murder perpetrated by the common population. Side by side with legal execution of criminals and war enemies, very few of these rulers did not murder or condemn to death, directly or indirectly, few or many innocent persons of all ages and of both sexes. Sometimes they imposed the death penalty over the victims legally, for "reasons of State" (*raison d'État*), though even in such "legal" murders there always is a wide gulf between the merciful and sadistic interpretation of "legality." More frequently the rulers condemned to death many an innocent person for such selfish reasons as economic advantages, hedonistic pleasure, revenge, hatred, sadistic drive, sexual motives, lust for power, rulers' security, and so on. Perhaps still more frequently they "eliminated" innocent persons because these individuals by their mere existence happened to inhibit the realization of the rulers' egotistic objectives. This sort of motive plays an eminent part in the mass-murders of hundreds and thousands of innocent persons in the massacres, "crusades," "purges," "liquidations," "holy wars,"

"restorations of order" always solemnly declared "for the Good of the Country," "Nationalism," "Purity of Race," and all sorts of justifying catchwords and mottoes aimed at screening the ugly selfish interests of the rulers. These mass-murders of thousands of innocent persons depict the heartlessness, moral insensitivity, and cynical disregard of human life and moral values which characterize the rulers. In this regard, their psychology is not very different from that of hardened murderers. Such "murders" are so common that they are often passed over by historians without mention, yet study reveals that the ruling group is indeed the most murderous group among all the groups of the ruled populations of almost all countries or nations.

An additional oblique confirmation of this conclusion is given by the exceptionally high frequency of *death by violence* among state-rulers. Being little inhibited in their struggles for power from murdering relatives, friends, competitors, and anyone who happens to be hindering satisfaction of their objectives, these rulers are treated to similar "murderous" treatment by their competitors. The ruling group well confirms the truth of the old, statement: "He who takes the sword shall perish by the sword."

Finally, regarding the crimes of aggravated assault, rape and, other sex offences, robbery, burglary, theft, larceny, embezzlement, fraud and forgery, and other lesser crime against person, property, and good mores, the rates of the rulers in these crimes are again much higher than those of the ruled. Ordinarily, when the rulers perpetrate crimes against property, they do not steal or grab or rob or forge or embezzle a few dollars or a small piece of real estate, or a few precious objects. Instead *they do these crimes on the largest scale,* grabbing by "the right of conquest" vast region territories, and kingdoms; under false pretense, expropriating and appropriating large fortunes and sources of wealth of their adversaries or citizens; by "diplomatic" persuasion and coercion acquiring big estates, fabulous monopolies and most profitable privileges; profiting greatly by

debasing the currency; and so on. An old English poem well expresses this large scale of the crimes of rulers:

> *"The law locks up both man and woman*
> *who steals the goose from off the common,*
> *but lets the greater felon loose,*
> *who steals the common from the goose."*

To sum up: in the crimes enumerated the criminality the rulers is many times higher than that of the total ruled population.

2. Historical Documentation

For our first evidence of the criminality of rulers, we may compare them to the ruled population in the crime of murder. Since there are only fragmentary data about the rates of murder of relatives for the total or adult (fourteen years old and over) populations, we shall compare the rulers' murder of their relatives with those of all kinds of murder for the total populations (murder of relatives makes up only an insignificant fraction of the larger class of murder generally). Both of these rates are approximate but, despite this, they disclose the difference in criminality to be so great that it remains striking even when the rates of the rulers' criminality are decreased ten or twenty or more times.

Depending upon the period, country, occupation, sex, age, race, etc., the murder rates for the ruled population fluctuate between: 0.0008 and 0.2 per 100 persons of the total or the adult population or of the main occupational populations, or far below one per cent for the ruled population. For the murderers of relatives among rulers the following gives approximate data:

Of 43 English monarchs and the Lord-Protectors beginning with William I and ending with George VI, some twenty rulers, or at least *40 per cent*, were guilty of this crime. In other words, the rate of

English rulers committing the gravest form of murder is more than a hundred times greater than the rate of the British population in the crime of murder!

This conclusion must be supplemented by the fact that with the legal and factual limitation of the power of English monarchs, they have freed themselves from this crime; none of the kings or queens since William III has been guilty of murdering his or her relatives or close friends and associates.

Similar data for the rates of murder of relatives and close friends for monarchs and rulers of various countries and periods naturally vary greatly, but they invariably remain far above the rates of general murder among their subjects. With various upstart rulers, of past and recent times, such as the Ten and the Thirty Tyrants in Ancient Greece, Marius and Sulla, Caesar and Antony, Crassus and Augustus in Rome, Cromwell and Robespierre, Mussolini and Hitler, Lenin and Stalin, and many of today's dictators or revolutionaries in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere, the crime-record is still worse than that of the legitimate, autocratic monarchs.

Of the 34 Turkish sultans, from Osman (1290-1326) up to Mahomet VI (1918-1922), at least 14 sultans or some *41 per cent* were guilty of direct or indirect murders of their relatives, close friends, and associates. But here again, with a partly factual and partly legal limitation of their power, the last five sultans, beginning with Abdul Mejid (1839-1861) and ending with Mahomet VI (1918-1922) seem to have been free from this form of murder (with a possible exception of Abdul Hamid II).

Similarly, in France, in the earliest Merovingian dynasty, its founder Clovis (481-511), his four sons, including the victorious Lothair (558-561), and Lothair's four sons, up to Lothair II and his son Dagobert (628-638) were all fratricide or the murderers of their close relatives in their intra-family struggle for power. Not very different was the situation in its declining period when the Merovingian

dynasty divided into several branches. All in all, no less than 40 per cent of the Merovingian rulers committed the discussed gravest form of murder.

Perhaps somewhat lower was the per cent of this sort of murderer in the subsequent dynasties of the Carolingians, the Capets, the Valois, the Bourbons, the Orleans, the Bonapartists. Of some 51 rulers, beginning with Charles the Bald (843-877) and ending with Louis Napoleon III (1852-1870), at least 9 rulers or 15 per cent were guilty of this gravest of murders. Except perhaps for Napoleon I, none of the post-revolutionary monarchs whose power was greatly limited, seems to have committed this crime.

[...]

The following mass-murders serve as examples of the rulers' massacres of thousands of innocent persons. From 15,000 to 25,000 persons killed in St. Bartholomew Night, in Paris; some 8,000 to 10,000 persons exterminated by the order of Sulla during just one meeting of the Roman Senate; tens of thousands of persons arrested and shot by the order of Lenin after the attempt on his life (the persons who not only did not participate in the attempt, but even did not know anything about it, as Lenin and his associates were well aware). In hundreds of thousands of executions during the years of the Red Terror, they explicitly stated: "Don't look in the records for any crime committed by the executed individuals; they are executed just because they happen to be the members of the bourgeois, or of the kulak-peasant or other potentially anti-Communist classes." A slaughter of 27,000 captives ordered by Richard the Lionhearted after taking Acca was because the captives could not pay the ransom of 200,000 gold pieces demanded by Richard and the Crusaders (this massacre by "Christian Crusaders" stands in a glaring contrast to the generosity of the sultan Salah-al-Din, the Crusaders' main adversary, who in a similar situation spared the lives of and freed

about 20,000 Christian captives). These examples give a fair idea of the mass-murders of thousands of innocent persons by rulers.

In brief, when all sorts of murders by the state-rulers are considered, the per cent of the murderers among them becomes still much higher than that shown by the percentages of the murderers of relatives and friends. Viewed from this standpoint, *the ruling group is indeed the most criminally murderous group among the populations of almost all countries or nations*.

[...]

3. Criminality of Rulers of Democracies and Republics

Many a reader of the preceding pages undoubtedly has been asking the question: But how about the constitutional monarchs, presidents, and members of Cabinets, in democracies and republics? About the leaders of Parliament or Congress? The supreme judges, the generals and admirals of the democratic military forces? Governors of democratic States or provinces? Mayors of the big cities and other government leaders and political bosses in democracies? Do the above conclusions apply to them also? Is their rate of criminality higher, too, than that of the ordinary citizens or of the total ruled population? Does not the fact of these rulers being elected make them paragons of virtue and moral leaders rather than a criminal group in comparison with the rank and file population of the democracies?

The general answer to these questions is that the above conclusions apply also to the ruling groups in democracies. All in all, their rate of criminality tends also to be notably higher than that of the total ruled populations.

The main qualification to these statements consists in recalling our second uniformity — that with limitation of the rulers' power, their criminality tends to decrease in gravity as well as frequency of crimes

committed. We have seen that even in limited monarchies their criminality declines, especially in such grave crimes as murder and aggravated assault. Democratic governments are, by law and in fact, greatly limited in their power. For this reason only, their criminality is to be expected to be notably lower than that of the autocratic, powerful governments.

For the same reason, criminality of democratic ruling groups consists mainly in the crimes against property, sex, good mores, and in lighter crimes against person. As a result of this qualitative and quantitative decrease of criminality of the ruling groups in democracies, the contrast between the rates of criminality of the rulers and the ruled (total population) in democracies becomes less great, than the contrast in big autocratic empires and nations. Then, under a system of centralized, autocratic power structure the offences tend to cluster about the highest seats of power in each central government. In democratic and limited power structures, without a centralized type of government, criminality tends to diffuse among several strata of governments and among the powerful economic and political groups, formally outside government, which factually are the informal and unofficial partners of the official government and are often more influential than the official ruling groups. Now for a brief corroboration of these conclusions.

1. That the grave criminality, of constitutionally (and factually) limited governments — monarchical or republican — tends to decline is shown by the fact that, after the limitation of their powers, the constitutional rulers of practically all such countries have become almost entirely free from the commitment of murder, aggravated assault and similar grave crimes against person. This can be said of the governments of Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Great Britain, Austria, Germany (up to Hitler), the United States, France, Italy, Russia (up to the Communist Government, 1918, which is by law and by fact, a dictatorial autocra-

cy), Japan, India, and of the constitutional rulers of a few other nations.

2. Despite this moral improvement of ruling groups limited in power, their total criminality still remains above that of the ruled population. This can be deduced easily from a simple confrontation of the rates of criminality of the total populations, with the relevant fragmentary data concerning the criminality of the members of the ruling groups in democracies.

We have seen that the rates of murder for the total populations fluctuate roughly between 0.0008 to 0.2 per 100 persons; while the rates for other crimes are roughly between 0.008 to 1.2 per 100 persons of the total population. Of these rates, the maximal rate for murder (0.2) and that for larceny (1.2) are abnormally high, exceptional, non-typical rates. This means roughly that we have in the total populations one murderer per some 500 to 125,000 individuals (500 again being the non-typical exceptional figure); and one criminal in each of the other crimes per some 12,500 to 84 individuals (this latter in larceny, for 1956, for 80,986,991 urban population of the United States). More specifically in the United States, in 1956, there was about one murderer per 20,000 and about one manslaughterer per 28,571 urban population.

Though with a decrease in murder-criminality of the constitutionally and factually limited governments the democratic governmental groups may not necessarily be more criminal than the common population, such groups are still as criminal (in these crimes) and possibly even more criminal than the total (ruled) population. The United States gives an example of this situation. As mentioned, in 1956, in our urban population there was about one murderer per 20,000 and one manslaughterer per 28,571 urban population. Now, in order to have 20,000 and 28,571 high governmental persons in the United States we shall take: all the presidents and vice-presidents of the United States and members of their Cabinets; then many (past and

present) influential leaders of the Congress; many top generals and admirals; to these we have to add: a number of (past and present) governors of the State; mayors and political bosses of the biggest cities. If we compare 20,000 and 28,571 government personnel of this sort with the same numbers of non-government persons, we find somewhat more murderers and manslaughterers within the ruling population. For example, we find among the twenty leading political bosses in this country, from 1850 to 1925, at least two who were indicted for murder (Martin Lomasey and Richard Crocker). Then, since the mutual killings of gangsters in their wars are considered murders, we have to view similarly the killings of each other by members of the different government factions struggling for existence, domination, and spoils. In this category we note the murders of Hamilton, Lincoln, Garfield, H. Long, and others, and the almost fatal beatings (like that of Massachusetts Senator Sumner by Col. Brooks) by adversaries from different "government gangs."

To victims of the civil war between these gangs, we must add thousands murdered in the violent struggle of pro-slavery and anti-slavery factions (like the victims of the violence at Lawrence, in the John Brown revolt, by the Ku-Klux Klan and the Union League) and in other political "wars" between opposite government factions; many an unnecessary murder committed by generals Sherman and Sheridan, governor Stanton, and their adversaries in the Civil War; the murders of large numbers of Indians, without any guilt on their part, with full approval of government agents. Finally, count all the victims murdered by ordinary gang-murderers acting under the order of many political bosses closely connected with, and now and then controlling, the murderous and other activities of the criminal gangs.

When all these and similar murders, committed directly or indirectly by high, middle, and low government agents are counted, the rate of murderous criminality of the total body of government agents is likely to become higher than that of the ordinary ruled population.

Even if the comparative criminal rates depend upon which of the killing actions of government agents are to be considered murder, there is no doubt that the rates of the ruling groups are higher than those of the total (ruled) population, in regard to crimes against property, sex offences, propriety, and the lesser crimes against person. If for comparison purposes we take the above percentage rates of the specified criminality of the urban population of the United States, then we have one sex-criminal (for all kinds of sex offences, including rape) per about 2085 urban population. Now among the presidents of the United States, at least two were guilty of sex irregularities (which would give one sex-offender per some 17 presidential population). If we take a larger stratum of the high government officials (like Alexander Hamilton, and other governmental leaders among the members of the Cabinet, leading members of the Congress, influential governors of the States and top military ranks), their rate in sex-offences appears to be notably greater than the rate for the total or urban population.

Still more certain is the higher criminality of ruling groups in democracies in the crimes against property. According to the above rates in all kinds of crime against property for the urban population of the United States in 1956, we have one criminal per about 370 population. Now, among the presidents of the United States, at least, two were accused of involvement in crimes against property (called often "corruption" and "graft"), perpetrated by their close associates and appointees (this would give one property-criminal per about 17 presidential population). Otherwise, the Cabinet and personnel of the White House staff of practically every administration have produced one or several corrupted officials. In some administrations, like Grant's or Harding's, the corruption exploded into sensational scandals and prison sentences for the offenders.

[...]

To put the matter in different form, we can say that if we have 370 Presidents of the United States; or 370 Vice-Presidents; or 370 members of the Cabinet; or 370 leading Senators or Congressmen; or 370 generals and admirals; or 370 mayors of big cities; or 370 governors of the States; or 370 other high-ranking officials, we can be reasonably certain that among each of these groups there will be more than one perpetrator of a crime against property. And these ruling perpetrators commit their crimes on a larger scale than the ordinary violators of the property laws and regulations. The same can be said, with slight modifications, about the high government officials of other democratic countries. Though limited in their power, these ruling groups still have much more power than the rank and file of the citizens. According to the hypothesis that power corrupts, this excessive power of democratic rulers tends to lead the government strata to a higher criminality than that of the ruled population.

If and when all the known (confirmed by the court verdict) crimes against property committed by the high-rank officials are roughly counted (without counting a possibly still larger number of the hush-hushed violations), their rates are found to be higher than the rates for the same kind of crime of the total (ruled) populations.

Robert Higgs

The State Racket
(2007)

The State as a criminal racket, whose mission is to control you and to extort your money is very lucidly portrayed by the author in this short essay. So, it is highly time to realize that "the government — this vile assemblage of bullies, muggers, sneak thieves, and con men — is not really on your side; indeed, it is out to get you."

Source: Robert Higgs, *Four Types of Government Operatives: Bullies, Muggers, Sneak Thieves, and Con Men*, The Independent Institute, December 20, 2007.

Somehow it seemed as though the farm had grown richer without making the animals themselves any richer — except, of course, for the pigs and the dogs. (*George Orwell, Animal Farm, 1945*)

The beginning of political wisdom is the realization that despite

everything you've always been taught, the government is not really on your side; indeed, it is out to get you.

Sometimes government functionaries and their private-sector supporters want simply to bully you, to dictate what you must do and what you must not do, regardless of whether anybody benefits from your compliance with these senseless, malicious directives. The drug laws are the best current example, among many others, of the government as bully. Our rulers presently enforce a host of laws that combine the worst aspects of puritanical priggishness and the invasive, pseudo-scientific, therapeutic state. They tolerate our pursuit of happiness only so long as we pursue it exclusively in officially approved ways: gin, yes; weed, no.

Notwithstanding the great delight that our rulers take in tormenting us with their absurdly inconsistent nanny-state commands, they generally have bigger fish to fry. Above all, the government and its special-interest backers want to take our money. If these people ran a store, they might aptly call it Robberies R Us. Their credo is simple and brazen: "you have money, and we want it."

Unlike the sincere street criminal, however, the robber in official guise rarely puts his proposition to you in the blunt form of "your money or your life," however much he intends to relate to you on precisely such terms. (If you doubt my characterization of these intentions, test what happens if you steadfastly resist at every step as the brigands escalate their threats: first ordering you to pay, then billing you for unpaid balances plus penalties and interest, sending you a summons, and ultimately beating you into submission or killing you for resisting arrest. Your sustained, open resistance always ends in the state's use of violence against you, in either your forcible imprisonment or your removal from the land of the living, after which your memory will be defamed by your designation as a criminal — governments never settle for mere brutality, but always supplement it with unabashed presumptuousness.)

When I say "rarely," I do not mean that the authorities never carry out their plunder blatantly. Throughout the land, for example, criminal courts, acting as *de facto* muggers, strip people of great sums of money in the aggregate by fining them for conduct that ought never to have been criminalized in the first place — drug-law violations, prostitution, gambling, antitrust-law violations, traffic infractions, reporting violations, doing business without a license, and innumerable other victimless "crimes." The predatory judges and their police henchmen care no more about justice than I care to live on a diet of pig pancreas and boiled dandelions. They are simply taking people's money because it's there to be taken with minimal effort. In this manifestation, government amounts to a gigantic speed trap.

The more common way for government officials to rob you, however, involves their seizure of so-called taxes, which take countless forms, all of which are purported to be collected in order to finance — *mirabile dictu* — benefits for you. Such a deal! You'd have to be a real ingrate to complain about the government's snatching your money for the express purpose of making your world a better place.

Sometimes the "political exchange" into which you are hauled kicking and screaming rests on such a ludicrous foundation, however, that honesty compels us to classify it, too, as a mugging. I have in mind such compassionately conservative policies as stripping taxpayers of hundreds of billions of dollars and handing the money over, for the most part, to rich people engaged in large-scale agribusiness and, sometimes, to landowners who don't even bother to represent themselves as farmers. The apologies that the agribusiness whores in Congress make for this daylight robbery are so patently stupid and immoral that the whole shameless affair resembles nothing so much as the schoolyard bully's grabbing the little kids' lunch money and then taunting them aggressively, "If you don't like it, why don't you do something about it?"

Every five years, when the farm-subsidy law expires and a new one is enacted, a few members of Congress pose as reformers of this piracy, but truly serious reforms never occur, and even the minor ones that come along from time to time prove unavailing, as the farm-booty interests invariably suck up "emergency relief" payments from the public treasury later on to make up for any shortfalls from the main subsidy programs.

Government sneak thieves, in contrast, fear that they may occupy more vulnerable positions than the agribusiness gang and similarly impudent special-interest groups cum legislators, so they dare not taunt the little kids so flagrantly. Instead, they specialize in legislative riders, budgetary add-ons and earmarks, logrolling, omnibus "Christmas tree" bills, and other gimmicks designed to conceal the size, the beneficiaries, and sometimes even the existence of their theft. At the end of the day, the taxpayers find there's nothing left in the till, but they have little or no idea where all of their money went. Finding out by reading an appropriations act is next to impossible, inasmuch as these statutes are almost incomprehensible to everyone but the legislative insiders and their staff members who devise them and write them down in a combination of Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit.

For example, for many years, a single congressman from northeastern Pennsylvania — first Dan Flood and then Joe McDade — substantially enriched the anthracite coal interests of that region by inserting a brief, one-paragraph limitation rider in the annual appropriations act for the Department of Defense. The upshot of this obscure provision was that Pennsylvania anthracite was transported to Germany to provide heating fuel for U.S. military bases that could have been heated more cheaply by using local resources. This coals-to-Newcastle shenanigan was a classic sneak-thief gambit, a thing of legislative beauty, but every year's budget contains thousands of schemes that operate with similar effect, if not in an equally audacious manner.

Unlike the government sneak thieves, the government con men openly advertise — indeed, expect to receive great credit for — certain uses of the taxpayers' money that are represented as bringing great benefits to the general public or a substantial segment of it. Surely the best example of the con man's art is so-called national defense, a bottomless pit into which the government now dumps, in various forms (many of them not officially classified as "defense"), approximately a trillion dollars of the taxpayers' money each year. The government stoutly maintains, of course, that all ordinary Americans are constantly in grave danger of attack by foreigners — nowadays, by Islamic terrorists, in particular — and that these voracious wolves can be kept from the door only by the maintenance and active deployment of large armed forces equipped with ultra-sophisticated (and correspondingly expensive) equipment and stationed at bases in more than a hundred countries and on ships at sea around the globe.

Without dismissing the alleged dangers entirely, a sensible person quickly appreciates that the threat is slight — just do the math, using reasonable probability coefficients — whereas the cost of (purportedly) dealing with it is colossal. In short, as General Smedley Butler informed us more than seventy years ago, the modern military establishment, along with most of its blessed wars, is for the most part nothing but a racket. Worse, because of the way it engages and coopts powerful elements of the private sector, it gives rise to a costly and dangerous form of military-economic fascism. Lately, the classic military-industrial-congressional complex has been supplemented by an even more menacing (to our liberties) security-industrial-congressional complex, whose aim is to enrich its participants by equipping the government for more effectively spying on us and invading our privacy in ways great and small.

Worst of all, despite everything that is claimed for the military's protective powers, its operation and deployment overseas leave us ordinary Americans facing greater, not lesser, risk than we would otherwise face, because of the many enemies it cultivates who would

have left us alone, if the U.S. military had only left them alone. (Yes, Virginia, they are over here because we're over there.) The president routinely declares that the hugely increased expenditures and overseas deployments for military purposes since 2001 have reduced the threat of terrorism, but, in fact, terrorist incidents and deaths have increased, not decreased. Although privileged elements of the political class gain from militarism and neo-imperialist wars, the rest of us invariably lose economic well-being, real security, and all too often life itself. In 2004, people who said that security against terrorism was their top concern voted disproportionately, by an almost 7-to-1 margin, for George W. Bush. They had been conned.

Although the mugger, the sneak thief, and the con man are not the only types of government operatives, they make up a large proportion of the leading figures in government today. The lower ranks, especially in the various police agencies, have a disproportionate share of the bullies. No attempt to understand government can succeed without a clear understanding of these ideal types and each one's characteristic modus operandi. With this understanding firmly in mind, you will remain permanently immune to the infectious swindle, "I'm from the government, and I'm here to help." The truth, of course, is the exact opposite: I say again, the government — this vile assemblage of bullies, muggers, sneak thieves, and con men — is not really on your side; indeed, it is out to get you.

Taxation - Expropriation

State propaganda has convinced many people into believing that "Taxes are what you pay for a civilized society" (statement made by judge Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1927). However, considering that taxes were introduced to pay for wars and for extravagant debts contracted by the States, this belief is totally unfounded and fully misleading.

More to the point is the view of Bertrand Russell. He openly declares that "In view of the fact that the bulk of the public expenditure of most civilized Governments consists in payment for past wars or preparation for future wars, the man who lends his money to a Government is in the same position as the bad men in Shakespeare who hire murderers." (*In praise of idleness*, 1932)

Most of the money is extorted by the State through taxation, more than voluntarily given through lending, and so we find ourselves in a dramatic and immoral condition, namely that of financing mass violence and mass parasitism. And this is the horrible situation in which we are still nowadays because of the State dominance.

Henry David Thoreau

Against taxation
(1848)

In a very simple but masterly way, Thoreau shows the harmfulness of taxation, which is used to finance wars (e.g. the war against Mexico), and the idiocy of the State that imprisons a person on the basis of bureaucratic registration problems that the State itself has created.

Source: Henry David Thoreau. *On the Duty of Civil Disobedience*, 1848.

I meet this American government, or its representative, the State government, directly, and face to face, once a year — no more — in the person of its tax-gatherer; this is the only mode in which a man situated as I am necessarily meets it; and it then says distinctly, Recognize Me; and the simplest, the most effectual, and, in the present posture of affairs, the indispensablest mode of treating with it on this head, of expressing your little satisfaction with and love for it, is to deny it then. My civil neighbor, the tax-gatherer [1], is the very man I have to deal with — for it is, after all, with men and not with

parchment that I quarrel — and he has voluntarily chosen to be an agent of the government. How shall he ever know well that he is and does as an officer of the government, or as a man, until he is obliged to consider whether he will treat me, his neighbor, for whom he has respect, as a neighbor and well-disposed man, or as a maniac and disturber of the peace, and see if he can get over this obstruction to his neighborliness without a ruder and more impetuous thought or speech corresponding with his action. I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, if ten men whom I could name — if ten honest men only — aye, if one HONEST man, in this State of Massachusetts, ceasing to hold slaves, were actually to withdraw from this co-partnership, and be locked up in the county jail therefor, it would be the abolition of slavery in America. For it matters not how small the beginning may seem to be: what is once well done is done for ever. But we love better to talk about it: that we say is our mission. Reform keeps many scores of newspapers in its service, but not one man. If my esteemed neighbor, the State's ambassador [2], who will devote his days to the settlement of the question of human rights in the Council Chamber, instead of being threatened with the prisons of Carolina, were to sit down the prisoner of Massachusetts, that State which is so anxious to foist the sin of slavery upon her sister — though at present she can discover only an act of inhospitality to be the ground of a quarrel with her — the Legislature would not wholly waive the subject the following winter.

Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison. The proper place today, the only place which Massachusetts has provided for her freer and less despondent spirits, is in her prisons, to be put out and locked out of the State by her own act, as they have already put themselves out by their principles. It is there that the fugitive slave, and the Mexican prisoner on parole, and the Indian come to plead the wrongs of his race, should find them; on that separate but more free and honorable ground, where the State places those who are not with her, but against her —

the only house in a slave State in which a free man can abide with honor. If any think that their influence would be lost there, and their voices no longer afflict the ear of the State, that they would not be as an enemy within its walls, they do not know by how much truth is stronger than error, nor how much more eloquently and effectively he can combat injustice who has experienced a little in his own person. Cast your whole vote, not a strip of paper merely, but your whole influence. A minority is powerless while it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority then; but it is irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight. If the alternative is to keep all just men in prison, or give up war and slavery, the State will not hesitate which to choose. If a thousand men were not to pay their tax-bills this year, that would not be a violent and bloody measure, as it would be to pay them, and enable the State to commit violence and shed innocent blood. This is, in fact, the definition of a peaceable revolution, if any such is possible. If the tax-gatherer, or any other public officer, asks me, as one has done, "But what shall I do?" my answer is, "If you really wish to do anything, resign your office." When the subject has refused allegiance, and the officer has resigned from office, then the revolution is accomplished. But even suppose blood should flow. Is there not a sort of blood shed when the conscience is wounded? Through this wound a man's real manhood and immortality flow out, and he bleeds to an everlasting death. I see this blood flowing now.

I have contemplated the imprisonment of the offender, rather than the seizure of his goods — though both will serve the same purpose — because they who assert the purest right, and consequently are most dangerous to a corrupt State, commonly have not spent much time in accumulating property. To such the State renders comparatively small service, and a slight tax is wont to appear exorbitant, particularly if they are obliged to earn it by special labor with their hands. If there were one who lived wholly without the use of money, the State itself would hesitate to demand it of him. But the rich man — not to make any invidious comparison — is always sold to the institution

which makes him rich. Absolutely speaking, the more money, the less virtue; for money comes between a man and his objects, and obtains them for him; and it was certainly no great virtue to obtain it. It puts to rest many questions which he would otherwise be taxed to answer; while the only new question which it puts is the hard but superfluous one, how to spend it. Thus his moral ground is taken from under his feet. The opportunities of living are diminished in proportion as what are called the "means" are increased. The best thing a man can do for his culture when he is rich is to endeavor to carry out those schemes which he entertained when he was poor. Christ answered the Herodians [3] according to their condition. "Show me the tribute-money," said he; — and one took a penny out of his pocket; — If you use money which has the image of Caesar on it, and which he has made current and valuable, that is, if you are men of the State, and gladly enjoy the advantages of Caesar's government, then pay him back some of his own when he demands it. "Render therefore to Caesar that which is Caesar's and to God those things which are God's" [4] leaving them no wiser than before as to which was which; for they did not wish to know.

When I converse with the freest of my neighbors, I perceive that, whatever they may say about the magnitude and seriousness of the question, and their regard for the public tranquillity, the long and the short of the matter is, that they cannot spare the protection of the existing government, and they dread the consequences to their property and families of disobedience to it. For my own part, I should not like to think that I ever rely on the protection of the State. But, if I deny the authority of the State when it presents its tax-bill, it will soon take and waste all my property, and so harass me and my children without end. This is hard. This makes it impossible for a man to live honestly, and at the same time comfortably, in outward respects. It will not be worth the while to accumulate property; that would be sure to go again. You must hire or squat somewhere, and raise but a small crop, and eat that soon. You must live within yourself, and

depend upon yourself always tucked up and ready for a start, and not have many affairs. A man may grow rich in Turkey even, if he will be in all respects a good subject of the Turkish government. Confucius said: "If a State is governed by the principles of reason, poverty and misery are subjects of shame; if a State is not governed by the principles of reason, riches and honors are subjects of shame." [5] No: until I want the protection of Massachusetts to be extended to me in some distant Southern port, where my liberty is endangered, or until I am bent solely on building up an estate at home by peaceful enterprise, I can afford to refuse allegiance to Massachusetts, and her right to my property and life. It costs me less in every sense to incur the penalty of disobedience to the State than it would to obey. I should feel as if I were worth less in that case.

Some years ago, the State met me in behalf of the Church, and commanded me to pay a certain sum toward the support of a clergyman whose preaching my father attended, but never I myself. "Pay," it said, "or be locked up in the jail." I declined to pay. But, unfortunately, another man saw fit to pay it. I did not see why the schoolmaster should be taxed to support the priest, and not the priest the schoolmaster; for I was not the State's schoolmaster, but I supported myself by voluntary subscription. I did not see why the lyceum should not present its tax bill, and have the State to back its demand, as well as the Church. However, at the request of the selectmen, I condescended to make some such statement as this in writing: — "Know all men by these presents, that I, Henry Thoreau, do not wish to be regarded as a member of any incorporated society which I have not joined." This I gave to the town clerk; and he has it. The State, having thus learned that I did not wish to be regarded as a member of that church, has never made a like demand on me since; though it said that it must adhere to its original presumption that time. If I had known how to name them, I should then have signed off in detail from all the societies which I never signed on to; but I did not know where to find such a complete list.

I have paid no poll tax for six years. I was put into a jail once on this account, for one night [6]; and, as I stood considering the walls of solid stone, two or three feet thick, the door of wood and iron, a foot thick, and the iron grating which strained the light, I could not help being struck with the foolishness of that institution which treated my as if I were mere flesh and blood and bones, to be locked up. I wondered that it should have concluded at length that this was the best use it could put me to, and had never thought to avail itself of my services in some way. I saw that, if there was a wall of stone between me and my townsmen, there was a still more difficult one to climb or break through before they could get to be as free as I was. I did not for a moment feel confined, and the walls seemed a great waste of stone and mortar. I felt as if I alone of all my townsmen had paid my tax. They plainly did not know how to treat me, but behaved like persons who are underbred. In every threat and in every compliment there was a blunder; for they thought that my chief desire was to stand the other side of that stone wall. I could not but smile to see how industriously they locked the door on my meditations, which followed them out again without let or hindrance, and they were really all that was dangerous. As they could not reach me, they had resolved to punish my body; just as boys, if they cannot come at some person against whom they have a spite, will abuse his dog. I saw that the State was half-witted, that it was timid as a lone woman with her silver spoons, and that it did not know its friends from its foes, and I lost all my remaining respect for it, and pitied it.

Thus the State never intentionally confronts a man's sense, intellectual or moral, but only his body, his senses. It is not armed with superior wit or honesty, but with superior physical strength. I was not born to be forced. I will breathe after my own fashion. Let us see who is the strongest. What force has a multitude? They only can force me who obey a higher law than I. They force me to become like themselves. I do not hear of men being forced to live this way or that by masses of men. What sort of life were that to live? When I meet a

government which says to me, "Your money our your life," why should I be in haste to give it my money? It may be in a great strait, and not know what to do: I cannot help that. It must help itself; do as I do. It is not worth the while to snivel about it. I am not responsible for the successful working of the machinery of society. I am not the son of the engineer. I perceive that, when an acorn and a chestnut fall side by side, the one does not remain inert to make way for the other, but both obey their own laws, and spring and grow and flourish as best they can, till one, perchance, overshadows and destroys the other. If a plant cannot live according to nature, it dies; and so a man.

[...]

I have never declined paying the highway tax, because I am as desirous of being a good neighbor as I am of being a bad subject; and as for supporting schools, I am doing my part to educate my fellow-countrymen now. It is for no particular item in the tax-bill that I refuse to pay it. I simply wish to refuse allegiance to the State, to withdraw and stand aloof from it effectually. I do not care to trace the course of my dollar, if I could, till it buys a man a musket to shoot one with — the dollar is innocent — but I am concerned to trace the effects of my allegiance. In fact, I quietly declare war with the State, after my fashion, though I will still make use and get what advantages of her I can, as is usual in such cases.

If others pay the tax which is demanded of me, from a sympathy with the State, they do but what they have already done in their own case, or rather they abet injustice to a greater extent than the State requires. If they pay the tax from a mistaken interest in the individual taxed, to save his property, or prevent his going to jail, it is because they have not considered wisely how far they let their private feelings interfere with the public good.

[...]

The authority of government, even such as I am willing to submit to — for I will cheerfully obey those who know and can do better than I, and in many things even those who neither know nor can do so well — is still an impure one: to be strictly just, it must have the sanction and consent of the governed. It can have no pure right over my person and property but what I concede to it. The progress from an absolute to a limited monarchy, from a limited monarchy to a democracy, is a progress toward a true respect for the individual. Even the Chinese philosopher [7] was wise enough to regard the individual as the basis of the empire. Is a democracy, such as we know it, the last improvement possible in government? Is it not possible to take a step further towards recognizing and organizing the rights of man? There will never be a really free and enlightened State until the State comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly. I please myself with imagining a State at last which can afford to be just to all men, and to treat the individual with respect as a neighbor; which even would not think it inconsistent with its own repose if a few were to live aloof from it, not meddling with it, nor embraced by it, who fulfilled all the duties of neighbors and fellow-men. A State which bore this kind of fruit, and suffered it to drop off as fast as it ripened, would prepare the way for a still more perfect and glorious State, which I have also imagined, but not yet anywhere seen.

Notes

[1] Sam Staples, local constable and tax collector in Concord.

[2] Samuel Hoar (1778-1856) a congressman from Concord, was sent by the Massachusetts legislature to Charleston (South Carolina) on behalf of Negro seamen from that State, threatened with arrest

and slavery on entering the port. He was rudely expelled from Charleston. His daughter was a close friend of the Emersons and a childhood friend of Thoreau.

[3] Herodians were followers of Herod Antipas, tetrarch of Galilee from 4 B.C. to A.D. 39.

[4] Matthew 22,16-22.

[5] Confucius Analects, 8.13.

[6] This is how the experience is recounted in Walden: "One afternoon, near the end of the first summer, when I went to the village to get a shoe from the cobbler's, I was seized and put into jail, because, as I have elsewhere related, I did not pay a tax to, or recognize I the authority of, the State which buys and sells men, women, and children, like cattle at the door of its senate-house. I had gone down to the woods for other purposes. But, wherever a man goes, men will pursue and paw him with their dirty institutions, and, if they can, constrain him to belong to their desperate odd-fellow society. It is true, I might have resisted forcibly with more or less effect, might have run "amok" against society; but I preferred that society should run "amok" against me, it being the desperate party. However, I was released the next day, obtained my mended shoe, and returned to the woods in season to get my dinner of huckleberries on Fair-Haven Hill."

[7] Mencius 4A5. From Thoreau's annotation in his notebook: Mencius said "People generally speak of 'the world,' 'the state,' and 'the family.' The root of the world lies in the state; the root of the state lies in the family; the root of the family lies in the person." Mengzi or Mencius (372–289 BC or 385–303 or 302 BC) was a Chinese Confucian philosopher who has often been described as the "second Sage", that is, after only Confucius himself. He is part of Confucius's fourth generation of disciples. Mencius inherited Confucius's thinking and developed it further.

Frédéric Bastiat

Taxation as theft (1850)

With the usual verve Bastiat dismantle the arguments of those favourable to State expenses based on tax receipts as a way to increase national wealth. This is what people are meant to see. What is willingly ignored by the State advocates is the fact that, after taxation, the common human being has less to spend to satisfy his direct needs and to invest in services he would like to promote.

Source: Frédéric Bastiat, *Ce qu'on voit et CE QU'ON NE VOIT PAS*, 1850.

Presentation

In the economic sphere, an act, a habit, an institution or a law generates not just one effect, but a series of effects. Of these effects, only the first is immediate; it manifests itself simultaneously with its cause, and *we see it*. The others unfold only successively; *we do not see them*; we are fortunate if we can *foresee them*. The difference

between a bad economist and a good economist is this: one sticks to the *visible effect*; the other takes into account both the effect *that can be seen* and *those that must be foreseen*.

But this difference is enormous, because it almost always happens that when the immediate consequence is favourable, the subsequent consequences are disastrous, and *vice versa*.

Hence it follows that the bad economist pursues a small present good that will be followed by a great future evil, while the true economist pursues a great future good at the risk of a small present evil. The same is true of hygiene and morals. It often happens that the sweeter the first fruit of a habit is, the more bitter are the consequences. Witness debauchery, laziness and profligacy. So, when a man, struck by the effects *we see*, has not yet learned to discern those *we do not see*, he abandons himself to harmful habits, not only out of inclination, but out of calculation.

This explains the inevitably painful evolution of humanity. Ignorance surrounds its cradle, then its actions are determined by their first consequences, the only ones which, in its first stage, it can see.

It is only in the long run that the human being, overcoming ignorance, learns to consider the other effects. Two very different masters teach him this lesson: Experience and Foresight. Experience governs effectively but brutally. It makes us acquainted with all the effects of an action, by causing us to feel them, and we cannot fail to end up knowing that fire burns by dint of burning ourselves. To this harsh doctor, I would like, as far as possible, to substitute a gentler one: Foresight. This is why I shall be looking at the consequences of certain economic phenomena, contrasting *those we see* with *those we do not see*.

Taxation

Have you ever heard people say: "There is no better investment than taxes: it's a fertile dew! See how many families it supports and follow its ripple effects on industry: it is an inexhaustible stream; it is life itself."

The advantages which State officials advocate are *those that are seen*. The good that results for their suppliers, that's *what we see too*. It's all too obvious.

But the disadvantages which the taxpayers have to bear *are those that are not seen*. And the resulting damage to their suppliers is *what we don't see either*, although it should be obvious to the mind.

When a State official spends, for his own account, *a hundred francs more*, that implies that a taxpayer spends, for his account, *a hundred francs less*. But the expense of the State official *is seen*, because it is done; whereas that of the taxpayer *is not seen* because, alas! he is prevented from performing it.

You compare the nation to a parched tract of land and taxes to a fertilizing rain. So be it. But you should also ask yourself where the sources of this rain are, and whether it is not precisely taxation that sucks the moisture out of the soil and dries it up.

You should also ask yourself whether it is possible for the soil to receive as much of this precious water through rain as it loses through evaporation.

The good thing is that when a citizen counts out a hundred francs to the taxman, he receives nothing in return. When, afterwards, a State official spends the hundred francs and gives them back to the citizen, it's in exchange for an equivalent value in wheat or labour. The final result for the citizen is a loss of five francs [as part of the salary of the taxman].

It is very true that often, perhaps very often, the State official provides the citizen with an equivalent service. In this case, there is no loss on either side, there is only an exchange. So, my argument does not at all apply to useful functions performed by useful functionaries. All I say is: if you want to create a function, prove its usefulness. Show that it is worth to the citizen, through the services it renders him, the equivalent of what it costs him. But leaving aside this intrinsic usefulness, don't use as an argument the advantage it confers on the State official, his family and his suppliers. Do not assert that it encourages labor.

When a citizen gives a State official a hundred francs for a really useful service, it's exactly the same as when he gives a cobbler a hundred francs for a pair of shoes. Give and take, and we're even. But when a citizen gives a hundred francs to a State official to receive no service, or even to be harassed, it's like giving it to a thief. It is nonsense to say that the State official will spend the hundred francs to the great benefit of national labour; the thief would have done the same. And so would have done a citizen, if he had not been stopped on the road either by the extra-legal parasite or by the legal sponger.

So, let's get used to judging things not only by *what we see*, but also by *what we don't see*.

[...]

In any case, last year I was on the Finance Committee. Every time one of our colleagues wished to set the allowances of the President of the Republic, ministers and ambassadors at a moderate level, he was told: "For the very good of the service, certain functions must be surrounded by prestige and dignity. This is the way to attract men of merit. Countless pleas are addressed to the President of the Republic, and it would be placing him in a painful position to force him to always refuse. A certain style in the ministerial and diplomatic salons is a part of the machinery of constitutional governments, etc., etc.".

Although such arguments may be controversial, they certainly deserve serious consideration. They are based on the public interest, which is poorly appreciated; and, as far as I am concerned, I have more regard for it than many of our Catons, who are driven by a narrow spirit of prejudice or jealousy.

But what revolts my conscience as an economist, what makes me blush for the intellectual reputation of my country, is when it is brought forward (which we never fail to do) this absurd and always favourably received banality: "Moreover, the luxury of great State officials encourages the arts, industry and labor. The Head of the State and his ministers cannot give banquets and parties without causing life to circulate through all the veins of the social body. To reduce their allowances is to starve Parisian industry and, consequently, that of the whole nation."

I must beg you, gentlemen, to pay some little regard to arithmetic, at least; and not to come before the National Assembly of France and say, to get its favour, that an addition gives a different sum depending on whether you add it from top to bottom or from bottom to top.

What! I'm going to arrange with a digger to make a gutter in my field, for a hundred francs! Just as I'm about to conclude, the taxman takes my hundred franc and passes them on to the Minister of the Interior. My deal is off, but the Minister will add another dish to his dinner. And then you dare to claim that this official expense is an addition to national industry! Don't you understand that this is simply a shift in satisfaction and work? A minister's table is better furnished, it's true; but a farmer's field is worse drained, and that's just as true. A Parisian caterer has earned a hundred francs, I grant you; but grant me that a provincial digger has failed to earn a hundred francs. All we can say is that the official dish and the satisfied caterer are *what we see*; the drowned field and the idle digger are *what we don't see*.

Dear me! how much trouble there is in proving that two and two

make four; and if you succeed in doing it, people shout: "It's so clear, it's boring."

And then they vote as if you hadn't proved anything at all.

Lysander Spooner

Taxes as Robbery
(1867)

A text of unprecedented clarity and strength against the power of extortion practised by every State against the citizens.

Source: Extract from Lysander Spooner, *No Treason*, 1867.

The ignominy of compulsory taxes

One essential of a free government is that it rest wholly on voluntary support. And one certain proof that a government is not free, is that it coerces more or less persons to support it, against their will. All governments, the worst on earth, and the most tyrannical on earth, are free governments to that portion of the people who voluntarily support them. And all governments, though the best on earth in other respects, are nevertheless tyrannies to that portion of the people — whether few or many — who are compelled to support them against their will. A government is like a church, or any other institution, in these respects. There is no other criterion whatever, by which to determine whether a government is a free one, or not, than

the single one of its depending, or not depending, solely on voluntary support.

No middle ground is possible on this subject. Either "taxation without consent is robbery," or it is not. If it is not, then any number of men, who choose, may at any time associate; call themselves a government; assume absolute authority over all weaker than themselves; plunder them at will; and kill them if they resist. If, on the other hand, taxation without consent is robbery, it necessarily follows that every man who has not consented to be taxed, has the same natural right to defend his property against a tax-gatherer, that he has to defend it against a highwayman.

It is perhaps unnecessary to say that the principles of this argument are as applicable to the State governments, as to the national one. The opinions of the South, on the subjects of allegiance and treason, have been equally erroneous with those of the North. The only difference between them, has been, that the South has had that a man was (primarily) under involuntary allegiance to the State government; while the North held that he was (primarily) under a similar allegiance to the United States government; whereas, in truth, he was under no involuntary allegiance to either.

Obviously there can be no law of treason more stringent than has now been stated, consistently with political liberty. In the very nature of things there can never be any liberty for the weaker party, on any other principle; and political liberty always means liberty for the weaker party. It is only the weaker party that is ever oppressed. The strong are always free by virtue of their superior strength. So long as government is a mere contest as to which of two parties shall rule the other, the weaker must always succumb. And whether the contest be carried on with ballots or bullets, the principle is the same; for under the theory of government now prevailing, the ballot either signifies a bullet, or it signifies nothing. And no one can consistently use a ballot, unless he intends to use a

bullet, if the latter should be needed to insure submission to the former.

The practical difficulty with our government has been, that most of those who have administered it, have taken it for granted that the Constitution, as it is written, was a thing of no importance; that it neither said what it meant, nor meant what it said; that it was gotten up by swindlers, (as many of its authors doubtless were), who said a great many good things, which they did not mean, and meant a great many bad things, which they dared not say; that these men, under the false pretence of a government resting on the consent of the whole people, designed to entrap them into a government of a part; who should be powerful and fraudulent enough to cheat the weaker portion out of all the good things that were said, but not meant, and subject them to all the bad things that were meant, but not said. And most of those who have administered the government, have assumed that all these swindling intentions were to be carried into effect, in the place of the written Constitution. Of all these swindles, the treason swindle is the most flagitious. It is the most flagitious, because it is equally flagitious, in principle, with any; and it includes all the others. It is the instrumentality by which all the others are made effective. A government that can at pleasure accuse, shoot, and hang men, as traitors, for the one general offence of refusing to surrender themselves and their property unreservedly to its arbitrary will, can practice any and all special and particular oppressions it pleases.

The result — and a natural one — has been that we have had governments, State and national, devoted to nearly every grade and species of crime that governments have ever practised upon their victims; and these crimes have culminated in a war that has cost a million of lives; a war carried on, upon one side, for chattel slavery, and on the other for political slavery; upon neither for liberty, justice, or truth. And these crimes have been committed, and this war waged, by men, and the descendants of men, who, less than a hundred years ago, said

that all men were equal, and could owe neither service to individuals, nor allegiance to governments, except with their own consent.

No attempt or pretence, that was ever carried into practical operation amongst civilized men — unless possibly the pretence of a "Divine Right," on the part of some, to govern and enslave others — embodied so much of shameless absurdity, falsehood, impudence, robbery, usurpation, tyranny, and villainy of every kind, as the attempt or pretence of establishing a government by consent, and getting the actual consent of only so many as may be necessary to keep the rest in subjection by force. Such a government is a mere conspiracy of the strong against the weak. It no more rests on consent than does the worst government on earth.

What substitute for their consent is offered to the weaker party, whose rights are thus annihilated, struck out of existence, by the stronger? Only this: *Their consent is presumed!* That is, these usurpers condescendingly and graciously presume that those whom they enslave, *consent* to surrender their all of life, liberty, and property into the hands of those who thus usurp dominion over them! And it is pretended that this presumption of their consent — when no actual consent has been given — is sufficient to save the rights of the victims, and to justify the usurpers! As well might the highwayman pretend to justify himself by presuming that the traveller *consents* to part with his money. As well might the assassin justify himself by simply *presuming* that his victim consents to part with his life. As well the holder of chattel slaves to justify himself by presuming that they consent to his authority, and to the whips and the robbery which he practises upon them. The presumption is simply a presumption that the weaker party consent to be slaves.

Such is the presumption on which alone our government relies to justify the power it maintains over its unwilling subjects. And it was to establish that presumption as the inexorable and perpetual law of this country, that so much money and blood have been expended.

The government worst than a gang of thieves

The payment of taxes, being compulsory, of course furnishes no evidence that any one voluntarily supports the Constitution.

1. It is true that the *theory* of our Constitution is, that all taxes are paid voluntarily; that our government is a mutual insurance company, voluntarily entered into by the people with each other; that each man makes a free and purely voluntary contract with all others who are parties to the Constitution, to pay so much money for so much protection, the same as he does with any other insurance company; and that he is just as free not to be protected, and not to pay tax, as he is to pay a tax, and be protected.

But this theory of our government is wholly different from the practical fact. The fact is that the government, like a highwayman, says to a man: "Your money, or your life." And many, if not most, taxes are paid under the compulsion of that threat.

The government does not, indeed, waylay a man in a lonely place, spring upon him from the roadside, and, holding a pistol to his head, proceed to rifle his pockets. But the robbery is none the less a robbery on that account; and it is far more dastardly and shameful. The highwayman takes solely upon himself the responsibility, danger, and crime of his own act. He does not pretend that he has any rightful claim to your money, or that he intends to use it for your own benefit. He does not pretend to be anything but a robber. He has not acquired impudence enough to profess to be merely a "protector," and that he takes men's money against their will, merely to enable him to "protect" those infatuated travellers, who feel perfectly able to protect themselves, or do not appreciate his peculiar system of protection. He is too sensible a man to make such professions as these. Furthermore, having taken your money, he leaves you, as you wish him to do. He does not persist in following you on the road, against your will; assuming to be your rightful "sovereign," on account of the "protection" he affords you. He does not keep "pro-

tecting" you, by commanding you to bow down and serve him; by requiring you to do this, and forbidding you to do that; by robbing you of more money as often as he finds it for his interest or pleasure to do so; and by branding you as a rebel, a traitor, and an enemy to your country, and shooting you down without mercy, if you dispute his authority, or resist his demands. He is too much of a gentleman to be guilty of such impostures, and insults, and villainies as these. In short, he does not, in addition to robbing you, attempt to make you either his dupe or his slave.

The proceedings of those robbers and murderers, who call themselves "the government," are directly the opposite of these of the single highwayman. In the first place, they do not, like him, make themselves individually known; or, consequently, take upon themselves personally the responsibility of their acts. On the contrary, they secretly (by secret ballot) designate some one of their number to commit the robbery in their behalf, while they keep themselves practically concealed. They say to the person thus designated:

Go to A_____ B_____, and say to him that "the government" has need of money to meet the expenses of protecting him and his property. If he presumes to say that he has never contracted with us to protect him, and that he wants none of our protection, say to him that that is our business, and not his; that we *choose* to protect him, whether he desires us to do so or not; and that we demand pay, too, for protecting him. If he dares to inquire who the individuals are, who have thus taken upon themselves the title of "the government," and who assume to protect him, and demand payment of him, without his having ever made any contract with them, say to him that that, too, is our business, and not his; that we do not *choose* to make ourselves *individually* known to him; that we have secretly (by secret ballot) appointed you our agent to give him notice of our demands, and, if he complies with them, to give him, in our name, a receipt that will protect him against any similar demand for the present year. If he refuses to comply, seize and sell enough of his property to pay not

only our demands, but all your own expenses and trouble besides. If he resists the seizure of his property, call upon the bystanders to help you (doubtless some of them will prove to be members of our band). If, in defending his property, he should kill any of our band who are assisting you, capture him at all hazards; charge him (in one of our courts) with murder; convict him, and hang him. If he should call upon his neighbors, or any others who, like him, may be disposed to resist our demands, and they should come in large numbers to his assistance, cry out that they are all rebels and traitors; that "our country" is in danger; call upon the commander of our hired murderers; tell him to quell the rebellion and "save the country," cost what it may. Tell him to kill all who resist, though they should be hundreds of thousands; and thus strike terror into all others similarly disposed. See that the work of murder is thoroughly done; that we may have no further trouble of this kind hereafter. When these traitors shall have thus been taught our strength and our determination, they will be good loyal citizens for many years, and pay their taxes without a why or a wherefore.

It is under such compulsion as this that taxes, so called, are paid. And how much proof the payment of taxes affords, that the people consent to "support the government," it needs no further argument to show.

2. Still another reason why the payment of taxes implies no consent, or pledge, to support the government, is that the taxpayer does not know, and has no means of knowing, who the particular individuals are who compose "the government." To him "the government" is a myth, an abstraction, an incorporeality, with which he can make no contract, and to which he can give no consent, and make no pledge. He knows it only through its pretended agents. "The government" itself he never sees. He knows indeed, by common report, that certain persons, of a certain age, are *permitted* to vote; and thus to make themselves parts of, or (if they choose) opponents of, the government, for the time being. But who of them do thus vote, and

especially how each one votes (whether so as to aid or oppose the government), he does not know; the voting being all done secretly (by secret ballot). Who, therefore, practically compose "the government," for the time being, he has no means of knowing. Of course he can make no contract with them, give them no consent, and make them no pledge. Of necessity, therefore, his paying taxes to them implies, on his part, no contract, consent, or pledge to support them — that is, to support "the government," or the Constitution.

3. Not knowing who the particular individuals are, who call themselves "the government," the taxpayer does not know whom he pays his taxes to. All he knows is that a man comes to him, representing himself to be the agent of "the government" — that is, the agent of a secret band of robbers and murderers, who have taken to themselves the title of "the government," and have determined to kill everybody who refuses to give them whatever money they demand. To save his life, he gives up his money to this agent. But as this agent does not make his principals individually known to the taxpayer, the latter, after he has given up his money, knows no more who are "the government" — that is, who were the robbers — than he did before. To say, therefore, that by giving up his money to their agent, he entered into a voluntary contract with them, that he pledges himself to obey them, to support them, and to give them whatever money they should demand of him in the future, is simply ridiculous.

4. All political power, so called, rests practically upon this matter of money. Any number of scoundrels, having money enough to start with, can establish themselves as a "government"; because, with money, they can hire soldiers [*], and with soldiers extort more money; and also compel general obedience to their will. It is with government, as Caesar said it was in war, that money and soldiers mutually supported each other; that with money he could hire soldiers, and with soldiers extort money. So these villains, who call themselves governments, well understand that their power rests primarily upon money. With money they can hire soldiers, and with

soldiers extort money. And, when their authority is denied, the first use they always make of money, is to hire soldiers to kill or subdue all who refuse them more money.

The state as a Mafia organization

For this reason, whoever desires liberty, should understand these vital facts, viz.:

1. That every man who puts money into the hands of a "government" (so called), puts into its hands a sword which will be used against him, to extort more money from him, and also to keep him in subjection to its arbitrary will.

2. That those who will take his money, without his consent, in the first place, will use it for his further robbery and enslavement, if he presumes to resist their demands in the future.

3. That it is a perfect absurdity to suppose that any body of men would ever take a man's money without his consent, for any such object as they profess to take it for, viz., that of protecting him; for why should they wish to protect him, if he does not wish them to do so? To suppose that they would do so, is just as absurd as it would be to suppose that they would take his money without his consent, for the purpose of buying food or clothing for him, when he did not want it.

4. If a man wants "protection," he is competent to make his own bargains for it; and nobody has any occasion to rob him, in order to "protect" him against his will.

5. That the only security men can have for their political liberty, consists in their keeping their money in their own pockets, until they have assurances, perfectly satisfactory to themselves, that it will be used as they wish it to be used, for their benefit, and not for their injury.

6. That no government, so called, can reasonably be trusted for a moment, or reasonably be supposed to have honest purposes in view, any longer than it depends wholly upon voluntary support.

These facts are all so vital and so self-evident, that it cannot reasonably be supposed that any one will voluntarily pay money to a "government," for the purpose of securing its protection, unless he first make an explicit and purely voluntary contract with it for that purpose.

Note

[*] The term "soldier" derives from the Latin *Solidarius* and refers to someone who serves others for money. *Solidare* in Latin means "to pay" and soldiers were paid in *solidi* (Italian: *soldi*).

Pyotr Kropotkin

On Taxes
(1913)

The origin and aim of taxation clarified by the author with reference to past history. In short, taxes appear in their true light, namely as means to plunder citizens and consolidate the State as the new master.

Source: Pyotr Kropotkin, *La science moderne et l'anarchie*. (L'Impôt: Moyen de créer les pouvoirs de l'Etat), 1913.

If the State, through military service, through the education it runs in the interests of the wealthy classes, through the Church and its thousands of civil servants, already wields tremendous power over its subjects, — this power is increased tenfold by means of taxation.

A harmless instrument in its early days, hailed and applauded by the taxpayers themselves when it replaced *corvée* labour, taxation has today become not only a heavy burden, but also a formidable weapon, all the more powerful because it disguises itself under a thousand different forms, capable of directing the entire economic

and political life of societies in the interests of the rulers and the rich. For those who are in power now use it, not only to carve out salaries for themselves, but above all to make and break fortunes, to accumulate immense wealth in the hands of a privileged few, to set up monopolies, to ruin the people and enslave them to the rich — and all this without the taxpayer ever suspecting the power they have handed over to their rulers.

"What could be fairer, however, than taxes?" say the defenders of the State. "Here, — they will say — is a bridge built by the inhabitants of such and such a commune. The river, swollen by the rains, is going to wash it away if we don't hurry to repair it. Isn't it natural and fair to call on all the commune's inhabitants to repair this bridge? And since so many of them have work to do, isn't it reasonable to replace their personal work, their inexperienced *corvée* labour, with a payment that will enable us to call in specialist workmen and engineers?"

"Or, — they will say — here's a ford that becomes impassable at certain seasons. Why shouldn't the inhabitants of the neighboring communes build a bridge? Why shouldn't they pay so much per head, instead of all coming, spade in hand, to repair this embankment? to resurface this road? Or why build a wheat store, to which each inhabitant will have to pay so much wheat per year to cover shortages, instead of entrusting the State with the task of taking care of food in the event of a shortage, in exchange for an insignificant tax?"

It all seems so natural, so fair, so reasonable, that even the most stubborn individualist would have nothing to say about it — and all the more so, as long as a certain equality of conditions reigns in the commune. And, multiplying examples of this kind, economists and defenders of the State in general are quick to conclude that taxation is justifiable, desirable from every point of view and ... "Long live taxation!"

Well, all this reasoning is false. For if certain communal taxes really have their origin in communal work, done together, — taxation or rather the formidable and multiple taxes that we pay to the State, have a completely different origin — *conquest*.

It was from conquered peoples that the monarchs of the East, and later the emperors of Rome, levied *corvée* labour. Roman citizens were exempted from these duties, which they passed on to the peoples under their domination. Up until the Great [French] Revolution — and in some cases right up to the present day — the so-called descendants of the conquering race (Roman, German, Norman), i.e., the so-called "nobles," were exempt from taxation. The peasant, the black bone conquered by the white bone, was alone on the list of those subject to "corvée labour and taxation" (*corvéables et taillables*). The lands of the nobles and of the "ennobled" paid nothing, until 1789. And to this day, wealthy English landowners pay next to nothing for their immense estates, keeping them uncultivated until their value has increased tenfold.

The taxes we pay to the State today are the result of conquest and serfdom — and not of voluntary communal work. Indeed, when the State burdened the people with corvées in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was by no means a question of those works that hamlets or villages undertook by virtue of the free consent of their inhabitants. Communal works continued to be carried out by local residents. But alongside these works, hundreds of thousands of peasants were brought in under military escort from distant villages to build this or that national road or fortress; to transport the provisions needed to feed an army; to follow, with their exhausted horses, the nobles off to conquer new castles. Others toiled in the mines and factories of the State; still others, under the whips of functionaries, obeyed the criminal whims of their masters, digging the ponds of royal castles or building palaces for kings, lords and their courtesans, while the wives and children of these *corvée* labourers fed upon the weeds of uncultivated fields, begged on the roads, or threw them-

selves, starving, under the bullets of soldiers, when attempting to plunder the convoys of exported wheat.

The *corvée* labour, imposed first on the conquered race (just as the French, English and Germans impose it today on the blacks of Africa), and later on upon all peasants, was the origin — the true origin — of the taxes we pay today to the State. Is it any wonder, then, that taxation still bears the stamp of its origins?

It was a huge relief for the countryside when, on the eve of the Great [French] Revolution, the *corvées* labour for the State began to be replaced by a kind of fee — a tax paid in money. When the Revolution, finally bringing a ray of light into the homes of the poor, abolished some of the salt-tax and land-tax that weighed directly on the poorest, and the idea of a fairer tax (and also more profitable for the State) began to emerge, there was, we are told, general contentment in the countryside. Especially among peasants more or less enriched by trade and lending at interest.

But until now, taxation has remained true to its original source. In the hands of the bourgeois who has seized power, it has continued to grow, and to be used mainly to the advantage of the bourgeoisie. By means of taxation, the ruling clique — the State, representing the quadruple alliance of king, church, judge and lord-soldier — has never ceased to extend its powers and treat the people as a conquered race. And today, by means of this precious instrument that strikes without us directly feeling the blow, we have become almost as enslaved to the State as our fathers were to their lords and masters.

How much work does each of us give to the State? No economist has ever tried to estimate the number of working days that the worker in the fields and factories gives each year to this Babylonian idol [1]. It would be futile to rummage through treatises on political economy to arrive at an approximate estimate of what the man who produces wealth gives of his labour to the State. A simple evaluation

based on the budget of the State, the nation, the provinces and the communes (which also contribute to State expenditure) would say nothing; for it would be necessary to estimate, not what goes into the treasury's coffers, but what the payment of each franc to the Treasury represents in actual expenditure by the taxpayer. All we can say is that the amount of work given each year by the producer to the State is immense. It must reach, and for certain classes exceed, the three days of work per week that the serf once gave to his lord.

And note that, whatever we do to reshape the tax base, it's always the worker who bears the full burden. Every cent paid to the Treasury is ultimately paid by the worker, the producer.

The State may well trim to a certain extent the rich man's income. But the rich man must still have an income: that income must be made, produced by someone — and it can only be made by someone who produces something through his work. The State claims its share of the spoils from the rich; but where do these spoils come from, which ultimately represents so much wheat, iron, porcelain or cloth sold, — all the results of the labour of the producing worker? Apart from the wealth that comes from abroad, and which represents the exploitation of other workers — the inhabitants of Russia, the Orient, Argentina, Africa — it is still the workers of the country itself who must give so many days of their labour to pay the tax, and to enrich the rich.

If the tax levied by the State — compared to its immense expenditure — seems to be somewhat lower in England than in other European nations, it is for two reasons. One is that the Parliament, half of which is made up of landowners, favours them by allowing them to levy an immense tribute on the inhabitants of the towns and the countryside, and pay only a small tax. And the other — the main one — is that of all European countries, England is the one that takes the most from the labour of the workers of other nations.

We sometimes hear talk of a progressive income tax which, according to our rulers, would hit the rich and benefit the poor. This was indeed the idea of the Great [French] Revolution, when it introduced this form of taxation. But today, all that is achieved by a slightly progressive tax is to trim the rich man's income a little; we take from him a little more than before of what he has taken from the worker. But that's all. It's always the worker who pays, and who generally pays more than the State takes from the rich.

[...]

As for indirect taxes, we know that not only are the items consumed by everyone most heavily taxed (the others bring in little), but also that any increase of a few centimes in the tax on beverages, or coffee, or wheat, translates into a much greater increase in the prices paid by the consumer.

It's obvious, moreover, that only he who *produces, who creates wealth through his work*, can *pay* taxes. The rest is merely a division of the spoils taken from the producer — a division which, for the worker, always boils down to additional exploitation.

So, we can say that, apart from the tax levied on wealth made abroad, the billions paid each year to the Treasury — in France, for example — are levied almost entirely on the labour of France's ten million or so workers.

Here, the worker pays as a consumer for drinks, sugar, matches and oil. There, when paying his rent, he pays into the Treasury the tax that the State levies on the owner of the house. There again, when he buys bread, he pays land tax, the rent for the land, the rent and taxes for the bakery, the charges of governmental supervision, the Ministry of Finance, and so on. When he buys a suit of clothes, he pays duties on imported cotton, the monopoly created by protectionism. When he buys coal, when he travels by rail, he pays the monopoly on mines

and railroads, created by the State in favour of the capitalists who own the mines and railways. In short, he pays the whole series of taxes that the State, the province and the commune levy on the soil and its products, on raw materials, on manufacturing, on the boss's income, on the privilege of education — everything, everything that the municipality, the province and the State see coming into their coffers.

How many working days per year do all these taxes represent? Isn't it very likely that, after adding them up, we'd find that the modern worker does more work for the State than the serf did for his master?

But if it were only that!

The reality is that taxation gives rulers the means to make exploitation more intense, to keep people in misery, to legally create fortunes - not to mention theft and frauds like that of Panama [2] — fortunes that capital alone could never have accumulated.

Notes

[1] This calculation was made more recently. Tax Freedom Day varies from country to country, depending on the methodologies used, so no real comparison is possible. As an indication, it appears that in the United States (according to calculations by the Tax Foundation), the day on which one finishes working for the State arrived in 2018 on April 19. In 1900, Tax Freedom Day arrived on January 22. In England, according to the Adam Smith Institute, it falls on June 10 (2024). In other European countries (Germany, France, Norway), it falls in July, which means working for the State more than half of the time.

[2] The scandal that affected the company involved in the construction of the Panama Canal concerned sums taken from the subscribers of the company's shares to pay journalists and politicians

in order to obtain their support for the passage of a law and the success of the subscription. But this was not enough to save the Company from bankruptcy, and with its liquidation (1889), 85,000 small shareholders lost everything. The scandal broke in 1892, when journalist Edouard Drumont received compromising documents about the affair and published them in the newspaper *La Libre Parole*.

John Beverley Robinson

About Taxation
(1916)

An extremely clear presentation of the indissoluble link between the existence of the Territorial State and the compulsory payment of taxes.

Source: John Beverley Robinson, *Economics of Liberty*, Chapter: Taxation, 1916.

[...] among the methods of obtaining a portion of the products of the community, without taking part in production, the oldest and simplest is taking what is desired by force.

This, when done by the upper classes, is called taxation.

In the monarchical military organizations of the past, the character of this privilege is easily seen.

The tax was levied in the name of the king or war leader, to whom the natural subservience of human nature spontaneously rendered submission.

It was the king's army, the king's people, the king's taxes; and he who questioned the propriety of the royal prerogative of taking from his people without return or accounting, was reckoned, and felt himself to be, a criminal, guilty of the highest crime of disloyalty.

Such is still the attitude of the generality. To evade the customs tax, to "swear off" the income tax, is still felt by most people to be the immoral avoidance of a just claim, even though they permit themselves to be guilty of these delinquencies.

Although the form of society has been much modified, the industrial having begun to supplant the military, the nature of taxation remains the same. It is still the taking of other people's possessions without their agreement, even if with their tacit consent; that is to say, no opportunity is offered by which the payment may be withheld, on the ground that the services offered in return are not worth the amount demanded, or are not wanted at all as would be done in ordinary mercantile transactions.

It is often said by reformers that government should be conducted upon business principles. This is impossible, because business rests upon doing its work well in return for what is freely given in payment; whereas government demands and takes its income, whether its work is well done or not, and whether it is wanted or not.

The distinction is ineffaceable.

The officials of a governmental organization, whether autocratic, constitutional or democratic, are in the position of those of a corporation of which the chief expenses are the salaries of the officials and employees, and the income is obtained by forcible levies.

It is impossible that an income so obtained should be expended as carefully and economically, and as much in the interest of those who pay it, as if it had to be obtained by offering a fair equivalent to taxpayers, and convincing them that the proposed bargain was to

their advantage, leaving them free to accept or decline at their pleasure.

For this reason denunciation of governmental corruption is entirely futile, indeed, laughable to them who have once clearly comprehended the true state of affairs.

The functions fulfilled by government today are chiefly of a commercial character, yet the service given is remunerated, not by bargain and sale, but by forcible levy. It is inevitable that officials should use this force-collected income to secure their own continuance in office by conferring valuable privileges upon their supporters, who, in turn, use every effort to strengthen the government.

The fact of this co-operation is well known. Everybody knows that behind each political party stands a group of rich men, and that their influence over the votes which are to elect the officials is given in return for the continuance of the privileges by which their wealth has been created.

This power of taking money from the individual without his consent, is the fundamental privilege upon which all the others are based, and by which they are licensed. It stands upon no logical ground, but is the royal prerogative — the will of the prince — in the language of former days.

It will perhaps be thought that a tax imposed by a representative assembly loses the character of a forcible levy, and becomes practically a mercantile transaction. Brief consideration will show that this is not the case. Although the severity of taxation by an autocrat is much mitigated by constitutionalism, the principle remains the same. Taxes are no longer imposed by leasing the collection to a pacha or proconsul, and letting him plunder unchecked. Modern governments have learned the importance of keeping the goose in good health, that it may lay more golden eggs.

But the vote is useless against taxation. Whichever party wins, taxes go on, and must go on. It is not possible to vote for a representative who will oppose taxation, for it is from taxation that he gets his bread and butter.

The essence of economic exchange is the freedom of both parties to withhold consent to a bargain. Even if it could be shown that the equivalent given were fully equal to the assessment levied, it would still lack the freedom of choice of the individual to permit it to be ranked as a commercial transaction.

The total amount of taxation in the United States, including Federal, State, city, town, village, school and all other taxes, has been calculated at something like $2,500,000,000. With a population of about 100,000,000 this amounts to about $25 per head, or $125 per family.

Great as is this forced deduction from the products of the workers, the damage inflicted by taxation indirectly is still greater. First must be placed that caused by taxes upon imports. These restrict freedom of exchange in two ways: by limiting or preventing trade between the nations which impose them, and by fostering monopolies among producers.

When nations give up the last remnants of the military state of the past and become fully commercialized, these tariffs will be abolished and production and exchange incalculably stimulated.

H. L. Mencken

More of the Same
(1925)

A corrosive piece about the exploitative nature of modern governments by one of the most critical minds of the American scene in the first half of the twentieth century.

Source: H. L. Mencken, *More of the Same*, American Mercury, February 1925.

The average man, whatever his errors otherwise, at least sees clearly that government is something lying outside him and outside the generality of his fellow men — that it is a separate, independent and often hostile power, only partly under his control, and capable of doing him great harm. In his romantic moments, he may think of it as a benevolent father or even as a sort of *jinn* [1] or god, but he never thinks of it as part of himself. In time of trouble he looks to it to perform miracles for his benefit; at other times he sees it as an enemy with which he must do constant battle. Is it a fact of no significance that robbing the government is everywhere regarded as a crime of

less magnitude than robbing an individual, or even a corporation? In the United States today it carries a smaller penalty and infinitely less odium than acts that are intrinsically trivial — for example, marrying two wives, both willing.

What lies behind all this, I believe, is a deep sense of the fundamental antagonism between the government and the people it governs. It is apprehended, not as a committee of citizens chosen to carry on the communal business of the whole population, but as a separate and autonomous corporation, mainly devoted to exploiting the population for the benefit of its own members. Robbing it is thus an act almost devoid of infamy — an exploit rather resembling those of Robin Hood and the eminent pirates of tradition. When a private citizen is robbed a worthy man is deprived of the fruits of his industry and thrift; when the government is robbed the worst that happens is that certain rogues and loafers have less money to play with than they had before. The notion that they have earned that money is never entertained; to most sensible men it would seem ludicrous. They are simply rascals who, by accidents of law, have a somewhat dubious right to a share in the earnings of their fellow men. When that share is diminished by private enterprise the business is, on the whole, far more laudable than not.

The intelligent man, when he pays taxes, certainly does not believe that he is making a prudent and productive investment of his money; on the contrary, he feels that he is being mulcted in an excessive amount for services that, in the main, are useless to him, and that, in substantial part, are downright inimical to him. He may be convinced that a police force, say, is necessary for the protection of his life and property, and that an army and navy safeguard him from being reduced to slavery by some vague foreign kaiser, but even so he views these things as extravagantly expensive — he sees in even the most essential of them an agency for making it easier for the exploiters constituting the government to rob him. In those exploiters themselves he has no confidence whatever. He sees them as purely

predatory and useless; he believes that he gets no more net benefit from their vast and costly operations than he gets from the money he lends to his wife's brother. They constitute a power that stands over him constantly, ever alert for new chances to squeeze him. If they could do so safely they would strip him to his hide. If they leave him anything at all, it is simply prudentially, as a farmer leaves a hen some of her eggs.

This gang is well-nigh immune to punishment. Its worst extortions, even when they are baldly for private profit, carry no certain penalties under our laws. Since the first days of the Republic less than a dozen of its members have been impeached, and only a few obscure understrappers have ever been put into prison. The number of men sitting at Atlanta and Leavenworth [2] for revolting against the extortions of the government is always ten times as great as the number of government officials condemned for oppressing the taxpayers to their own gain. Government, today, has grown too strong to be safe. There are no longer any citizens in the world; there are only subjects. They work day in and day out for their masters; they are bound to die for their masters at call. Out of this working and dying they tend to get less and less. On some bright tomorrow, a geological epoch or two hence, they will come to the end of their endurance, and then such newspapers as survive will have a first-page story well worth its black headlines.

Notes

[1] Jinn (anglicised as *genies*) are supernatural creatures in early Arabian and later Islamic mythology.

[2] Atlanta and Leavenworth are Federal prisons in the USA.

Ammon Hennacy

On the refusal to pay taxes (1954)

The One-man Revolution of Ammon Hennacy against the rapacious immoral Warfare State.

Source: Ammon Hennacy, *Autobiography of a Catholic Anarchist*, from Chapter 7, 1954.

Tax Statement, 1950

Now on Jan. 14, 1950 I mailed a statement to Mr. Stuart, Collector of Internal Revenue in Phoenix explaining why I was refusing to pay my income tax. It said:

As a non-church Christian Anarchist and a follower of Gandhi the man of the Half-Century, I refuse to pay my income tax for the seventh consecutive time. Enclosed find my statement of earnings in 1949. I have instructed my various farm employers that I am working for nothing on the day that you come to garnishee my wages, so that I receive nothing, and so do you. As in the time of Matthew, the tax-

gatherer (aside from the hangman) has been the least honorable of the human species. However I hold no ill will against you personally. Your allegiance is to Caesar; mine is to God.

I believe that the state is immoral inasmuch as it lives by war and operates by the return of evil for evil in legislatures, courts and prisons.

I believe that the church is un-Christian and immoral in upholding war and this return of evil for evil by the state, thus denying the Sermon on the Mount.

There are millions of well-meaning Christian people who pay taxes for war. How, then, do I set myself up to judge them? In older times prophets came out of the desert who warned the people of certain destruction awaiting them because of their evil ways. Today we cannot wait for leaders, but all of us who pay for the Bomb must take our responsibility. The extreme of the Atom Bomb brings the need for the extreme message of Christ: the Sermon on the Mount. The following ethical analysis leads up to such action as I and a few others have been and are taking. Love without Courage and Wisdom is Sentimentality, as with the ordinary church member. Courage without Love and Wisdom is Foolhardiness, as with the ordinary soldier. Wisdom without Courage and Love is Cowardice, as with the ordinary intellectual. Therefore, one who has Love, Wisdom and Courage is the one in a hundred million who moves the world, as with Jesus, Buddha, Gandhi. *The people in this country who approximate this difficult ideal are the leaders of the Catholic Worker Movement who publish the Christian Anarchist monthly, the CATHOLIC WORKER.*

The argument is an old one, old as Jesus driving the money changers out of the Temple and being crucified for His rebellion against the corrupt church of His time. It is as old as Socrates who drank the hemlock rather than cater to the corrupt politicians of his time. It is as old as Tolstoy who defied the Czar and the subservient Orthodox

Church which enslaved the Russian people. It is as old as Gandhi, who by his non-violent Satyagraha campaigns overcame the great British Empire and his chief detractor, Churchill, who called him a "naked fakir." I am acting in the tradition which Jefferson, Paine and Emerson gave to this country. I am acting in the tradition of the early Quakers who refused to pay taxes for war and openly broke the law by hiding escaped slaves. I am practicing the same idea as that of Thoreau who refused to pay taxes for the Mexican War and slavery.

The refusal of myself and a few others to pay taxes will not stop World War III, the continuance of conscription, and the fraud of the Welfare State now being slipped over on the American people. The question is not "Can we change the world?" but "Can we keep the world from changing us?" The Unforgivable Sin is that committed by our politicians, clerical and intellectual leaders when they make pipsqueaks of young folk who start life with high ideals. In the past a few men like William Lloyd Garrison and Eugene V. Debs stood in the way of evil politicians and corrupt union leaders. Today those few who might speak the truth have been fooled into becoming leaders of pressure groups. If they get something for their group at the expense of the rest of us they have won their battle — and their own individual life pension.

The fallacy of seeking to change the other fellow and to get his name on the dotted line for some party, union, religion, or other pressure group has prevented people from doing the one thing which they are capable of doing which is to change themselves, to refuse to be a part of the dominant lie, to live the truth no matter what the consequences. In order to do this one must not have much baggage; one must live a life of voluntary poverty, of dedication to the ideal.

The validity of this proposed action is supported by the following analysis of events and trends in present day society. The great mass of people are kept busy gaining a living and in being victims of "escape" activities of their senseless world, rather than in trying to

think matters through on the coming war and the Servile State. To those who are ready to question the acts and purposes of their lives this summary, though harsh, is essentially true.

The whole propaganda of the capitalist and high-up clergy against Communism is a camouflage; their cry for Free Enterprise and Freedom of the Will, for the American Way of Life, and against the Servile and Welfare State does not come with good grace. The capitalist who grew rich at the expense of the small business man, the farmer, and labor, now cries against subsidies granted to others than himself. The dominant clergy, whose churches pay no taxes on their immense holdings and who do not have an Inquisition and a state-supported church, or the old Puritan Blue Laws and Prohibition simply because they cannot get away with it, now wish released time for so-called religious education in the schools and free bus transportation for parochial schools. The capitalist is not interested in Free Enterprise; he is interested in his freedom to exploit you. The dominant clergy are not interested in your exercise of Free Will but seek to enslave you to their dogma and will.

To oppose the enemies of Communism does not mean that I approve of Communism. The racket of the capitalist and the clergy has been exchanged for the racket of the Commissar. Real communism was practiced by the early Christians, who also refused allegiance to Caesar in the army and refused to go to court, one who did so being denied communion. There is no communism in Russia today, only State Capitalism. They have not been used to freedom so do not miss it. In this country we are free to talk but few pay attention because or the noise of the Mammon Arts. Capitalism is doomed. It cannot last because its machinery produces more than the wages given to workers can buy back. Hence the depressions and wars. Despite the give-away Marshall plan (we fought two wars and are not free from England yet) and the talk of Christian missionaries about a Jesus whom they have, perhaps unconsciously, discarded for churchianity and worship of capitalism, the Communists are destined to rule the

world as capitalism continues to fall. Whether the Christians will become true followers again when they are forced underground and whether a free civilization can emerge when the Communist dictatorship falls of its own weight of bureaucracy and tyranny is a question.

The efforts of the confused man in the White House with his deficit spending and election promises of increased income for everyone, and with his hypocritical quoting of the Sermon on the Mount will be of no avail. His one good quality is his loyalty to his fellow gangsters. The only part of the Sermon on the Mount he practices is where it says: "Give to him that asketh of thee and to him who would borrow of thee turn thou not away." Only it is not his increased income that is squandered but the heritage of the American people. The Republicans are not better for they advocate such policies as pouring money into the dead-end of Formosa. Meanwhile big trust funds and Democratic politicians are relieved of full payment of taxes and the poor man has his taxes withheld to pay for the atom bomb and future and past wars. The only reason that the Fascist Franco has not been officially blessed is that our politicians do not feel that they can put it across.

There is a way of life that is not at the same time a way of death. (Armaments and war preparations have not saved any nation, but only aggravated wars.) It takes something more than conversation and prayers to attain this New Way of Life. If we believe in some thing differing from this dog-eat-dog system under which we live we have to act as if we believed it. This means that we cannot be a part of the system which lives upon Rent, Interest, Profit, and the weaknesses and vices of its members. If we mean business we cannot register for the draft, pay taxes for war, accept ration, social security, pension or subsidy from the government which we consider immoral. We will then have to simplify our lives and live on the land. We must be producers, not parasites. We cannot vote or ask for police protection but must know that "All things work together for good to those

who love God." Despite our white man's arrogance, we must not permit ourselves to be deluded into thinking that we have something to offer the primitive people, such as the Hopi Indians, whose civilization without war and government can teach us many lessons.

I do not intend to pay any income tax now or in the future, and plan to picket your office on March 14th. in protest against payment of taxes, not only for war and the bomb, but for the support of an anti-Christian government which denies the Sermon on the Mount daily.

Sincerely,

Ammon A. Hennacy

Karl Hess

Declaration about taxes (1969)

This is what Karl Hess wrote on April 15th, 1969 to accompany his 1040 tax form. The letter was sent to the Tax Office to explain his refusal to pay any income to the tax authorities considering it as an extortion by a government intent on destroying "the ends of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

The Declaration of Independence of the United States of America establishes a bill of particulars in regard to intolerable infringements, abuses, and denials of political power which belongs to the people.

The Federal government of the United States of America today is guilty of exactly every sort of infringement, abuse, and denial stated as intolerable by the Declaration of Independence.

I cannot, in conscience, sanction that government by the payment of taxes.

Further, the Federal government of the United States of America has established as a principle, and ruthlessly by the power of its officials enforces as a practice, that it can demand the primary loyalty of the people, that it can exercise all political power on their behalf, that it can wage war without their approval, and that it can and should establish the standards of their behavior and the goals of their lives.

I could not in conscience sanction such a government by the payment of taxes. Finally, the Declaration of Independence, in the clearest possible language, tells Americans that when a government becomes destructive of the ends of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness that it is the right and the duty of the people to abolish such government, to "throw off such government."

It is in the spirit of that Declaration, and in comradeship with men everywhere who seek freedom and to throw off such governments, that I now refuse to pay the taxes demanded by the government in the attached form.

Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy is a tragi-comic aspect in the life of the individuals.

It is tragic because State crimes need a colossal bureaucratic apparatus to be performed. It is impossible to exterminate millions of people in an amateurish way.

At the same time bureaucracy is a comic phenomenon because of the blunders, the nonsense, the total idiocy of many of its acts and procedures.

Besides that, we have the squandering of material resources and the blocking of human potentialities that are the main results of bureaucratic routine.

For all these reasons, the obliteration of the bureaucracy should be the task of all morally decent individuals and groups.

Charles Dickens

The Circumlocution Office (1857)

This extract contains, in the words of Charles Dickens, "the whole Science of Government". We can attribute two different meanings and intentions to these passages. Either

(a) as a reproach to the government that should intervene in social life but it doesn't because it is too keen on procrastinating everything, or

(b) as a reproach to the government that, in whatever sphere of life it intervenes the results are just empty words and the implementation of the famous "law of delay" (C. N. Parkinson, 1970) or, even worse, the "law of impediment."

In any case, the outcome of government activity (meddling) or inactivity (obstructing) is fully obnoxious and is condensed in the statement "Everything the government touches turns to s**t."

Source: Charles Dickens, *Little Dorrit*, from Chapter 10: Containing the whole Science of Government, 1857.

The Circumlocution Office was (as everybody knows without being told) the most important Department under Government. No public business of any kind could possibly be done at any time without the acquiescence of the Circumlocution Office. Its finger was in the largest public pie, and in the smallest public tart. It was equally impossible to do the plainest right and to undo the plainest wrong without the express authority of the Circumlocution Office. If another Gunpowder Plot had been discovered half an hour before the lighting of the match, nobody would have been justified in saving the parliament until there had been half a score of boards, half a bushel of minutes, several sacks of official memoranda, and a family-vault full of ungrammatical correspondence, on the part of the Circumlocution Office.

This glorious establishment had been early in the field when the one sublime principle involving the difficult art of governing a country was first distinctly revealed to statesmen. It had been foremost to study that bright revelation and to carry its shining influence through the whole of the official proceedings. Whatever was required to be done, the Circumlocution Office was beforehand with all the public departments in the art of perceiving — HOW NOT TO DO IT.

Through this delicate perception, through the tact with which it invariably seized it, and through the genius with which it always acted on it, the Circumlocution Office had risen to overtop all the public departments; and the public condition had risen to be — what it was.

It is true that How not to do it was the great study and object of all public departments and professional politicians all round the Circumlocution Office. It is true that every new Premier and every new Government, coming in because they had upheld a certain thing as necessary to be done, were no sooner come in than they applied their utmost faculties to discovering How not to do it. It is true that from the moment when a general election was over, every returned

man who had been raving on hustings because it hadn't been done, and who had been asking the friends of the honourable gentleman in the opposite interest on pain of impeachment to tell him why it hadn't been done, and who had been asserting that it must be done, and who had been pledging himself that it should be done, began to devise, How it was not to be done. It is true that the debates of both Houses of Parliament the whole session through, uniformly tended to the protracted deliberation, How not to do it. It is true that the Royal Speech at the opening of such session virtually said, My lords and gentlemen, you have a considerable stroke of work to do, and you will please to retire to your respective chambers, and discuss, How not to do it. It is true that the Royal Speech, at the close of such session, virtually said, My lords and gentlemen, you have through several laborious months been considering with great loyalty and patriotism, How not to do it, and you have found out; and with the blessing of Providence upon the harvest (natural, not political), I now dismiss you. All this is true, but the Circumlocution Office went beyond it.

Because the Circumlocution Office went on mechanically, every day, keeping this wonderful, all-sufficient wheel of statesmanship, How not to do it, in motion. Because the Circumlocution Office was down upon any ill-advised public servant who was going to do it, or who appeared to be by any surprising accident in remote danger of doing it, with a minute, and a memorandum, and a letter of instructions that extinguished him. It was this spirit of national efficiency in the Circumlocution Office that had gradually led to its having something to do with everything. Mechanicians, natural philosophers, soldiers, sailors, petitioners, memorialists, people with grievances, people who wanted to prevent grievances, people who wanted to redress grievances, jobbing people, jobbed people, people who couldn't get rewarded for merit, and people who couldn't get punished for demerit, were all indiscriminately tucked up under the foolscap paper of the Circumlocution Office.

Numbers of people were lost in the Circumlocution Office. Unfortunates with wrongs, or with projects for the general welfare (and they had better have had wrongs at first, than have taken that bitter English recipe for certainly getting them), who in slow lapse of time and agony had passed safely through other public departments; who, according to rule, had been bullied in this, over-reached by that, and evaded by the other; got referred at last to the Circumlocution Office, and never reappeared in the light of day. Boards sat upon them, secretaries minuted upon them, commissioners gabbled about them, clerks registered, entered, checked, and ticked them off, and they melted away. In short, all the business of the country went through the Circumlocution Office, except the business that never came out of it; and its name was Legion.

Sometimes, angry spirits attacked the Circumlocution Office. Sometimes, parliamentary questions were asked about it, and even parliamentary motions made or threatened about it by demagogues so low and ignorant as to hold that the real recipe of government was, How to do it. Then would the noble lord, or right honourable gentleman, in whose department it was to defend the Circumlocution Office, put an orange in his pocket, and make a regular field-day of the occasion. Then would he come down to that house with a slap upon the table, and meet the honourable gentleman foot to foot. Then would he be there to tell that honourable gentleman that the Circumlocution Office not only was blameless in this matter, but was commendable in this matter, was extollable to the skies in this matter. Then would he be there to tell that honourable gentleman that, although the Circumlocution Office was invariably right and wholly right, it never was so right as in this matter. Then would he be there to tell that honourable gentleman that it would have been more to his honour, more to his credit, more to his good taste, more to his good sense, more to half the dictionary of commonplaces, if he had left the Circumlocution Office alone, and never approached this matter. Then would he keep one eye upon a coach or crammer from the

Circumlocution Office sitting below the bar, and smash the honourable gentleman with the Circumlocution Office account of this matter. And although one of two things always happened; namely, either that the Circumlocution Office had nothing to say and said it, or that it had something to say of which the noble lord, or right honourable gentleman, blundered one half and forgot the other; the Circumlocution Office was always voted immaculate by an accommodating majority.

Such a nursery of statesmen had the Department become in virtue of a long career of this nature, that several solemn lords had attained the reputation of being quite unearthly prodigies of business, solely from having practised, How not to do it, as the head of the Circumlocution Office. As to the minor priests and acolytes of that temple, the result of all this was that they stood divided into two classes, and, down to the junior messenger, either believed in the Circumlocution Office as a heaven-born institution that had an absolute right to do whatever it liked; or took refuge in total infidelity, and considered it a flagrant nuisance.

Richard Simpson

Bureaucracy
(1859)

This is probably one of the best essays on bureaucracy. It captures the essence and the *raison d'être* of any bureaucratic apparatus and it does so in a very profound way. For the author the bureaucratic mind is the pedantic mind of those who think they know better. And, on the basis of this absurd pretence, the bureaucrats want to direct our life, i.e. "to measure out our labour, to superintend our studies, to prescribe our opinions, to make itself answerable for us, to put us to bed, tuck us up, put on our nightcap, and administer our gruel."

This statement made in 1859 (and others scattered throughout the text) has proved itself so terribly true that it is high time to put an end to this obnoxious agent that, for decades, has been sucking so much energy out of all productive individuals, energy that could have gone towards building a healthy and wealthy social life for each and everyone.

Source: Richard Simpson, *Bureaucracy*, The Rambler, February 1859.

It may seem strange to some of our readers, that while we profess great hostility to bureaucracy, or the interference of a centralised government in matters of family and individual life, we should at the same time take up the cudgels in favour of a governmental inquiry into our education which will probably result in such an interference.

And here, most certainly, if we thought we could do without Government altogether, we should infinitely prefer doing so; but all our most sensible heads have come to the conclusion that this is impossible, both on account of our poverty and weakness, and because of the power and intention of Government. The problem, therefore, is, to make the best terms we can; and our advocacy of cooperation with the Commission is grounded entirely on this consideration.

For we consider that any generalised system of education is of dangerous tendency, that it leans towards the bureaucracy which we so much fear, and encourages bureaucratic principles both in teachers and in the taught. Bureaucracy resides in faculties, not in classes. There could not be a bureaucracy of mere farmers, or landed proprietors, or merchants; similarity of employment is not enough; nor are organisation, mutual dependence, and mutual intelligence sufficient. A military government is not a bureaucracy. The men of a bureaucracy must have sufficient literary and scientific culture to enable them to set up as critics and guides of life, and therefore fit to direct the life of the nation. Bureaucracy is nothing factitious, nothing imposed from without; it is a natural growth, produced by the creation and organisation of a mass of educated *employés*. It is the expression of their social life.

In all governments there may be odious tyranny, monopolies, exactions, and abominable abuses of nearly all kinds; but the idea of a bureaucracy is not fulfilled till we add the pedantic element of a pretence to direct our life, to know what is best for us, to measure out our labour, to superintend our studies, to prescribe our opinions, to

make itself answerable for us, to put us to bed, tuck us up, put on our nightcap, and administer our gruel. This element does not seem possible without a persuasion on the part of the governing power that it is in possession of the secret of life, that it has a true knowledge of the all-embracing political science, which should direct the conduct of all men, or at least of all citizens. Hence any government that avowedly sets before its eyes the *summum bonum* of humanity, defines it, and directs all its efforts to this end, tends to become a bureaucracy.

The world has seen many realisations of, and more attempts to realise, all kinds of bureaucracies; the bureaucracy of lawyers, of divines, of physiologists, of political economists, of schoolmasters, of philosophers, of paternal administrators — all of whom have had their special nostrum, their panacea, for ailing humanity, which they have felt called to compel humanity, list or loth, to swallow. The bureaucracy of lawyers is the universal pattern of all. Law, according to the Greek, Roman, and revived-classical definition, extends to every action of man: the legal rights of legislators attach to every possible act; whatever the subject does may be questioned; they may abuse, but can never exceed, their power. The authority of government is unlimited, so far as there are no express boundaries to it. "Whatever the law does not command, it forbids," says Aristotle, and "the laws speak on all possible subjects" [Ethics, v. II and 2]. Again, "The law should govern all things." [Politics, iv. 6]. So far was this principle carried, that a society where the law was not thus developed was not thought to deserve the name of a polity. England would have been thought barbarous, unstatesmanlike, unscientific, in considering all actions lawful, and the liberty of the subject unbounded, till a law can be produced that forbids them. In Greece and Rome the law was first, and the man had to prove his right. In England, the man is first, and the burden of proof of illegality in his actions is thrown on the law; there is no *droit admistratif*, no power whatever belongs to the government, as such, except what the law

gives it; there is no personification of the state, no sacrifice of the solid constituent to the ideal whole. England has no XII Tables to declare the *salus populi suprema lex*, but clings to the mediaeval and Christian principle, *jus cujusque suprema lex*; the supreme law is founded on the rights of individuals, not on the supposed expediency of the state.

But the civil law takes the entire man under its tutelage, and sets itself up as the mundane providence. And lawyers, imbued with its spirit, are the very incarnations of bureaucracy. Never was this exhibited more clearly than in the Convention of French pettifoggers, where Robespierre declared, "We will have an order of things where all base and cruel passions are chained up, and all beneficial and generous passions aroused, *by the laws*"; and where St. Just pretended to change, by a violent dose of legislation, the morals and manners of a nation, and to reform the human heart.

Happily free from this aggravated plague of lawyers, England has suffered much from the bureaucracy of divines: as in the religious espionage established by the penal laws; in the Puritan pretence to identify Church and State, to deduce their State-Church rules from Scripture only, and to abolish canon, civil, chancery, and common law and law-courts in favour of their elder-discipline and scriptural courts of conscience — a pretence carried out with inquisitorial espionage, and the gravest attention of the heaviest divines even to the lightest *minutiae* of female ornament and male amusement; and in the caliphate of Charles I, with his viziers Laud [1] and Juxon [2] and Spotswood [3], their courts of High Commission and Star-Chamber, and their hundreds of governmental acts, motived solely by the desire to fix each man passively in his proper place, and to maintain in each the sense that he was under the paternal charge of persons who could judge better than himself what he should eat, drink, and avoid.

But this is rather the physiological bureaucracy, such as Bacon dreamed of in his *New Atlantis* [4]. Suffice it to say, that the great characteristic of true bureaucracy is the intimate conviction of its conductors that the provisions made by them adequately cover the whole area of human life and thought, or at least the most important parts of it; therefore that all other provisions are superfluous, and, if contrary to their ideas, noxious, and as such, to be done away with as soon as possible, so as to leave a clear field for the regenerating action of their beneficent influence. Hence the intolerant, monopolising, intrusive character of all true bureaucracy, and its distinction from the vulgar inartificial military tyranny, or the rule of the policeman. These only look at first to the outside of things, to overt acts; bureaucracy, when fully developed, searches the hearts and thoughts by its secret police. But take the soldier or the policeman, educate him to look after our morals, to report upon our opinions, and to interfere with our family arrangements, and you soon teach him to be a bureaucrat. There is no bureaucracy in the rough-and-ready expedients of the press-gang, or in the recruiting-sergeant wheedling the drunken ploughboy to receive the Queen's shilling. But when all the population is kept on the registers, their employments and acquirements noted, their bodily capabilities marked, and themselves subjected at intervals to the machinery of the conscription, then we begin to perceive the presence of a bureaucratic agency, mixing itself up with the family, and directing the national life.

But this agency does not become very intolerable till it is further developed, and begins to meddle with locomotion, communication, association, opinion, and faith. It then becomes a kind of tutorship or pedantry, applicable to little boys, but applied to grown men and women. Its whole type is pedagogic; its symbol is the schoolmaster: not, indeed, the schoolmaster of old days, when the birch became the refuge of decayed butlers, seedy bankrupts, out-at-elbows ne'er-do-wells who had failed in every other occupation, and lazy loungers who had not credit to command capital for any higher venture — in a

mass of such materials there was neither organisation, nor ambition, nor restlessness, and therefore no germs of bureaucracy.

But this type of schoolmaster is rapidly disappearing under the government influence; considered both internally and externally, the "preceptor's" life is now a different thing from what it was. Taken by itself, the vocation of a teacher has three elements: grandeur of trust — to form a budding intellect and to direct opening habits; irksomeness of operation, in its wearisome repetitions, contradictions of impudent pupils, annoyances, and disappointments; and pettiness of material to be worked with — the infantine mind, not in its amiable manifestations, but in a routine as distasteful to itself as to the teacher — alphabets, rudiments, simple ideas and words, elementary arithmetic, and other things as uninteresting to the most ordinary as to the more extraordinary mind. Then, with regard to its external position, the triviality of the necessary acquirements keeps the scholastic market abundantly if not well supplied, and depresses the market-value even of the better class of teachers. All these things tended to keep down the average acquirements of primary schoolmasters; or to confine the profession to a class of men who, if not fit for that work, were at any rate fit for nothing else. There is a contradiction in the requisite elements of character: the religious grandeur of the trust requires an enlarged or religious soul to appreciate it: on the other hand, an enlarged mind is but too apt to be utterly disgusted both with the irksome wearisome treadmill of labour and with the petty details of alphabets, spelling-lessons, and addition; and a mind that could easily allow itself to be absorbed in these matters is hardly likely to take an intelligent view of the grandeur of its vocation. Hence the good schoolmaster was usually a dull fellow of high principle, who worked hard because it was his duty, and was able to stick to his work because he had not wit to feel the tedium of the eternal round of routine he was doomed to tread; while the bad schoolmaster was often the seedy fellow we have described above, entering the profession without a conscience, without a thought of

the ideal grandeur of the calling, driven by the necessity of seeking food and shelter, and invited by the easy elementary character of the small stock-in-trade requisite to begin business.

But the days of this jog-trot system were numbered when Government began to provide schools, and to pay teachers according to the results of a competitive examination. Such examination only proves the sharpness or power of masters, not their patience or will to economise those powers. But for a model primary master, patience rather than sharpness is the first requisite. The primary master loses his pupils as soon as they get beyond the rudiments, and has to begin again with a fresh batch. His chances of having a legitimate opportunity to display his flashy acquirements are but small; in a short time he is wearied out, bored to death, and loses patience; then he begins to test new theories and try new schemes, unless he makes up for his wearisome mental drudgery by passionate indulgence; at least he rejects the idea of giving up his life to this distasteful discipline; he looks forward to emancipation, or to raising himself, if not in his profession, at least through his profession; he enters into combination with others of the class, with whom he agitates theories and schemes; he becomes more and more alienated from the plain dry duty of instructing a rapid succession of children in the same rudiments; he begins to dislike this almost ecclesiastical calling, which constitutes the ascetic life of so many devoted religious persons, and attaches himself more and more to the government which awakened his intellectual ambition by its competitive examinations, and which holds the purse on which he chiefly depends: then he begins to regard himself as a member of the class of functionaries — as a government *employé*, and to despise all authority but that which holds out prizes to his ambition. Here, then, is an organisation, wide-spreading, influential, pedantic; a ready tool of government interference, if any Ledru Rollin [5] should arise who wants to use it.

And the boys formed on the competitive principle constitute another element of danger in the same direction. The master is naturally

anxious to present a creditable school to the inspector: he has done all he can to sharpen his pupils, and to fill them with a kind of literary enthusiasm; and the boys have got the smattering of an education that makes them discontented with unintellectual labour, and holds out to them hopes of clerkly employment. The bricklayer's son, who has learned Latin and the use of the globes, despises the handicraft of his father, and determines not to be an artisan: he seeks a place — clerk, shopboy, railway officer, policeman, postman — something "literary," or something under government, where his pen-proficiency and book-learning may be turned to some account. Then the influence of the competitive system itself substitutes ambition for respect and the amiable feelings which made the master a kind of father to his boys, and leads the pupils to value their acquirements, not for any substantial excellence of their own, but for the power they confer of triumphing over others, and raising themselves above their original level. Moreover the special subjects in which the competition takes place are subjects of no intrinsic market-value in themselves, productive neither of food nor raiment, but simply preparations to aid the mind in the future business of life. But these mental preparations have hitherto in school been treated as the substantial business of life; and there is a life where they are the substantial business, namely, the life of the bureau. Competitive education, therefore, is gradually forming a large class of young men whose interest it would be to remodel society on a bureaucratic basis, and to multiply offices, so that they might be able to gain their living by what they had learned at school.

Now in a country like ours, where one power in the constitution is the democratic element, the spread of intelligence among the people must continually bring more and more of them within the number of those in whom the exercise of political power is vested. And the mere multiplication of the constituents of a state is a step towards bureaucracy; it almost necessitates both the multiplication of *employés* and the increase of their power to pry into the actions of every citizen.

For instance, when the French Revolution gave the right of universal suffrage, it was of course necessary to take care that the same man should not fraudulently vote several times at the same or different urns. Hence every elector — every male adult — had to be furnished with a kind of passport and ticket of identification, in which the police had to certify all changes of domicile, and at last all locomotion. The man was described in the paper he carried, and he was liable to be challenged to produce it at any time or place. Here is the abominable passport system following as a logical result from universal suffrage and the ballot; and bureaucracy is proved to be as natural an attendant on the multiplication and intensifying of the democratic element of society as on autocracy. And when this numerous class of *employés* consists of young men taught in the competitive schools, they must be of the type which such schools are calculated to turn out. A crammed knowledge, a smattering of all sciences, is no store to be depended upon: its real result is a conceited ignorance, a sharpening of the common logical powers of the mind, adapting it for that commonest of all logical processes, the development of principles to their farthest results, but leaving it quite unfurnished for the real business of reason — weighing probabilities, allowing for the interference of contrary principles, and appreciating all facts on which induction is to be founded. The young, ardent, unfurnished mind insists on *a priori* principles. The *rights of man* on the one side, the *divine right of kings* on the other, divide unformed intellects between them; older heads, older either in years or in judgment, soon see the utter futility of the attempt to apply mathematical and metaphysical methods to the practical questions of morals and politics. But unhappily the *a priori* method has great charms: its unfaltering infallibility, its confident universality, its entire contempt for all gainsayers, and the facility of its arrangement, all captivate the young student. It is at the level of his powers: for logic requires but little external aid; it is internal; its principles are innate; it is as perfect in youth as in age — soon learned, easily used: given a prolific general principle, and, like the Tyrian cow's hide, logic soon cuts it

up into strips enough to surround a city. But learning, that cautious hesitating desire to be right and fear of being wrong which tests the validity of each step by examples and experiments, is long, difficult, and disagreeable; it is recommended to the youthful student by no charms — it bears on its face the impress of dull prosaic labour.

Yet it is the characteristic of all great statesmen. Selden [6] avers that he and his assistants left not a document unturned in concocting the Declaration of Rights. Burke [7], in spite of his vast philosophical powers, and the ease and brilliancy with which he argues on general principles, is the great prophet of prosaic politics. All really great statesmen and lawyers are characterised by such a love of facts, by such a careful weighing of authorities, by such special pleading, that they seem to be cynically indifferent to the logical development of principles, to oratory, to philosophy, to the grandest and most admirable bursts of nature and feeling. In the sphere of law and politics, the man of cool judgment and informed reason snuffs out all such flourishes, pooh-poohs the rhetorician, and respects facts alone.

And this consideration will enable us to appreciate at its just value the praise which is claimed by Frenchmen, and allowed them by all fair minds. "We are logical," they say; "we carry out principles to their full development, and sacrifice facts to reason; we are preëminently rational": whereas "the English are more practical, but less reasonable; they do not think, or carry out their principles; they are in a perpetual hesitation as to rational systems, and never come to any simple unmixed conclusion; fortune favours them, but their minds are of an inferior order." We may note the French characteristic in the Irish mind. Without forgetting that the Irish Burke stands at the very head of the representatives of the English spirit, we cannot conceal from ourselves that much the same spirit rules in Ireland as in France, and with the same political results. One nation as much as the other is led to personify government, to look up to it as a personal ruler, animated with its own reason and will, and acting from its own feelings and impulses, and to expect it to guide, direct,

and govern every thing. Instead of regarding it as a temporary committee — a kind of national vestry, elected to carry on the national business for a time in accordance with the national feeling, till a change in the public temper shall substitute another set of men to represent another policy — they consider government as a providence, omnipotent, and therefore answerable for every ill. As government is the great master of the supplies, they covet nothing so much as a place under it. The national ambition is to be an *employé*: without considering how the state is to go on if all are employed by it, all press into its service, and expect it to support them.

They reason out logically the first and simplest idea of government; they do not return upon the notion, analyse it, and modify their feelings in respect to it. This it is to be logical; this it is to be half-educated in a great national system of shallow and showy learning — to have sharpened intellects without practised judgments; this it is to be qualified almost naturally for journalists, for brilliant one-sided essayists, for special correspondents, for reporters, for penny-a-liners, for almost all the secondary employments of literature: but not to be fitted for a great imperial view of things, for command, for combination, for justice, for the highest walks in philosophy, till the defect has been eradicated by real labour and long and patient thought. The boasted superiority of our intellectual neighbours is really an inferiority, because the practical education of the illiterate Englishman is in its results much nearer to the most developed learning than the half-finished literary culture of France, which only makes a man logical and consistent in taking the part for the whole, in wearing half-truths threadbare, and in seeing no limit to his own capacity. Not that such a way of viewing things is peculiar to the Frenchman; give the illiterate Englishman the French culture, and he will soon have the French ideas.

It is only among such a people that bureaucracy in its purest and intensest form is possible; when the mechanism of government is considered to be the end of all things — the chief good of man; when

man is a mere governable disposable animal, meant to be dealt with by the deep arcana of reports, orders, admonitions, and police regulations. The half-educated man never knows his ignorance; he thinks he knows all things; in other words, he makes the little he knows equivalent to all things. Let this little be an acquaintance with the procedures of administration, and these procedures are sure to present themselves to his imagination as the grandest and most important things in the world. They will be his religion, and more than his religion: when his function supplies him also with food and raiment, then all the passions of interest are enlisted on its side, and administrators will club together for mutual protection and defence, and to exalt their function into the great prophetic and social institution of the world.

And people with this admiration of their functions are always the best functionaries; they go about their duties with a zest and religious fervour which ensures the most enthusiastic activity. Hence the bureaucratic spirit finds great favour with secretaries of state; they find their work facilitated and simplified by the zeal of their subordinates. The ease that it communicates to the wheels of politics is wonderful. Administrators know so well their own department, that the clumsy mechanism of our stupid old amateur vestrymen, overseers, justices, sheriffs, and legislators, has no chance of standing before it. Think of the power with which a poor-law commissioner comes down upon a pig-headed board of guardians that *will* give outdoor relief instead of breaking up a poor body's home. He comes with the triple prestige of superior place, superior knowledge of the law, and perfect familiarity with the details of administrative practice. He comes down like an expert on a set of tyros, like a sailor on a lot of land-lubbers, like a traveller on a party of untravelled bumpkins. Every man is entitled to respect in matters of his own trade. The division of departments has enabled our commissioner to gather up into his own hands all the ribbons of every subdivision of his subject; he knows its statistics by heart; he soon comes to an understanding with

the clerk of the board, or some other paid and permanent official, and with a very little dexterity manages to make matters go as he wishes. Nothing stands against him except every now and then the deep-read scientific knowledge of some retired philosopher, who besides taking a general view of all political departments, and reducing the commissioner's pretensions to their proper dimensions, is able to grapple with him on his own ground, and to maintain his argument even against the other's special preparation; then comes discussion and publicity, and an amendment of the obnoxious proceedings.

But as the state increases, and most in the classes that require to be administered, administration must increase likewise; the number of *employés* must wax greater and greater, they must be organised, and with their organisation the classification of the people whose affairs they have to administer must keep pace. In each department a powerful fraternity will be gradually formed, to inquire, to register, to report: first of all merely about our powers of contributing to the taxes; then about our births, deaths, and marriages; soon we have them inquiring about our religion — and we may be sure that what they inquire about they would meddle with if they dared — they do so whenever they dare. They inquire about a soldier's, or a pauper's, or a prisoner's religion, when he first enters the barrack, or the poor-house, or the prison. Is that man thenceforth really free to change his religion as he likes, with the freedom guaranteed to each subject by our constitution and our laws? or is he administered by the *employé*, who would compel him to keep as he is rather than take the trouble to alter the register? The poorer classes are already administered bureaucratically. The little end of the wedge is in, and a speculative systematic statesman may any day find occasion to drive it deeper.

It is a great mistake to suppose that a bureaucratic system is only possible where the government is monarchical; it can arise gradually under every form of policy, and it renders every form of government despotic. A man in authority is what he is, however he came there — by hereditary title, by the bayonets of his soldiers, or by

universal suffrage; the road of his advancement is an accident, his position is the positive element, his essence is that he is a ruler. Whatever safeguards are necessary for any authorities, are necessary for all; we run no less risk from the aggrandised democrat than from the monarch or the aristocrat; it is the human nature of all of them equally to meddle, and to unite as much as possible the controlling with the executive power, so as to have no one who can interfere with their meddling. What can be clearer than that the controlling is the supreme power? what more logical than that the supreme power should actively assert its supremacy? A logical, that is, a half-learned people will therefore transfer the nominal power to the place where it really exists, and will cumulate the whole of it in the people or the monarch. Thus by bureaucracy people or monarch becomes equally despotic; it gives despotic power to whatever government it serves. The Swiss republics and the German and Sardinian constitutions are as despotic in their administration as the French empire, because in all the administration is bureaucratic.

Bureaucracy, when powerful, is essentially revolutionary, because it is logical; that is, because it proceeds on the literary development of general principles, not on the practical road of experiences and facts, and thence is led to introduce radical changes inconsistent with the habits of the people for whom it legislates. In interests and in condition the functionaries form a class apart, whose business is to classify the rest in the way that gives itself least trouble, and at the same time to multiply its duties towards them so as to have more claim upon them for pay and an excuse for multiplying its numbers. It always keeps changing the people along arbitrary lines of an artificial classification, on arithmetical, not on human principles; it makes no account of the history and habits of the people — what should it know of habits and history? Its only aim is perpetually to discover new modes of interference, to provide more work for the bureau, and to subject the people ever more completely to its drill.

It is revolutionary towards the head of the government, because its power does not reside in any person, but in the system; the bureau, the complex body, is supreme, and goes on as well without a head as with one. The head depends on it, not it on the head; he falls, and another rises in his room; but whoever rises must use the organisation that is ready — he cannot govern without it, has no time to form a fresh system, and is obliged to adopt that which is at hand. The head, therefore, that manifests any symptoms of a hostile reforming tendency, has to fear the bureaucracy as his most deadly, most revolutionary enemy.

Now, how to guard against the insidious approaches of this vile system. First, we have to restrict as much as possible the sphere of the meddlesomeness of Government, and to keep our independence in as many departments of life as possible; never to consent that the Government should have a power over one class that we do not wish it to have over another. Never to applaud an unjust law against others, lest it be one day turned against us. To be patient under the necessary unreadiness and slowness of an independent system, where each part is balanced by checks; and to oppose steadily and consistently every great attempt at centralisation, such as an equalised poor-rate and a central administration of the duties of the boards of guardians, whatever benefits or conveniences may be promised to us in exchange. The class of functionaries must be kept low. For this cause we lament the competitive examination, as encouraging acquirements that find no legitimate outlet in the work to be performed, and providing us with a restless encroaching body of young pedants; whereas the old system left us in peace, with the knowledge that we had nothing to fear from the assured incapacity and unambitious content of those to whom the permanent routine duties of the state were committed. The functionaries should always be kept subject to the public, and punished for every breach of courtesy or duty towards those whose business they have to administer. And in disputes the law should always *prima facie*

suppose the functionary to be in the wrong, or at least should hold the balance perfectly even. They must, of course, be responsible to their official superiors, but not in questions between them and the public: as soon as the public has no power of proceeding against the functionary except with his superior's consent, then the foundations of a real bureaucracy are laid. Again, all complaints, all actions against them, must be public; while the functionaries are not allowed to acquire the freemasonry of a secret society, they can never do much harm. Finally, we shall never be safe from bureaucracy till we have exorcised from our public men that doctrinaire spirit which reigns in revolutionists like Bentham, Buckle, and Bright — that positivism which treats man statistically and in the mass, not as individuals; arithmetically, not according to interests. The first result of formularisation is to abstract personality, as we showed in a review of Mr. Buckle last July. We must, then, be always suspicious of any school which treats men as so many ciphers to add up, subtract, divide, multiply, and reduce to vulgar fractions.

Notes

[1] Archbishop William Laud (1573-1645). Archbishop of Canterbury whose attempts to bring uniformity of worship and the "beauty of holiness" into the Anglican liturgy precipitated the slide into Civil War.

[2] William Juxon (1582-1663). Bishop of London from 1633 to 1649 and Archbishop of Canterbury from 1660 until his death.

[3] Sir Robert Spotswood (1596-1646). A close supporter of Charles I, in 1645 he was appointed secretary of state for Scotland. During the civil war he was taken prisoner and charged of high treason. He was executed in January 17, 1646.

[4] Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) wrote *The New Atlantis* in 1623.

[5] Alexandre Auguste Ledru-Rollin (1807-1874) was a French politician known for his inflammatory speeches and demagogic stance.

[6] John Selden (1584-1654) was an English jurist, scholar of England's ancient laws and constitution.

[7] Edmund Burke (1729-1797) was an Anglo-Irish statesman, author, orator, political theorist, and philosopher who occupied for many years a seat in the British House of Commons as a member of the Whig party.

Robert Michels

State and Party Bureaucracy (1925)

The author puts forward the thesis that State and Party bureaucracy are the means to maintain power in the hands of the State ruling élite and of the Party political leaders. In exchange of their services the bureaucrats obtain jobs in the State or Party apparatus. This assure their allegiance to State rulers and Party leader instead of possible continuous rebellions that might make the existence of any political power quite precarious if not impossible in the long run.

Source: Robert Michels, *Zur Soziologie der Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie*, Second Edition 1925. [English Title: *Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*].

The organisation of the State needs a vast and highly articulated bureaucracy. This is an essential factor in the politics of the ruling class, in order to maintain itself in power and to ensure the continuity of government. The instinct of self-preservation compels the

modern State to incorporate and bind to itself the greatest possible number of interests. This need of the State organism increases in parallel with an increase among the masses of the conviction about the defectiveness, even the inadequacy, of the present order of society; in short, with the increase of what is called, by the authorities, 'discontent'.

The State, especially the democratic state, best meets this need to create for itself as large a group of defenders as possible by forming a caste of functionaries directly dependent upon the State. In this it is greatly helped by the trends of modern economics. On the part of the State there is an enormous supply of official positions. On the part of the citizens an even greater demand of jobs. The reason for the latter is the insecurity in which the members of the intermediate social strata (small industrialists, artisan tradesmen, peasants, etc.) find themselves due to the formation of large-scale expropriatory capitalism and the organised resistance of the working class, both movements converging, whether they wish it or not, against the middle classes.

All these people, whose economic existence is seriously threatened by the modern economy, endeavour to find safe situations for their sons, to secure a social position which shall shelter them from the play of economic forces.

For this purpose, they find the State trough, with the important pension entitlement it grants, particularly suitable. The enormous demand that arises from this situation, a demand which is always greater than the supply, creates the so-called "intellectual proletariat." This constitutes a mass subject to great fluctuations in numbers. The State in fact, from time to time, put in a difficult situation by the increasing demand for positions in its service, finds itself forced to open the floodgates of its bureaucratic channels even wider to accommodate a few thousand new postulants, in order to transform them from dangerous enemies into zealous partisans and defenders.

Two intellectual classes are thus formed: the first consisting of those who have managed to find a place in the manger of the State, whilst the other consists of those who, in the words of Scipio Sighele (*L'intelligenza della folla*, Turin, 1903), have besieged the fortress without succeeding in entering it.

The former can be compared to a group of slaves, always ready to defend the State, their employer, under any circumstances, partly out of class selfishness, partly out of personal selfishness (the fear of losing their jobs). They are therefore undoubtedly to be regarded as the most loyal supporters of the State. The latter, on the other hand, are the sworn enemies of the State. They are the eternal restless spirits who lead the bourgeois opposition and in part also assume the leadership of the revolutionary parties of the proletariat. It is true that the State bureaucracy does not in general expand as rapidly as do the discontented elements of the middle class. None the less, it is constantly expanding, sometimes even beyond the actual demand for official positions. Thus, it happens that the bureaucracy presents itself as an endless screw that is less and less in tune with the general welfare.

And yet this bureaucratic machinery remains necessary. Through it alone can be satisfied the claim of the educated members of the population for secure positions for life. At the same time, the mechanism of bureaucracy is also a means of self-defence for the State or the inevitable consequence of the need to defend a property right that has a weak legal basis, and an antidote for preventing the uprising and revolt of the public conscience. This is how Amilcare Puviani, an economist from the University of Perugia who died prematurely, and to whom we owe an important paper on the myth of the State, expressed it (*Teoria della Illusione Finanziaria*, 1903).

The tendency of the modern State to rely on bureaucracy is reinforced through the institution of parliamentarism, in which the people's representative must continually reinforce his or her popu-

larity with bribes (*pots de vin* are called in France, which, however, are found everywhere in other forms). Against the bureaucracy, however, two powerful enemies are rising: the financial instability due to the immense amount of post-war State debts and the advent of new oligarchic governments, which rely not on unhealthy armies of employees (unhealthy because they were created by old governments and imbued with their spirit), but rather on an elite of devoted personal followers; to these is added a third factor: the ethical need to clean the Augia stables [1], which have become too smelly. In all three cases — which can, of course, occur together — a demobilisation of the employees may result. Only the future can tell us if this counter-trend will prevail or represents only a temporary parenthesis.

Some of these traits indicated for the State are shared by the Party. A State or Party in which the circle of the élite is unduly restricted, i.e. in which the oligarchy is composed of too small a number of individuals, runs the risk of being swept away by a democratic revolution of the masses. Hence the modern Party, like the modern State, endeavours to give to its own organization the widest possible base, and to attach to itself, even financially, the largest possible number of individuals. Thus arises the need for a strong bureaucracy, and these tendencies are reinforced by the increase in the tasks imposed by modern organization.

The bureaucratic growth of the Party [The Socialist Party] necessarily undermines two elements that are among the essential prerequisites of any socialist conception: an understanding of the broader, ideal and cultural aims of socialism and an understanding of the international multiplicity of its manifestations. The Party mechanism becomes the main thing. The capacity for an accurate grasp of the peculiarities and the conditions of existence of the labour movement in other countries diminishes in proportion as the single national organizations become broader.

In the days of the so-called "socialism of the *émigrés*," the socialists devoted themselves to an elevated policy of principles, inspired by the classical criteria of internationalism. Almost all of them were, so to speak, specialists in this general field. They were guided in this direction by their way of life, characterised by the frequent exchange of thoughts in quiet evenings, while the *samovar* [2] boiled, and by constant contact, elbow to elbow, with men of the most diverse languages, by the enforced isolation from the bourgeois world of their respective countries, and the utter impossibility of any "practical" action.

[...]

To some of those who form the lower and middle strata of the Party bureaucratic hierarchy, may be aptly applied what Alfred Weber said (in 1909) at the Vienna congress of the *Verein Für Sozialpolitik*: bureaucracy in matters of internal policy is the number one enemy of all individual freedom and of an honest conscience. The dependence upon higher powers, characteristic of the average employee, suppresses individuality and gives to the society in which employees predominate a narrow petty-bourgeois and philistine stamp.

The bureaucratic spirit corrupts character and leads to narrowness. In every bureaucracy we may observe place-hunting, a mania for promotion, and obsequiousness towards those upon whom promotion depends; there is arrogance towards inferiors and servility towards superiors.

Wolfgang Heine, who in the German socialist party is one of the boldest defenders of the personal and intellectual liberty of the members, and who is always in the breach to denounce "the tendency to bureaucracy and the suppression of individuality," goes so far, in his struggle against the socialist bureaucracy, as to refer to the awful example of the Prussian State. It is true, he says, that Prussia is

governed in accordance with uniform principles and by a bureaucracy which must be considered as a model of its kind; but it is no less true that the Prussian State, precisely because of its bureaucratic characteristics, and notwithstanding its external successes, is essentially retrogressive. Prussia could hardly produce any distinguished personalities, or at least it is unable to tolerate their existence, so that Prussian politics tend more and more to degenerate into a spiritless and mechanical regime, displaying a lively hostility to all inner progress.

Notes

[1] In Greek Mythology, the stables of King Augeas housed the single greatest number of cattle in the country and had never been cleaned, until the time of the great hero Heracles. The expression means a challenging task, improving or fixing something that is currently in a very bad condition.

[2] A *samovar* is a metal container traditionally used to heat and boil water, generally to make tea.

James M. Beck

The Rise of Bureaucracy in the U.S.A. (1932)

The author deals with the rise of bureaucracy, everywhere in the U.S.A., to the detriment of the public (the taxpayers) and of the autonomy of the states of the Union. The centralization of bureaucratic power in the hands of the Federal State might have represented an economic and technical demand of the times but it goes against the principles and values upon which the American society was founded.

Source: James M. Beck, *Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy*, 1932.

Bureaucracy and its Propaganda

The bureaucracy, at the expense of the tax payers, is ever at work to increase the importance and prestige of their several bureaus and incidentally their salaries, and to secure greater recognition of the rank and file of the bureaucracy. If Congress at times weakly yields to these powerful propaganda organizations, it is because they are

organized and are an appreciable force at the polls, while the tax payers and consumer are unorganized and inarticulate.

These men and women of the bureaucracy, whether working at public expense to increase the size and importance of their departments, thus imposing a still greater burden on the American tax payer, or whether working through their unions to increase their own salaries, are powerfully assisted by organizations and associations not connected with the Government. The American Federation of Labor, for instance, comes to the aid of mechanics and employees of the Arsenals and Navy Yards in their disputes concerning rates of pay. Such Federation also lends assistance to the civil service clerks or postal employees in their attempts to secure higher salaries and secure tenures of office.

Various trade associations through their journals and letters or telegrams to individual members of Congress support the bureaucracy in requests for larger appropriations for the particular bureau or division in which such trade associations are interested. The Navy League composed of members not in the federal service supports the Navy in its demand for more warships and the Association of American Ship Owners supports the Shipping Board in increasing appropriations and the Postmaster General in seeking greater subsidies for the carriage of mails. The manufacturers of airplanes favor transportation of mail by air and an even larger bureau in the Department of Commerce claims the supervision of aircraft. They are also interested in larger air forces for the Army and Navy.

The great unorganized public has no such highly organized propaganda. Its voice is inarticulate, and yet it pays the piper, but without calling the tune. Many forget their larger interest as tax payers in the hope that benefits to their trade or industry may be secured at public expense. It is easy to understand that as more mail is carried by air and the larger the air forces of the War, Navy, and Commerce Departments as well as of the Coast Guard, the more prosperous are

the manufacturers of airplanes, who coined the much overworked phrase "Make America air minded." This is equally true of many other industries.

When the bureaucracy, either honestly or otherwise, agrees with the trade associations and both work to a common end, what possibility is there for the members of the Senate and House to learn the true state of the public needs? As elsewhere pointed out, President Taft more than twenty years ago admitted that it was difficult for either the President or the heads of the departments to secure adequate data on which to base policies and recommend legislative action. The average Senator or Congressman, drawn for a few short years from civilian life in which he was engaged in one of the professions or in trade, is not prepared to cope with the bureaucracy and the associations with their technical training and long experience. Congressman Reed of New York in a statement of January 9, 1932, from the floor of the House of Representatives said:

> "We are living in a day of the most highly organized propaganda system in the world. It had its birth during the (World) War and it has continued down to the present time. As a result of it, minorities have exercised great power over Congress."

He might have said "dominating power." The most that is now being done is to pare off a few millions of dollars indiscriminately from the appropriations requested by the bureaucracy and then smugly advertise to the people that Congress has cut the estimates, without really knowing whether such paring has allowed too little to meet some essential need of the Government and too much for some such folly as the food properties of the udo [a vegetable] or that describing the "Antiscorbutic vitamin in home-canned carrots." At the time such minor cuts in estimates are being made, Congress may be creating new bureaus or enlarging the duties and activities of existing bureaus in one of the deficiency appropriation measures, which follow the

annual appropriations and usually contain a nest of legislative snakes.

It was correctly stated in the Report of the Joint Committee on Reorganization of the Executive Departments, submitted by President Harding to the 68th Congress, 1st session, and ordered on June 3, 1924, to be printed:

> "Hardly a session of Congress passes without the enactment of legislation creating new executive agencies, transforming old ones, or imposing new or larger duties upon existing establishments. Hardly a year goes by when some executive department does not organize a new bureau or division for the purpose of carrying out new requirements of law."

It is not only by means of press releases and fillers, bulletins, and reports that publicity is secured for the creation of new and enlargement of old activities of the bureaucracy but there are personal contacts and surveys made through the use of public money for subsistence and traveling expenses of employees and of some of the bureau chiefs and their subordinates. A statute expressly provides that unless otherwise authorized in the law, the Government shall not be charged with the traveling and subsistence expenses of officers and employees attending nongovernmental associations. To avoid this prohibition, it is conveniently provided that such official may have official business in the city, where the meeting happens to be held or in a nearby city. In fact, it was known that some years ago a certain Cabinet officer charged the Government with his traveling expenses for several return trips to his home but later was required to refund such expenses to the Government.

(From Chapter VII)

Bureaucracy and the Constitution

The Constitution is not today what it was fifty years ago, nor was it then what it was a half a century earlier, and it is safe to predict that it will not be fifty years from now what it is today. The eternal inquiry arises, "*quo vadis?*" Are we treading the downward path to *Avernus* [*], from which escape is so difficult, or are we ascending to new and nobler heights of constitutionalism? That should be the great question for every thoughtful American.

Time will not suffice to illustrate my meaning by suggesting the portentous changes to which the Constitution has been subjected. I can only indicate a few by a passing sentence and in indicating these, I do not mean to suggest that some of them may not be desirable, for some undoubtedly conform to the economic needs of the nation and to the democratic genius of the American people.

The destruction of the electoral college, except as an empty form; the profound change in the representative system, due to the changed democratic ideal that a representative should think *with*, and not *for* his constituents; the breaking down of the barriers that once imperfectly marked the different functions of the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary; the steady deterioration in power of Congress, as the great Council of the Republic and the corresponding aggrandizement of the Executive, until he is, in everything but name, an elective King for a short tenure; the perversion of the taxing power, whereby the Federal Government assumes powers never granted to it; the even greater perversion of the power of appropriation, whereby the Federal Government has persuaded the states, by the moral bribery of Federal grants, to yield their reserved powers; the destruction of the equitable principle that direct taxation should be apportioned among the states in proportion to political power in the House of Representatives; the denial by the Senate of the right of the states to choose their own Senators, except by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; the denial of the right of the states to deter-

mine, in respect to their local conditions, the qualifications of an elector; the slow destruction of the power of the state over domestic commerce by the expansion of the federal commerce power; the creation of numerous bureaus and some departments to effectuate purposes, which are not within the sphere of federal power; the socialistic experiment of aiding failing industries by grants from the Federal Treasury; the perversion of the taxing power to re-distribute wealth; the appointment of diplomatic representatives to represent our country in foreign lands without the sanction of the Senate; the power to declare war without the consent of Congress by acts which make war inevitable, and, finally, the crowning atrocity of the Eighteenth Amendment, which invades individual liberty in a manner, at which Washington and Franklin would have stood aghast and which, in this respect, relegates the once proudly conscious States to the ignominious position of being mere police provinces.

These are only a few illustrations of the profound changes which have been wrought in one hundred and forty-three years of constitutional development. As I have said, some of them may be advantageous, but certainly not all of them. Many of them constitute a revolutionary change in the conceptions of liberty, which were supposed to have been unalterably written into the Constitution.

I appreciate that many of these changes are the inevitable results of the impact of a mechanical civilization. Take, for example, the more comprehensive question, which once agitated the American people, that of centralization. When the Constitution was adopted, the States had a very real consciousness of their own sovereignty, while the conception of national unity was a very slow growth. All this is changed in our lifetime as a result of a mechanical civilization. The old struggle against centralization has largely passed away. Only lip service is longer paid by either of the great parties to the rights of the states. The "indestructible union of indestructible states" is now little more than a rhetorical phrase. Each of the great political parties, when in power, vies with the other in consolidating the Union by

multiplying bureaucratic agencies, for which no true authority can be found in the Federal Constitution.

To the extent that this is the result of economic forces, it is irresistible, even if not always desirable, but it is, in part, due to that greed for power, which grows by what it feeds upon. Some of us believe that the Constitution cannot survive if the planetary system of the States be wholly absorbed in the central sun of the Federal Government. Our nation is too vast in area and our people too numerous to be governed altogether from Washington and yet it seems impossible to combat the tendency towards centralization, when this "ethos" of the people, of which Aristotle spoke, demands it. The portentous difference between the American people, when they framed the Constitution, and the American people today is this: our forbears thought in terms of abstract political rights, but we today think in terms of concrete economics. Moreover, the gospel of the American people today is efficiency and to secure such efficiency they are apparently willing to sacrifice any principle that seemingly makes for the greater consideration of security.

(From Chapter XVIII)

Note

[*] In Greek mythology *Avernus* was believed to be the entrance to the underworld, and is portrayed as such in the *Aeneid* of Virgil.

Bruno Rizzi

The Bureaucratisation of the World (1939)

A radical critique of the Soviet bureaucracy as a parasitic class that exploits producers to an even greater extent than capitalists do in bourgeois societies.

Source: Bruno Rizzi, *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*, First Part: Chapter 4, 1939.

In Soviet society, the exploiters do not appropriate the surplus-value directly as the capitalist does by collecting his company's dividends, but indirectly, through the State, which collects all the national surplus-value and then distributes it to its own officials. A large part of the bureaucracy, technicians, directors, specialists, stakanovists, etc., are to some extent allowed to draw their very high emoluments directly from the company they control. In addition, they also, like all bureaucrats, enjoy the State "services" paid for with surplus-value and which in the USSR, in honour of the 'socialist' forms of life, are important and numerous.

On the whole, the bureaucracy extracts the surplus value from the direct producers with a colossal overhead increase in the "nationalised" companies. This is not the 2 or 3 per cent for administrative expenses noted in Naville's [1] famous collective farm, but percentages that would make the bravest capitalist's hair stand on end and are documented in the works of Trotsky himself.

Thus, we see that exploitation from its individual form is transformed into a collective form corresponding to the transformation of property. There is a class which *en bloc* exploits another in accordance with class property, and which then goes on to distribute through the State the proceeds internally amongst its members. (The inheritance of bureaucratic posts is to be expected). The surplus-value is swallowed up by the new privileged through the State machine that is no longer an apparatus of political oppression only, but also of economic administration of the nation. The machine for exploitation and for the maintenance of social privileges has been brought together in a single organ. A perfect apparatus, it could be said!

Labour-power is no longer bought by the capitalists, but is monopolised by a single master: the State. Workers no longer go and offer their labour to different employers to choose the one that suits them best. The law of economic competition no longer works: workers are at the mercy of the State. The overheads of enterprises, which increase dramatically in totalitarian States and do not spare the great democracies, show us that everywhere in the world bureaucratic collectivism is in the making and that class ownership is crystallising.

In the USSR, wages are set by the "Planning" Commission, i.e. the top bureaucracy. Sales prices to the public follow the same course. This allows us to realise that between the production cost of goods and the sales price to the public, the bureaucracy makes its fortune. Because the bureaucracy costs huge sums of money, inflates production costs in order to cover its salaries, more or less hidden, and makes

huge mark-ups on the selling prices. The trade unionist Citrine visiting a Soviet shoe factory was not able to obtain from the manager the prices at which the public would buy the shoes they were showing him, but he did learn that in the shoe factory shop the price was 32 roubles, while in the sales warehouses he later found the same shoes displayed at 70 roubles. The sale of articles manufactured by the company in its factory outlet is very limited: the bureaucracy treats the workers as customers and sends them 'to its state shops'.

In a regime with "socialist tendencies," a 120% mark-up seems to us outrageous, all the more so since capitalist merchants limit themselves to an average of 40% for the same article. It is the bureaucracy which does the accounts of enterprises and of the State, and while it does not receive dividends as the old capitalists did, disposes at will of the use of the sums set aside. The whole meaning of the "happy life" announced by Stalin lies in the surcharges and selling prices imposed by the bureaucracy, and in the placement of the earmarked capital for "public" works that are primarily of use to the bureaucratic class.

Mr. Naville will tell us that capital is accumulated for the State too, and for the future, through the establishment of large factories, power stations, etc., etc., but what exploiting class has not been obliged to do the same? Even the bourgeois, by exploiting proletarians was able to lead a happy life, and at the same time capitalised for mankind. He handed down to us the most formidable and perfect productive organisation the world has ever seen. He did so not as a gift to mankind, but because he was driven to perfect his machines, scientifically rationalise labour and create model factories by the needs of production development. It was therefore not philanthropy. The Soviet bureaucracy, by the same laws, is obliged to "capitalise" for the future even though its essence remains typically exploitative.

Note

[*] Pierre Naville (1904-1993) was a French surrealist writer and sociologist. He played a leading role in the French and international Trotskyist movement.

Milovan Djilas

The Bureaucracy as the New Class (1957)

An analysis of the new bureaucratic class which arose in Russia following the seizure of power by the Bolshevik party. This new class became the substitute for a non-existent capitalist class in order to promote, in the fastest and most brutal way, industrialisation presented as the path to socialism and a means for uplifting the proletariat.

Source: Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, 1957.

In 1936, when the new Constitution was promulgated, Stalin announced that the "exploiting class" had ceased to exist. The capitalist and other classes of ancient origin had in fact been destroyed, but a new class, previously unknown to history, had been formed.

It is understandable that this class, like those before it, should believe that the establishment of its power would result in happiness and freedom for all men. The only difference between this and other

classes was that it treated the delay in the realization of its illusions more crudely. It thus affirmed that its power was more complete than the power of any other class before in history, and its class illusions and prejudices were proportionally greater.

This new class, the bureaucracy, or more accurately the political bureaucracy, has all the characteristics of earlier ones as well as some new characteristics of its own. Its origin had its special characteristics also, even though in essence it was similar to the beginnings of other classes.

Other classes, too, obtained their strength and power by the revolutionary path, destroying the political, social, and other orders they met in their way. However, almost without exception, these classes attained power after new economic patterns had taken shape in the old society. The case was the reverse with new classes in the Communist systems. It did not come to power to *complete* a new economic order but to *establish* its own and, in so doing, to set up its power over society.

In earlier epochs the coming to power of some class, some part of a class, or of some party, was the final event resulting from its formation and its development. The reverse was true in the U.S.S.R. There the new class was definitely formed after it attained power. Its consciousness had to develop before its economic and physical powers, because the class had not taken root in the life of the nation. This class viewed its role in relation to the world from an idealistic point of view. Its practical possibilities were not diminished by this.

In spite of its illusions, it represented an objective tendency toward industrialization. Its practical bent emanated from this tendency. The promise of an ideal world increased the faith in the ranks of the new class and sowed illusions among the masses. At the same time, it inspired gigantic physical undertakings.

Because this new class had not been formed as a part of the economic and social life before it came to power, it could only be created in an organization of a special type, distinguished by a special discipline based on identical philosophic and ideological views of its members. A unity of belief and iron discipline was necessary to overcome its weaknesses.

The roots of the new class were implanted in a special party, of the Bolshevik type. Lenin was right in his view that his party was an exception in the history of human society, although he did not suspect that it would be the beginning of a new class.

To be more precise, the initiators of the new class are not found in the party of the Bolshevik type as a whole but in that stratum of professional revolutionaries who made up its core even before it attained power.

It was not by accident that Lenin asserted, after the failure of the 1905 revolution, that only professional revolutionaries — men whose sole profession was revolutionary work — could build a new party of the Bolshevik type. It was still less accidental that even Stalin, the future creator of a new class, was the most outstanding example of such a professional revolutionary.

The new ruling class has been gradually developing from this very narrow stratum of revolutionaries. These revolutionaries composed its core for a long period. Trotsky noted that in pre-revolutionary professional revolutionaries was the origin of the future Stalinist bureaucrat. What he did not detect was the beginning of a new class of owners and exploiters.

This is not to say that the new party and the new class are identical. The party, however, is the core of that class, and its base. It is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to define the limits of the new class and to identify its members. The new class may be said to be made up of

those who have special privileges and economic preference because of the administrative monopoly they hold.

Since administration is unavoidable in society, necessary administrative functions may be coexistent with parasitic functions in the same person. Not every member of the party is a member of the new class, any more than every artisan or member of the city party was a bourgeois.

In loose terms, as the new class becomes stronger and attains a more perceptible physiognomy, the role of the party diminishes. The core and the basis of the new class is created in the party and at its top, as well as in the State political organs.

The once live, compact party, full of initiative, is disappearing to become transformed into the traditional oligarchy of the new class, irresistibly drawing into its ranks those who aspire to join the new class and repressing those who have any ideals.

The party makes the class, but the class grows as a result and uses the party as a basis. The class grows stronger, while the party grows weaker; this is the inescapable fate of every Communist party in power.

If it were not materially interested in production or if it did not have within itself the potentialities for the creation of a new class, no party could act in so morally and ideologically foolhardy a fashion, let alone stay in power for long.

Stalin declared, after the end of the First Five-Year Plan: "If we had not created the apparatus, we would have failed!" He should have substituted "new class" for the word "apparatus," and everything would have been clearer.

It seems unusual that a political party could be the beginning of a new class. Parties are generally the product of classes and strata

which have become intellectually and economically strong. However, if one grasps the actual conditions in pre-revolutionary Russia and in other countries in which Communism prevailed over national forces, it will be clear that a party of this type is the product of specific opportunities and that there is nothing unusual or accidental in this being so.

Although the roots of Bolshevism reach far back into Russian history, the party is, to a certain extent, the product of the unique pattern of international relationships in which Russia found itself at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century.

Russia was no longer able to live in the modern world as an absolute monarchy, and Russia's capitalism was too weak and too dependent on the interests of foreign powers to make it possible to have an industrial revolution. This revolution could only be implemented by a new class, or by a change in the social order. As yet, there was no such class.

In history, it is not important who implements a process, it is only important that the process be implemented. Such was the case in Russia and other countries in which Communist revolutions took place.

The revolution created forces, leaders, organizations, and ideas which were necessary to it. The new class came into existence for objective reasons, and by the wish, wits, and action of its leaders.

The social origin of the new class lies in the proletariat just as the aristocracy arose in a peasant society, and the bourgeoisie in a commercial and artisans' society. There are exceptions, depending on national conditions, but the proletariat in economically underdeveloped countries, being backward, constitutes the raw material from which the new class arises.

There are other reasons why the new class always acts as the champion of the working class. The new class is anti-capitalistic and, consequently, logically dependent upon the working strata. The new class is supported by the proletarian struggle and the traditional faith of the proletariat in a socialist, Communist society where there is no brutal exploitation. It is vitally important for the new class to assure a normal flow of production, hence it cannot ever lose its connection with the proletariat.

Most important of all, the new class cannot achieve industrialization and consolidate its power without the help of the working class. On the other hand, the working class sees in expanded industry the salvation from its poverty and despair.

Over a long period of time, the interests, ideas, faith, and hope of the new class, and of parts of the working class and of the poor peasants, coincide and unite. Such mergers have occurred in the past among other widely different classes. Did not the bourgeoisie represent the peasantry in the struggle against the feudal lords?

The movement of the new class toward power comes as a result of the efforts of the proletariat and the poor. These are the masses upon which the party or the new class must lean and with which its interests are most closely allied. This is true until the new class finally establishes its power and authority.

Over and above this, the new class is interested in the proletariat and the poor only to the extent necessary for developing production and for maintaining in subjugation the most aggressive and rebellious social forces. The monopoly which the new class establishes in the name of the working class over the whole of society is, primarily, a monopoly over the working class itself. This monopoly is first intellectual, over the so-called *avant-garde* proletariat, and then over the whole proletariat. This is the biggest deception the class must accomplish, but it shows that the power and interests of the new class lie

primarily in industry. Without industry the new class cannot consolidate its position or authority.

Former sons of the working class are the most steadfast members of the new class. It has always been the fate of slaves to provide for their masters the most clever and gifted representatives. In this case a new exploiting and governing class is born from the exploited class.

Jacques Ellul

The dominance of the bureaus (1965)

In this extract the author underlies the fact that, in the modern State, the real power is in the hand of the bureaus. So, the idea that, in democracy, through the electoral process, the citizens control the State and formulate policies by way of their representatives, is a total political illusion.

Source: Jacques Ellul, *L'Illusion Politique*, Chapitre 4: La bureaucratie, 1965.

The idea that the citizen should control the State is based on the vision that, in the State, Parliament effectively directs the political body, the administrative bodies and the technical bodies. But this is a complete illusion. Anton Böhm [*Die Politische Meinung*, 1962] clearly shows that the organs of representative democracy now serve only to endorse the decisions drawn up by experts and pressure groups. Similarly, Giovanni Sartori [*L'avenir des Parlements*, 1964], in an exceptional study of Parliament, has shown the powerlessness

of Parliament to fulfil the functions with which democratic ideology has invested it, and on which still rests the whole innocent belief that control by the citizens is possible.

In particular, Sartori shows that the current position of Parliament at the centre of the State and identified with the government, radically alters the foundations on which the parliamentary State was built, namely: the idea of representation, the idea of control, and the need for protection by the law. It is one of the most lucid studies of the failure of the principle of representation, which has been caused, among other factors, by the professionalisation of politicians, and the filtering out of candidates in political parties, with the parliamentary staff tending to become a representative projection of the party staff. Sartori concludes that our parliaments are "atypical" with regard to the Nation as a whole. We will not go into the details of these analyses because we consider that the problem of parliamentarianism is only secondary.

We still see the State as a relatively simple decision-making body, where decisions are taken according to established, regular and controlled procedures. We have already pointed out that the subject of decisions has changed considerably and is no longer concerned with exciting political issues on which the masses focus their attention. The same applies to the decision-making process. It is no longer that simple system of clear legal procedures laid down in a constitution. Of course, this procedure still exists, but it is no longer significant. The decision-making process is made up of a complex set of personal judgements, traditions, conflicts between multiple State bodies and pressure from outside groups. And the plurality of decision-making centres has become the rule within the political body. Because this body is not simple at all. When we talk about a president, ministers and an assembly, we have not yet said anything, for the State has become a huge body dealing with everything, possessing a multitude of centres, offices, departments and establishments.

Everything I have just said is perfectly familiar to political scientists. Numerous detailed and very realistic studies have been carried out on both the structure and the decision-making process. But here a peculiar psychological problem arises. These same political scientists (who are perfectly aware of these issues), when they write an article on politics, when they take sides on a given problem, seem to completely forget their meticulous analyses and go back to the ancient conception of the State. To our great surprise, we see them once again debating the presidential system or the electoral procedure as if the political future were dependent on these illusory forms. It seems to me that there is still no link between concrete studies of the reality of the State and thinking about politics in the modern world. Particularly when it comes to the control of power, there is a clear contradiction between actual knowledge of what the modern State is and the constantly renewed claim that the citizen can control the State.

A modern State is not *first and foremost* a centralised decision-making body, a set of political organs. It is *first and foremost* an enormous machinery of offices. It is made up of two contradictory elements: a political staff, assemblies and councils, and an administrative staff in the bureaus (the distinction between political staff and administrative staff being less and less clear). Tradition attaches great importance to assemblies, councils, votes and the appointment of political staff. This is where political thought resides and where, from the point of view of democracy, popular sovereignty is expressed.

At the same time, the well-known, classic and reassuring administrative model is presented. Administrative staff are appointed by politicians and are therefore entirely dependent on them. They form the body of civil servants who have no latitude with regard to the State, just as the officers' corps did in the past. The administration is there to carry out the decision of the political bodies, and that is its only role. It is set in motion by the decision of the central brain. This vast

administrative body is therefore nothing without the political centre, which is everything. Faced with this administration, the citizen, perhaps, is effectively protected: he has recourse. But much more than that, citizens are masters through the elections to councils and assemblies. They can influence the decisions of the State, and consequently the administration. The latter is nothing more than a relay, a mechanism, a transmission belt.

This very simple, very classic view sums up (without knowing them) both the Hegelian idea of the administration as a relay between the State and society, and the Marxist idea of the administration as a means of the State. And this also explains the lack of importance (except in administrative law) attributed to the study of administration. There are very few real sociological studies on government administration. Even in an otherwise sympathetic book such as *L'État et le Citoyen*, there is just one small, uninteresting paragraph on administration.

Yet, we believe that, in reality, the State is gradually becoming absorbed by the administration. There is a facade, an appearance of political power in the person of this man or that council, but it is no more than a facade, even in authoritarian regimes. The real political problems, those of the daily life of the Nation, those of the relationship between citizens and public power, those of the growth of authority, those of economic power, are in the hands of the bureaus. This is the reality of the modern State.

First of all, this administration has become considerably unwieldy and complex. It is all very well to reduce the body of civil servants to a few simple rules, a few statutes, and the administration to a few general structures. But this does not reflect reality. On the contrary, it would be necessary to penetrate the innumerable jumble of bureaus and their remits, the hundreds of departments in a ministry, the divisions, the hierarchies and above all the connecting bodies. We know that relations between administrative sections have

become terribly complex, and that liaison organs had to be created, i.e. platforms, referrals. Once a dossier has been started, it has to go through five, ten, twenty departments, each adding a document, attesting to having taken note of it.

And when these departments report to different directorates, or even different ministries, it is not certain that the channels are clear. The connecting bodies know the proper channels and put one competent office in touch with another, and so on. Let us not protest against the inflation of bureaucracy: this complexity is a reflection of the very complexity of the Nation and the multiplicity of tasks that the State is charged with. No one can get an accurate picture of this enormous machinery and, to my knowledge, there is no organisation chart detailing the various interrelationships. Even if there were an organisation chart for a ministry (which I'm not sure there is), it would not amount to much because it would not include the horizontal relations with neighbouring ministries and with local administrative bodies. No one understands the whole thing, and no one actually controls it.

At the same time, however, we must realise that this bureaucracy permeates the whole body of the State. A minister is exactly nothing without his bureaucratic infrastructure. But the ministry is in fact this enormous administrative body: we can see that the bureaucracy penetrates the political head, and that the latter is reduced, apart from a few personalities whose usefulness is not always obvious, to a bureaucratic complex. I am well aware that this will be challenged by saying that the minister makes the decisions, and while he may not know all his offices and the entire administrative structure, he does know his various directors. The directors know the heads of department well ... and through a series of hierarchical cascades, each at each level knowing his immediate subordinates well, and the offices he reports to, the highly-adjusted machine ultimately depends on the head at the top. I claim that here again we have an entirely theoretical view of the subject.

From the moment an overall decision of principle is taken by the Minister, it escapes his control. The matter takes on a sort of life of its own, circulates in the departments, and everything ultimately depends on what the bureaus decide to do with it. Perhaps the result will be an order that complies with the original intention. It may produce a text that is quite different. More often, nothing will come of it. The decision will have been exhausted in the many administrative circuits and will never see the light of day. We know of cases where the ministerial order comes to nothing, simply because it has been blocked, deliberately or otherwise, at some point. We know of more cases where the decision in principle is published in a one-line decree, to which it is added that implementing decrees will follow. These implementing decrees never see the light of day. They depend entirely on the bureaucracy.

I could even cite a major and essential order issued in 1945 that has never been applied. Twice, in 1951 and 1959, the Minister ordered that the implementing measures be taken: they were never taken. But is this just disorder? Complicity? The powerlessness of the boss? Office mismanagement? Laziness? In reality it's a much deeper phenomenon: it's the fact that the bureaus have now taken on an independent life, that the administration has its own power of censure and decision-making, outside the political power, obeying much less to interests (which sometimes happens) or personal pressure (which is rare) than to the laws of operation against which nothing can be done.

What often seems to have been overlooked is that the complexity of the administrative apparatus makes it impossible for a single centre to take decisions, and the cumbersome nature (inevitable, as we shall see) of the bureaucracy makes it impossible for a single head to give orders to the whole organisation.

Does this mean that the State is paralysed and bankrupt? Not at all. What we see is a transformation of unimaginable scale: what used to

be a system of transmission has gradually been transformed into a system of decision-making; what used to be a *Ministerium* (service) has become a Power. But we do not have here a real plurality of *diversified* decision-making centres in opposition to one another; rather we are in the presence of a multiplicity of correlative decision-making centres, not directly responsible, all included in the same apparatus.

Today, *that* is the State. This fact emerges even more clearly if we consider that, every day, at various levels of the different bodies, it is not just one but several hundred, sometimes thousands of decisions are made (taking into account only the central powers). But this set of decisions is not made by an individual. It cannot even be said that they are really part of *one* general decision, of which they are merely an application and diversification. Even when these decisions refer to a fundamental choice that has been taken, it is ultimately these thousand fragmentary decisions that give to this basic choice its colour, its value and its effectiveness. The general choice amounts to very little. For example, a treaty such as the Evian agreements is nothing: what will make something of these agreements are the thousands of interpretations, the thousands of decisions taken by the various administrations. And it cannot even be said that these agreements will set the general line: it is many other general lines that will determine the decisions of supposed application, and the supporting interpretations of the theoretical texts.

[...]

This apparatus nevertheless obeys certain ... laws. Not those of the constitution or parliament. Not even the rules laid down by administrative law (although of course, from a formal point of view, these obviously apply and take us back to a reassuring universe where controls, correlations and hierarchies are correctly established!) These are organisational laws, sociological trends and customs. Let's

just mention in passing the ones that are always cited: continuity and stability. The administration remains, the political staff changes. True and false.

We are familiar with the tendency to sweep aside administrations and individuals during changes of regime [in France] (1940, 1944, 1958). We are also well aware of the politician's anchorage in politics, which has become his profession. When they are swept out of power, they still remain there by proxy, through influence. But what is true is that, behind the changes in administrative staff, a constant structure, a continuity of tradition ensures the real strength of the administration. After a certain amount of trial and error, a period of hesitation during which efficiency is lost, the old procedures are quickly restored: this is because they were not the result of arbitrariness, routine and bureaucratic stupidity. For 75% of them, they are the best adapted and most effective ways for obtaining the desired result. This is obviously not the feeling of the average citizen, but that's another matter!

Another well-known law of this administrative structure is specialisation and rationalisation. It is even the specialisation of tasks, the division of functions in order to maximise the competence and efficiency of each person in his or her field. This is one of the fundamental causes of the proliferation of bureaucracy and its growing complexity. Hence the need for great precision in the work, the lack of ambiguity in decisions and execution, and also, despite common perception and appearance, the speed of operations. It's a *leitmotif* to talk about administrative slowness. However, if we consider the complexity of the problems, the enormity of the tasks, the colossal mass of information received and transmitted (not out of desire, but because in fact the information media make it possible to gather and use ever more documentation, and it would be wrong not to do so!) one realises that in reality there has been an extraordinary acceleration in transmission and execution, even without a concomitant growth in staff numbers.

Ultimately, the imperative of this apparatus is efficiency. This imperative really align the apparatus with the ideology of technology. Bureaucracy has nothing to do with values. It doesn't know what social justice or political freedom are. Bureaucracy is there to function, to make a political-economic-social whole work, to move it forward as a whole. It does not seek to promote truths. It cannot consider individuals. It obeys the sole rule of efficiency...

"Yes, but to achieve a goal! ... and that goal is set by politics! ... and that goal is value! ...".

Not at all. If a goal is set by politicians, it is diluted in the machinery and soon becomes meaningless. The administration no more obeys a central impulse, than it knows the goal of achieving Value. Everybody is merely concerned in ensuring that his economic, political and social sectors function well, without crisis, without interruption. Everyone has his own sector, and doesn't know the whole picture.

But neither should it be thought that it is a super-eminent political power that overshadows the whole! There are only links of coordination and interdependence between these sectors (within which the only rule is therefore efficiency), as well as hierarchies.

But these hierarchies are not at all those envisaged for by the law or by administrative statutes. For many very subtle reasons, stemming from the social body itself, the needs of the State, the greater or lesser efficiency of a body, administrative branches take on different weights and values. We know that "Finance" was the key to everything else. But this is no longer entirely true.

Depending on the country, the propaganda administration may be the one that carries the most weight in decisions, or the police, or scientific and technical research. We also know how powerful the *Ponts et Chaussées* [Bridges and Highways] administration is at a local level in France; its decisions are practically unassailable, and all administrations of allegedly equal rank have to bow before it... This

is only to indicate that the body has its own particular principles of structuring and evolution, with its own motivations independent of pure politics. Now, as we have seen, this bureaucracy, because of its strong stability, tends towards a certain fixity, a certain rigidity.

Georges Lapassade has said: "Administrations disseminate an ideological orthodoxy whose dogmatic rigidity is a reflection of this system of Power." Of course, the administration (except for propaganda) is not an agent for disseminating an ideology. But unconsciously, involuntarily, it generates this rigidity for the social body. The clearest example of this today is the development of Public Relations, which have no other purpose than to ensure greater efficiency of the administration by perfect psycho-moral adaptation of the social body to that administration.

Finally, the last characteristics that we will mention just as quickly: anonymity and secrecy. Decisions are taken anonymously. This became clear during the great Nazi trials after the war. No one had ever made a decision. This was repeated at the Eichmann trial. You can't say, "That's a lawyer's argument, that's a lie." On the contrary, it was the exact image of everything that takes place in a modern State. All a chief can do is to issue a general directive, which usually does not in itself imply any concrete decisions, and therefore no real responsibility for the concrete action emerging at the other end.

New decisions taken at every level are necessarily the anonymous result of several bureaus, technicians and circumstances. In the end, each decision is independent of any individual. And just as the decision is anonymous, the criteria for judgement, the processes, the methods of action of each department, of each bureaucratic element, are ultimately perfectly secret. Here again, it is necessary to distinguish between official legal forms and regulations known only to those concerned (and even if they were made public, they would only be known to those concerned, because they are too numerous and too technical!), and customs that are decisive and remain strictly

secret. All this stems from the fact that, ultimately, offices are only concerned with problems of necessity.

At no time can there be any true freedom of choice for any of the people in the administration, or for the administrative body itself. They can only take decisions of necessity. Nor can global decisions be taken at the so-called political level, precisely because of this bureaucratic structure of the State. By way of illustration, we are all familiar with the conflict between the liberal State and the imperial administration. Freedom can in no way fit into the bureaucratic order.

C. Northcote Parkinson

The Prohibitive Procrastinator (1970)

The author describes the behaviour of the State bureaucracy in extremely ironic terms. Unfortunately, reality does not differ much from what is here depicted.

Source: C. Northcote Parkinson, *The Law of Delay*, Chapter 13, 1970.

There is nothing static in our changing world and recent research has tended to show that the Abominable No-man is being replaced by the *Prohibitive Procrastinator* (PP). Instead of saying 'No' the PP says, 'In due course' (scientifically, IDC), these words foreshadowing *Negation by Delay* (scientifically, ND). The theory of ND depends upon establishing a rough idea of what amount of delay will equal negation. If we suppose that a drowning man calls for help, evoking the reply 'In due course', a judicious pause of five minutes may constitute for all practical purposes, a negative response. Why? Because the delay is greater than the non-swim-

mer's expectation of life. The same principle holds good in a case at law. A, divorced from B, demands the custody of their daughter (aged 17) but is told by counsel that she will be of age before the case can be determined. At the retail level, A is told by his ironmonger, B, that the lawnmower he wants can be delivered in six months (i.e., by December). All these are examples of ND in its simpler forms.

Where the urgent matter requires remedial legislation, delay takes on a new dimension. The judicious pause will correspond, nevertheless, to the life expectation of the man from whom the proposal originates. If it is the divorce laws which obviously need revision, the *Prohibitive Procrastinator* starts by asking about the age and health of the Reformer whose Bill it is. Taking the age of 70 as the basis of his calculation, modified by actuarial factors, he concludes that Reformer A may expect to agitate for another eight years. Negation by Delay (ND) means the process of ensuring that 'In due course' (IDC) will mean, in this instance, nine years from now. Realization that the IDC is greater than the Reformer's expected life of agitation (LA) is often enough to kill the whole idea at the outset.

For many altruistic men the knowledge that it cannot be done in their lifetime is equivalent to the knowledge that it cannot be done at all. Where a useful reform takes place, as must occasionally happen, this is the result of the Reformer's living and working for years beyond the limits of reasonable expectation. The Reformer may thus outlive the PP, whose especial hatred is of reformers much younger than himself. There are cases, therefore, where the IDC ('In due course') factor is less than the LA ('Life of agitation') and some half-hearted legislation is the result. But men like Sir Alan Herbert [*] have never been numerous and they are tending, in fact, to become extinct. The average reformer or innovator gives up more easily, leaving the PP (*Prohibitive Procrastinator*) in a position of strength, ready to defeat the next proposal by using the same technique. Delays are thus deliberately designed as a form of denial and are

extended to cover the life expectation of the person whose proposal is being pigeon-holed.

DELAY IS THE DEADLIEST FORM OF DENIAL

This is the Law of Delay.

In mathematical terms it is represented by the equation where:

L = LA or the expected life of the person from whom the proposed reform originates,

m = IDC or the time elapsing between the first proposal and the final solution,

n = the number of extraneous issues brought into the discussion, and

p = the age of the Prohibitive Procrastinator,

$x = (L = n)^m / 3p$

Then x is the amount of delay which is equal to denial.

At this point it is necessary to emphasize that the PP seldom says outright 'This cannot be done in your life-time!' He allows this fact to emerge stealthily in the course of discussion.

'Our best method,' he will begin with apparent helpfulness, 'is to form a Commitee on Procedure. This will produce an outline proposal, the various parts of which will be referred to sub-committees formed to deal with the legal, financial, cynical, technical, political, hysterical, statistical, ineffectual and habitual aspects of the scheme. The sub-committees will report back to the Committee on Procedure, which will then issue an Interim Report. This should be laid before a Commission of Inquiry which will assemble not later than 1975. It will be the object of the Commission to recommend the procedures which we should adopt in deciding, first of all, whether there is a case for proceeding further in the matter.'

Pausing for breath, the PP will complete, on the back of an envelope, his calculation as to how much delay will equal negation. Having outlined a process which will continue until, say, 1977, he realizes that 1980 is the target date. So he continues as follows:

'Supposing and I emphasize that the question is more — much more — than a formality — *supposing* that there is a case for action, the Commission's final report will go to an inter-departmental Working Party, which will advise on the composition of the Planning Committee. It will be the task of the Planning Committee to approach the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, who will bring the matter before the Minister. Should his reaction be favourable, the matter will be brought up at the Party Conference at Skegness. It will be for the Party to decide whether the time is opportune, so soon before (or possibly so soon *after*) the General Election. In the light of that decision, it will be for the Minister to issue a directive. He would not, however, at that stage, do more than accept the need, in principle, for further investigation.'

That is usually enough to end the matter without a single argument being used against the proposal under discussion. All the Reformer can see before him is an endless vista of committees trying to decide whether there is a case for making a preliminary inquiry into the terms of reference for a Commission. *Comitology* (the science of committee-sitting) is an old method of playing for time, but the techniques of delay have been strengthened in the modern world by the current emphasis on research.

In matters scientific, the first rule, as we know, is to discover the facts. The same rule, as applied to human problems, means that a crime wave is not a matter of principle but of measurement. If Negroes riot in Los Angeles our first reaction is to count the Negroes, our second to decide whether they are as black as they are painted. That fact-finding is thus a substitute for decision is very generally known. What we fail to recognize is that fact-finding is also a substitute for

thought. The months we spend in hearing the views of statisticians, psychologists, graphologists, sociologists, alchemists and alienists are not merely months of inaction. Their effect is to smother our thought (as well as our action) in waves of irrelevance. We shall have to realize some day that reforms depend upon the existence of reformers with a general as well as a specialized knowledge, upon people who are often a law unto themselves, upon people who say 'Why not?' more often than 'Why?' and refuse to listen to the PP's covert opposition.

Army officers used to be taught, and indeed may still be taught, how to make an Appreciation. In doing this, one used to begin (it might be) with a theoretical position of crisis. The enemy would be advancing from A towards B, the bridge being blown up at X and the railhead destroyed at Y, with all communication interrupted between you and the next higher formation. With shells bursting on all sides, the harassed officer was supposed to sit down and write 'Appreciation' at the top of a sheet of foolscap, underlining it before going on to add the details of his Aim, the Factors which might affect its Attainment, the Courses open to either side, and the Conclusion to which he was inescapably driven. No marks were ever awarded for concluding that the Army was the wrong profession to have chosen in the first place.

There can be no doubt, however, of the value of this mental exercise. Whether or not people actually do all this in battle, the logic of the Appreciation has much to commend it. And one would suppose that the commonest mistake of inexperience would be in a misinterpretation of the facts. In fact, however, the real stumbling block is always the *Aim* paragraph. For most people it is far more difficult to decide what they are trying to do than to describe how they propose to set about it. As for the factors which affect the situation, as seen from either side, they are only relevant in so far as they relate to the aim. If the aim is wrong, nothing else in the appreciation will be right. This

observation is as true in peace as in war and the born Reformer is one who considers his aim first and the statistical position afterwards.

With his aim clearly in mind what is his next step? Surely, a memorandum. But here lies one of the most dangerous traps in his path. In former times, and even, it is rumoured, today, he would seek to give his ideas the widest circulation and have them printed or duplicated in large numbers. Because it was uneconomic in time and expense to set up the type or cut the stencil more than once, he always ordered spare copies. Where 78 people were to have copies he would order 100, just in case more would be needed; where 780, he would order 1,000. But the spare copies represented a waste, deplorable for any administrator. The natural reaction was to distribute them to those marginally interested in the issue. But each time even more copies were added, for distribution lists like many things have an innate principle of growth. And, just as inevitably, the lengthening list extended to people who were decreasingly literate. More and more people at lower and lower levels were spending longer and longer time reading what concerned them less and less.

It is here that the Reformer who wishes to outwit the PP finds to hand an unexpected ally in the form of a piece of modern technology. By dialling from a suitable machine a precise number of copies of a clearly thought-out and convincing memorandum — the number calculated on the basis of the effective decision-makers in his way — the Reformer bypasses both delay and unintelligence at one stroke. He gets his views in front of the right people at the right time.

Memoranda come from those who have done their thinking beforehand. In three respects the writer of a crisp memorandum with a specific circulation has an advantage over the PP. He has defined his purpose. He has undermined the confidence, in committee, of those who have failed to read it. And he has provided, quite probably, the basis of what will be agreed.

Parkinson's Law of Delay cannot of course be avoided; it is as inevitable as the Law of Gravity. But just as it was within the bounds of human ingenuity to accomplish human flight so, perhaps, there will always be a right way of getting new ideas off the ground.

Note

[*] Sir Alan Patrick Herbert (24 September 1890 – 11 November 1971), was an English humorist, novelist, playwright, law reformist, and, from 1935 to 1950, an independent Member of the UK Parliament.

Propaganda

The manipulation of people or what an author calls "the rape of crowds" is an essential aspect of the political propaganda by all States. Political propaganda has been and is still absolutely necessary to:

a) Justify the actions of the States, even the most sordid and despicable.

b) Promote and encourage the consent and the adhesion of the masses to any State policy (aggressions and exterminations of minorities included).

That is why, during the age of Statism, all the State rulers have paid a strong attention (and plenty of money) to control the means of communication, from the Gazettes of Napoleonic times to the Mass Media of the twentieth century and beyond.

We have now reached the age of mass surveillance and post-truth information. At the same time the individual has also at his/her disposal means to counteract all this. Is then up to each of us to become a serial moron or a critically independent human being.

Gustave Le Bon

The Propaganda by the Agitators of Crowds

1895

The author highlights the psychological traits that create a leader and the essential aspects that make propaganda effective.

Source: Gustave Le Bon, *Psycologie des foules*, Chapitre III, 1895.

The leaders as agitators of crowds

As soon as a certain number of living beings are brought together, whether they be a herd of animals or a crowd of people, they instinctively place themselves under the authority of a leader, that is an agitator.

In human crowds, the leader is often no more than a ringleader or agitator, but as such he plays a considerable role. His will is the nucleus around which the opinions of the crowd are formed and attain an identity. The crowd is a servile herd that can never do without a master.

At first, the leader was usually someone who was led. He himself has been hypnotised by the idea of which he has then become the apostle. The idea has taken possession of him to the point where everything outside it vanishes, and any opinion to the contrary seems to him to be error and superstition. Robespierre, for example, was hypnotised by the philosophical ideas of Rousseau, and used the methods of the Inquisition to propagate them.

Leaders are not usually men of thought, but men of action. They are not very clear-sighted, nor could they be, since clear-sightedness generally leads to doubt and inaction. They are mainly recruited from among the neurotics, the excited, the semi-alienated who border on madness. However absurd may be the idea they defend or the goal they pursue, their convictions are so strong that all reasoning is lost upon them. Contempt and persecution do not affect them or only serve to excite them even more. Personal interests, family, everything is sacrificed. The very instinct for self-preservation is entirely obliterated in them, so much so that the only reward they often seek is martyrdom. The intensity of their faith gives their words great suggestive power. The multitude is always ready to listen to the strong-willed man who knows how to impose himself upon them. Crowds of people lose all willpower and instinctively turn to those who have it.

The means of action of the leaders as agitators: affirmation, repetition, contagion

When it comes to slowly instilling ideas and beliefs into the minds of crowds – with modern social theories, for instance – the leaders have recourse to different methods. They mainly use the following three expedients: affirmation, repetition and contagion. Their action is fairly slow, but the effects are long-lasting.

The pure and simple affirmation, free of all reasoning and proof, is a sure way of getting an idea into the minds of the masses. The more concise the statement, the more weight it carries. Religious books and legal codes of all ages have always resorted to simple affirmations. Statesmen called upon to defend some political cause, commercial men pushing the sale of their products by means of advertising, know the value of affirmation.

However, the affirmation only acquires real influence if it is constantly repeated, and as often as possible, in the same terms. It was Napoleon who said that there is only one figure of rhetoric of serious importance, namely repetition. Through repetition, the affirmation is fixed in people's minds to the point where it is accepted as a proven truth.

[...]

When an affirmation has been sufficiently repeated, and there is unanimity in the repetition, as happens with certain financial companies that buy all the competitions, a current of opinion is formed and the powerful mechanism of contagion kicks in. In the crowds, ideas, feelings, emotions and beliefs have a contagious power as intense as that of microbes. This phenomenon can be observed in animals themselves as soon as they are together in number. The tic of a horse in a stable is soon imitated by the other horses in the same stable. A fright or disorderly movement by a few sheep soon spreads to the whole flock. The contagion of emotions explains the suddenness of panics. Cerebral disorders, like madness, also spread by contagion. We know how common insanity is among doctors who treat the mentally insane. They even cite forms of madness, such as agoraphobia, which are transmitted from humans to animals.

Contagion does not require the simultaneous presence of individuals on a single spot; it can take place at a distance under the influence of certain events which direct all minds in the same direction and give

them the characteristics peculiar to crowds. This is especially the case when minds are prepared by the distant factors I have previously studied. An example in point is the revolutionary movement of 1848, which, after breaking out in Paris, suddenly spread to a large part of Europe and shook several monarchies.

Imitation, to which so much influence has been attributed in social phenomena, is in reality simply an effect of contagion.

[...]

"The dual action of the past and of reciprocal imitation renders, in the long run, all the men of the same country and of the same period so similar that even among those who would seem to be the most immune to it, such as philosophers, learned men and men of letters, thought and style have an air of familiar resemblance that immediately enables us to recognise the time to which they belong. A moment's conversation with any individual is enough to gain a thorough knowledge of his reading, his usual occupations and the environment in which he lives." (Gustave Le Bon, *L'homme et les sociétés*, 1881).

Prestige

Opinions propagated by affirmation, repetition and contagion possess great force because they end up acquiring that mysterious power called prestige.

Everything that has dominated the world, whether ideas or people, has imposed itself mainly through the irresistible force expressed by the word prestige. We all understand the meaning of this word, but it is applied in too many different ways for it to be easy to define. Prestige may involve certain feelings such as admiration and fear, which are sometimes even its basis, but it can exist perfectly well without

them. Human beings who are dead, and therefore not to be feared – Alexander, Caesar, Mohammed, Buddha – possess considerable prestige. On the other hand, there are fictive beings that we do not admire, for example the monstrous divinities of the subterranean temples of India, who nevertheless seem to us to be endowed with great prestige.

Prestige is in fact a kind of fascination that an individual, a work or a doctrine exerts on our minds. This fascination paralyses all our critical faculties and fills our soul with astonishment and respect. The feelings it provokes are inexplicable, like all feelings, but probably of the same order as the suggestion undergone by a magnetised person. Prestige is the most powerful spring of all domination. Gods, kings and women would never have reigned without it.

[...]

... there are many factors that can contribute to the development of prestige: one of the most important has always been success. The successful man, the idea that takes hold, ceases by that very fact to be disputed.

Prestige always disappears with failure. The hero whom the crowd acclaimed the day before is scorned the day after by the same crowd, if fate has dealt him a blow. The greater the prestige, the stronger the reaction. The multitude then considers the fallen hero as an equal and takes revenge for having bowed to a superiority it no longer recognises. Robespierre, who cut off the necks of his colleagues and of a great number of his contemporaries, enjoyed immense prestige. When a shift of a few votes deprived him of power and then of prestige, the crowd followed him to the guillotine with as much imprecation as it had accompanied its victims the day before. It is always with fury that believers smash the statues of their ancient gods.

The prestige taken away by failure is suddenly lost. It can also be worn away, but more slowly, by being subject to discussion. However, this process is very effective. From the moment prestige is called into question, it ceases to be prestige. Gods and men who have managed to retain their prestige for a long time have never tolerated discussion. To win the admiration of the crowds, it is necessary to keep them always at a distance.

Adolf Hitler

War Propaganda (1925)

A very lucid exposition of the means and ends of propaganda through the recognition that, with respect to the Germans, the Anglo-Saxon world had shown, during the World War I, to have a superior grasp of the necessity of propaganda and a higher skill in using it advantageously.

Source: Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Volume 1: War Propaganda, 1925.

In my attentive following of all political events, propaganda has always been of great interest to me. I saw it as an instrument that the Socialist-Marxist organizations, in particular, understood and used with masterly skill. I learned early on that the correct use of propaganda is a real art, which was and remained almost unknown to the bourgeois parties.

Only the Christian-social movement, especially in Lueger's [1] time,

achieved a certain virtuosity with this instrument and owed many of its successes to it.

But it was only during the war [World War I] that we could see the tremendous results that correctly applied propaganda could lead to. Unfortunately, however, everything had to be studied on the other side, because the activities on our side remained more than modest in this respect. And it was precisely the complete failure of the entire reconnaissance on the German side, which had to be glaringly obvious to every soldier, that prompted me to deal with the question of propaganda even more intensively.

There was often more than enough time to think, but the practical lessons were given to us by the enemy, unfortunately only too well.

For what we failed to do here, the enemy made up for with incredible skill and truly ingenious calculation. I also learnt a great deal from the enemy war propaganda. However, time passed without a trace in the minds of those who should have learnt this lesson; some of them thought they were too clever to take instruction from others, while others lacked the honest will to do so.

Did we have any propaganda at all?

Unfortunately, I can only answer in the negative. Everything that has really been done in this direction has been so inadequate and wrong from the outset that it has at least been of no use, and sometimes even caused harm.

Inadequate in form, psychologically wrong in essence: this has to be the result of a careful examination of German war propaganda.

Even the first question does not seem to have been fully clarified, namely: Is propaganda a means or an end?

It is a means and must therefore be judged from the point of view of the end. Its form will therefore have to be appropriately adapted to support the goal it serves. It is also clear that the meaning of the end

may be different from the point of view of the general need, and that therefore the propaganda is also determined differently in its intrinsic value. But the goal for which we fought in the course of the war was the most sublime and mightiest that can be imagined for human beings: it was the freedom and independence of our people, the security of food for the future and the honour of the nation; something which, despite the contrary opinion of today, is nevertheless present or should be present. This again corresponds to a higher justice, because, sooner or later, nations without honour tend to lose their freedom and independence, since generations of scoundrels without honour do not deserve freedom. But those who want to be cowardly slaves must not and cannot have any honour at all, because that kind of honour would quickly become an object of universal hatred.

The German people were fighting for a human existence, and the purpose of the war's propaganda would have been to support this struggle; helping it to victory had to be the goal.

But when peoples fight for their existence on this earth, i.e. when they are confronted with the fateful question of being or not being, all considerations of humanity or aesthetics collapse into nothingness. For all these ideas do not float in the ether of the world, but originate from the imagination of man and are bound to him.

His separation from this world also dissolves these concepts into nothingness, for nature does not recognise them. But even among human beings, only a few peoples, or rather races, possess them, to the extent that they originate from their own feelings. Humanity and aesthetics would perish even in a humanly inhabited world if it were to lose the races that are the creators and bearers of these concepts.

However, all these concepts of humanity and aesthetics have only subordinate importance in the struggle of a people for its existence in this world; indeed, they are completely ruled out as determining the

forms of the fight as they could paralyse the self-preservation power of a struggling people. But that is always the only visible result.

As far as the question of humanity is concerned, Moltke [2] has already stated that in war it is essential to make a decision as quickly as possible and that the fiercest manners of fighting are at the same time the most humane.

But if one tries to approach such matters with the drivel of aesthetics etc., then there can really be only one answer: questions of fate of the importance of a people's struggle for existence cancel out any obligation to beauty. The most unattractive thing there can be in human life is and remains the yoke of slavery. Or does this Schwabing [3] decadence perceive the current fate of the German nation as "aesthetic"? But there is really no need to discuss this with the Jews, the modern inventors of this cultural perfume. Their entire existence is a protest against the aesthetics of the image of the Lord.

But once these aspects of humanity and beauty have been ruled out for the fight, they cannot be used as a yardstick for propaganda.

In war, propaganda was a means to an end. The end was the German people's successful fight for the existence. Therefore, the propaganda could only be considered based on how it achieved that goal.

The cruellest weapons were humane if they led to a quicker victory, and the only beautiful methods were those that helped to secure the dignity of freedom for the nation.

This was the only possible position when facing the question of war propaganda in such a life-and-death struggle.

If one had realised this in the so-called authoritative places, one could never have come into such uncertainty about the form and use of this weapon; for this too is only a weapon, albeit a truly terrible one in the hands of the connoisseur.

The second question of crucial importance was the following: To whom should propaganda be addressed? To the scientific intelligentsia or to the less educated masses?

It must always be aimed at the masses!

For the intelligentsia, or what is unfortunately often called that today, there is not propaganda, but scientific instruction. Propaganda, however, is as little science in its content as an advertising poster is art. The art of the poster lies in the designer's ability to attract the attention of the public through form and colour. The art exhibition poster only has to draw attention to the art of the exhibition; the more it succeeds in this, the greater the art of the poster itself. The poster should continue to give the masses an idea of the significance of the exhibition, but in no way be a substitute for the art on display. Anyone who wants to engage with the art itself must therefore study more than the poster; indeed, merely "wandering" through the exhibition is by no means sufficient. Only after a detailed study of the exhibits can he be expected to immerse himself in the individual works and then slowly form a fair judgement.

The situation is similar with what we call propaganda today.

The task of propaganda does not lie in the scientific education of the individual, but in drawing the attention of the masses to certain facts, processes, necessities, etc., the significance of which is to be brought to the attention of the masses.

The art of propaganda now lies exclusively in doing this in such an excellent way that a general conviction of the reality of a fact, the necessity of a process, the correctness of something necessary, etc. arises. But since it is not and cannot be necessity in itself, since its task, just as with the poster, is to attract the attention of the crowd and not to instruct those who are already scientifically experienced or striving for education and insight, its work must always be

directed more towards feeling and only to a very limited extent towards the so-called intellect.

All propaganda must be popular and its intellectual level must be adjusted according to the receptivity of the most limited among those to whom it is intended. The greater the mass of people to be reached, the lower its purely intellectual level will have to be. If, however, as in the case of propaganda for the maintenance of a war, it is a question of drawing a whole people into its sphere of influence, then extreme caution must be exercised in avoiding a too high level of intellectuality.

The more modest is its scientific weight, and the more it takes into account the feelings of the masses, the more resounding its success. This popular acceptance is the best proof of the correctness or incorrectness of a propaganda and not the successful satisfaction of a few scholars or aesthetic youngsters.

The art of propaganda lies precisely in the fact that, grasping the emotional imagination of the masses, it finds its way in a psychologically correct form to the attention and further to the heart of the broad masses. The fact that this is not understood by our supposedly clever people only proves their laziness of thought or conceit.

But if one understands the necessity of adjusting the art of advertising propaganda to the broad masses, the following lesson follows: It is wrong to want to give propaganda the versatility of, say, scientific instruction.

The receptivity of the masses is very limited, their understanding is small, but forgetfulness is high. In view of these facts, any effective propaganda must be limited to very few points, and these must be utilised as catchwords until even the last person is able to imagine what is meant by such a word.

As soon as you sacrifice this principle and want to be versatile, you will cause the effect to flutter, as the crowd will neither be able to

digest nor retain the material on offer. This, however, weakens the result again and finally cancels it out.

Therefore, the greater the scope of the message, the more necessary it is for propaganda to follow a simple plan of action, which is also the most effective and targeted psychologically.

For example, it was fundamentally wrong to ridicule the opponent, as Austrian and German comic book propaganda mainly did. It was fundamentally wrong because when a soldier came face to face with the enemy, he saw something different. The result was terrible because now under the direct pressure of his enemy's resistance, he felt deceived by the ones who were supposed to have enlightened him, and instead of a strengthening of its combativeness or even just firmness, the opposite occurred.

The soldier lost his will to fight.

In contrast, the war propaganda of the British and Americans was psychologically correct. By presenting the Germans to their own people as barbarians and Huns, it prepared the individual soldier for the horrors of war and thus helped to protect him from illusions. The most dreadful weapon that was now used against him only seemed to him to confirm what he had already learned and strengthened his faith in the correctness of his government's claims, just as it increased his anger and hatred of the wicked enemy. For the cruel effect of the enemy weapon, which he now discovered through first-hand experience, gradually appeared to him as proof of the "Hun-like" brutality of the barbarian enemy, which he was already familiar with, without him having been made to think for a moment that his weapons might perhaps, or even probably, have an even more dreadful effect.

Thus, the English soldier, above all, could never feel that he had not been informed at home. This was not the case with the German soldier, so that, eventually, he rejected everything that came from his side as "deceitful" and "a fraud." This happened because officials

thought that they could assign any convenient jackass to propaganda duty. They failed to understand that propaganda demands the most brilliant experts on the soul that can be found.

Thus, German war propaganda offered an unsurpassable example of teaching and instruction for "information" that worked in reverse as result of a complete lack of understanding of psychology.

But there was an infinite amount of evidence to pick up from the enemy for those who were willing to open their eyes and learn. There was plenty of opportunity to learn from the tidal wave of enemy propaganda that assailed us for four and a half years.

However, the very first prerequisite of any propagandistic activity was understood most poorly: namely an intentionally biased and one-sided position on every question dealt with.

In this area, sins were committed from the top down right at the beginning of the war in such a way that one was entitled to doubt whether so much nonsense could really only be attributed to pure stupidity.

For example, what would you say about a poster that advertises a new soap but also describes other soaps as "good"?

You would just shake your head.

But it's exactly the same with political advertising.

The task of propaganda, for example, is not to weigh up the various rights, but to emphasise exclusively the one it represents. It does not have to objectively investigate the truth, insofar as it is favourable to the other side, in order to then present it to the masses with doctrinaire sincerity, but rather to serve incessantly its own interests.

It was fundamentally wrong to discuss the blame for the war from the point of view that not only Germany alone could be held responsible for the outbreak of this catastrophe, but it would have been right

to impose this blame entirely on the enemy, even if this had not really corresponded to the true course of events, as was in fact the case.

But what was the consequence of this half-measure?

The broad masses of a nation are not made up of diplomats or scholars of constitutional law, nor even of all those capable of sound judgement. They are like children who are vacillating as they are inclined to doubt and uncertainty. As soon as one's own propaganda only admits the glimmer of a right on the other side, the basis for doubting one's own right has already been laid. The masses are now unable to distinguish where the other side's injustice ends and their own begins. In such a case, they become insecure and suspicious, especially when the opponent does not commit the same foolishness, but instead places all and any blame on the enemy. What could be more explainable than the fact that one's own people finally believe the enemy's propaganda, which is more united and unified, even more than their own? And what's more, in a nation that already suffers as much from the obsession with objectivity as the Germans! For here, everyone will endeavour to do no wrong to the enemy, even at the risk of putting their own People and State under the heaviest burden, even to the risk of destruction.

Of course, the masses do not realise that this was not the intention of the authoritative bodies. The vast majority of the people are so feminine in disposition and attitude that their thoughts and actions are determined less by sober consideration than by emotional feelings.

This feeling, however, is not complicated, but very simple and firm. There is not much differentiation, but rather a positive or a negative, love or hate, right or wrong, truth or lie, but never half and half or part of one and part of the other.

English propaganda in particular understood all this in the most

ingenious way — and took it into account. There were really no half-measures there that could have given rise to doubts.

The proof of their brilliant understanding of the primitiveness of sentiment in the mass of the people lay in the publication of horrors, which suited this condition and both cleverly and ruthlessly prepared the ground for moral solidity at the front even when great defeats came along. And further, in nailing down the German enemy as being the sole cause of the War — a lie which, only through the unconditional, impudent, one-sided stubbornness with which it was put before the nation, took account of the sentimental and extremist nature of the public, and so gained credence.

The extent to which this kind of propaganda was effective was shown most strikingly by the fact that after four years it was not only able to keep the enemy firmly in line, but even began to corrode our own people.

The fact that our propaganda was not so successful should really come as no surprise. It already carried the seeds of ineffectiveness in its inner ambiguity. Finally, its content alone made it unlikely that it would make the necessary impression on the masses. To hope that this insipid pacifist dishwater could succeed in intoxicating people to die was something only our spiritless "statesmen" could manage.

So this wretched product was pointless, even harmful.

But all the ingenuity in the presentation of propaganda will not lead to success if one fundamental principle is not always taken into account with equal rigour. Propaganda has to limit itself to say very little and repeat it forever. Here, as with so many things in the world, perseverance is the first and most important prerequisite for success.

Especially in the field of propaganda, one must never allow oneself to be led by aesthetes or the blasé. Not by the former, because otherwise the content in form and expression, instead of being suitable for the masses, will soon develop appeal only for literary tea parties; but

one should be wary of the latter, because their lack of their own fresh feeling is always looking for new stimuli. These people get tired of everything in a short time; they want variety and never know how to empathise with or even understand the needs of their not yet so hardened fellow citizens. They are always the first to criticise propaganda, or rather its content, which they find too old-fashioned, too hackneyed, then again too outdated, and so on. They always want something new, seek variety and thus become true mortal enemies of any effective political mass mobilisation. For as soon as the organisation and content of propaganda begin to be geared to their needs, they lose all coherence and instead flutter apart completely.

Propaganda, however, is not there to provide blasé masters with a constant supply of interesting diversions, but to convince, namely, to convince the masses.

But the latter, in its sluggishness, always needs a certain amount of time before it is willing to take note of even one thing, and only a thousand-fold repetition of the simplest concepts will finally make it remember.

Every variation must never change the content of what is to be conveyed by the propaganda, but must always say the same thing at the end. Thus, the slogan must be illuminated from different angles, but the end of each consideration must always be the slogan itself. Only in this way can and will propaganda have a unified and coherent effect.

This great line alone, which must never be abandoned, allows the final success to mature if it is always consistently emphasised. But then, one will be amazed to realise what tremendous, almost unbelievable results such perseverance leads to.

Every advertisement, whether it is in the field of business or politics, is successful because of the duration and uniformity of its application.

Here, too, the example of the enemy's war propaganda was noteworthy: limited to a few points of view, calculated exclusively for the masses, pursued with tireless perseverance. Throughout the war the basic ideas and forms of execution, once recognised as correct, were applied without the slightest change ever being made.

In the beginning it was seemingly crazy in the audacity of its claims, later became unpleasant and finally it was believed. After four and a half years a revolution broke out in Germany, the catchwords of which were taken from the enemy's war propaganda.

In England, however, they realised something else: that the potential success of this intellectual weapon lies only in its massive application, but that success amply covers all costs.

Propaganda was regarded there as a weapon of the first order, whereas here it was the last bread and butter of jobless politicians and the print jobs of modest heroes.

All in all, its success was zero.

Notes

[1] Karl Lueger (1844-1910) was an Austrian lawyer and politician who served as Mayor of Vienna from 1897 until his death in 1910.

[2] Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke (1800-1891) was a Prussian field Marshal and the Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army from 1857 to 1888.

[3] Schwabing used to be famous as Munich's bohemian quarter.

Arthur Ponsonby

State War Propaganda (1928)

Arthur Ponsonby, 1st Baron Ponsonby of Shulbrede (1871 – 1946), was a British diplomat, politician, writer, and social activist. In the whole of his life he was passionately against any military conflict. Ten years after the ending of the First World War, he exposed the lies manufactures by all the States in order to create a climate favourable to intervention in the war and to the continuation of the hostilities until final victory.

Source: Arthur Ponsonby, *Falsehood in Wartime*, Introduction, 1928.

The object of this volume is not to cast fresh blame on authorities and individuals, nor is it to expose one nation more than another to accusations of deceit.

Falsehood is a recognized and extremely useful weapon in warfare, and every country uses it quite deliberately to deceive its own people, to attract neutrals, and to mislead the enemy. The ignorant

and innocent masses in each country are unaware at the time that they are being misled, and when it is all over only here and there are the falsehoods discovered and exposed. As it is all past history and the desired effect has been produced by the stories and statements, no one troubles to investigate the facts and establish the truth.

Lying, as we all know, does not take place only in wartime. Man, it has been said, is not "a veridical animal," but his habit of lying is not nearly so extraordinary as his amazing readiness to believe. It is, indeed, because of human credulity that lies flourish. But in wartime the authoritative organization of lying is not sufficiently recognized. The deception of whole peoples is not a matter which can be lightly regarded.

A useful purpose can therefore be served in the interval of so-called peace by a warning which people can examine with dispassionate calm, that the authorities in each country do, and indeed must, resort to this practice in order, first, to justify themselves by depicting the enemy as an undiluted criminal; and secondly, to inflame popular passion sufficiently to secure recruits for the continuance of the struggle. They cannot afford to tell the truth. In some cases it must be admitted that at the moment they do not know what the truth is.

The psychological factor in war is just as important as the military factor. The morale of civilians, as well as of soldiers, must be kept up to the mark. The War Offices, Admiralties, and Air Ministries look after the military side. Departments have to be created to see to the psychological side. People must never be allowed to become despondent; so victories must be exaggerated and defeats, if not concealed, at any rate minimized, and the stimulus of indignation, horror, and hatred must be assiduously and continuously pumped into the public mind by means of "propaganda." As Mr. Bonar Law said in an interview to the United Press of America, referring to patriotism, "It is well to have it properly stirred by German frightfulness"; and a sort of general confirmation of atrocities is given by vague phrases which

avoid responsibility for the authenticity of any particular story, as when Mr. Asquith said (*House of Commons*, April 27, 1915): "We shall not forget this horrible record of calculated cruelty and crime."

The use of the weapon of falsehood is more necessary in a country where military conscription is not the law of the land than in countries where the manhood of the nation is automatically drafted into the Army, Navy, or Air Service. The public can be worked up emotionally by sham ideals. A sort of collective hysteria spreads and rises until finally it gets the better of sober people and reputable newspapers.

With a warning before them, the common people may be more on their guard when the war cloud next appears on the horizon and less disposed to accept as truth the rumours, explanations, and pronouncements issued for their consumption. They should realize that a Government which has decided on embarking on the hazardous and terrible enterprise of war must at the outset present a one-sided case in justification of its action, and cannot afford to admit in any particular whatever the smallest degree of right or reason on the part of the people it has made up its mind to fight.

Facts must be distorted, relevant circumstances concealed, and a picture presented which by its crude colouring will persuade the ignorant people that their Government is blameless, their cause is righteous, and that the indisputable wickedness of the enemy has been proved beyond question. A moment's reflection would tell any reasonable person that such obvious bias cannot possibly represent the truth. But the moment's reflection is not allowed; lies are circulated with great rapidity. The unthinking mass accept them and by their excitement sway the rest.

The amount of rubbish and humbug that pass under the name of patriotism in wartime in all countries is sufficient to make decent people blush when they are subsequently disillusioned. At the outset the solemn asseverations of monarchs and leading statesmen in each

nation that they did not want war must be placed on a par with the declarations of men who pour paraffin about a house knowing they are continually striking matches and yet assert they do not want a conflagration. This form of self-deception, which involves the deception of others, is fundamentally dishonest.

War being established as a recognized institution to be resorted to when Governments quarrel, the people are more or less prepared. They quite willingly delude themselves in order to justify their own actions. They are anxious to find an excuse for displaying their patriotism, or they are disposed to seize the opportunity for the excitement and new life of adventure which war opens out to them. So there is a sort of national wink, everyone goes forward, and the individual, in his turn, takes up lying as a patriotic duty. In the low standard of morality which prevails in wartime, such a practice appears almost innocent. His efforts are sometimes a little crude, but he does his best to follow the example set.

Agents are employed by authority and encouraged in so-called propaganda work. The type which came prominently to the front in the broadcasting of falsehood at recruiting meetings is now well known. The fate which overtook at least one of the most popular of them in this country exemplifies the depth of degradation to which public opinion sinks in a war atmosphere.

With eavesdroppers, letter-openers, decipherers, telephone tappers, spies, an intercept department, a forgery department, a criminal investigation department, a propaganda department, an intelligence department, a censorship department, a ministry of information, a Press bureau, etc., the various Governments were well equipped to "instruct" their peoples.

The British official propaganda department at Crewe House, under Lord Northcliffe, was highly successful. Their methods, more especially the raining down of millions of leaflets on to the German Army, far surpassed anything undertaken by the enemy. In *The*

Secrets of Crewe House by Sir Campbell Stuart, the methods are described for our satisfaction and approval. The declaration that only "truthful statements" were used is repeated just too often, and does not quite tally with the description of the faked letters (page 99) and bogus titles and book-covers (page 104), of which use was made. But, of course, we know that such clever propagandists are equally clever in dealing with us after the event as in dealing with the enemy at the time. In the apparently candid description of their activities we know we are hearing only part of the story. The circulators of base metal know how to use the right amount of alloy for us as well as for the enemy.

In the many tributes to the success of our propaganda from German Generals and the German Press, there is no evidence that our statements were always strictly truthful. To quote one: General von Hutier, of the Sixth German Army, sent a message in which the following passage occurs:

> The method of Northcliffe at the Front is to distribute through airmen a constantly increasing number of leaflets and pamphlets; the letters of German prisoners are falsified in the most outrageous way; tracts and pamphlets are concocted, to which the names of German poets, writers, and statesmen are forged, or which present the appearance of having been printed in Germany, and bear, for example, the title of the *Reclam* series, when they really come from the Northcliffe Press, which is working day and night for this same purpose. His thought and aim are that these forgeries, however obvious they may appear to the man who thinks twice, may suggest a doubt, even for a moment, in the minds of those who do not think for themselves, and that their confidence in their leaders, in their own strength, and in the inexhaustible resources of Germany may be shattered.

The propaganda, to begin with, was founded on the shifting sand of the myth of Germany's *sole* responsibility. Later it became slightly confused owing to the inability of our statesmen to declare what our aims were, and towards the end it was fortified by descriptions of the magnificent, just, and righteous peace which was going to be "established on lasting foundations." This unfortunately proved to be the greatest falsehood of all.

In calm retrospect we can appreciate better the disastrous effects of the poison of falsehood, whether officially, semi-officially, or privately manufactured. It has been rightly said that the injection of the poison of hatred into men's minds by means of falsehood is a greater evil in wartime than the actual loss of life. The defilement of the human soul is worse than the destruction of the human body. A fuller realization of this is essential.

Another effect of the continual appearance of false and biased statement and the absorption of the lie atmosphere is that deeds of real valour, heroism, and physical endurance and genuine cases of inevitable torture and suffering are contaminated and desecrated; the wonderful comradeship of the battlefield becomes almost polluted. Lying tongues cannot speak of deeds of sacrifice to show their beauty or value. So it is that the praise bestowed on heroism by Government and Press always jars, more especially when, as is generally the case with the latter, it is accompanied by cheap and vulgar sentimentality. That is why one instinctively wishes the real heroes to remain unrecognized, so that their record may not be smirched by cynical tongues and pens so well versed in falsehood.

When war reaches such dimensions as to involve the whole nation, and when the people at its conclusion find they have gained nothing but only observe widespread calamity around them, they are inclined to become more sceptical and desire to investigate the foundations of the arguments which inspired their patriotism, inflamed their passions, and prepared them to offer the supreme sacrifice.

They are curious to know why the ostensible objects for which they fought have none of them been attained, more especially if they are the victors. They are inclined to believe, with Lord Fisher, that "The nation was fooled into the war" (*London Magazine*, January 1920). They begin to wonder whether it does not rest with them to make one saying true of which they heard so much, that it was "a war to end war."

When the generation that has known war is still alive, it is well that they should be given chapter and verse with regard to some of the best-known cries, catchwords, and exhortations by which they were so greatly influenced. As a warning, therefore, this collection is made. It constitutes only the exposure of a few samples. To cover the whole ground would be impossible. There must have been more deliberate lying in the world from 1914 to 1918 than in any other period of the world's history.

There are several different sorts of disguises which falsehood can take. There is the deliberate official lie, issued either to delude the people at home or to mislead the enemy abroad; of this, several instances are given. As a Frenchman has said:

> "*Tant que les peuples seront armés, les uns contre les autres, ils auront des hommes d'État menteurs, comme ils auront des canons et des mitrailleuses.*" ("As long as the peoples are armed against each other, there will be lying statesmen, just as there will be cannons and machine guns.")

A circular was issued by the War Office inviting reports on war incidents from officers with regard to the enemy and stating that strict accuracy was not essential so long as there was inherent probability.

There is the deliberate lie concocted by an ingenious mind which may only reach a small circle, but which, if sufficiently graphic and picturesque, may be caught up and spread broadcast; and there is

the hysterical hallucination on the part of weak-minded individuals.

There is the lie heard and not denied, although lacking in evidence, and then repeated or allowed to circulate. There is the mistranslation, occasionally originating in a genuine mistake, but more often deliberate. Two minor instances of this may be given.

> *The Times* (agony column), July 9, 1915:
>
> JACK F. G.—If you are not in khaki by the 20th, I shall cut you dead [i.e. I shall deliberately ignore you]. - Ethel M.
>
> The Berlin correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette* transmitted this:
>
> If you are not in khaki by the 20th, *backe ich dich zu Tode* (I will hack you to death).

During the blockade of Germany, it was suggested that the diseases from which children suffered had been called *Die englische Krankheit*, as a permanent reflection on English inhumanity. As a matter of fact, *die englische Krankheit* is, and always has been, the common German name for rickets.

There is the general obsession, started by rumour and magnified by repetition and elaborated by hysteria, which at last gains general acceptance.

There is the deliberate forgery which has to be very carefully manufactured but serves its purpose at the moment, even though it be eventually exposed.

There is the omission of passages from official documents of which only a few of the many instances are given; and the "correctness" of words and commas in parliamentary answers which conceal evasions of the truth.

There is deliberate exaggeration, such, for instance, as the reports of the destruction of Louvain: "The intellectual metropolis of the Low Countries since the fifteenth century is now no more than a heap of ashes" (*Press Bureau*, August 29, 1914), "Louvain has ceased to exist" (*The Times*, August 29, 1914). As a matter of fact, it was estimated that about an eighth of the town had suffered.

There is the concealment of truth, which has to be resorted to so as to prevent anything to the credit of the enemy reaching the public. A war correspondent who mentioned some chivalrous act that a German had done to an Englishman during an action received a rebuking telegram from his employer: "Don't want to hear about any good Germans"; and Sir Philip Gibbs, in *Realities of War*, says: "At the close of the day the Germans acted with chivalry, which I was not allowed to tell at the time."

There is the faked photograph ("the camera cannot lie"). These were more popular in France than here. In Vienna an enterprising firm supplied atrocity photographs with blanks for the headings so that they might be used for propaganda purposes by either side.

The cinema also played a very important part, especially in neutral countries, and helped considerably in turning opinion in America in favour of coming in on the side of the Allies. To this day in this country attempts are made by means of films to keep the wound raw.

There is the "Russian scandal," the best instance of which during the war, curiously enough, was the rumour of the passage of Russian troops through Britain. Some trivial and imperfectly understood statement of fact becomes magnified into enormous proportions by constant repetition from one person to another.

Atrocity lies were the most popular of all, especially in this country and America; no war can be without them. Slander of the enemy is esteemed a patriotic duty. An English soldier wrote (*The Times*, September 15, 1914): "The stories in our papers are only exceptions.

There are people like them in every army." But at the earliest possible moment stories of the maltreatment of prisoners have to be circulated deliberately in order to prevent surrenders. This is done, of course, on both sides. Whereas naturally each side tries to treat its prisoners as well as possible so as to attract others.

The repetition of a single instance of cruelty and its exaggeration can be distorted into a prevailing habit on the part of the enemy. Unconsciously each one passes it on with trimmings and yet tries to persuade himself that he is speaking the truth.

There are lies emanating from the inherent unreliability and fallibility of human testimony. No two people can relate the occurrence of a street accident so as to make the two stories tally. When bias and emotion are introduced, human testimony becomes quite valueless. In wartime such testimony is accepted as conclusive. The scrappiest and most unreliable evidence is sufficient — "the friend of the brother of a man who was killed," or, as a German investigator of his own liars put it, "somebody who had seen it," or, "an extremely respectable old woman."

There is pure romance. Letters of soldiers who whiled away the days and weeks of intolerable waiting by writing home sometimes contained thrilling descriptions of engagements and adventures which had never occurred.

There are evasions, concealments, and half-truths which are more subtly misleading and gradually become a governmental habit.

There is official secrecy which must necessarily mislead public opinion. For instance, a popular English author, who was perhaps better informed than the majority of the public, wrote a letter to an American author, which was reproduced in the Press on May 21, 1918, stating:

> There are no Secret Treaties of any kind in which this country is concerned. It has been publicly and clearly stated more than once by our Foreign Minister, and apart from honour it would be political suicide for any British official to make a false statement of the kind.

Yet a series of Secret Treaties existed. It is only fair to say that the author, not the Foreign Secretary, is the liar here. Nevertheless the official pamphlet, *The Truth about the Secret Treaties*, compiled by Mr. McCurdy, was published with a number of *unacknowledged excisions*, and both Lord Robert Cecil in 1917 and Mr. Lloyd George in 1918 declared (the latter to a deputation from the Trade Union Congress) that our policy was not directed to the disruption of Austro-Hungary, although they both knew that under the Secret Treaty concluded with Italy in April 1915 [Treaty of London] portions of Austria-Hungary were to be handed over to Italy and she was to be cut off from the sea. Secret Treaties naturally involve constant denials of the truth.

There is sham official indignation depending on genuine popular indignation which is a form of falsehood sometimes resorted to in an unguarded moment and subsequently regretted. The first use of gas by the Germans and the submarine warfare are good instances of this.

Contempt for the enemy, if illustrated, can prove to be an unwise form of falsehood. There was a time when German soldiers were popularly represented cringing, with their arms in the air and crying "*Kamerad*," until it occurred to Press and propaganda authorities that people were asking why, if this was the sort of material we were fighting against, had we not wiped them of the field in a few weeks.

There are personal accusations and false charges made in a prejudiced war atmosphere to discredit persons who refuse to adopt the orthodox attitude towards war.

There are lying recriminations between one country and another. For instance, the Germans were accused of having engineered the Armenian massacres, and they, on their side, declared the Armenians, stimulated by the Russians, had killed 150,000 Mohammedans (*Germania*, October 9, 1915).

Other varieties of falsehood more subtle and elusive might be found, but the above pretty well cover the ground.

A good deal depends on the quality of the lie. You must have intellectual lies for intellectual people and crude lies for popular consumption, but if your popular lies are too blatant and your more intellectual section are shocked and see through them, they may (and indeed they did) begin to be suspicious as to whether they were not being hoodwinked too. Nevertheless, the inmates of colleges are just as credulous as the inmates of the slums.

Perhaps nothing did more to impress the public mind — and this is true in all countries — than the assistance given in propaganda by intellectuals and literary notables. They were able to clothe the rough tissue of falsehood with phrases of literary merit and passages of eloquence better than the statesmen. Sometimes by expressions of spurious impartiality, at other times by rhetorical indignation, they could by their literary skill give this or that lie the stamp of indubitable authenticity, even without the shadow of a proof, or incidentally refer to it as an accepted fact. The narrowest patriotism could be made to appear noble, the foulest accusations could be represented as an indignant outburst of humanitarianism, and the meanest and most vindictive aims falsely disguised as idealism. Everything was legitimate which could make the soldiers go on fighting.

The frantic activity of ecclesiastics in recruiting by means of war propaganda made so deep an impression on the public mind that little comment on it is needed here. The few who courageously stood out became marked men. The resultant and significant loss of spiri-

tual influence by the Churches is, in itself, sufficient evidence of the reaction against the betrayal in time of stress of the most elementary precepts of Christianity by those specially entrusted with the moral welfare of the people.

War is fought in this fog of falsehood, a great deal of it undiscovered and accepted as truth. The fog arises from fear and is fed by panic. Any attempt to doubt or deny even the most fantastic story has to be condemned at once as unpatriotic, if not traitorous. This allows a free field for the rapid spread of lies. If they were only used to deceive the enemy in the game of war it would not be worth troubling about. But, as the purpose of most of them is to fan indignation and induce the flower of the country's youth to be ready to make the supreme sacrifice, it becomes a serious matter. Exposure, therefore, may be useful, even when the struggle is over, in order to show up the fraud, hypocrisy, and humbug on which all war rests, and the blatant and vulgar devices which have been used for so long to prevent the poor ignorant people from realizing the true meaning of war.

It must be admitted that many people were conscious and willing dupes. But many more were unconscious and were sincere in their patriotic zeal. Finding now that elaborately and carefully staged deceptions were practised on them, they feel a resentment which has not only served to open their eyes but may induce them to make their children keep their eyes open when next the bugle sounds.

[...]

There are some who object to war because of its immorality, there are some who shrink from the arbitrament of arms because of its increased cruelty and barbarity; there are a growing number who protest against this method, at the outset known to be unsuccessful, of attempting to settle international disputes because of its imbecility and futility. But there is not a living soul in any country who does not

deeply resent having his passions roused, his indignation inflamed, his patriotism exploited, and his highest ideals desecrated by concealment, subterfuge, fraud, falsehood, trickery, and deliberate lying on the part of those in whom he is taught to repose confidence and to whom he is enjoined to pay respect.

None of the heroes prepared for suffering and sacrifice, none of the common herd ready for service and obedience, will be inclined to listen to the call of their country once they discover the polluted sources from whence that call proceeds and recognize the monstrous finger of falsehood which beckons them to the battlefield.



Edward Bernays

Propaganda under Democracy (1928)

Through the commercial advertising of Edward Bernays politicians learned how to sell a party platform and a party man to the large public. Some of his suggestions are interesting proposals provided they are not used to manipulate people for the mere aim of gaining power in view of dominating-exploiting everybody.

Source: Edward Bernays, *Propaganda*, 1928.

Chapter I Organizing Chaos

The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country.

We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. This is a logical

result of the way in which our democratic society is organized. Vast numbers of human beings must cooperate in this manner if they are to live together as a smoothly functioning society.

Our invisible governors are, in many cases, unaware of the identity of their fellow members in the inner cabinet.

They govern us by their qualities of natural leadership, their ability to supply needed ideas and by their key position in the social structure. Whatever attitude one chooses to take toward this condition, it remains a fact that in almost every act of our daily lives, whether in the sphere of politics or business, in our social conduct or our ethical thinking, we are dominated by the relatively small number of persons — a trifling fraction of our hundred and twenty million — who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the masses. It is they who pull the wires which control the public mind, who harness old social forces and contrive new ways to bind and guide the world.

Chapter II The New Propaganda

In the days when kings were kings, Louis XIV made his modest remark, "*L'État c'est moi.*" He was nearly right.

But times have changed. The steam engine, the multiple press, and the public school, that trio of the industrial revolution, have taken the power away from kings and given it to the people. The people actually gained power which the king lost. For economic power tends to draw after it political power; and the history of the industrial revolution shows how that power passed from the king and the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie. Universal suffrage and universal schooling reenforced this tendency, and at last even the bourgeoisie stood in fear of the common people. For the masses promised to become king.

Today, however, a reaction has set in. The minority has discovered a powerful help in influencing majorities. It has been found possible so to mold the mind of the masses that they will throw their newly gained strength in the desired direction. In the present structure of society, this practice is inevitable. Whatever of social importance is done today, whether in politics, finance, manufacture, agriculture, charity, education, or other fields, must be done with the help of propaganda. Propaganda is the executive arm of the invisible government.

Universal literacy was supposed to educate the common man to control his environment. Once he could read and write he would have a mind fit to rule. So ran the democratic doctrine. But instead of a mind, universal literacy has given him rubber stamps, rubber stamps inked with advertising slogans, with editorials, with published scientific data, with the trivialities of the tabloids and the platitudes of history, but quite innocent of original thought. Each man's rubber stamps are the duplicates of millions of others, so that when those millions are exposed to the same stimuli, all receive identical imprints. It may seem an exaggeration to say that the American public gets most of its ideas in this wholesale fashion. The mechanism by which ideas are disseminated on a large scale is propaganda, in the broad sense of an organized effort to spread a particular belief or doctrine.

I am aware that the word "propaganda" carries to many minds an unpleasant connotation. Yet whether, in any instance, propaganda is good or bad depends upon the merit of the cause urged, and the correctness of the information published.

In itself, the word "propaganda" has certain technical meanings which, like most things in this world, are "neither good nor bad but custom makes them so." I find the word defined in *Funk and Wagnalls' Dictionary* in four ways:

> "1. A society of cardinals, the overseers of foreign missions; also the College of the Propaganda at Rome founded by Pope Urban VIII in 1627 for the education of missionary priests; Sacred College *de Propaganda Fide*.
>
> "2. Hence, any institution or scheme for propagating a doctrine or system.
>
> "3. Effort directed systematically toward the gaining of public support for an opinion or a course of action.
>
> "4. The principles advanced by a propaganda."

[...]

Modern propaganda is a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group.

This practice of creating circumstances and of creating pictures in the minds of millions of persons is very common. Virtually no important undertaking is now carried on without it, whether that enterprise be building a cathedral, endowing a university, marketing a moving picture, floating a large bond issue, or electing a president. Sometimes the effect on the public is created by a professional propagandist, sometimes by an amateur deputed for the job. The important thing is that it is universal and continuous and in its sum total it is regimenting the public mind every bit as much as an army regiments the bodies of its soldiers.

[...]

In our present social organization approval of the public is essential to any large undertaking. Hence a laudable movement may be lost unless it impresses itself on the public mind. Charity, as well as business, and politics and literature, for that matter, have had to adopt

propaganda, for the public must be regimented into giving money just as it must be regimented into tuberculosis prophylaxis. The Near East Relief, the Association for the Improvement of the Condition of the Poor of New York, and all the rest, have to work on public opinion just as though they had tubes of tooth paste to sell. We are proud of our diminishing infant death rate — and that too is the work of propaganda.

Propaganda does exist on all sides of us, and it does change our mental pictures of the world. Even if this be unduly pessimistic — and that remains to be proved — the opinion reflects a tendency that is undoubtedly real. In fact, its use is growing as its efficiency in gaining public support is recognized.

This then, evidently indicates the fact that anyone with sufficient influence can lead sections of the public at least for a time and for a given purpose. Formerly the rulers were the leaders. They laid out the course of history, by the simple process of doing what they wanted. And if nowadays the successors of the rulers, those whose position or ability gives them power, can no longer do what they want without the approval of the masses, they find in propaganda a tool which is increasingly powerful in gaining that approval. Therefore, propaganda is here to stay.

It was, of course, the astounding success of propaganda during the war that opened the eyes of the intelligent few in all departments of life to the possibilities of regimenting the public mind. The American government and numerous patriotic agencies developed a technique which, to most persons accustomed to bidding for public acceptance, was new. They not only appealed to the individual by means of every approach — visual, graphic, and auditory — to support the national endeavor, but they also secured the cooperation of the key men in every group — persons whose mere word carried authority to hundreds or thousands or hundreds of thousands of followers. They thus automatically gained the support of fraternal,

religious, commercial, patriotic, social and local groups whose members took their opinions from their accustomed leaders and spokesmen, or from the periodical publications which they were accustomed to read and believe. At the same time, the manipulators of patriotic opinion made use of the mental clichés and the emotional habits of the public to produce mass reactions against the alleged atrocities, the terror and the tyranny of the enemy. It was only natural, after the war ended, that intelligent persons should ask themselves whether it was not possible to apply a similar technique to the problems of peace.

As a matter of fact, the practice of propaganda since the war has assumed very different forms from those prevalent twenty years ago. This new technique may fairly be called the new propaganda.

It takes account not merely of the individual, nor even of the mass mind alone, but also and especially of the anatomy of society, with its interlocking group formations and loyalties. It sees the individual not only as a cell in the social organism but as a cell organized into the social unit. Touch a nerve at a sensitive spot and you get an automatic response from certain specific members of the organism.

Chapter VI Propaganda and Political Leadership

The great political problem in our modern democracy is how to induce our leaders to lead. The dogma that the voice of the people is the voice of God tends to make elected persons the will-less servants of their constituents. This is undoubtedly part cause of the political sterility of which certain American critics constantly complain.

No serious sociologist any longer believes that the voice of the people expresses any divine or specially wise and lofty idea. The voice of the people expresses the mind of the people, and that mind is made up for it by the group leaders in whom it believes and by those persons who understand the manipulation of public opinion. It is

composed of inherited prejudices and symbols and clichés and verbal formulas supplied to them by the leaders.

Fortunately, the sincere and gifted politician is able, by the instrument of propaganda, to mold and form the will of the people.

Disraeli cynically expressed the dilemma, when he said: "I *must* follow the people. Am I not their leader?" He might have added: "I *must* lead the people. Am I not their servant?"

Unfortunately, the methods of our contemporary politicians, in dealing with the public, are as archaic and ineffective as the advertising methods of business in 1900 would be today. While politics was the first important department of American life to use propaganda on a large scale, it has been the slowest in modifying its propaganda methods to meet the changed conditions of the public mind. American business first learned from politics the methods of appealing to the broad public. But it continually improved those methods in the course of its competitive struggle, while politics clung to the old formulas.

The political apathy of the average voter, of which we hear so much, is undoubtedly due to the fact that the politician does not know how to meet the conditions of the public mind. He cannot dramatize himself and his platform in terms which have real meaning to the public. Acting on the fallacy that the leader must slavishly follow, he deprives his campaign of all dramatic interest. An automaton cannot arouse the public interest. A leader, a fighter, a dictator, can. But, given our present political conditions under which every office seeker must cater to the vote of the masses, the only means by which the born leader can lead is the expert use of propaganda.

Whether in the problem of getting elected to office or in the problem of interpreting and popularizing new issues, or in the problem of making the day-to-day administration of public affairs a vital part of

the community life, the use of propaganda, carefully adjusted to the mentality of the masses, is an essential adjunct of political life.

The successful business man today apes the politician. He has adopted the glitter and the ballyhoo of the campaign. He has set up all the sideshows. He has annual dinners that are a compendium of speeches, flags, bombast, stateliness, pseudo-democracy slightly tinged with paternalism. On occasion he doles out honors to employees, much as the republic of classic times rewarded its worthy citizens.

But these are merely the sideshows, the drums, of big business, by which it builds up an image of public service, and of honorary service. This is but one of the methods by which business stimulates loyal enthusiasms on the part of directors, the workers, the stockholders and the consumer public. It is one of the methods by which big business performs its function of making and selling products to the public. The real work and campaign of business consists of intensive study of the public, the manufacture of products based on this study, and exhaustive use of every means of reaching the public.

Political campaigns today are all sideshows, all honors, all bombast, glitter, and speeches. These are for the most part unrelated to the main business of studying the public scientifically, of supplying the public with party, candidate, platform, and performance, and selling the public these ideas and products. Politics was the first big business in America. Therefore there is a good deal of irony in the fact that business has learned everything that politics has had to teach, but that politics has failed to learn very much from business methods of mass distribution of ideas and products.

[...]

One reason, perhaps, why the politician today is slow to take up methods which are a commonplace in business life is that he has such ready entry to the media of communication on which his power depends.

The newspaperman looks to him for news. And by his power of giving or withholding information the politician can often effectively censor political news. But being dependent, every day of the year and for year after year, upon certain politicians for news, the newspaper reporters are obliged to work in harmony with their news sources.

The political leader must be a creator of circumstances, not only a creature of mechanical processes of stereotyping and rubber stamping.

George Orwell

The language as a tool for manipulation (1946)

In this text Orwell points out how a certain use of the English language can constitute a way to hide unpalatable truth and to present awful realities as normal or even beneficial practices. In other word, using the language for propaganda.

Subsequently in *Nineteen eighty-four* (1949) the author will list what can be considered the master strokes of propaganda under the Big Brother: *War is Peace / Freedom is Slavery / Ignorance is Strength*. Paradoxical as these formulas may seem, they underpin, not even too covertly, the policies of practically all State rulers.

Source: George Orwell, *Politics and the English Language*, 1946.

Most people who bother with the matter at all would admit that the English language is in a bad way, but it is generally assumed that we cannot by conscious action do anything about it. Our civilization is decadent and our language — so the argument runs — must inevitably share in the general collapse. It follows that any struggle

against the abuse of language is a sentimental archaism, like preferring candles to electric light or hansom cabs to aeroplanes. Underneath this lies the half-conscious belief that language is a natural growth and not an instrument which we shape for our own purposes.

Now, it is clear that the decline of a language must ultimately have political and economic causes: it is not due simply to the bad influence of this or that individual writer. But an effect can become a cause, reinforcing the original cause and producing the same effect in an intensified form, and so on indefinitely. A man may take to drink because he feels himself to be a failure, and then fail all the more completely because he drinks. It is rather the same thing that is happening to the English language. It becomes ugly and inaccurate because our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts. The point is that the process is reversible. Modern English, especially written English, is full of bad habits which spread by imitation and which can be avoided if one is willing to take the necessary trouble. If one gets rid of these habits one can think more clearly, and to think clearly is a necessary first step towards political regeneration: so that the fight against bad English is not frivolous and is not the exclusive concern of professional writers.

[...]

In our time it is broadly true that political writing is bad writing. Where it is not true, it will generally be found that the writer is some kind of rebel, expressing his private opinions and not a 'party line'. Orthodoxy, of whatever colour, seems to demand a lifeless, imitative style. The political dialects to be found in pamphlets, leading articles, manifestos, White Papers and the speeches of Under-Secretaries do, of course, vary from party to party, but they are all alike in that one almost never finds in them a fresh, vivid, home-made turn of speech. When one watches some tired hack on the platform mechan-

ically repeating the familiar phrases — *bestial atrocities, iron heel, bloodstained tyranny, free peoples of the world, stand shoulder to shoulder* — one often has a curious feeling that one is not watching a live human being but some kind of dummy: a feeling which suddenly becomes stronger at moments when the light catches the speaker's spectacles and turns them into blank discs which seem to have no eyes behind them. And this is not altogether fanciful. A speaker who uses that kind of phraseology has gone some distance towards turning himself into a machine. The appropriate noises are coming out of his larynx, but his brain is not involved as it would be if he were choosing his words for himself. If the speech he is making is one that he is accustomed to make over and over again, he may be almost unconscious of what he is saying, as one is when one utters the responses in church. And this reduced state of consciousness, if not indispensable, is at any rate favourable to political conformity.

In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence of the indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan, can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not square with the professed aims of political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called *pacification*. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called *transfer of population* or *rectification of frontiers*. People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called *elimination of unreliable elements*. Such phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without calling up mental pictures of them. Consider for instance some comfortable English professor defending Russian

totalitarianism. He cannot say outright, 'I believe in killing off your opponents when you can get good results by doing so'. Probably, therefore, he will say something like this:

> 'While freely conceding that the Soviet regime exhibits certain features which the humanitarian may be inclined to deplore, we must, I think, agree that a certain curtailment of the right to political opposition is an unavoidable concomitant of transitional periods, and that the rigours which the Russian people have been called upon to undergo have been amply justified in the sphere of concrete achievement.'

The inflated style is itself a kind of euphemism. A mass of Latin words falls upon the facts like soft snow, blurring the outlines and covering up all the details. The great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap between one's real and one's declared aims, one turns as it were instinctively to long words and exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish spurting out ink. In our age there is no such thing as 'keeping out politics'. All issues are political issues, and politics itself is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred and schizophrenia. When the general atmosphere is bad, language must suffer. I should expect to find — this is a guess which I have not sufficient knowledge to verify — that the German, Russian and Italian languages have all deteriorated in the last ten or fifteen years, as a result of dictatorship.

But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought. A bad usage can spread by tradition and imitation, even among people who should and do know better. The debased language that I have been discussing is in some ways very convenient. Phrases like *a not unjustifiable assumption, leaves much to be desired, would serve no good purpose, a consideration which we should do well to bear in mind,* are a continuous temptation, a packet of aspirins always at one's elbow. Look back through this essay, and for certain you will

find that I have again and again committed the very faults I am protesting against. By this morning's post I have received a pamphlet dealing with conditions in Germany. The author tells me that he 'felt impelled' to write it. I open it at random, and here is almost the first sentence that I see: '(The Allies) have an opportunity not only of achieving a radical transformation of Germany's social and political structure in such a way as to avoid a nationalistic reaction in Germany itself, but at the same time of laying the foundations of a co-operative and unified Europe.' You see, he 'feels impelled' to write — feels, presumably, that he has something new to say — and yet his words, like cavalry horses answering the bugle, group themselves automatically into the familiar dreary pattern. This invasion of one's mind by ready-made phrases (*lay the foundations, achieve a radical transformation*) can only be prevented if one is constantly on guard against them, and every such phrase anaesthetizes a portion of one's brain.

I said earlier that the decadence of our language is probably curable. Those who deny this would argue, if they produced an argument at all, that language merely reflects existing social conditions, and that we cannot influence its development by any direct tinkering with words and constructions. So far as the general tone or spirit of a language goes, this may be true, but it is not true in detail. Silly words and expressions have often disappeared, not through any evolutionary process but owing to the conscious action of a minority. Two recent examples were *explore every avenue* and *leave no stone unturned,* which were killed by the jeers of a few journalists. There is a long list of flyblown metaphors which could similarly be got rid of if enough people would interest themselves in the job; and it should also be possible to laugh the *not un-* formation out of existence, (one can cure oneself of the *not un-* formation by memorizing this sentence: *A not unblack dog was chasing a not unsmall rabbit across a not ungreen field*), to reduce the amount of Latin and Greek in the average sentence, to drive out foreign phrases and strayed

scientific words, and, in general, to make pretentiousness unfashionable. But all these are minor points. The defence of the English language implies more than this, and perhaps it is best to start by saying what it does not imply.

To begin with it has nothing to do with archaism, with the salvaging of obsolete words and turns of speech, or with the setting up of a 'standard English' which must never be departed from. On the contrary, it is especially concerned with the scrapping of every word or idiom which has outworn its usefulness. It has nothing to do with correct grammar and syntax, which are of no importance so long as one makes one's meaning clear, or with the avoidance of Americanisms, or with having what is called a 'good prose style'. On the other hand it is not concerned with fake simplicity and the attempt to make written English colloquial. Nor does it even imply in every case preferring the Saxon word to the Latin one, though it does imply using the fewest and shortest words that will cover one's meaning. What is above all needed is to let the meaning choose the word, and not the other way about. In prose, the worst thing one can do with words is to surrender to them. When you think of a concrete object, you think wordlessly, and then, if you want to describe the thing you have been visualizing, you probably hunt about till you find the exact words that seem to fit it. When you think of something abstract you are more inclined to use words from the start, and unless you make a conscious effort to prevent it, the existing dialect will come rushing in and do the job for you, at the expense of blurring or even changing your meaning. Probably it is better to put off using words as long as possible and get one's meaning as clear as one can through pictures or sensations. Afterwards one can choose — not simply accept — the phrases that will best cover the meaning, and then switch round and decide what impression one's words are likely to make on another person. This last effort of the mind cuts out all stale or mixed images, all prefabricated phrases, needless repetitions, and humbug and vagueness generally. But one can often be in doubt about the effect

of a word or a phrase, and one needs rules that one can rely on when instinct fails. I think the following rules will cover most cases:

(i) Never use a metaphor, simile or other figure of speech which you are used to seeing in print.

(ii) Never use a long word where a short one will do.

(iii) If it is possible to cut out a word, always cut it out.

(iv) Never use the passive where you can use the active.

(v) Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word or a jargon word if you can think of an everyday English equivalent.

(vi) Break any of these rules sooner than say anything outright barbarous.

These rules sound elementary, and so they are, but they demand a deep change of attitude in anyone who has grown used to writing in the style now fashionable. One could keep all of them and still write bad English.

I have not here been considering the literary use of language, but merely language as an instrument for expressing and not for concealing or preventing thought. Stuart Chase and others have come near to claiming that all abstract words are meaningless, and have used this as a pretext for advocating a kind of political quietism. Since you don't know what Fascism is, how can you struggle against Fascism? One need not swallow such absurdities as this, but one ought to recognize that the present political chaos is connected with the decay of language, and that one can probably bring about some improvement by starting at the verbal end. If you simplify your English, you are freed from the worst follies of orthodoxy. You cannot speak any of the necessary dialects, and when you make a stupid remark its stupidity will be obvious, even to yourself. Political language — and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Conservatives to Anarchists — is designed to make lies sound

truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind. One cannot change this all in a moment, but one can at least change one's own habits, and from time to time one can even, if one jeers loudly enough, send some worn-out and useless phrase — some *jackboot, Achilles' heel, hotbed, melting pot, acid test, veritable inferno* or other lump of verbal refuse — into the dustbin where it belongs.

Serge Tchakhotine

The Rape of the Masses through Political Propaganda (1952)

The author qualify propaganda as a "psychic rape" committed by the dominant élite against the defenceless masses, defenceless because lacking the formidable instruments of strong persuasion at disposal of the political and economic masters.

Source: Serge Tchakhotine, *Le viol des foules par la propagande politique*, 1952.

But what really characterises the times in which we live is a decline in the real influence of communities on public life: they are becoming more like docile instruments in the hands of dictators and even usurpers, who, using on the one hand a more or less intuitive knowledge of psychological laws, and on the other hand the formidable technical means now available to them in the modern State, and not letting themselves be held back by any moral scruples, exert on all the individuals making up a people an effective action which we have presented here as a kind of psychic rape.

You could say that they are constantly psychically violating them. It is only natural that they should, from time to time, resort to noisy demonstrations in which they exploit and unleash the forces inherent in crowds; for example, loud military parades, spectacular displays such as Hitler's Nuremberg Congress, or Mussolini's harangues from his balcony.

And there is a very simple explanation for this: we saw above that a conditioned reflex, if it is not "refreshed" from time to time, i.e. accompanied by an absolute reflex, loses its effectiveness. When psychic violence is used as a method of government, the force of the symbols acting on the great masses, i.e. the force of the imperative orders acting on those under suggestion, that is on the "psychic slaves," fades little by little, if we do not periodically touch the chords that fear or enthusiasm are capable of making vibrate in them.

This is why the dictators' art of government always comprises two essential forms or phases of action:

1. to gather the masses into crowds, to impress them with a psychic lash, by haranguing them violently and at the same time making them perceive certain symbols — the keys to their affectivity — by rekindling their faith in them;

2. to disperse these 'crowds' again, by transforming them into 'masses', and to make them act for a certain time, by surrounding them on all sides with the symbols that have become active again.

[...]

Emotional propaganda, designed to excite crowds to the maximum, is not the prerogative of dictatorships. In the United States, the use of the principle of "psychic rape" of the masses, and even of crowds, during presidential elections reaches an extraordinary degree of intensity; the methods are simply borrowed from advertising and the processions (parades) take on a purely carnivalesque character:

banners, chariots, living symbols like elephant (Republican) and donkey (Democrat), girls, confetti, swirls of paper sheets, raining down from the tops of skyscrapers, all amid a deafening din of orchestras, shouts, horns.

To get an idea of the scale of a propaganda campaign in the United States, suffice it to say that during Roosevelt's New Deal campaign in 1932, the procession that swept through the streets of New York included 255,000 participants with 200 orchestras; to launch this propaganda Roosevelt called on 1,500,000 volunteer agitators.

Hitler, above all, knew how to combine these demonstrations of force with the sporting interest of the masses in aviation: he organised his demonstrations at the same time as aviation meetings. He arrived at these demonstrations with great fanfare in his plane, had the slogan "Hitler over Germany" spread everywhere and distributed to his followers badges in which a swastika was combined with the image of aircraft wings, etc. The public, especially young people, were enthusiastic when they learned that sometimes he had to speak on the same day in 3 or 4 towns far apart, where he arrived and from where he left by plane.

This youthful enthusiasm, triggered by propaganda, is understandable if we realise, as Domenach does so well, that "propaganda borrows from poetry the seduction of rhythm, the prestige of words and even the violence of images. It makes people dream of past glories and better tomorrows." (J. M. Domenach, *La propagande politique*, 1950).

Young people are particularly sensitive to these impulses, especially when you consider that folk poetry is so closely related to magic incantations and liturgy.

The forms used in senso-propaganda are well known — in fact, they are the most widely used to date. What was new about the emotional propaganda of Hitler and his adversary, the "Iron Front" in

Germany, was that the forms of propaganda were combined with methods that particularly touched the emotional chords of the human soul: for example, the publication of the economic programme, at the same time as highlighting the failure of the adversaries, was done by means of the press, radio, flyers, meetings and individual propaganda.

When it was a question of intimidating the opponents and the passive individuals, and of filling one's own supporters with courage, one had above all to resort to guerrilla warfare using symbols, flag wars, posters, demonstrations, parades with carriages full of symbols, groups of people in uniform and marching to the cadence, etc. When it came to arousing feelings of anger, pity or concern for the fate of one's fellow man, the means employed were posters, leaflets with a violent tone and assemblies, where those present were left to quiver with indignation, shout their hatred or burn with enthusiasm. To ridicule opponents, the means employed were carnival processions, in which figures and caricatured groups could be shown, or street songs, "butterflies" carrying satirical verses, posters and caricatures, and songwriters in cabarets and popular theatres.

Hannah Arendt

Totalitarian Propaganda (1953)

For Hannah Arendt, totalitarian propaganda thrives on the "escape from reality into fiction." The invention of this fiction for the masses should show a sort of consistency that is nothing else than the constant and continuous repetition of a certain lie. And the lie should be a comforting one for the uprooted masses subject to the shocks of life in the modern world, where the State has erased and destroyed all previous communities and the familiar links between individuals.

Source: Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Chapter 11: The Totalitarian Movement, 1953.

Only the mob and the elite can be attracted by the momentum of totalitarianism itself; the masses have to be won by propaganda. Under conditions of constitutional government and freedom of opinion, totalitarian movements struggling for power can use terror to a limited extent only and share with other parties the necessity of

winning adherents and of appearing plausible to a public which is not yet rigorously isolated from all other sources of information.

It was recognized early and has frequently been asserted that in totalitarian countries propaganda and terror present two sides of the same coin. This, however, is only partly true. Wherever totalitarianism possesses absolute control, it replaces propaganda with indoctrination and uses violence not so much to frighten people (this is done only in the initial stages when political opposition still exists) as to realize constantly its ideological doctrines and its practical lies. Totalitarianism will not be satisfied to assert, in the face of contrary facts, that unemployment does not exist; it will abolish unemployment benefits as part of its propaganda. Equally important is the fact that the refusal to acknowledge unemployment realized — albeit in a rather unexpected way — the old socialist doctrine: He who does not work shall not eat. Or when, to take another instance, Stalin decided to rewrite the history of the Russian Revolution, the propaganda of his new version consisted in destroying, together with the older books and documents, their authors and readers: the publication in 1938 of a new official history of the Communist Party was the signal that the superpurge which had decimated a whole generation of Soviet intellectuals had come to an end. Similarly, the Nazis in the Eastern occupied territories at first used chiefly antisemitic propaganda to win firmer control of the population. They neither needed nor used terror to support this propaganda. When they liquidated the greater part of the Polish intelligentsia, they did it not because of its opposition, but because according to their doctrine Poles had no intellect, and when they planned to kidnap blue-eyed and blond-haired children, they did not intend to frighten the population but to save "Germanic blood."

Since totalitarian movements exist in a world which itself is nontotalitarian, they are forced to resort to what we commonly regard as propaganda. But such propaganda always makes its appeal to an external sphere — be it the nontotalitarian strata of the population at

home or the nontotalitarian countries abroad. This external sphere to which totalitarian propaganda makes its appeal may vary greatly; even after the seizure of power totalitarian propaganda may address itself to those segments of its own population whose co-ordination was not followed by sufficient indoctrination. In this respect Hitler's speeches to his generals during the war are veritable models of propaganda, characterized mainly by the monstrous lies with which the Fuehrer entertained his guests in an attempt to win them over.

The external sphere can also be represented by groups of sympathizers who are not yet ready to accept the true aims of the movement; finally, it often happens that even party members are regarded by the Fuehrer's inner circle or the members of the elite formations as belonging to such an external sphere, and in this case they, too, are still in need of propaganda because they cannot yet be reliably dominated. In order not to overestimate the importance of the propaganda lies one should recall the much more numerous instances in which Hitler was completely sincere and brutally unequivocal in the definition of the movement's true aims, but they were simply not acknowledged by a public unprepared for such consistency. But, basically speaking, totalitarian domination strives to restrict propaganda methods solely to its foreign policy or to the branches of the movement abroad for the purpose of supplying them with suitable material. Whenever totalitarian indoctrination at home comes into conflict with the propaganda line for consumption abroad (which happened in Russia during the war, not when Stalin had concluded his alliance with Hitler, but when the war with Hitler brought him into the camp of the democracies), the propaganda is explained at home as a "temporary tactical maneuver." As far as possible, this distinction between ideological doctrine for the initiated in the movement, who are no longer in need of propaganda, and unadulterated propaganda for the outside world is already established in the prepower existence of the movements. The relationship between propaganda and indoctrination usually depends upon the size of the movements on one

hand, and upon outside pressure on the other. The smaller the movement, the more energy it will expend in mere propaganda; the greater the pressure on totalitarian regimes from the outside world — a pressure that even behind iron curtains cannot be ignored entirely — the more actively will the totalitarian dictators engage in propaganda. The essential point is that the necessities for propaganda are always dictated by the outside world and that the movements themselves do not actually propagate but indoctrinate. Conversely, indoctrination, inevitably coupled with terror, increases with the strength of the movements or the totalitarian governments' isolation and security from outside interference.

Propaganda is indeed part and parcel of "psychological warfare"; but terror is more. Terror continues to be used by totalitarian regimes even when its psychological aims are achieved: its real horror is that it reigns over a completely subdued population. Where the rule of terror is brought to perfection, as in concentration camps, propaganda disappears entirely; it was even expressly prohibited in Nazi Germany. Propaganda, in other words, is one, and possibly the most important, instrument of totalitarianism for dealing with the nontotalitarian world; terror, on the contrary, is the very essence of its form of government. Its existence depends as little on psychological or other subjective factors as the existence of laws in a constitutionally governed country depends upon the number of people who transgress them.

Terror as the counterpart of propaganda played a greater role in Nazism than in Communism. The Nazis did not strike at prominent figures as had been done in the earlier wave of political crimes in Germany (the murder of Rathenau and Erzberger); instead, by killing small socialist functionaries or influential members of opposing parties, they attempted to prove to the population the dangers involved in mere membership. This kind of mass terror, which still operated on a comparatively small scale, increased steadily because neither the police nor the courts seriously prose-

cuted political offenders on the so-called Right. It was valuable as what a Nazi publicist has aptly called "power propaganda": it made clear to the population that the power of the Nazis was greater than that of the authorities and that it was safer to be a member of a Nazi paramilitary organization than a loyal Republican. This impression was greatly strengthened by the specific use the Nazis made of their political crimes. They always admitted them publicly, never apologized for "excesses of the lower ranks" — such apologies were used only by Nazi sympathizers — and impressed the population as being very different from the "idle talkers" of other parties.

The similarities between this kind of terror and plain gangsterism are too obvious to be pointed out. This does not mean that Nazism was gangsterism, as has sometimes been concluded, but only that the Nazis, without admitting it, learned as much from American gangster organizations as their propaganda, admittedly, learned from American business publicity.

More specific in totalitarian propaganda, however, than direct threats and crimes against individuals is the use of indirect, veiled, and menacing hints against all who will not heed its teachings and, later, mass murder perpetrated on "guilty" and "innocent" alike. People are threatened by Communist propaganda with missing the train of history, with remaining hopelessly behind their time, with spending their lives uselessly, just as they were threatened by the Nazis with living against the eternal laws of nature and life, with an irreparable and mysterious deterioration of their blood. The strong emphasis of totalitarian propaganda on the "scientific" nature of its assertions has been compared to certain advertising techniques which also address themselves to masses. And it is true that the advertising columns of every newspaper show this "scientificality," by which a manufacturer proves with facts and figures and the help of a "research" department that his is the "best soap in the world." It is also true that there is a certain element of violence in the imaginative exaggerations of publicity men, that behind the assertion that girls who do not use this

particular brand of soap may go through life with pimples and without a husband, lies the wild dream of monopoly, the dream that one day the manufacturer of the "only soap that prevents pimples" may have the power to deprive of husbands all girls who do not use his soap. Science in the instances of both business publicity and totalitarian propaganda is obviously only a surrogate for power. The obsession of totalitarian movements with "scientific" proofs ceases once they are in power. The Nazis dismissed even those scholars who were willing to serve them, and the Bolsheviks use the reputation of their scientists for entirely unscientific purposes and force them into the role of charlatans.

But there is nothing more to the frequently overrated similarities between mass advertisement and mass propaganda. Businessmen usually do not pose as prophets and they do not constantly demonstrate the correctness of their predictions. The scientificality of totalitarian propaganda is characterized by its almost exclusive insistence on scientific prophecy as distinguished from the more old-fashioned appeal to the past. Nowhere does the ideological origin, of socialism in one instance and racism in the other, show more clearly than when their spokesmen pretend that they have discovered the hidden forces that will bring them good fortune in the chain of fatality. There is of course a great appeal to the masses in "absolutist systems which represent all the events of history as depending upon the great first causes linked by the chain of fatality, and which, as it were, suppress men from the history of the human race" (in the words of Tocqueville). But it cannot be doubted either that the Nazi leadership actually believed in, and did not merely use as propaganda, such doctrines as the following: "The more accurately we recognize and observe the laws of nature and life, ... so much the more do we conform to the will of the Almighty. The more insight we have into the will of the Almighty, the greater will be our successes." It is quite apparent that very few changes are needed to express Stalin's creed in two sentences which might run as follows: "The more accurately

we recognize and observe the laws of history and class struggle, so much the more do we conform to dialectic materialism. The more insight we have into dialectic materialism, the greater will be our success." Stalin's notion of "correct leadership," at any rate, could hardly be better illustrated. (Stalin, *Leninism*, 1933).

[...]

Totalitarian propaganda perfects the techniques of mass propaganda, but it neither invents them nor originates their themes. These were prepared for them by fifty years of the rise of imperialism and disintegration of the nation-state, when the mob entered the scene of European politics. Like the earlier mob leaders, the spokesmen for totalitarian movements possessed an unerring instinct for anything that ordinary party propaganda or public opinion did not care or dare to touch. Everything hidden, everything passed over in silence, became of major significance, regardless of its own intrinsic importance. The mob really believed that truth was whatever respectable society had hypocritically passed over, or covered up with corruption.

Mysteriousness as such became the first criterion for the choice of topics. The origin of mystery did not matter; it could lie in a reasonable, politically comprehensible desire for secrecy, as in the case of the *British Secret Services* or the *French Deuxième Bureau*; or in the conspiratory need of revolutionary groups, as in the case of anarchist and other terrorist sects; or in the structure of societies whose original secret content had long since become well known and where only the formal ritual still retained the former mystery, as in the case of the Freemasons; or in age-old superstitions which had woven legends around certain groups, as in the case of the Jesuits and the Jews. The Nazis were undoubtedly superior in the selection of such topics for mass propaganda; but the Bolsheviks have gradually learned the trick, although they rely less on traditionally accepted mysteries and

prefer their own inventions — since the middle thirties, one mysterious world conspiracy has followed another in Bolshevik propaganda, starting with the plot of the Trotskyites, followed by the rule of the 300 families, to the sinister imperialist (i.e., global) machinations of the British or American Secret Services.

The effectiveness of this kind of propaganda demonstrates one of the chief characteristics of modern masses. They do not believe in anything visible, in the reality of their own experience; they do not trust their eyes and ears but only their imaginations, which may be caught by anything that is at once universal and consistent in itself. What convinces masses are not facts, and not even invented facts, but only the consistency of the system of which they are presumably part. Repetition, somewhat overrated in importance because of the common belief in the masses' inferior capacity to grasp and remember, is important only because it convinces them of consistency in time.

What the masses refuse to recognize is the fortuitousness that pervades reality. They are predisposed to all ideologies because they explain facts as mere examples of laws and eliminate coincidences by inventing an all-embracing omnipotence which is supposed to be at the root of every accident. Totalitarian propaganda thrives on this escape from reality into fiction, from coincidence into consistency.

The chief disability of totalitarian propaganda is that it cannot fulfill this longing of the masses for a completely consistent, comprehensible, and predictable world without seriously conflicting with common sense. If, for instance, all the "confessions" of political opponents in the Soviet Union are phrased in the same language and admit the same motives, the consistency-hungry masses will accept the fiction as supreme proof of their truthfulness; whereas common sense tells us that it is precisely their consistency which is out of this world and proves that they are a fabrication. Figuratively speaking, it is as though the masses demand a constant repetition of the miracle

of the Septuagint, when, according to ancient legend, seventy isolated translators produced an identical Greek version of the Old Testament. Common sense can accept this tale only as a legend or a miracle; yet it could also be adduced as proof of the absolute faithfulness of every single word in the translated text.

In other words, while it is true that the masses are obsessed by a desire to escape from reality because in their essential homelessness they can no longer bear its accidental, incomprehensible aspects, it is also true that their longing for fiction has some connection with those capacities of the human mind whose structural consistency is superior to mere occurrence. The masses' escape from reality is a verdict against the world in which they are forced to live and in which they cannot exist, since coincidence has become its supreme master and human beings need the constant transformation of chaotic and accidental conditions into a man-made pattern of relative consistency. The revolt of the masses against "realism," common sense, and all "the plausibilities of the world" (Burke) was the result of their atomization, of their loss of social status along with which they lost the whole sector of communal relationships in whose framework common sense makes sense. In their situation of spiritual and social homelessness, a measured insight into the interdependence of the arbitrary and the planned, the accidental and the necessary, could no longer operate. Totalitarian propaganda can outrageously insult common sense only where common sense has lost its validity. Before the alternative of facing the anarchic growth and total arbitrariness of decay or bowing down before the most rigid, fantastically fictitious consistency of an ideology, the masses probably will always choose the latter and be ready to pay for it with individual sacrifices — and this not because they are stupid or wicked, but because in the general disaster this escape grants them a minimum of self-respect.

While it has been the specialty of Nazi propaganda to profit from the longing of the masses for consistency, Bolshevik methods have demonstrated, as though in a laboratory, its impact on the isolated

mass man. The Soviet secret police, so eager to convince its victims of their guilt for crimes they never committed, and in many instances were in no position to commit, completely isolates and eliminates all real factors, so that the very logic, the very consistency of "the story" contained in the prepared confession becomes overwhelming. In a situation where the dividing line between fiction and reality is blurred by the monstrosity and the inner consistency of the accusation, not only the strength of character to resist constant threats but great confidence in the existence of fellow human beings — relatives or friends or neighbors — who will never believe "the story" are required to resist the temptation to yield to the mere abstract possibility of guilt.

To be sure, this extreme of an artificially fabricated insanity can be achieved only in a totalitarian world. Then, however, it is part of the propaganda apparatus of the totalitarian regimes to which confessions are not indispensable for punishment. "Confessions" are as much a specialty of Bolshevik propaganda as the curious pedantry of legalizing crimes by retrospective and retroactive legislation was a specialty of Nazi propaganda. The aim in both cases is consistency.

Before they seize power and establish a world according to their doctrines, totalitarian movements conjure up a lying world of consistency which is more adequate to the needs of the human mind than reality itself; in which, through sheer imagination, uprooted masses can feel at home and are spared the never-ending shocks which real life and real experiences deal to human beings and their expectations. The force possessed by totalitarian propaganda — before the movements have the power to drop iron curtains to prevent anyone's disturbing, by the slightest reality, the gruesome quiet of an entirely imaginary world — lies in its ability to shut the masses off from the real world. The only signs which the real world still offers to the understanding of the unintegrated and disintegrating masses — whom every new stroke of ill luck makes more gullible — are, so to speak, its lacunae, the questions it does not care to discuss publicly,

or the rumors it does not dare to contradict because they hit, although in an exaggerated and deformed way, some sore spot.

From these sore spots the lies of totalitarian propaganda derive the element of truthfulness and real experience they need to bridge the gulf between reality and fiction. Only terror could rely on mere fiction, and even the terror-sustained lying fictions of totalitarian regimes have not yet become entirely arbitrary, although they are usually cruder, more impudent, and, so to speak, more original than those of the movements. (It takes power, not propaganda skill, to circulate a revised history of the Russian Revolution in which no man by the name of Trotsky was ever commander-in-chief of the Red Army). The lies of the movements, on the other hand, are much subtler. They attach themselves to every aspect of social and political life that is hidden from the public eye. They succeed best where the official authorities have surrounded themselves with an atmosphere of secrecy. In the eyes of the masses, they then acquire the reputation of superior "realism" because they touch upon real conditions whose existence is being hidden. Revelations of scandals in high society, of corruption of politicians, everything that belongs to yellow journalism, becomes in their hands a weapon of more than sensational importance.

Vance Packard

Political Propaganda in the USA (1957)

A political campaign for electing representatives in a democratic system is like a marketing campaign for selling a merchandise. The content is not so important as the form, namely, the appearance of the candidate and his/her appeal to the emotions of the voters. So, it is quite appropriate the remark of Adlai Stevenson, during the 1956 USA Presidential election that "The idea that you can merchandise candidates for high office like breakfast cereal ... is the ultimate indignity to the democratic process."

Source: Vance Packard, *The Hidden Persuaders*, Chapter 17: Politics and the Image Builders, 1957.

"A world of unseen dictatorship is conceivable, still using the forms of democratic government."
Kenneth Boulding, University of Michigan

The manipulative approach to politics is of course not a discovery of the nineteen-fifties, or even the twentieth century. Napoleon set up a press bureau that he called, perhaps in a playful moment, his *Bureau of Public Opinion*. Its function was to manufacture political trends to order. Machiavelli was another who made some original contributions to the thinking in this field. Manipulation of the people by a tyrant with a controlled society is a fairly simple matter, and he can be heavy-handed or light-handed about it, to taste. The real challenge comes in dealing effectively with citizens of a free society who can vote you out of office, or spurn your solicitation for their support, if they are so minded.

Effective political manipulation and mass persuasion in this kind of situation had to wait upon the appearance of the symbol manipulators. They did not turn their attention to politics in a serious way until the nineteen-fifties. Then in a few short years, climaxing in the Presidential campaign of 1956, they made spectacular strides in changing the traditional characteristics of American political life. They were able to do this by drawing upon the insights of Pavlov and his conditioned reflexes, Freud and his father images, Riesman and his concept of modern American voters as spectator-consumers of politics, and Batten, Barton, Durstine and Osborn and their mass merchandising lore.

As the decade of the fifties was beginning, a portent of things to come appeared in *The New York World-Telegram*, a normally Republican newspaper, in describing preparations for the 1950 Congressional campaign. The headline read:

THE HUCKSTERS TAKE OVER GOP CAMPAIGN

And the lead explained that:

> "the politicians are beginning to apply all the smart advertising

> techniques used by mass production America to merchandise autos, bath salts, and lawn mowers."

It went on to explain:

> "Under Chairman Leonard W. Hall (R., N.Y.) and Robert Humphreys, publicity director, the Republican Congressional Committee has made-to-order productions for the candidate who wants to use television, movies built around cartoons and charts, dramatized radio spot announcements . . . newsletters, street interview techniques, etc."

Those two men were to rise to greater eminence in Republican affairs.

A leading Democrat, William Benton, former cohead of the ad agency Benton and Bowles, ran a successful campaign for the Senate using many mass-merchandising techniques. He explained: "The problem is to project yourself as a person." To do this he used one-minute radio spots that were pre-evaluated for crowd appeal, comic strip ads pretested for reader interest, pretty girls in street-corner booths, five-minute movies.

By the 1952 Presidential campaign the professional persuaders had been welcomed into the inner councils by at least one party. Stanley Kelley, Jr., of Brookings Institution, made a study of the 1952 campaign, which he reported in his book *Professional Public Relations and Political Power* (1956). He said:

> "The campaign . . . reveals some interesting differences in the place occupied by professional publicists in the councils of the opposing parties. The strategy, treatment of issues, use of media, budgeting, and pacing of the Eisenhower campaign showed the pervasive influence of professional propagandists. The Democrats used fewer profession-

> als, were less apt to draw upon commercial and industrial public-relations experience in their thinking, and their publicity men apparently had less of a voice in the policy decisions of the campaign."

The Democrats, of course, took a shellacking and, Kelley suggested, had learned their lesson and would make greater use of public relations and advertising men in 1956.

The depth probers, too, were turning their attention to politics. During the 1952 campaign Dr. Dichter announced that all the long-winded talking about issues such as inflation and Korea would actually have very little to do with the outcome. The crux of the campaign, he insisted, was the emotional pull exercised by the rival candidates. After the campaign Burleigh Gardner stated in *Tide*, the merchandisers' magazine, that depth techniques should be applied to political forecasting. He contended that by using projection techniques to detect underlying emotional tones (rather than just asking people how they were going to vote) the Eisenhower landslide could have been predicted. A New York ad executive using depth techniques contended that if ad men were given really free rein they could successfully swing crucial voters in just about any election, with appeals geared to the undecided or listless mass. His agency made a test study during the 1952 campaign with the 'I don't know' voters, using the same projective techniques used to spot affinities for brand images, to get the voters' underlying emotional tone. After the election it called up the people who had been probed (all of them professedly undecided) and found it had been 97 per cent right in predicting how each one would vote. The spokesman for the agency said that the undecided voter is not the thoughtful "independent" he is often pictured. The switch voter, he said, "switches for some snotty little reason such as not liking the candidate's wife." Depth-prober James Vicary did some similar work in Kingston, New York, during a mayoralty campaign and found he could usually diagnose how the 'I don't know' voter was actually going to vote.

By 1956 even the famous nose-counter George Gallup, director of the American Institute of Public Opinion and of the Gallup Poll, was conceding that he was starting to use "interviews in depth" to supplement his more conventional methods.

The depth approach to politics seemed justified by the growing evidence that voters could not be depended upon to be rational. There seemed to be a strong illogical or nonlogical element in their behavior, both individually and in masses.

A sample of this non-rational behavior was the reaction of voters to President Eisenhower's heart attack in 1955. In early September, 1955, just before his seizure the Gallup Poll showed that sixty-one per cent of those questioned said they would vote for him if he ran against Mr. Adlai Stevenson, the leading Democratic possibility. Then he was stricken, and during the months that followed, when it seemed touch and go whether he would ever regain his health enough to run again, his rating on the poll rose steadily until in March it stood at 66 per cent in the hypothetical contest with Stevenson. In commenting on this rise James Reston, of *The New York Times*, remarked: "The explanation of this escapes me for the moment, but when I find it I'll send it along."

The *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* got into this seeming non-rational element in voters' thinking when it reported an experiment with people known to be either strongly pro- or anti-Democratic. All heard a ten-minute speech on national affairs. Half of the material was carefully slanted to be pro-Democratic, and half slanted to be anti-Democratic. The people were told they were being tested on their memory. Twenty-one days later they were tested on the material. It was found that people's memories were 'significantly better' in recalling material that harmonized with their own political viewpoint or 'frame of reference'. There was a clear tendency for them to forget the material that didn't harmonize with their own preconceived notions.

Several political commentators (Reston, Dorothy Thompson, Doris Fleeson are examples) took special note in 1956 of what they felt was the growing role of 'personality' in American politics. Dorothy Thompson called it the "cult of personality." Sociologist David Riesman, in noting the same phenomenon, considered it a part of the trend to other-directedness in American life. Americans, in their growing absorption with consumption, have even become consumers of politics. This has brought an increased emphasis on giving the nod to the best performer; and in evaluating performance the 'sincerity' of the presentation has taken on increased importance. He pointed out, in *The Lonely Crowd*,

> "Just as glamour in packaging and advertising of products substitutes for price competition, so glamour in politics, whether as *charisma* — packaging — of the leader or as the hopped-up treatment of events by mass media, substitutes for the type of self-interest that governed the inner-directed."

Not only do the American people, the depth probers concluded, want political leaders with personality, but in the Presidency they want a very definite kind of personality. Eugene Burdick, teacher of political theory at the University of California, made a study of the qualities of the perfect President while serving as a fellow at the *Center for Advanced Study in the Behaviorial Sciences* at Stanford. (This is the same Eugene Burdick who in 1956 brought out a best-selling novel *The Ninth Wave* on the irrational trends in politics). Dr. Burdick found that the perfect President doesn't arise out of great issues but becomes 'great' in our minds because of his personality. He becomes 'great' to the degree that he becomes a 'father image' in our minds. Burdick relates:

> "Recent polls and psychological studies reveal the extent to which the President has now become what psychologists call a 'father image' in the average American home."

Burdick summed up (in *This Week*) a composite picture of the perfect President:

> "He is a man who has great warmth, inspires confidence rather than admiration, and is not so proper that he is unbelievable. He must have 'done things' in another field than politics, and he must have a genuine sense of humor. His stand on individual political issues is relatively unimportant . . . ."

After filling in the portrait, Burdick adds:

> "Clearly there are some aspects of this portrait that are disturbing. (1) Is it, for example, ominous, that issues are less important than personality? (2) Is it healthy in a democracy that citizens desire a leader who will protect them? (3) Are Americans in their dislike for politicians looking for a heroic leader of the totalitarian type?"

By the mid-fifties most enterprising politicians were checking themselves in the mirrors to see if their images were on straight. *Printer's Ink*, the merchandisers' trade journal, quoted a ranking Democrat as saying in 1955:

> "Any candidate is aware, of course, that. . . the sooner he begins to build a favorable image of himself in relation to the issues of the day the more likely he is to come through."

Even Adlai Stevenson, the genial, rapier-tongued egg-head of the ill-fated 1952 campaign was criticized in 1956, by his opponents, as lacking "the Presidential image." He reportedly began trying to correct this alleged shortcoming by presenting an image of himself to America as being a little less of a wit and a little more a man of determination and decisiveness. Meanwhile, the image of President Eisenhower in 1956 was reported undergoing a change. Louis Harris, the noted pollster and political analyst, conducted 1,200

'qualitative interviews' after President Eisenhower's illnesses, to find the "deep reasons and motives that lie behind" the people's feelings about the President. In his report, in *Collier's* magazine (July 20, 1956) he mentioned that many people who had supported General Eisenhower in 1952 had seen him as a vigorous man of integrity who could clean up things and get the country out of trouble. "This led some to say that American voters, especially women, had a 'father image' of him," Mr. Harris said, and added,

> "Today this has changed to a real extent. Eisenhower is no longer looked on as being vigorous. Courageous he still is, people will tell you when discussing the farm or natural-gas bill vetoes. But the image has mellowed. He is now looked on as being more kindly, wiser, and as one voter put it: 'kind of a grandfather of the Republic'."

By the mid-fifties both major United States parties had become deeply involved in the use of professional persuaders to help in their image-building problems. In early 1956 *Nation's Business*, which is published by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, happily heralded the new, businessman's approach to politics. It proclaimed:

> "Both parties will merchandise their candidates and issues by the same methods that business has developed to sell goods. These include scientific selection of appeals; planned repetition. . . . No flag-waving faithfuls will parade the streets. Instead corps of volunteers will ring doorbells and telephones. . . . Radio spot announcements and ads will repeat phrases with a planned intensity. Billboards will push slogans of proven power. . . . Candidates need, in addition to rich voice and good diction, to be able to look 'sincerely' at the TV camera . . . ."

Let's look briefly at some of the more vivid examples of the new style of political persuaders at work. First, the Republicans.

The extent to which the merchandising approach had taken over at the Republican National Headquarters by 1956 was shown by a statement issued by Leonard Hall, national party chairman, explaining why the Republican Party was going to regain control of Congress. He said, among other things, that

> "it has a great product to sell . . . . You sell your candidates and your programs the way a business sells its products."

The committee's public-relations director, young crew-cut L. Richard Guylay, who had helped pioneer the merchandising approach to politics by handling the image building for a number of Senators, explained that the new

> "scientific methods take the guesswork out of politics and save a lot of wasted time and effort . . . . Len Hall is a great supporter of modern techniques."

[...]

The manipulative approach to political persuasion through carefully staged productions carried over into the campaign itself. The GOP, for its big rally featuring Mr. Eisenhower in Philadelphia, prepared a thirty-two-page 'Scenario and Timetable'. It specified that the audience be equipped with 'dignified noisemakers'. The climactic Election Eve rally glorifying Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Nixon even made the TV columnist for a GOP-inclined chain flinch. Harriet Van Home called the little speeches of presumably typical citizens "patently rehearsed testimonials borrowed from the tobacco ads."

One of Mr. Eisenhower's warmest admirers among political columnists, Roscoe Drummond, revealed that the accent of the campaign

was being put "less on speeches and more on appearances." In one TV show where Mr. Eisenhower was featured for half an hour, he spoke for one minute. The TV columnist of *The New York Times* complained that some of the GOP's showmanship "bordered on embarrassing deification."

The ad-man approach to building up Mr. Eisenhower was perhaps best demonstrated in a short TV spot drama in which an alleged taxi driver was shown walking his dog at night in the park facing the White House. The man looked in awe toward the light in the White House window and said fervently: "I need you!"

A TV director who assisted the White House in some of its staged productions featuring Mr. Eisenhower was, in the privacy of his heart, a Stevenson man. He justified his cooperation by explaining to the author: "The American public is so inured to slickness that, at the least, you have got to come up to the level of slickness expected on TV before your message comes through."

In the last days of the campaign, when the paramount and special problem of the GOP was to convince the nation that Mr. Eisenhower was in robust health despite his two major illnesses, it lessened somewhat its reliance on TV in projecting Mr. Eisenhower. Television — even as stage-managed by Mr. Montgomery — tended to make the President seem a little more pallid than GOP strategists wished. It turned more to public 'appearances' in which the President waved, grinned, and perhaps said a few words.

Now to turn to the Democrats. They were struggling as best they could to catch up with the times in the matter of persuasion techniques. The fact that their efforts seemed punier than the Republicans' can at least in part be attributed to the fact that big persuaders cost big money, and they were complaining that the big contributors were mainly on the Republican side. Also being less attuned to the advanced thinking of business management they were slower to grasp the lessons of persuasion being learned by merchandisers.

Like the Republicans they began committing a large portion of their campaign money to five- and ten-minute TV spots. They, like the Republicans, set up an indoctrination school in campaign techniques. And they brought in from the universities social scientists such as Paul Willis, of Indiana University, to do their trend spotting for them. They busily bought up stock film footage from the NBC Film Library and other sources to dress up their TV pitches. They began lining up Hollywood stars such as Henry Fonda and David Wayne to help make long-playing music-narration platters to be passed out by local Democratic clubs. Hollywood made such a vivid film of Democratic voices of the past that some planners feared it would take the edge off live speakers.

The Democrats' difficulties were aggravated by the fact that even though they planned to spend $8,000,000 (at least) in mass-media persuasion they couldn't find a major ad agency willing to handle their account. The big persuaders mostly looked the other way. This became something of a scandal in advertising circles in late 1955 and early 1956 as the months passed and still the Democrats evidently could not interest a major agency in their multimillion-dollar account. The merchandising magazine *Printer's Ink* acknowledged that the Democrats were having difficulty lining up a suitable agency "allegedly because big agency men don't want to alienate the Republican businessmen who head many many client companies. Some agency executives call this idea ridiculous." *Advertising Age* also thought such a notion was pretty ridiculous, but admitted that there "was probably just enough truth in the assertion that the Republicans had a much wider potential choice to be slightly embarrassing." It went on to say it was pleased that advertising men and methods were being more and more widely used in politics. "This is all to the good." What was not good, it added, "is the growing public discussion of the importance of advertising in politics" and the growing notion that it is important for a party or candidate to have "the right advertising agency." (An indication of the personal political sympa-

thies of ad executives was seen in the Senate's post-mortem report on campaign contributions. Officials of thirty-seven leading agencies gave $51,000 to the Republicans, nothing to the Democrats).

As the embarrassment over the Democrats' plight grew there was talk of sending a rescue mission or 'task force' to the Democrats in the form of an unlabelled pool of bright ad men drawn from the various agencies. There was also some talk of setting up some sort of a special 'anchor' agency to serve any party that couldn't get an agency.

The suspense ended when the relatively small but lively ad agency Norman, Craig and Kummel agreed to take the Democrats' account. This was the agency that had created the successful *I Dreamed I Went Walking in My Maidenform Bra* campaign. While it was a David compared with the Goliath B. B. D. & O. on the Republicans' side, ad men looked forward with relish to the campaign, all politics aside. It promised to be an exciting exhibition of persuasion techniques, because there was bad blood between the two agencies. Norman, Craig and Kummel hated B. B. D. & O. worse than the Democrats hated the Republicans. It seems that Norman, Craig and Kummel built the TV quiz show *The $64,000 Question* up to an all-time high rating only to have the prize grabbed away by the bigger B. B. D. & O. Walter Craig, agency executive, said his agency was counting on its "creative flair as much as anything else" to beat the B. B. D. & O. Republicans. He said that all the top people on the Democratic account were *bona fide* Democrats. The account executive, Chester Herzog, thirty-four, previously had had the Blatz Beer account.

One touch the Norman, Craig and Kummel people added to the Democrats' convention in Chicago was a little 'quiz' show on the platform involving youngsters Gloria Lockerman and Lenny Ross, who had proven themselves prodigies on *The $64,000 Question*. The

quiz master who questioned them about big national problems was keynote speaker Frank Clement.

Another touch the agency presumably added was the keynote speech itself. Mr. Clement did a dry run of it on kinescope film to test the impact of each gesture and peroration. Also at the Democratic Convention, on advice of persuaders from the world of mass communication, the old-style display of red-white-and-blue motif was abandoned. Instead, everything, even the platform chairs, was a telegenic blue.

Like the Republicans, the Democrats of 1956 were well represented by showmen from Hollywood and Broadway to keep the show 'moving'. Their entertainment director was Dore Schary, head of M-G-M. (Reportedly he got himself in trouble with influential M-G-M stockholders of Republican persuasion for these efforts). Another Democratic official of note was Mrs. Lynn Nichols. She was in charge of the *Hoopla Division* with responsibility for supervising demonstrations both inside and outside the hall.

As Mr. Stevenson's campaign approached its ill-fated conclusion Democratic strategists — now psychologically oriented — were reportedly unhappy because he was not 'projecting' himself well and still lacked a really convincing Presidential image. Mr. Stevenson himself was heard to mutter that he felt as if he were competing in a beauty contest rather than a solemn debate. He voiced his irritation at the symbol manipulators' approach to political persuasion — at least the Republican variety — by saying:

> "The idea that you can merchandise candidates for high office like breakfast cereal. . . is the ultimate indignity to the democratic process."



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